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HISTORY OF
THE SECOND WORLD WAR

UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY SERIES
Edited by Sir James BUTLER

The authors of the Military Histories have been
given full access to official documents. They and the
editor are alone responsible for the statements
made and the views expressed.

VICTORY
IN THE WEST

VOLUME I

The Battle of Normandy

MAJOR L. F. ELLIS
C.V.0., C.B.E., D.S.0., M.C.
WITH
CAPTAIN G. R. G. ALLEN, c.B.£., D.8.0., R.N.

LIEUT-COLONEL A. E. WARHURST

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES ROBB
G.C.B., K.B.E., D.8.0., D.F.C., A.F.C.

LONDON: 1962
HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

L © Crown copyright 1962
. Second Impression (with amendments) 1974

Produced in England for Her Mayesty’s Stationery Office by
Product Support (Graphics) Limited, Derby

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CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD . . ; ; : ‘ ‘ : . Xvi
Cuapter I. THE ORIGINS OF ‘OVERLORD’ ; I
Dunkirk to Pearl Harbour I
Anglo-American co-operation . 3
Combined Chiefs of Staff , 4
North Africa landings, November 1942. 7
Development of the Combined Bomber Offensive 9
Appointment of Cossac . ; 10
Cossac’s outline plan approved, August 1943 <- 49
Combined Bomber Offensive and Overlord ; . ai
Appointment of Supreme Allied es

December 1943 . : ‘ ; . 24

CraptTer II. THE SHAPING AND COMMAND
OF OVERLORD . ; ‘ eS : - 27
Allied build-up in Britain ; : : : . 28
Command and staff appointments . é : - go
Enlargement of plan. : ‘ : : - 32
Assault craft problems : , : - 34
Subsidiary landing in southern France? , : . 36
Overlord’s start postponed . ‘ : ; . 36
Directive to General Eisenhower . : ‘ - 39
Command of Allied Strategic Air Forces . : - 40
CraptTer III. THE SITUATION IN FRANCE - 45
The Vichy régime . : - 45
French Resistance and General de Gaulle ; . 48
Allied help . ‘ : ‘ . 50
Resistance in the Low Countries ; ‘ : . 5!
Evolution of German defence policy - 52
Appreciation by von Rundstedt, October 1943 . - 54
Rommel to command an army group : : . 56
Enemy situation, early 1944 . ; . 56
German war production and new weapons - . 59

vi CONTENTS

| Page
CuarTerR IV. THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN _. . 63
Neptune Initial Joint Plan, February rot : . 63
Naval, air and army plans ‘ : , . 64
Review of plans, April 1944 . : ; ; . 80
Eisenhower’s view of future strategy : : - 82
Administration and maintenance. : : . 83
Artificial harbours (‘Mulberries’) . - 87
Conditions governing choice of H-hour and D-day . gI
CHAPTER V. PREPARATORY OPERATIONS . - 93
New directive to strategic air forces . : ‘ . Q4
‘Big Week’ and air superiority ; : : - 94
Attacks on airfields and radar . : ‘ . 96
Transportation Plan. : ; ; : - 97
Assault on enemy railway system. ‘ i
On coastal defences and other military targets é . 102
Deception and reconnaissance . ; i - 103
Counter-offensive against V-weapons ‘ : - 105
Effort expended and results achieved : . 109
Cuapter VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE. . 15
Hitler’s ‘Atlantic Wall’ . : : ‘ : . 115
German Army in the West. : : . 7
Anti-invasion measures redoubled. : ; . IQ
Von Rundstedt and Rommel differ . ; ; . Ig
German air and naval forces in the West . : - 120
Sabotage by the Resistance. : : . aI
Security and de Gaulle . é : : ; . 125
Allied cover plans . ; ‘ ‘ . 127
German forecast of Allied intentions. , ; . 128
CuapTer VII. THE END OF THE BEGINNING... _131
Naval preparations : . 3!
Composition of Twenty-First Army Group : . 192
Final exercises and assembly of shipping . : . 133
Briefing, maps and waterproofing . . : . 136
Réle of airborne divisions ; : : : - 137
D-day provisionally 5th June . : 140
Naval movements begin and midget submarines leave 140
Postponement ; : é : . 4!
D-day finally decided for 6th June : ; . 144

Assault forces sail . ‘ : ‘ : - 144

CONTENTS vil

Page

CHapter VIII. D-DAY: AIRBORNE ASSAULT AND
OPENING BOMBARDMENT _. ; : . 149
The airborne divisions open assault . ; . 149
Bomber Command attacks coastal defences . 158
Tactical surprise achieved . : : : . 159
Further measures to deceive. : ; . 159
Naval bombardment begins . : ; : . 161
Allied fighters cover the fleets . : . 61
Assault forces reach lowering positions and deploy . 164
American bombers attack beaches . ; : . 166
CHapTer IX. D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS . 169
Run-in and touch-down . : ; ; : . 169
50th Division at Gold. : ; ; ; . 173
grd Canadian Division at Juno é : 5 . 1178
grd British Division at Sword . : : . . 184
Americans at Utah and Omaha sa. . 187
Failure of German Air Force and Atlantic Wall . 193
Crapter X. D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND : . 197
German dispositions and reactions . - . : . 197
grd British Division advance towards Caen . 201
6th Airborne Division reinforced _.. : . 204
grd Canadian Division advance in centre . ; . 206
50th Division close on Bayeux. : ; ‘ » 209
Allied air forces range the battlefield ‘ . Qil
American progress at Omaha and Utah . . 213
Germans prepare counter-attack . ; . 216
Beach organisation and anchorage defence : . 217
Casualties and the day’s effort : . 222
CuHaptTer XI. CONSOLIDATING GAINS. . 225
Army operations, 7th to 9th June. : ; . 225
Second Army repulses German armour . . 228
First American Army’ s lodgements expanded . - 232
German Air Force impotent . . - 233
Allied air operations delay enemy reinforcements . 234
Allied landings behind schedule _.. : A . 239

Maritime operations, 6th to 16th June. : . 240

Vili CONTENTS

CuHaPpTreR XII. EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

Second Army to outflank Caen

Small gains east of the Orne .

Right repulsed at Villers-Bocage

Americans take Caumont and cut Cotentin peninsula
Von Rundstedt and Rommel report situation dangerous
Hitler demands counter-attack

Mulberries, small harbours and build-up .

Flying bombs start, 13th June. :

Hitler visits his commanders in France

CuHaPTeR XIII. THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND
CHERBOURG

Storm delays Caen operations . ;

Second Army opens Epsom operation, 2 sth June
Heavy panzer counter-attacks beaten off .

Americans capture ewer

Maritime successes.

Naval reorganisation .

Neptune officially ended, 3oth June .

Von Rundstedt and Rommel visit Hitler in Germany.

CHapTrer XIV. THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

Maritime operations _..

Effects of storm and loss of American Mulberry.
Normandy base and build-up . :
Summary of Allied air operations since D-day ‘
Opposing armies’ strengths at end of June
Montgomery’s policy unchanged.

Second Army takes Caen, oth July .

Americans fight for St. L6 tj.

Von Rundstedt replaced by von Kluge

Rommel injured and evacuated

CHAPTER XV. OPERATION ‘GOODWOOD’

Evolution of the plan

Object to facilitate American break-out
Preliminary air bombardments

Progress of Second Army ;

Additional German tanks drawn to British front
Americans take St. L6, rgth July

Page
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256
257
259
263
266
268

271

277
283

289
293
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296

299
3ol
302
305
307

SII
318
321
326

327

327
330
337
340
347
348

CONTENTS 1x

Page
Postponement of attempt to break out. - «. 348
Public concern and Shaef criticism . . 352

Cuaptrer XVI. THE PLOT TO MURDER HITLER 361

Earlier conspiracies ; : . 363
Attitude of German commanders i in West . : . 366
Plot misfires and Hitler reacts promptly . : . 369
Events at von Kluge’s headquarters and in Paris . 370
Consequences for the German Army : : - 373
CuapTer XVII. THE AMERICAN BREAK-OUT . 377
First Canadian Army operational, 23rd July __. . 377
American break-out succeeds . . 382
Enemy’s left shattered and way to Brittany open . 383
Germans start reinforcing from Pas de Calais. . 385
New British attack near Vire . : : . 386
German generals discuss withdrawal ‘ . - 395
Hitler admits its possibility, 31st July : - 395
Achievements of Allies’ heavy bombers. ; - 399
CuHaPrTeR XVIII. BEGINNING OF THE

ENVELOPMENT . : : : : : . 401
British hold German counter-attacks : . 401
Third American Army operational, 1st er . 402
One corps to clear Brittany. ‘ . 403
Main American forces to wheel left . : ; . 403
Hitler orders counter-thrust to west coast . ; . 405
Montgomery orders advance to R. Seine . . 407
Allied armies push ahead , , . 408
Hitler’s counter-thrust defeated near “Mortain ' 413

Explosive motor boats, ‘human torpedoes’ and U- boats 416

CuHapTer XIX. FALAISE . ; ; : : . 419
Canadians attack towards Falaise, 7th August . . 419
Second Army progress . ‘ - 425
American corps turns north from le Mans - 425
Bradley sends Third Army eastwards : : - 429
Canadians capture Falaise : - 432
Hitler sanctions withdrawals . : : : - 433
Model replaces von Kluge. ‘ : - 434
Allies land in southern France, 15th August , - 437

x CONTENTS

Page
CuarpTreR XX. ADVANCE TO THE SEINE . - 439
Germans in a shrinking pocket ; : : - 439
Allied air attacks devastating . ‘ : : - 442
Gap finally closed, 21st August ; ; : - 447
Allied and German intentions. ‘ - 449
Americans at Seine wheel down left bank. : - 453
British and Canadians close to Seine : ; - 454
Air attacks on enemy’s escape routes ‘ : - 455
Paris liberated, 25th August . 457
Eisenhower and Montgomery differ c on future strategy. 459
CHarpTer XXI. THE SEINE TO THE SOMME... 465
Montgomery’s objectives include Channel ports and
Antwerp . : , : ‘ ; . 465
Passage of the Seine : ‘ ‘ ‘ . 466
Second Army crosses the Somme ; : . 470
Americans abreast and Canadians in Dieppe : . 471
Le Havre blockaded from land and sea _ . ‘ - 47!
U-boats lose heavily ; . ‘ ‘ : . 471
Allied air operations _. ‘ - 472
Supply problem of fast-moving armies. ‘ - 473
Eisenhower defines tasks , E - 474
Assumes command in the field, 1st September . - 476

CuapTeR XXII. THE WINNING OF OVERLORD § 477

Naval contribution to Overlord ‘ : : - 477
Merchant Navy’s part . : - ,. 478
Artificial harbours, petrol and supplies ‘ ; - 479
Maintenance area and airfields é ; ; . 481
Army specialist corps and services . ; : . 481
Contribution of the Air Forces : ; i . 484
German generalship , : : ; : . 489
Allied fighting efficiency . ; . . 491
Montgomery’s conduct of the battle. : ; . 493
Allied progress on other European fronts . ; - 496
INDEX , : ; : : - 579

REFERENCE TO UNPUBLISHED SOURCES - 597

II.

III.

IV.

VI.

VII.

VITl.
IX.

APPENDICES

Page
DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME COMMANDER,
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE - 499
ALLIED NAVAL FORCES IN OPERATION
NEPTUNE . : : ; . : . 501
Part I. Command . 501
II. Organisation of Task Forces showing | associ-
ated Army formations . : ‘ - 503
III. Bombarding Forces . , 504
IV. Summary of Forces assigned to Operation
Neptune. : ; ‘ . 507
V. Landing ships and craft ; : ‘ 511
GERMAN NAVAL FORCES IN THE WEST,
JUNE 1944 . . : ‘ : 519
THE ALLIED ARMIES. , ; ; . 521
Part I. Forces engaged on the Continent. . 521
II. Notes on British Army organisation . - 533
III. Notes on American Army organisation . 540
IV. British Army weapons, vehicles and equip-
ment . : : . 54!
V. Tanks and anti-tank guns ‘ - 545
VI. Measures to deal with the German mortar. 550
THE ENEMY . : : ; ; . 552
Part I. German Command in the West ‘ 552
II. German land forces encountered by the Allies 553
ALLIED AIR FORCES . : : . 556
Part I. Forces engaged : : . 556
II. Notes on Allied aircraft employed é . 563
GERMAN AIR FORCE IN THE WEST. 567
Part I. Organisation and strength ; . 567
II. Notes on German aircraft employed . . 569
CIVIL AFFAIRS IN FRANCE _. ‘ . 571

OVERLORD AND FRENCH RESISTANCE 573
CODE NAMES MENTIONED IN TEXT. 575

GENERAL MAPS

Central Europe—At the outbreak of war, = Speen:

1939 -
The N ormandy Battlefield
The British Assault Area .
The Odon Battlefield
St. L6 to Falaise

SITUATION MAPS

German Army Dispositions, dawn 6th June 1944

The British Assault Area—Situation midnight 6th June
The American Assault Area—Situation eas 6th a
Situation morning 1oth June :

Villers-Bocage, 11th to 15th June

Situation midnight 17th June . :

The Epsom Battle, 24th June to 1st July

Situation midnight goth June .

Capture of Caen, 7th to gth July

The Goodwood Battle Plan...

The Goodwood Battle, 18th to 2oth July

Situation midnight oath July :

The Break-out, 24th to 31st July

Situation midnight gist July

Caumont and Mt. Pincon, 29th July to 6th August
Mortain Counter-Attack, 6th and 7th August

The Envelopment, 1st to 16th August ;

Capture of Falaise, 7th to 16th August

The Falaise Pocket, 16th to 20th August

The Crossing of the Seine and Advance to the Somme, arst

August to 1st September

Page

15
27
197
275
389

120
212
222

DIAGRAMS AND SKETCH MAPS

Page
Combined Chiefs of Staff Organisation . , ; 4
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force : . 38
German Armies in the West, June 1944. : ‘ - 57
Assault Force—Naval organisation . . 67
Allied Air Forces—Outline order of battle, 6th June 1044 - 74
Operation ‘Neptune’—Air cover for the assault on saad . 76
Assault Force—Army organisation . - 79
British Supply System 86
Mulberry Harbour at Arromanches, ath September ro
D-+490 days. ; . 89
Zerst6rungskarte Mai 1044 (Railway Destruction) ; . «12
Operation ‘Neptune’—Convoy routes and naval covering
forces . : ; . 136
Fly-in Routes of the American Airborne Divisions ‘ . 157
Operation ‘Neptune’—The naval bombardment . ‘ . 168

Organisation of the Seaborne Assault—British Second Army. 172
*King’ Beach in ‘Gold’ Area—Showing the German defences

as known to Allied Intelligence, May 1944 . 176
Organisation of the Seaborne Assault—United States First

Army . : : : . 189
Beach Organisation—British Sector ; ‘ : ‘ . 218
Seaward Defence System—Assault Area. : : . 220
British and German forces, July 1944. : ‘ : - 333
Battle Forecast Diagrams—I, II and III. - 357, 359
Zerstérungskarte Juni, Juli 1944 (Railway Destruction). . 400
The Rear Maintenance Area—Layout early August 1944 . 482
Europe, 5th June and 1st September 1944 . : ‘ - 495
Overlord—Chain of Command. ‘ ; . 500
German Naval Command Group West, June 1044 : . 518
German Air Force in the West, sil ro44—Location of of head-

quarters. . 568

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ILLUSTRATIONS

A majority of the illustrations are from copyright photographs supplied by
the Imperial War Museum. In selecting the most suitable from its vast
national collection the help of the Director and Staff of the Museum is
gratefully acknowledged. Acknowledgements are also made of the help
given by the U.S. Department of the Army, the Canadian Department of
National Defence, the Air Ministry and the National Maritime Museum
in supplying photographs which were not otherwise available.

1. General Paget : ; i . Following page 30
2. General Morgan : ; - go
g. General Eisenhower . go
4. Air Marshal Tedder . 30
5. Admiral Ramsay 80
6. Admiral Kirk 80
7. Admiral Vian 80
8. General Montgomery 80
g. General Bradley 80
10. General Dempsey. 80
11. General Eisenhower, General Brenton
Air Marshal Coningham, General Vandenberg,
Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory : 96
12. British Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Cunningham,
Field-Marshal Brooke, Air Marshal Portal,
Field-Marshal Dill, General Ismay : . 96
13. The President with the British and Canadian Prime Ministers
Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Mackenzie King . 96
14. Field-Marshal von Rundstedt : : ; - 144
15. Field-Marshal Rommel : : . 144
16. Field-Marshal von Kluge _. ; : ; - 144
17. Field-Marshal Model ; : : . 144
Preparation for D-day
18. Aircraft for the British airborne assault . : - 144
19. Landing craft for the naval assault : : . 144
20. Enemy beach obstacles ; : . 160
21. Engineer tanks of the 79th As anired Division ; . 160
22. Mine-clearing (flail) tank. é : ; . 160
Airborne Assault °
23. Gliders near Ranville_. . 160

24. Bénouville bridge and — of inp de main bare . 160

XVI

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26.

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28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33-
34.
35-
36.
37-
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

46.
47.
48.
49-
50.
5!.
52.
53-
54.
55:
56.
57:
58.
59-
60.
61.
62.
63.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Seaborne Approach
British warships open fire :
Assault craft head for the beaches
Landings on D-day
Infantry and amphibious (DD) tank
Royal Marine Commandos
Canadian troops
Follow-up units :
Beach organisation taking shape
Mulberry harbour under construction
Rocket-firing Typhoon
General de Gaulle returns to Hanes.
Air Marshal Harris .
General Doolittle
General Spaatz

Lancasters of Bomber Command sae aeaeured divisions

near Villers-Bocage
Air attacks on railways
Near Paris
At Vire in Normandy
Spitfires in flight
Air Marshal Sholto Douglas .
Air Marshal Hill

44 & 45. In the Normandy bocage

General Patton ; : : "
General Crerar
Lancaster bomber and Spitfire fighter

Cromwell and Sherman tanks advance south of Caen
Infantry with Churchill tanks attack in the cornfields

German dual-purpose 88-mm gun
Knocked-out German Tiger tank

British medium (5°5-in.) gun

Shermans in the Caumont country
Rocket-firing Typhoons over the Falaise ‘hocket’
German transport destroyed by air attack
Knocked-out German Panther tank .
Six-barrelled German mortar (‘nebelwerfer’)
Mosquito of Coastal Command

Seine bridges, old and new j

Trail of a beaten army at the Seine .
Advance of a victorious army from the Somme

192
192

192
192
208
208
208
208
280
280
280
280
280

280

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280
320
320
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320
336
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336
336
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336
424
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476
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476

FOREWORD

CAMPAIGN which began with the greatest assault that has
Az been made on a fortified and strongly defended coast by

combined sea, land and air forces, and ended with the total
defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany, must hold an out-
standing position in military history. Such was the Allied campaign
in North-West Europe in 1944 and 1945, of which the British
operations in particular are the subject of these volumes.
Before describing how it was fought and won, the reader may be
reminded of two under-lying considerations about which there can
be no dispute.

This campaign could not have been fought at all tf the Allies had
not possessed the power to make full use of the sea and atr.

All the Allied forces which defeated Germany in the West and all
their material equipment reached the Continent from overseas. The
combined maritime power expressed by the Allies’ naval and air
forces and their merchant shipping enabled them to control and use
sea communications stretching thousands of miles across the oceans
of the world. Had the Allies not been able to transport their strength
overseas how little would it have availed them. Hitler or his succes-
sors might still be holding in thrall most of western Europe.

Moreover, the Allies’ mastery in the air was not only a neces-
Sary ingredient of their maritime power but of all operations of war.
The most significant revolution of warfare during the present cen-
tury has been effected by the development of air power. The essential
part it played in the war against Germany will appear as Allied
operations are described.

Yet in spite of the Allies’ maritime power, the strength of their
armies, and their almost complete mastery in the air,

the campaign could hardly have been fought successfully in 1944-
1945 tf Germany had not at the same time been fighting for life
against Russia.

To measure the relative strengths of armies it is usual to take a
division as the yardstick, though divisions vary greatly in size, com-
position and fighting value. In June 1944, Germany had some sixty
divisions with which to fight the Allies on the western front: at the
same time she had over two hundred divisions fighting the Russian
armies on the eastern front and about twenty divisions opposing the
Allied armies in Italy. In the course of the war relative strengths
changed, but it is certainly true that the western Allies defeated much

xvi

xvill FOREWORD

less than half of the German forces and that muchmore than half were
defeated by Russia—assisted by over £400,000,000 of war material
provided by her western Allies. In appraising the conduct of the
western operations these fundamental facts should not be forgotten.

Apart from its size, the dramatic completeness of the Allied victory,
and the fact that it destroyed Hitler’s Nazi régime and freed western
Europe from German domination, the campaign has several distinc-
tive features which add to its military significance.

In the first place Allied co-operation, built on a foundation of
Anglo-American partnership, was closer and more effective than in
any former war. This was indeed the key to success. In this history
attention is focussed on operations under British command. That
must not seem to imply under-valuation of Britain’s allies; American
forces were responsible for a major share of the fighting and of the
Allied victory but it must also be remembered that French, Polish,
Belgian, Dutch and Czechoslovak fighting men also contributed to
the Allied victory, so far as they were able. The American history
is being written by their own historians and several volumes are
already published; we are greatly indebted for permission to use their
historical studies and the results of their research. Here only enough
is told of American operations to explain the conduct and progress of
the fighting and the setting in which their operations took place. We
also owe much to the work done by Canadian historians and grate-
fully acknowledge their help in describing Canadian operations
under British command.

Another noteworthy feature of the campaign was the successful
conjunction of sea, land and air forces in combined operations. The
potential unity of military power was realised more fully than ever
before and in planning, training and execution the three Services
combined their distinctive skills to weave the final pattern of victory.
The establishment of a British Combined Operations Headquarters
was evidence of the new emphasis on inter-Service co-operation.

During the years that preceded the opening of the assault in the
West the Allies had enlarged their experience of warfare with Ger-
many in North Africa and Italy and had greatly developed their
military strength. Science was called on increasingly to reinforce
military knowledge and full use was made of technical skill and of
organised industrial capacity. For their conclusive defeat of Ger-
many’s armed forces the Allies were equipped with advantages that
no invading army had ever enjoyed before. As in every war human
courage, character and skill were ultimately deciding factors, but in
all three Services the human element was supported by unparalleled
wealth of material power, scientifically developed and supplied on
an unprecedented scale through the faithful and sustained labours of
the civil population. The millions of men and women engaged in

FOREWORD xix

war production knew that they were indeed essential partners of
those in the fighting Services, and the latter gained not only material
but moral support from this knowledge of their common purpose.

Yet military success depends largely on leadership, as does the use
in wartime of a nation’s human and material resources. It is perhaps
to the political leadership of the British and American peoples as well
as to the quality of their respective military leaders and of the forces
they commanded that history will largely attribute the Allied victory
in the West.

This account of the British share in the campaign will be published
in two volumes. The present volume contains the story up to the end
of August 1944; the second will describe the remainder of the cam-
paign which ended with victory in May 1945.

Our account is based mainly on the vast quantity of contemporary
records of all three Services and of those captured from the enemy.
References to published sources have been given but our far more
numerous references to contemporary documents, which are not
available for public inspection, are included only in a confidential
edition. This should be available for use by students when the
archives are opened.

We have had the advantage of personal advice and help from
many of the leading commanders who were concerned and from
members of the Editor’s Advisory Panel. We are greatly indebted
to them. We also wish to thank Mrs. R. Donald, Mrs. H. Southern,
Miss D. J. Dawson and Lieut-Colonel G. W. Harris who at various
stages have helped us in our researches; Mr. B. M. Melland, Mr.
R. R. A. Wheatley and Mr. A. M. Sefi for the study and translation
of captured German documents; and Mr. D. K. Purle who, under
the guidance of Colonel T. M. Penney, has drawn all the maps and
diagrams. We are deeply grateful to them and we acknowledge
thankfully how much we owe to their work. We have learnt much
from the criticism and counsel of Sir James Butler and we thank him
for his unfailing kindness and help.

We have had unrestricted access to naval, army and air force
records and to other relevant documents which are not available to
the public, and complete freedom in using them; the Historical
Sections of the Cabinet Office and the Service Ministries have been
consistently helpful and we have never been asked to modify our text
in order to conform to an ‘official’ view. What is written in the
following chapters is our own view of the campaign, formed after
very careful study. For any errors of fact or judgement we alone are
responsible.

December 1960

L. F. Evuis

EDITOR’S NOTE

The Government’s decision under the Public Records Act 1967 to open
the archives after thirty years has made it possible to include in the
present reprint the source references contained hitherto only in the
confidential edition. They will be found at the end of the volume after
the index. In the text they are individually indicated in each chapter
by numbers in the margin.
Some misprints and minor errors have been rectified.
j.R.M.B.

CHAPTER I
THE ORIGINS OF ‘OVERLORD’

with other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at
the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed
forces.’ }

The simplicity and confidence of this order, given to General
Eisenhower early in 1944, may not impress the reader who knows
what happened afterwards but does not remember so clearly what
had gone before. To English people who had lived through the tor-
turing uncertainties of the four previous years it marked an amazing
climax.

Nearly four years had passed since the British Expeditionary Force,
which entered the Continent on the outbreak of war to combine with
France against the armed forces of Germany, had been withdrawn
to England leaving Hitler mastery not only of France but of Norway,
Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Czechoslovakia
and western Poland. Eastern Poland, Finland and the smaller Baltic
States had been absorbed by Russia with Germany’s connivance;
Hitler’s ally, Italy, had overrun Albania. Alone in Europe, weakened
by loss though backed by all the nations of the Commonwealth,
Britain then confronted the massive strength of Germany and her
associates. British confidence in ultimate victory was not shaken, but
it was recognised that while the fight for existence continued at sea
and in the air, action must be mainly defensive; economic blockade
at sea and air attack on German centres of production were the chief
weapons to employ till the armed strength of the nation and Com-
monwealth had been restored and expanded, and we could again
take the offensive* The loss of any foothold on the Continent from
which Germany could be attacked underlined the need of am-
phibious forces and gave impetus to the development of equipment
for amphibious operations.?*

Other volumes of this series tell of the years which passed before
Britain could join with the United States of America in so con-
fidently ordering General Eisenhower to re-enter Europe and

Yu will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction

1 Appendix I.

* Following common practice, the term ‘amphibious’ is used to describe operations
which require the use of both sea and land forces, but it should be remembered that
the term also covers the use of air forces which are an essential component of all ‘am-
phibious’ operations.

B I

2 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

destroy the enemy’s armed forces, yet the significance of that order
and the story of how it was obeyed cannot be appreciated fully with-
out remembrance of how our position had been revolutionised
between 1940 and 1944.

There had been the threat of invasion and victory in the Battle
of Britain as there had been continuous war in the air in succeeding
years. There had been victories and defeats in Cyrenaica, Libya,
Abyssinia and Somaliland, in Greece and Crete, Syria, Iraq and the
Far East. There had been Germany’s vicious onslaught on Russia
in 1941, which alined a new and powerful ally with Britain and the
Commonwealth though at the cost of material aid which could be
ill spared. Later that year the United States, an even greater ally,
had joined us in the war, when Japan attacked at Pearl Harbour and
seized islands and territories in the Pacific and the Far East. It was
not until late in 1942 that the tide turned. Then British and American
troops who had landed in Algeria and Morocco struck eastwards to
meet converging British forces driving the enemy westwards from
Egypt, while Russia struck back successfully at Stalingrad and other
points in her long front. Thereafter there had been no major set-
backs. In 1943 Russia had renewed her counter-offensive and re-
covered more lost ground, while the western Allies had freed all
North Africa, Sicily and southern Italy, destroying in their progress
large enemy armies and forcing Italy to surrender. Meanwhile, in the
Pacific, Japanese ambitions had been baulked effectively, and the
Allies’ position had been progressively improved.

Throughout these long and fluctuating fights, embracing every
theatre and every front, the Anglo-American fighting capacity had
been sustained by their navies’ never-resting war at sea, despite its
fearful toll of men and ships. The stern challenge of the U-boats,
which had threatened our very existence, at length appeared to have
been mastered, and from the middle of 1943 the security of the
Allies’ sea communications was comparatively assured. We no
longer faced the question of survival but the task of building up
strength for a decisive attack on Hitler’s ‘fortress’. The very fact that
through those lean and dangerous years we had been able to move
troops and supplies across the oceans of the world, though often
through great dangers and with severe loss, was a measure of the
significance of maritime power and of the debt we owe to the Royal
Navy and the Merchant Navy and to their partner, the Royal Air
Force.

When the pageant of those years is reviewed from a distance the
outstanding changes which had taken place between 1940 and 1944
are easily distinguishable. A great national effort together with the
passage of time, the fruits of experience, the moral support and
material assistance of the United States (in the President’s phrase,

ANGLO-AMERICAN CO-OPERATION 3

‘all aid short of war’), had already enabled Britain and the Common-
wealth to make war more effectively by the end of 1941 when the
entry of America into the war added her full resources of man-power,
materials and industrial capacity to the forces matched against the
Axis powers.® By the close of 1943 the advantages which Germany
had won by force in 1940 were more than counter-balanced through
the combination of the Allies’ strength; thereafter the balance of
power was progressively weighted in their favour and while their
position was thus conspicuously improved the relative position of
Germany was no less conspicuously worsened. In 1940 her armies
had held in Europe what seemed to be a position of unchallengeable
dominance; by the end of 1943 they were being driven back on two
fronts and a third was threatened. So large a proportion of her army
and air force was fighting a defensive war in Russia and Italy that,
wheréas in June 1940 there were 137 German divisions in France and
the Low Countries, now less than half that number could be spared
to meet the Allies’ coming thrust. Moreover, Hitler’s obstinate belief
that he could strangle us at sea and wound us mortally from the air
had proved to be as vain as his desire to dominate Europe, and
by the end of 1943 Allied mastery in both elements was virtually
assured. Germany had still great war-making capacity, but the
Allies’ capacity was even greater when General Eisenhower was
given command of the forces which were to win for the Allies
victory in the West.

Plans and preparations for the Allied campaign had already
reached a penultimate stage when the Supreme Commander was
chosen at the close of 1943. Two years before, that is a fortnight
after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour had brought America into the
war, Mr. Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
with their military advisers, had met in Washington to take counsel
together*They had been in almost continuous consultation since the
outbreak of war in Europe and as American aid to Britain increased
they had agreed that the defeat of Germany would take precedence
even if Japan should enter the war. They had met earlier in 1941 and
had expressed the British and American unity of purpose in the
Atlantic Charter.‘ But the meeting in Washington at the end of that
year was the first of its kind, for now both America and Japan were
at war. It was distinguished from those which were to follow by the
code name ‘Arcadia’, though anything less arcadian than its purpose

* For the story of Anglo-American co-operation during 1940-1941 see the volumes of
Grand Strategy in this series.

* The Atlantic Charter was an eight-point declaration of peace aims issued by Mr.
Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill during their meeting at sea on 14th Aug. 1941. It was
published in Great Britain as a White Paper (Cmd. 6321) on gist Oct. 1941.

4 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

or than Washington in mid-winter would be hard to conceive. A
decision was taken there which had immeasurable consequences,
for it confirmed an agreement that the western Allies’ war effort and
use of resources In man-power and materials should be accepted as
combined responsibilities—an arrangement which was certainly
more nearly ideal than any other arrangement made by any other
Allies, in any other war.5

To implement this resolution, subject to the direction of the
Prime Minister and the President (whose close friendship and almost
daily communication ensured their personal accord), the Chiefs of
Staff of the three Services of each country were constituted as ‘the
Combined Chiefs of Staff’, who were in practice to serve the Allies
as the corporate, directing mind for all operations of war*The com-
position of this momentous conjunction is shown below.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF’S ORGANISATION

President Prime Minister
and

and
Commander-in-Chief of British Minister
the American Armed Forces of Defence

American = COMBINED CHIEFS = (ae oreah
OF STAFF

(with Joint Staff Mission

Joint Chiefs of Staff in: Washington)

Combined Chiefs
of Staff's
Secretariat
Combined Combine Combined Combined Combined Combined Combined
Staff Military Intelligence Munitions Communications Meteorological Civil
Planners’ Transportation Committee Assignment Board Committee Affairs
Committee Committee Board Committee

+ The British Joint Staff Mission represented the British Chiefs of Staff at routine
meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and also acted as liaison between the
British diplomatic and supply bodies in Washington and the Combined Chiefs of
Staff organisation.

It will be remembered that Mr. Churchill was both Prime
Minister and Minister of Defence, and under him the British Chiefs
of Staff Committce were virtually responsible for the central direc-
tion of all British operations of war. Mr. Roosevelt was both Presi-
dent and Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the United
States.

The original membership of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was as

follows:

5 Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, July 1,
1943 to June 30, 1945 (H.M.S.O., 1945), p. 8.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 5

British Chiefs of Staff Committee
General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and
Chief of the Naval Staff.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff.
Lieut-General Sir Hastings Ismay, Mr. Churchill’s representa-
tive.

American Foint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral W. D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President.

General G. C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army.

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Fleet.

Lieut-General H. H. Arnold, Commanding General Army Air
Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

Later, Sir Dudley Pound was succeeded by Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Andrew Cunningham; Admiral Stark left for London as Com-
mander, United States Naval Forces in Europe, and Admiral King
combined the offices of Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations.

Since it was also decided that the headquarters of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff should be in Washington, full meetings could only be
held at intervals, so the members of a British Joint Staff Mission,
which had succeeded an earlier military mission and was already
stationed in Washington, were appointed to represent the British
Chiefs of Staff at routine meetings held for the day-to-day conduct
of business. Field- Marshal Sir John Dill, who had until recently been
Chief of the Imperial General Staff and was at this time acting as
personal adviser to Mr. Churchill in his capacity of Minister of
Defence, was now appointed to remain as his personal representa-
tive in Washington and to head the Mission, whose other members
were Admiral Sir Charles Little, General Sir Colville Wemyss and
Air Marshal A. T. Harris.

Though the history of grand strategy is being written in other
volumes of this serics, any account of British operations in the final
campaign in North-West Europe must take cognisance of such high-
level decisions as directly affected the conduct of the campaign.
Moreover, the first statement of Allied strategy has distinctive
importance.

In confirmation of British and American agreements on strategic
aims which had been reached before the United States was at war, it
was reaffirmed at the Washington Conference that ‘notwithstanding
the entry of Japan into the war’ the Atlantic and European theatre

6 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

was still considered to be ‘the decisive theatre’, Germany ‘the prime
enemy’, and her defeat ‘the key to victory’; ‘only the minimum of
force necessary for the safe-guarding of vital interests in other
theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany * For
the American public, traditionally sensitive to any threat of Japanese
encroachment, this might well have proved an unpopular decision;
it is the more notable as evidence that on this fundamental question
British and American war leaders had at this stage reached a
common conclusion.

It could hardly be expected that this would always be so. In the
conduct of a world war the widely separated standpoints of two such
differently circumstanced countries as Great Britain and the United
States must inevitably make it difficult for their political and military
leaders always to find a mutually acceptable policy, and it is neither
surprising nor disturbing that British and American views did not
always coincide, that, indeed, they differed radically at various
times. What is more impressive is the fact that their leaders so often
saw alike, and that even when prolonged discussion failed to recon-
cile opinions, agreed decisions were none the less arrived at and, once
reached, were loyally observed. A characteristic illustration was
provided during the ensuing months.

Having agreed that their first aim was to defeat Germany, the
Allies defined the essential features of their strategy as requiring
security of the main areas of British and American war industry and
the maintenance of their essential sea and air communications; the
closing and tightening of the ring round Germany; the wearing
down and undermining of German resistance; and the continuous
development of offensive action against Germany. While concentrat-
ing on these tasks, only such positions in the eastern theatre should
be maintained as would safeguard vital interests and deny Japan
access to raw materials needed for her continuance of the war.

They went on to enumerate the ‘steps to be taken in 1942 to put
into effect the above general policy’. Of these only three need be
mentioned here. The ‘ring round Germany’ was to be strengthened
and closed “by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and support-
ing Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by
gaining possession of the whole North African coast’. The ‘wearing
down of Germany’ would be sought through ‘ever-increasing air
bombardment by British and American forces’; other means would
be assistance to Russia, blockade and the maintenance of a spirit of
revolt and the organisation of subversive movements in occupied
countries. It did ‘not seem likely’ that in 1942 any large-scale land
offensive against Germany would be possible except on the Russian
front, but the Allies must be ready to take advantage of any opening
that might result from the wearing down of German resistance ‘to

A NORTH AFRICA LANDING 7

conduct limited land offensives’. ‘In 1943 the way may be clear’, they
said, ‘for a return to the Continent across the Mediterranean, from
Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe.®That
was as far as the Allies could foresee their long-term strategy at the
beginning of 1942, but preliminary steps were taken to plan and pre-
pare for the assembly in England of the Allied forces that would be
needed for large-scale operations on the Continent.

And even as they reached these decisions the world situation was
changing in ways which would modify their application. In the first
half of 1942 the Allies’ position went from bad to worse nearly
everywhere. A Russian winter counter-offensive had regained
ground, but a heavy German attack was renewed after the thaw and
the Russians were driven back at crucial points. Japanese conquests
in the Pacific and Far East (including our loss of Hong Kong and
Singapore) threatened India, Australia and the remaining islands of
the Pacific; Rommel’s advance in North Africa threatened Egypt
and the Middle East; while the continued loss of Allied merchant
shipping threatened world-wide ocean routes and in particular the
Atlantic communications on which any Allied offensive in Europe
must depend. During this time much of the Allies’ resources and
shipping was inevitably absorbed by urgent measures to arrest the
enemies’ advances. A plan which had been discussed at Washing-
ton for British and American landings in North-West Africa, to close
the ring round Germany on the southern front, had perforce to be
laid aside, though the Joint Planning Committee of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff (later called the Combined Staff Planners) had
regarded it ‘as of the first strategical importance in the Atlantic area’*

After the return from Washington in January 1942, British plan-
ning was intensified for the major operation envisaged in 1943—
namely the launching of a full-scale attack by Allied forces landed
in France—or, alternatively, an immediate landing in France by
such forces as would be available at the time if circumstances re-
quired such an emergency operation in 1942. The first of these was
known as ‘Roundup’, the second as ‘Sledgehammer’*

In April, General Marshall and Mr. Harry Hopkins (the un-
official personal emissary of the President) came to England bringing
a project in general terms for the major operation against Germany
in 1943 and meanwhile for the opening of ‘an active sector on this
front by steadily increasing air operations and by raids and forays all
along the coasts’. It also called for immediate preparations in readi-
ness for an emergency operation in 1942 though this ‘WOULD BE
JUSTIFIED ONLY IN CASE (I) THE SITUATION ON THE RUSSIAN
FRONT BECOMES DESPERATE... (2) THE GERMAN SITUATION
IN WESTERN EUROPE BECOMES CRITICALLY WEAKENED’.&

* Capitals in the original text.

8 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

These proposals were warmly welcomed. American participation in
1943 was promised on a scale which greatly enlarged the previous
conception of Roundup and enhanced the prospect of an earlier
German defeat. The comparatively small contribution which was
all that America could provide in 1942 if the Allies were led by
circumstances to embark on the emergency operation, Sledge-
hammer, was also defined.

It would be necessary to go far beyond the scope of this volume to
trace events which, in the following months, led to a gradual diver-
gence of British and American views on the policy to be pursued
against Germany. The fact must be noted that American opinion
moved away from the limitations of action in 1942 which had been
stressed in the April text of the Marshall plan. By July, when,
with Admiral King and Mr. Hopkins, General Marshall again came
to London it was to urge ‘that Sledgehammer be immediately
adopted as a combined British-American operational plan for
execution at the earliest possible date in 1942, not later than October
15th’ and ‘be regarded as the opening phase of Roundup with the
consequent purpose not only of remaining on the Continent but of
building up ground and air forces and logistic facilities, and expand-
ing our foothold, to the limits of our capabilities’** The President
had instructed them that he regarded it as ‘of the highest impor-
tance that U.S. ground troops be brought into action against the
enemy in 1942’ and Sledgehammer ‘of such grave importance’
that they ‘should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for
it’.?

In the discussions which had been pursued between April and
July there had been no corresponding change in the British view.
British leaders shared the desire of both the American and Russian
leaders to open a ‘second front’ against Germany in the West as soon
as possible, but anxious and prolonged study had only confirmed
their conclusion that, except in emergency, to launch a cross-Channel
operation in 1942, with the comparatively small forces and equip-
ment, mostly British, which were all that could be available then,
would be a grave mistake. It would offer little hope of success
against unbroken German strength and might well result in costly
failure; it would. but ‘eat up the seed corn’ from which a later and
larger harvest must be won. In the British view the only favourable
opportunity for action against Germany in 1942 was in North Africa¥
and they reverted to the plan discussed at Washington for Allied
landings there ‘to close the ring round Germany’.

When General Marshall and his colleagues were at length con-

7 Presidential memorandum, ‘Instructions for the London Conference, July 16th, 1942’
tqnotee in oc E. Sherwood, White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (London, 1949),
vol. II, p. 605).

BOLERO AND COSSAC 9

vinced that these opposed views could not be reconciled they re-
ported this to President Roosevelt and on his instructions agreed to
the North African operation;**but although this might delay the
major cross-Channel assault in 1943, preparations for such an assault
were to continue vigorously. A plan, ‘Bolero’, for the movement of
American forces, supplies and equipment to Great Britain and for
their reception, accommodation and maintenance there, was already
in operation under the direction of combined staffs, constituting
‘Bolero’ committees, in Washington and London*

It was characteristic of both British and American leaders that
when once a plan which they had opposed strongly was finally
adopted by mutual consent, they threw themselves whole-heartedly
into preparations for its achievement. The agreement which had
been reached so slowly in July was quickly put into effect. British
and American forces landed in French North Africa that autumn
and by January 1943 their action was already yielding good results
when a further meeting at the highest level was held near Casa-
blanca, in Morocco. This meeting was more appropriately christened
‘Symbol’, for it was indeed symbolic of Allied unity in action and it
marked a crucial turning-point in the war with Germany. When the
meeting was in progress, converging attacks from east and west were
visibly loosening the enemy’s grip on North Africa. In Europe,
Russia was regaining more lost ground and had in turn surrounded
a German army besieging Stalingrad. In both theatres the enemy
had been forced on to the defensive. The ring round Germany was
being closed.

At Casablanca it was agreed, among much else which does not
directly concern this volume, that when North Africa was cleared
pressure on the enemy must be maintained by a follow-up attack on
Sicily, though this would mean that the Allies could not also stage in
1943 a large-scale invasion of Europe from the west against un-
broken opposition. They would develop the Combined Bomber
Offensive aimed at the enemy’s war-making capacity and morale;
they would continue to assemble the strongest possible forces in
readiness to re-enter the Continent as soon as German resistance was
sufficiently weakened; and meantime they would undertake such
limited cross-Channel operations as might be practicable with the
forces and material available. One other decision was taken which
indirectly bore heavily on Overlord. The battle of the Atlantic was
in its most critical stage and it was agreed that this must be given
priority over all else; production of landing craft was cut down to
make way for more escort vessels and other warships. The difficulty
of mounting ‘a large-scale invasion of Europe’ was correspondingly
increased. The Combined Chiefs of Staff went on to define the
operations to be undertaken in 1943 and, in considering the question

10 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

of command, they now envisaged an invasion in force in 1944. The
President had suggested that the supreme commander should be
British, but Mr. Churchill felt that this could be determined later,
on the principle that command should be held by an officer of the
nation which furnished the majority of the forces employed.® In
order to prepare plans for the operation it was, however, decided to
set up at once a combined allied staff, under a British chief of staff
with an American deputy*Subsequently Lieut-General F. E. Mor-
gan was appointed ‘Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
(designate)’ with Major-General Ray W. Barker, of the United States
Army, as his deputy. Other members of the staff were drawn
from all three Services of both nations and the organisation became
known as C.O.S.S.A.C. from the initials of General Morgan’s
designation.

Some little time elapsed while the Combined Chiefs of Staff
settled the terms of General Morgan’s directive, so that he only re-
ceived it on the 26th of April, 1943*It declared that ‘our object is to
defeat the German fighting forces in North-West Europe’ and it in-
structed him not only to prepare plans for a full-scale assault against
the Continent as early as possible in 1944 but also for ‘an elaborate
camouflage and deception scheme’ extending over the coming sum-
mer and designed to pin the enemy in the West and keep alive
German expectation of large cross-Channel operations in 1943. He
was also to prepare plans for an immediate return to the Continent,
with whatever forces might be available at the time, in the event of
German disintegration.

At the next full meeting (‘Trident’), held in Washington in May
1943, the shape of a large-scale assault in 1944 was given further
definition. Its aim would be to secure a lodgement on the Continent
from which further offensive operations could be carried out. The
target date was to be May the Ist, 1944, and forces and equipment
for the operation would be established in the United Kingdom as
rapidly as possible* Subsequently General Morgan was given a
supplementary directive and a list of forces which were expected to
be available. These would comprise an assault force of nine divisions
(that is, five infantry divisions simultaneously loaded in assault
vessels, two infantry divisions as follow-up and two airborne divi-
sions) and twenty divisions for movement into the lodgement area.
Provision was to be made for the seizure and development of ports
that would enable these forces to be augmented by further divisions,
shipped direct from America or elsewhere at the rate of from three
to five a month. Naval forces would include about 3,300 assault ships
and landing craft; air forces were expected to consist of about

* See W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. IV (1951), pp. 393-407, 827.

COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS 11

11,400 aircraft which would include 632 transport planes for air-
borne operations. *

General Morgan was to submit an outline plan for the operation—
now renamed ‘Overlord’—by August the Ist, and as it was already
the first week of June this allowed him very little time.

Fortunately Cossac inherited a mass of material from those who
had been planning Roundup and Sledgehammer, and on this his
staff had begun work immediately on appointment. Staff studies,
appreciations and plans for cross-Channel operations, of various
kinds and on increasing scale, had indeed been prepared almost
without pause since the British Expeditionary Force had returned
from France in 1940; for even before evacuation from Dunkirk was
completed and though the country was threatened with invasion,
Mr. Churchill had ordered the adoption of an offensive policy by
raids on enemy-held coasts and had instituted a small organisation
to give effect to it under the command of General A. G. B. Bourne,
Royal Marines*The day when we should be able to return to France
in force to fight the German Army seemed then to be remote indeed,
but while building up our strength we could do something immedi-
ately to trouble the enemy’s occupation of the shores which faced us
across the Channel and the North Sea.

In the years which followed, many raids of varying size and im-
portance had been carried out in order to damage or destroy
German installations or equipment and to disturb the enemy’s
peace of mind. As our raiding experience accumulated the small
organisation which Mr. Churchill had instituted was gradually ex-
panded, first under the direction of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger
Keyes and later under Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten, into
a Combined Operations Headquarters, separate alike from the
Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry, though with close
affiliations to all three* This was an innovation in British military
organisation, and partly because, in its adolescence, its functions in
relation to the Services and other Ministries were shaped by the
needs of the moment rather than to any previously-designed pattern,
and partly because the seed which it grew bore fruit in the operations
of others, the importance of the part which Combined Operations
Headquarters played in the final campaign is often not sufficiently
recognised. Yet by 1943 its work had had three results of far-reaching
consequence.

First, the Chief of Combined Operations, Lord Louis Mount-
batten, had been promoted Vice-Admiral with equivalent ranks in
the Army and Royal Air Force; he had been given the status of a
Chief of Staff and, when major issues or matters affecting combined
operations were under consideration, he sat as a member of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

12 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

Secondly, the Chief of Combined Operations and his staff had
acquired recognised authority as indispensable advisers on the
planning and equipment of all seaborne assaults; in collaboration
with the Service Ministries they had prepared and published a com-
prehensive series of training manuals which were in use by the
Services; and they had acquired, and furnished with expert in-
structors and special equipment, a number of training areas, on
which the necessary instruction in the new assault technique was
being practised under skilled guidance and in realistic conditions.

Thirdly, experiment and concentrated study of the special re-
quirements of a seaborne assault, based at first on experience gained
in raids and more recently in Mediterranean landings, had been
joined with the Royal Navy’s long experience and skill to produce a
variety of specially designed assault shipping and landing craft
which were to play a decisive part in the coming assault on the
French coast, and indeed in seaborne assaults in every theatre of
war.

The Chief of Combined Operations had one other task of a
different nature. He was responsible for the organisation, training,
and control of ‘Commandos’—small formations of troops drawn from
the Army and the Royal Marines (one was also found from the
Allied contingents in Britain) who were specially trained for employ-
ment on expeditions which called for a high degree of disciplined
daring and initiative, such as the raiding of an enemy coast or the
quick seizure of a threatening strongpoint. Eight Commandos were
among the first of the Allied troops to reach France as were the
closely corresponding American ‘Ranger’ battalions.

But the contribution of Combined Operations Headquarters to
the success of the coming campaign cannot be measured only by
these and other easily distinguishable achievements. The doctrine
preached by Combined Operations Headquarters, with its emphasis
on unified staff-work and control, affected the outlook and per-
meated the thought of all three Services and influenced action in
many unrecognised ways. It was indeed fortunate that so much
imagination and energy had been available for the propagation of
its faith and the proof of its works before the Allies were to launch
the biggest combined operation yet known. Especially in that forma-
tive period it owed a great deal to the ability and zeal of Lord Louis
Mountbatten.

The climax of our raiding policy was reached in August 1942 with
a so-called ‘reconnaissance in force’ at Dieppe in which the land
forces engaged consisted mainly of Canadian troops. It was on a
much bigger scale than any previous raid, and though carried out
with great gallantry the main tactical object was not achieved and
the raid involved heavy losses. But it provided experience of great

LESSONS OF 1942 DIEPPE RAID 13

value and its lessons had far-reaching influence on the planning and
conduct of the final cross-Channel assault, for tactical failure may be
more instructive than success if the lessons are duly learnt. It not
only re-emphasised the need for meticulous inter-Service planning
and training to ensure exact but flexible performance, smooth co-
operation and the effective use of available means, but exposed the
necessity for improved technique, organisation and equipment, and
for a higher standard of arrangements for communications and
control. Outstanding among the lessons learnt was the importance of
overwhelming fire-support in the initial stages of a seaborne land-
ing. This led to the evolution of a new technique of bombardment,
in which all types of naval, air and army weapons were combined.
Special types of craft were designed to provide close support in-
shore and to enable the Army’s field guns to fire while still afloat.
These developments and the advent of the amphibious tank and
other specialised armoured fighting vehicles combined to establish
the fire power of the Army during the initial stages of a landing.®**

Dieppe taught that the association of considerable naval and army
forces for combined operations involved complex problems of
organisation which had not been fully mastered. The naval forces
which had been engaged at Dieppe were therefore retained as the
embryo of ‘Force J’ which served for the continuous study of am-
phibious problems and was developed as the prototype of the other
naval ‘forces’ to be used in the assault. Eventually Force J bore the
Canadian component of our assaulting armies to the initial landing
in Normandy.*

The long-range striking power of modern armaments and air
forces, scientific apparatus to give the enemy early warning of our
approach, and concrete and other coastal defences would constitute
difficulties against which no seaborne force had ever before been
matched. Yet the pregnant importance of specially designed assault
ships and landing craft may not at first sight be obvious, for it de-
rived from another special characteristic of the Second World War.
During this war highly mechanised armies were being engaged for
the first time, and these were employing a variety, size and weight of
equipment hitherto unknown. Seaborne assault was no longer
mainly an affair of landing men but of also landing the vast scale
of artillery, tanks, vehicles, mechanical plant, ammunition, stores,
supplies and petrol on which a mechanised army is dependent in
battle, and of landing them not in ports but on open beaches and
in the face of modern ground and air defences. In every seaborne
attack assault ships and landing craft in sufficient numbers had

® Notes on these and other weapons used in fhe Overlord campaign are given in
Appendix IV.

14 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

become a prerequisite of success. An account of these essential instru-
ments of seaborne invasion is given in Appendix II, but as the sub-
ject will recur constantly in this history it may be helpful to explain
here what is involved. Assault shtps comprise passenger liners
equipped to carry both assaulting troops and small landing craft for
putting them ashore; specially built naval vessels to carry tanks or
vehicles and to discharge them on the shore over ramps; and a wide
range of merchant ships adapted to perform various functions in the
assault area. All these were capable of making ocean voyages.
Landing craft were designed to land troops, vehicles or stores on
open beaches during an assault, or to give them fire support from
close inshore. They varied in size and function from small craft
holding thirty-six men which could be carried at davits by infantry
landing ships, to craft designed to land heavy vehicles or any close
fire support weapons. Landing craft are open-decked for use in com-
paratively sheltered water and are not capable of making ocean
voyages.?° It will be found that as the war progressed shortage of
certain categories, notably tank landing ships (L.S.T.s), at times had
a marked influence on strategy. Why this shortage persisted, why, as
General Marshall wrote, it “was to plague us to the final day of the
war in Europe’, why in Mr. Churchill’s phrase ‘the plans of two
great Empires like Britain and the United States should be so much
hamstrung and limited by . . . these particular vessels’, 11 is discussed
in Appendix II and in the volumes dealing with grand strategy. It
will be seen later how it affected the campaign to be described.

When the Cossac staff were appointed they entered into a rich
inheritance not only of experience focussed in Combined Operations
Headquarters but also of work done by the group known as the
Combined Commanders, who throughout the previous year had
been studying conditions to be met in a seaborne attack on Germany
under various conditions—that is in Sledgehammer or Roundup.
The Combined Commanders were General Sir Bernard Paget,
Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, with, at different times, Air

10 The principal types of assault ships and landing craft, and the initials by which
they are commonly known are as follows:

Landing Ship Headquarters (L.S.H.)
6 », Infantry (L.S.I.)
re »» Tank (L.S.T.)

Landing Craft Infantry (L.C.I.)
% »» Assault (L.C.A.)
% » Tank (L.C.T.)

There were in all nineteen different types of assault ships and landing craft.

11 The War Reports of General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold, ed. Millis Walter
and J. B. Lippincott (New York, 1947), p. 154; Churchill, The Second World War, vol. V,
P- 454-

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COMBINED COMMANDERS’ VIEWS 15

Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas succeeded by Air Marshal Sir Trafford
Leigh-Mallory as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Com-
mand, and Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay (who had at this time
been appointed as Naval Commander (Designate) of the Expedi-
tionary Force for Sledgehammer) or other naval representatives.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower and later Lieut-General Frank M.
Andrews, Commanding General, European Theatre of Operations
of United States Army (known as E.T.O.U.S.A.), were associated
with them, while Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, as Chief of
Combined Operations, joined them when required. Their planners
had summarised among other things an exhaustive collection of in-
formation on the nature of the whole seaboard from Holland to the
Bay of Biscay*In this they had examined the respective advantages
and demerits of every beach on which a landing might be made, of
every port which might be captured and every locality from which
operations could then be developed. In each case they took into
account the sea approaches, the prevailing winds and tides; the
nature of the beaches, their exits, hinterlands and possible inunda-
tions; the prospect of an early seizure of one or more major ports; the
availability of airfields or land suitable for their early construction;
the volume of fighter protection that could be afforded from British
airfields in the opening phase; the enemy’s coastal and beach
defences, and the strength of the troops holding them; the location of
enemy naval forces and minefields; the nature and strength of the
naval support required; and, finally, the capacity of the assault area
for a build-up of forces to compete with the enemy’s reserves. Taking
all these into consideration the Combined Commanders agreed that
the most favourable place for a large-scale landing was the Caen
sector of Normandy provided that the eastern beaches of the Cotentin
peninsula were included in the assault area so as to facilitate the early
capture of Cherbourg. They regarded this condition as essential.
The Cossac staff re-examined all this material and quickly nar-
rowed the choice to two areas, namely the Pas de Calais coast or the
Caen sector of Normandy. At first sight it would seem obvious that
the cross-Channel assault should be made where the French coast
lies within sight of the cliffs of Dover and air cover for the assaulting
forces could most easily be provided; moreover, a landing there’
would open to the Allies the shortest route to Germany. But just
because this was so obvious the German defences of the Pas de Calais
coast were the most formidable; this was indeed the pivotal area of
their defence system. Moreover, the ports in the Dover area were
far too small to accommodate the invasion shipping which would
have to assemble at many ports along the south coast and in the
Thames estuary. Apart from this there were other disadvantages.
The conformation of the Pas de Calais coast with its high cliffs,

16 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

narrow beaches, and restricted exits would make it very difficult to
maintain large forces through the beaches and, in order to capture
adequate port capacity, the lodgement area would have to be
extended either eastwards to include Belgian ports or westwards to
include the Seine ports; in face of the enemy’s surrounding opposi-
tion neither appeared to be a promising operation of war.

None of these disadvantages applied to the Normandy coast. It
was less strongly fortified. The beaches are partly sheltered from pre-
vailing westerly winds and are more suitable for the landing of large
quantities of vehicles and stores; Cherbourg and the Brittany ports
are within closer reach. Any advantage of proximity would be for-
feited, for the direct sea crossing would be lengthened to a hundred
miles and the time during which a fighter aircraft could operate over
the assault area would be diminished, but the naval and air authori-
ties were prepared to accept this for the sake of other gains.

Cossac came to the same conclusion as the Combined Commanders
had done, but with one notable variation. While landings should be
made in the Caen sector of Normandy, the eastern beaches of the
Cotentin peninsula should be excluded. The need to capture Cher-
bourg quickly was recognised, but with the limited forces allotted for
the Overlord assault by the Combined Chiefs of Staff the risk of
landing troops on the peninsula while its narrow neck was in enemy
hands should not be taken.

The Combined Commanders had estimated that landings should
be made on a four-division front and that, for this and for the
follow-up, assault shipping and landing craft must be available to
lift ten divisions and eighteen commandos; they had also envisaged
the employment of four or five airborne divisions. That was the
Combined Commanders’ estimate of the forces needed for a success-
ful assault under conditions which then obtained.

The ‘Appreciation and Outline Plan*which Cossac duly sub-
mitted in August 1943 was not, however, based on this or any other
estimate of what was needed but on the specific allocation which
had been made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff—namely nine
divisions (including two airborne) for the assault and twenty
divisions for the subsequent build-up of the lodgement area, with a
defined amount of assault vessels and transport aircraft. Governed by
these limited means the Cossac plan provided for the initial assault
to be made on a three-division front in conjunction with airborne
troops and commandos. If the enemy’s fighter forces were reduced; if his
reserve troops in France and the Low Countries as a whole did not exceed
twelve full-strength, first-quality divisions on the day of the assault; and
(since maintenance would have to be carried out over beaches for some three
months) if improvised sheltered waters were provided for use till adequate
ports were available, it was thought that an Allied assault on the lines

COSSAC PLAN APPROVED 17

of this outline plan should have ‘a reasonable prospect of success’. At
the same time it was urged that if possible the resources to be em-
ployed should be strengthened so as to increase the weight of the
follow-up and possibly to extend the assault frontage.

The Cossac outline plan was considered in turn by the British
Chiefs of Staff, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and, finally, by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, all of whom recommended its adoption to
Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt at a meeting in Quebec in
August 1943 known as ‘Quadrant’. Both accepted the plan, but in
doing so Mr. Churchill urged that the forces to be employed should
be strengthened by at least twenty-five per cent and that the assault
front should be extended to include the eastern shores of the Cher-
bourg peninsula* The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that stronger
forces should be made available ‘if possible’, but they did not then
increase the allocation of assault shipping and craft on which the
Cossac plan was based. While, therefore, it was satisfactory to
General Morgan that his outline plan had been approved and that
he was now ordered to proceed with detailed planning and full
preparations and was given authority ‘for taking the necessary
executive action to implement those plans approved by the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff’*he still held the anomalous position of chief of
staff to an unknown commander, with orders to continue planning
for the use of forces which might be increased and, as he considered,
with insufficient assault shipping and transport aircraft even for the
comparatively limited forces allotted. His position was not eased by
the knowledge that, on Mr. Churchill’s suggestion, it was now agreed
to appoint an American soldier as Supreme Commander. American
staff procedure differs in many respects from the British, so that
General Morgan’s other uncertainties were increased by the know-
ledge that he was planning for a supreme commander who would be
accustomed to the use of a different idiom.

Throughout the months which followed the meeting at Quebec
these unanswered questions as to who would be the supreme com-
mander and what forces and assault craft would in fact be made
available were continuing subjects of debate at high level, for with
them were involved other questions of grand strategy. The Allied
resources of men and material were mounting steadily, but they were
not yet sufficient for all the tasks the Allies had in hand in the
several theatres of war. The number of American troops assembling
in Britain under the Bolero plan was increasing but not so quickly as
had been forecast.*

The supply of assault shipping and landing craft was large and
growing but it was being claimed for operations in the Pacific, the
Mediterranean and in South-East Asia as well as for the coming
cross-Channel assault. Moreover, a proposal had been made at

18 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

Quebec that this main attack, Overlord, should be backed by a
synchronised assault on the French Mediterranean coast, later to be
known as ‘Anvil’*If so this would add yet another claimant to the
competition for assault shipping and landing craft. The positive:
shortage of shipping owing to U-boat sinkings and the relative short-
age for the operations envisaged were factors which influenced both
strategic and tactical planning during these years.

Debate on the means to be made available for Overlord turned
largely on what was to happen in Italy and on the course to be pur-
sued there. The conduct of the Italian campaign, which had followed
the defeat of the enemy in North Africa and Sicily and the Italian
surrender, had been influenced since its inception by two considera-
tions which were not easily reconcilable. On one hand was the
Allies’ desire to engage and hold in Italy as many German divisions
as possible, so as to reduce correspondingly the number that could be
employed on the Russian front or be used to oppose an Allied
assault in the West, and to have air bases from which to bomb the
aircraft industry in southern Germany. To this end General Sir
Harold Alexander’s armies must be strong enough to maintain un-
relenting pressure on German forces in Italy. On the other hand
was the Allies’ intention to launch a major cross-Channel offensive
in the coming spring; to that end the strongest possible forces must
be assembled and trained and none that were wanted for the major
campaign should be tied up in Italy or elsewhere. The proposal to
launch a synchronised assault on the south coast of France had been
made before any effort to decide an appropriate share-out of re-
sources which would be available in the European theatre at the
time concerned.

Thus considerations of grand strategy bore directly on the plan-
ning and preparations for Overlord and, while there was agreement
that Germany must be finally defeated by assault from the west, there
were stubborn differences of opinion as to how the success of that
assault could best be assured. Put shortly, the British Chiefs of Staff
thought (in the autumn of 1943) that the success of Overlord, on the
limited scale on which it was being planned, would be jeopardised unless
diversionary operations in Italy or elsewhere occupied substantial
German forces in south Europe and so prevented their transfer to
the western front. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff feared, on the
other hand, that such diversionary operations might absorb too
large a share of Allied resources, and, if so, Overlord might fail
through starvation* The justice of these contrasted arguments is
examined very fully by Mr. Ehrman in his account of grand strategy
during this period.!2 The difficulty of resolving them was increased
by the fact that there was as yet no supreme commander for Overlord

13 John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. V (H.M.S.O., 1956), chap. II passim.

NEED FOR SUPREME COMMANDER 19

to say with authority what forces and equipment he must have to
ensure its success.

Delay in deciding whether the strength of Overlord could be in-
creased was due partly to the difficulty of foreseeing the course of
events in Italy and of reaching agreement on the requirements of the
Italian campaign, and partly to the demands of other theatres of war;
in particular for American operations against Japan on which the
British were not fully informed. But it was also attributable largely
to delay in the appointment of a supreme commander for Overlord,
and this procrastination affected both planning and preparations
and had ultimate bearing on the conduct of the campaign.

At times American leaders suspected that, notwithstanding formal
agreement on the priority of Overlord, British leaders were half-
hearted about the pledge to launch it in the spring of 1944. There
was indeed some justification for this American uneasiness for,
though British leaders never contemplated the abandonment of
Overlord and never for a moment allowed the work of preparation
to slacken, they did at times consider advocating its deferment* It is
not necessary for an understanding of Overlord to trace all the
tangled causes for high-level embarrassment in 1943, but it is right
to notice that British hesitation on strategic grounds was fostered by
a suspicion on their part that American leaders still under-estimated
the difficulties of Overlord as they had done of Sledgehammer when
they urged its launching in 1942* and British leaders had better
reasons for their uneasiness. To them it seemed that American
protestations of belief in the prime importance of Overlord did not
square with their apparent unwillingness to settle matters which
must have decisive influence on the success of the campaign. At
Casablanca American leaders had pressed for the immediate
appointment of a chief of staff to the supreme commander (designate)
in order that planning might begin without delay. But the Combined
Chiefs of Staff did not at first give General Morgan any executive
authority and only in September was he authorised to proceed with
detailed plans and preparations. In May they had agreed to a pre-
liminary allocation of forces and equipment for the assault phase of
the campaign but, although in August they agreed that these should
be increased ‘if possible’, no specific measures were taken to increase
them. They agreed in August to approve the nomination of Admiral
Sir Charles Little (Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth) and Air
Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory (Commander-in-Chief, Fighter
Command) as, respectively, Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief
for Overlord, yet did not think it desirable to define their authority,
pending the selection of a supreme commander* In October it was
recognised that the Portsmouth Command must be separated from
Overlord and Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay succeeded to the Naval

20 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

Command of Overlord, but still no directive was given him.
Although in November Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory was given a
directive which defined his command of the tactical air forces
allotted to Overlord, it left undecided his authority in regard to
strategic bomber forces which constituted a major part of Allied air
power.*

On these and some other crucial issues British and American
leaders held divergent views and it was consequently difficult to
reach an agreed decision. To Americans it seemed wise to postpone
major decisions till the supreme commander was appointed and able
to state his requirements. British representatives urged in October
that the appointment should therefore not be deferred any longer*
but since it had meanwhile been agreed that an American should be
given supreme command the nomination would be made by the
President and he had not yet made up his mind. It was widely
believed in the autumn that General Marshall would probably be
his choice and General Morgan visited Washington in order to dis-
cuss matters with him in person. While there he urged a more
adequate provision of assault craft, but although he was met with
great understanding, in this regard he had no success. Neither then
nor after his return was his importunity rewarded and planning and
preparations continued to be seriously handicapped by these un-
certainties.*

It will be seen later that all, and more than all, that General
Morgan was arguing for so tirelessly in 1943 was provided in 1944 in
response to demands of the supreme commander; but it will also be
found that, at such a late date, it could only be done by a postpone-
ment of the opening attack.

The recital of these divergent views and minor misunderstandings
must not give a warped impression of British-American co-operation
in 1943. It must not be allowed to appear that between the periodical
conferences, when the Combined Chiefs of Staff were joined by the
Prime Minister and the President and a common policy was sought
on world-wide issues affecting both nations and every theatre of war,
there was any pause in combined staff work or any less successful
pursuit of agreement on the day-to-day conduct of Allied affairs.
Only five of the major conferences had been held, but during 1943
there had been over a hundred meetings of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. At these a huge mass of business affecting both nations had
been transacted without unresolved difficulty. Normally the British
view was expressed by Sir John Dill and his colleagues on behalf of
the British Chiefs of Staff and it would be difficult to over-estimate
the value of their part in this extraordinary and hitherto unique
example of international combination.

The next full conference for the determination of outstanding

BOMBER OFFENSIVE AND OVERLORD 21

questions was held at Cairo (‘Sextant’) and Teheran (‘Eureka’) in
November and early December 1943. As before, they were attended
by Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt. During part of the early
meetings in Cairo, General Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers from
China were present at the President’s request and for some days
subsequently the conference adjourned in order to confer with
Marshal Stalin and his advisers in Teheran before returning to com-
plete its business in Cairo. After the conference a communiqué was
agreed by the Prime Minister, the President and Marshal Stalin
which read: “The military staffs of the three Powers concerted their
plans for the final destruction of the German forces. They reached
complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations
which will be undertaken from East, West, and South, and arrange-
ments were made to ensure ultimate and continuous co-operation.’

The main decision reached was ‘that “Overlord” would be
launched in May in conjunction with a supporting operation against
the south of France on the largest scale that is permitted by the
landing craft available at that time’.*

At the conclusion of these meetings the Allied programme for the
defeat of the Axis in Europe was restated. First, they said, ‘the pro-
gressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, in-
dustrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of
lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air
combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined
Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite of
Overlord’; it must continue to have ‘the highest strategic priority’*
In stating this the Combined Chiefs of Staff were reaffirming the
primary object of the Combined Bomber Offensive which had been
defined during the Casablanca meeting a year previously in a
directive, and subsequently amplified in another known as ‘Point-
blank’, issued in June 1943¥It had been in progress ever since.

Nothing has yet been said of this offensive, though it had been
steadily mounting in violence, for the time had not yet come when
its operations were directly related to the coming land campaign; up
to this point their description belongs rather to other volumes in this
series.13 Yet in order to appreciate thé significance of the Cairo
decision recorded above it is necessary to understand the position of
the Allies’ strategic bomber forces at the turn of the year 1943-1944,
for air power had become a predominant factor in all operations of
war. No longer could the Navy be masters at sea, no longer could an
army advance to victory unless their sister service had such air
superiority that the enemy’s air forces could not interfere effectively

96 - Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive (H.M.S.O.,
1901).

22 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

with their operations. Not only did the older services need such
negative protection from air attack, they also needed the positive
and distinctive assistance which could only be made by the striking
power of air forces. So much was proved beyond all question.
Whether in addition to their complementary réle in actions by land
or at sea there was also an independent, strategic réle which air
forces could fulfil was a matter about which there had been long-
held differences of opinion.

The concept of independent strategic air power had seemingly not
been appreciated by German war leaders. The German air force had
been designed mainly for co-operation with land forces. It had
fought the Battle of Britain as a preliminary aid to invasion by land
forces and the subsequent sporadic bombing of Great Britain and the
attacks on shipping were not based on any coherent strategic plan.
In Britain and the United States, on the other hand, those who were
responsible for shaping air policy had long studied not only the
complementary réle of air forces to operations by land and sea but
also their ability to play a distinct, strategic réle, by independent
attack on an enemy’s war-making capacity. Protagonists of this view
argued that air forces enjoy signal advantages for such a task. From
widely dispersed bases their massed power of attack can quickly be
focussed on vital targets, deep in the heart of the enemy’s country,
without first having to break through any ‘front’ or to expend
strength on intermediate targets; and they can hit incomparably
hard.

But while British air leaders had recognised the potentialities of
strategic bombing they had had insufficient opportunity to prove its
value during the opening years of the war. The limited range, power
and number of available aircraft had restricted their operations;
diversion for other imperative tasks had interrupted their programme;
insupportable losses in daylight attacks on defended targets had led
to the adoption of night bombing, and in those early years difficulties
of navigation and bomb-aiming on dark or cloudy nights had largely
vitiated results. Ever since 1940 high priority had been given to the
production of more powerful, four-engined bombers and new aids
to navigation and bomb-aiming, but it would take time to provide
these in large numbers. At the close of 1941 evidence of the effect of
bombing on Germany’s war-making capacity, by the comparatively
small number of less powerful aircraft which was all we then had,
was inconclusive and for a time such operations were slowed down
while a more powerful force was building*

The entry of the United States brought weighty reinforcement of
the view that strategic bombing might have decisive influence on the
course of the war and, although some considerable time would
elapse before American bombers could be based in England and

APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL EISENHOWER 23

join in active operations against Germany, it was decided that the
Royal Air Force should meanwhile resume its offensive with a new
directive* By a decision formally approved by the War Cabinet on
the 14th of February, 1942, their attacks were ‘to be focused on the
morale of the enemy’s civil population and, in particular, of the in-
dustrial workers’ in cities within the range of a new aid to navigation
(known as ‘Gee’) just coming into use*Cologne and Essen, Duisburg,
Disseldorf and other places in the Ruhr were named. Shortly after
the issue of this new directive Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris was
appointed as the new Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber
Command.

It has been wittily said that while ‘some men make a noise and
some men make a difference’ Sir Arthur Harris did both* The direc-
tive he inherited was not of his making but from the date of his
appointment he made it his own. From then on he was an unshakable
advocate of ‘area’ bombing on the largest practicable scale, holding
that this was the quickest, surest and most economical way to destroy
the enemy’s morale and war-making capacity. He backed his opinion
by energetic action, and although during 1942 his force could not be
numerically increased, reorganisation with the new four-engined
bombers and new navigational aids greatly increased its striking
power. Improved techniques, which included the employment of
specially trained ‘pathfinders’ and greater use of incendiary bombs,
were developed and the organisation of the first thousand-bomber
raid, on Cologne on May the goth, gave impressive, if not conclusive,
evidence of what strategic bombing might effect.

Meantime American bomber forces—organised as the United
States Eighth Air Force commanded by Lieut-General Ira C.
Eaker—assembled in Britain and began active operations. Their
bombers had been designed and equipped for precision bombing of
targets by day rather than for area bombing of towns by night, and
they soon found (as the Royal Air Force had found in 1940) that
when their objective lay in Germany, beyond the range of their own
fighter cover, their losses were prohibitive. They had calculated that
their more heavily armed bombers, flying in close formation, would
be able to ward off attacks by the enemy’s fighters; they learned by
bitter experience that this was not so. But instead of changing over
to night bombing, as Bomber Command had done, they set out to
develop long-range fighters and with these, and by attack on the
enemy’s fighter production centres, to weaken German air defence
and obtain the air superiority needed for effective daylight bombing.

Both of these powerful bomber forces were operating under the
direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. For unlike the tactical air
forces which were being prepared under the control of Sir Trafford
Leigh-Mallory for co-operation with naval and land forces largely

24 THE ORIGINS OF OVERLORD

dependent on air support, the strategic bombers were carrying on an
offensive which, though a ‘pre-requisite to Overlord’, was indepen-
dent of other arms so long as their bases were safeguarded. The time
was soon coming when their operations would be more directly
related to the cross-Channel assault and the subsequent campaign,
but that time had not yet come when the Cairo meetings confirmed
the position of the Combined Bomber Offensive at the head of the
Allies’ programme for the defeat of the Axis in Europe.

Next on the Cairo programme came Overlord which, since the
Quadrant meeting in Quebec, had been regarded as ‘the primary
ground and air effort against the Axis’ for 1944 and was to be carried
out ‘during May’ of that year. It was recognised that Overlord as at
present planned was ‘on a narrow margin’ and that ‘everything
practicable should be done to increase its strength’. The examination
of the proposed supporting operation against the south of France—
Anvil—(now regarded as an essential complement to Overlord)
was to be pressed forward on the basis of not less than a two-division
assault, and if it should prove that greater strength was needed the
provision of additional resources ‘would be considered’. It had been
recognised at the August meeting in Quebec that ‘a shortage of
vehicle lift for “Overlord” and the necessity of additional landing
craft therefore’ would also have to be made good from the Mediter-
ranean. Craft were to be returned to the United Kingdom in January
for use in Overlord and ‘every effort was to be made’ by accelerated
building and conversion to provide essential additional landing
craft for the European theatre of operations.*

All this was satisfactory as far as it went but for those who were
planning and preparing for Overlord it did not go very far. General
Morgan was no wiser as to the scale on which to complete detailed
plans for he still did not know what forces and assault craft would in
fact be made available—yet the campaign was due to be launched in
four months’ time.

But one momentous decision was announced at the close of the
Cairo Conference. Marshal Stalin had raised the question of the
supreme command at Teheran, urging strongly that the appoint-
ment should be made without further delay, and President Roosevelt
had promised an early decision. A few days later, at the last meeting
of the resumed conference in Cairo on December the 6th, it was
announced that he had decided to nominate General Dwight D.
Eisenhower to be the Supreme Allied Commander for Overlord*

At last there would be someone to state requirements with author-
ity, someone who could insist that outstanding questions must be
answered without delay. In place of the limited power of a staff
officer there would henceforth be substituted the full authority of a
supreme commander.

COSSAC’S CONTRIBUTION TO OVERLORD 25

It may be well at this point to review what Cossac had achieved
before General Eisenhower took up his appointment.

Aided by the studies and material of the Combined Commanders,
Cossac had outlined a plan for launching the Overlord campaign
with the forces and equipment allocated. Once that was approved
the Cossac staff had been reorganised as the nucleus of an opera-
tional staff for the future Supreme Commander, in which the three
Services of two nations were fully represented, all imbued with unity
of purpose and employing a single method. Cossac headquarters had
become the source from which both Service and Civil Ministries
derived impetus and guidance on the co-ordination of all tasks re-
lated to Overlord. Much progress had been made by those directly
responsible for the organisation of supply and communications and
the design and production of special equipment, including the
preparation of embarkation facilities along our own coasts, of arti-
ficial harbours for erection off the far shore, and of pipe-lines for the
submarine delivery of petrol to the armies and air forces in France.
Formations to be employed in the opening phases of the campaign
were being given intensive special training, and, among much else,
measures were being rapidly developed for the quartering, supply
and movement of the large number of aircraft and troops that would
be involved, for the allocation and adaptation of shipping, and for the
all-important requirements of security. There were, too, many other
matters for which Cossac was responsible. These included the co-
ordination of air, land and sea reconnaissance related to Overlord;
Intelligence; camouflage and deception plans; meteorological
organisation; measures to animate and aid subversive action by
resistance movements in the occupied countries of North-West
Europe; organisation for dealing with the legal, fiscal, economic and
other aspects of Civil Affairs which would be met in the countries to
be liberated from German control. Foundations on which the struc-
ture of Overlord was based were thus already well laid before the
Supreme Commander took charge.

In his review of the campaign when all was over General Eisen-
hower wrote that General Morgan’s work before he arrived on the
scene ‘made D-day possible’.14

14 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (London, 1948), p. 253.

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CHAPTER II

THE SHAPING AND COMMAND
OF OVERLORD

commander, preparations for the coming campaign enter

their final phase and it will be well to reflect for a moment
on what was involved, before our vision is affected ‘by the dust of
conflict or the glamour of success’. The opening cross-Channel
assault tends to pre-occupy attention, for it involves the mastery of a
first tremendous obstacle on which all else depends. Yet this will be
only a beginning, and its absorbing interest should not be allowed to
dull the apprehension of what must follow if the Allies’ ambitions are
to be fulfilled. After the seizure of a bridgehead in France and its
expansion as a base for further operations, the enemy must be driven
out of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark and Nor-
way; Germany must be conquered and her armed forces destroyed,
so that the world might be purged of the evil she had bred and had
diffused like a canker among the nations of Europe.

In order to realise their intention the Allies were organising the
mightiest fighting forces they could muster. They were also to pledge
a large proportion of their shipping to the transport of men and
materials, and a major share of their industrial plant and population
to the equipment and sustenance of the campaign. During the war
the convenience’ of civilians and their standards of life were of
secondary concern.

At the very outset of their enterprise Allied forces must engage in
combined operations which were unique in difficulty and danger.
Germany had held an almost unchallenged position in France for
four years. To resist the approach of seaborne foes she held at readi-
ness round the coast considerable numbers of U-boats and light
surface-craft and a few destroyers, to dispute the passage of the
Channel, as well as an extensive organisation for mine-laying by
ships and aircraft. Parts of the French coast had been fortified by the
exploitation of modern engineering skill and a large concentration of
labour and materials. Within these defences were numerous bat-
teries, many sited in almost indestructible emplacements to cover
beaches thickly sown with ingeniously destructive obstacles, and
behind them considerable armies were waiting to repel an invader,
with air forces to assist them and direction-finding appliances, radar,

W= the turn of the year and the appointment of a supreme

28 THE SHAPING AND COMMAND OF OVERLORD

to give early warning of his approach. In 1942 the Dieppe raid had
shown that a high price might have to be paid before this coastal
crust could be broken through—and since then it had been con-
tinuously strengthened. As an additional hindrance the enemy would
be sure to destroy port facilities and render them unusable for weeks
if not for months; during that time attacking armies and immediate
reinforcements must be landed and sustained over open beaches,
exposed alike to the vagaries of the Channel weather and to German
malice. To force such defences had never been attempted before.

Fortunately on this occasion the Allies held advantages usually
enjoyed only by an aggressor nation. They had time to prepare for
the coming campaign with care and forethought which matched its
difficulty; they held the initiative and could attack when and where
they chose; and the combination of all Allied Services, supported
by abundant material, would enable them to attack, this time, in
preponderant strength.

In the final months of preparation the greatest strain must fall
inevitably on Great Britain as the main base of Allied operations.
Within her relatively confined shores millions of her own and Allied
forces were already assembling, while ammunition, stores, equipment
and food were being amassed in unprecedented quantities. Shipyards
were working at high pressure building, repairing and fitting out ships
and craft for many special duties and landing craft production was at
its peak, often in unusual places and by unorthodox means. Special
equipments were being developed to overcome foreseeable difficulties.

Never before had Britain sent into battle large forces which were
so well equipped, well balanced and elaborately trained. The war
had been in progress for over four years and experience from many
seas and many battlefields had been brought to bear on the task that
lay ahead. The armada which was to put the armies ashore and to
sustain them on the Continent included over twelve hundred fighting
vessels of all kinds, over four thousand assault ships and craft and
about sixteen hundred merchant ships and ancillary vessels* The
armies too had a variety of arms and equipments never previously
conceived and the air forces a strength, power and mobility never
before attained. By the time the campaign opened there would be
gathered in the United Kingdom Allied armies totalling over three
and a half million men. The British army would number nearly one
and threequarter millions, Dominion forces a hundred and seventy-
five thousand, the United States army and air forces a million and
a half and other national contingents nearly forty-four thousand*
There would be some thirteen thousand aircraft in the country, in-
cluding over four thousand bombers and some five thousand fighters,
apart from thousands in use for training or held for replacements,
and about three thousand five hundred gliders.*

BUILD-UP IN BRITAIN 29

Britain had become a huge storehouse, workshop, arsenal, armed
camp, and aircraft carrier. ‘It was claimed facetiously at the tre
that only the great number of barrage balloons floating constantly in
British skies kept the islands from sinking under the seas.’ } In all
this accumulation of strength the United States authorities were
associated, and indeed it was only made possible by the addition of
their great resources of energy and power; but the fact that they were
pouring fighting men, munitions and supplies into a country where
with our own forces large contingents of many other Allied nations
were now serving—Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders,
Frenchmen, Norwegians, Belgians, Dutch, Poles, and Czechs—aug-
mented day by day the congestion on English soil, and added to the
strain on British shipping, material resources and manpower. By
the end of May 1944 over a million and a half men had been
brought from America across the threatened waters of the Atlantic.
Nearly sixty per cent came in normal escorted convoys but over
thirty per cent in unescorted passenger ships, all British or British-
controlled, which relied for safety on their speed. The British liners
Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, each adapted to hold fifteen thou-
sand men, together brought over four hundred and twenty-five
thousand troops and during all this movement not a man was lost at
sea. About sixty per cent of the accommodation needed for American
troops was found by the requisition or transfer of existing facilities,
but about forty per cent had to be newly constructed and of this
additional accommodation twenty-seven per cent was British built.
A hundred and thirty-three airfields were provided for the American
air forces; eighty-three of these were transferred from the Royal Air
Force, but fifty new airfields were built for their use, thirty-six by
British, fourteen by American labour. Moreover, of the vast amount
of supplies and equipment required for the American forces in Great
Britain, by the end of May over two-thirds, five and a quarter million
tons, was brought in by sea, forty per cent of it in the five months
before D-day; but approximately thirty-one per cent of all supplies
for the American forces in Europe (apart from Italy) was provided
from British sources.* Moreover, tension was increased by awareness
of the fact that on Britain, if anywhere, all German counter-measures
would certainly be spent. By the end of May nearly fifty-two thousand
civilians had been killed and sixty-three thousand seriously injured
in German air raids¥ and the fact that Germany was preparing to
attack with new long-range weapons was known in high quarters
though not yet to the public.

1 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 63.
* See R. G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, vol. I (Dept. of the Army,
Washington, D.C., 1953), pp. 231, 237, 258.

go THE SHAPING AND COMMAND OF OVERLORD

With movement severely restricted and large areas of the country
reserved for military use, the civilian population saw comparatively
little of what was going on and knew nothing definite about impend-
ing operations; yet sober confidence, tempered by anxiety, grew with
the belief that the main attack on Germany was soon to be opened.
This sense of approaching crisis was quickened when the appoint-
ment of a supreme commander was publicly announced early in the
new year.

General Eisenhower had already many friends in England, for he
had come there to command all the United States’ forces in the
European theatre in June 1942. In the autumn of that year he had
left to serve as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, in
the landings in North Africa and in the subsequent campaigns in
Tunisia, Sicily and Italy. He had been outstandingly successful in
emphasising the Allies’ unity of aim and in overriding the petty
rivalries and mistrust which spring all too easily from national
divergencies of outlook, method and manners, and have so often
marred the conduct of Allies in arms. He had been equally successful
in securing the co-operation of all three Services of both nations—a
co-operation which was fostered by the fully integrated character of
his own headquarters. In his conduct of the Mediterranean cam-
paigns he had shown ability to take decisions yet a notable willingness
to trust subordinate commanders, and he was liked and respected by
all who came in contact with him. In British Service circles and with
the public his reputation stood high and his new appointment was
welcomed on both sides of the Atlantic.

At the same time Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder was
appointed Deputy Supreme Commander—a significant recognition
of the importance of the air arm in the coming campaign. Sir Arthur
Tedder had commanded our air forces in the Middle East and the
co-operation of army and air forces during his command had been
markedly effective. From February 1943 he had been Commander-
in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, and as such had been
responsible for the planning and execution of Allied air operations
in. Tunisia and against Sicily and Italy. He had thus been closely
associated with General Eisenhower and his staff, with whom he had
worked in complete harmony.

At General Eisenhower’s request Lieut-General W. Bedell Smith,
his chief of staff throughout the North African and Mediterranean
campaigns (and previously first American secretary of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff), was appointed as his chief of staff for Overlord.
General Eisenhower’s desire to retain an American chief of staff who
had been with him so long was not unnatural, for not only did the
two men use the same Service idiom but they were accustomed to
working together and were familiar with each other’s idiosyncrasies.

1. General Paget

2. General Morgan

3. General Eisenhower

4. Air Marshal Tedder

BRITISH SERVICE COMMANDERS 31

General Morgan now became a deputy chief of staff and his know-
ledge of all that had gone before in the development of the Cossac
plan, and his intimate contacts with the British ministries and or-
ganisations concerned in the preparations for the coming campaign,
would indeed have been irreplaceable.

The British and Canadian armies which were to be employed
comprised the British Twenty-First Army Group. Its headquarters
had formed in July 1943 in evacuated premises of St. Paul’s School
in west London and General Sir Bernard Paget had then been
appointed to the command. In the ill-fated expedition to Norway in
1940 General Paget had experienced the futility of engaging in
combined operations which were inadequately planned, insufh-
ciently manned and unsuitably equipped. Later, as Commander-in-
Chief, Home Forces, he had proved to be a modern Sir John Moore,
and by his influence and energy had raised the standard and
quickened the spirit of training throughout the Army. As chairman
of the Combined Commanders (page 14) he had been intimately
associated with leaders of the other Services and with the Chief of
Combined Operations in the study of factors involved in a cross-
Channel assault and in the earlier planning for a return to the
Continent, which was later taken over by Cossac and developed as
Overlord. In command of the Twenty-First Army Group he had
laid firm foundations on which its waxing strength was eventually
built up. General Paget’s distinctive contribution to final victory
should always be recognised.

In the autumn of 1943 it had been decided that the Commander-
in-Chief of the Twenty-First Army Group should be ‘jointly re-
sponsible with the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief and the Air
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, for planning
the operation (Overlord), and when so ordered, for its execution,
until such time as the Supreme Allied Commander allocated an
area of responsibility to the First American Army Group’ Thus
General Paget would command both the British and American
ground forces employed during the first phase of Overlord.

When, however, General Eisenhower was selected for the supreme
allied command of Overlord, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
took his place as Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean,
General Paget succeeded Sir Henry Wilson as Commander-in-Chief,
Middle East, and General Sir Bernard Montgomery was appointed
to take over from General Paget the command of the Twenty-First
Army Group and with it the command of all ground forces to be
engaged in the first phase of Overlord.*

General Montgomery had proved his military skill and fine quali-
ties of leadership in the 1940 campaign in France and Flanders, in
his notable defeat of Rommel in North Africa, in the carhpaign in

32 THE SHAPING AND COMMAND OF OVERLORD

Sicily and in early operations in Italy. In the last phase of the North
African campaign, and in the Sicilian and Italian fighting, his
Eighth Army had been part of General Eisenhower’s command; the
latter had thus had ample opportunity to appreciate General Mont-
gomery’s soldierly gifts and to evaluate the fighting experience in
which they had been signally displayed.

At home the appointment was popular. As one of Britain’s best
known and most successful soldiers he had become ‘Monty’ to the
man in the street as well as to the troops of the Eighth Army. His
personality inspired confidence and his picturesque figure was easily
distinguishable; for although he was an infantryman, he wore when
in battle-dress the black beret of the Royal Armoured Corps and
with it the badge of the Royal Tank Regiment set beside the badge
of his own rank.

Both the other Commanders-in-Chief had special qualifications.
Admiral Ramsay had organised the evacuation of the British Ex-
peditionary Force from Dunkirk in 1940; he had helped to plan the
Allied landings in North Africa in 1942 and, in 1943, had com-
manded the British naval task force in the assault on Sicily. Air
Marshal Leigh-Mallory had commanded 12 Group in the Battle of
Britain, had been Air Force commander in the Dieppe raid, had
been Commandant of the Royal Air Force School of Army Co-
operation, and Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Com-
mand. Since his appointment for Overlord he had been responsible
for the build-up and training of the British element of the Allied
Expeditionary Air Force.

The Supreme Commander was to pay a short visit to America
before taking up his command. On setting out for Washington he
first saw General Montgomery and told him that, in his view, the
scale on which Overlord was being planned was too small and the
front to be attacked was too narrow; the plan did not provide
effectively for a quick capture of Cherbourg or emphasise sufficiently
the early need for the use of major ports and for a rapid build-up of
forces. He instructed General Montgomery and General Bedell
Smith to act for him in England, pending his return from America,
and to examine the Cossac plan in detail with the Naval and Air
Commanders-in-Chief with a view to its revision on lines which
would obviate these weaknesses*General Eisenhower then saw the
Prime Minister in Marrakesh and expressed the same dissatisfaction
with the width and weight of the opening assault as at present
planned.

On his way to England General Montgomery also visited Marra-
kesh, where the Prime Minister was convalescing after the sharp
attack of pneumonia which had overtaken him towards the end of
the Cairo and Teheran conferences. There Mr. Churchill gave him

ASSAULT AREA WIDENED 33

a copy of the Cossac Outline Plan and told him that from the first he,
Mr. Churchill, had considered that the assault was designed to em-
ploy too small a force on too narrow a front. General Montgomery
expressed emphatically the same opinion*and, knowing that the
Prime Minister and the Supreme Allied Commander both held this
view, he was on sure ground when he reached England on January
the 2nd, and at once took up the matter with the Naval and Air
Commanders-in-Chief and with the planning staffs and Ministries
concerned.

When General Eisenhower arrived in England on January the
15th to assume his new command General Montgomery was ready
to submit proposals for the enlargement of the Cossac Outline Plan.
These were considered at a meeting with his principal commanders
which General Eisenhower held on January the 21st*The principal
changes proposed were, first, an increase of the number of seaborne
divisions for the initial assault from three to five (the Combined
Commanders had advocated four and Cossac had been restricted to
three by the limitation of forces and equipment allocated by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff); and, secondly, an expansion of the
assault front from twenty-five to nearly fifty miles, including part of
the eastern shore of the Cotentin peninsula, so as to facilitate the
early capture of Cherbourg. General Eisenhower was satisfied that
both the requirements he had stated to General Montgomery before
going to Washington were met by the new plan and his approval of

the plan was quickly endorsed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff;*

but it took much longer to decide whether and how the necessary
additional resources could be found.

Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory explained that an additional eight
fighter squadrons would be required to cover the extended assault
area and wider shipping lanes, and some two hundred more troop
carrier aircraft in order that three airborne divisions could be
dropped within twenty-four hours. These air forces should be
available in Britain two months before D-day to allow for the
training of glider and troop carriers crews.*

Admiral Ramsay showed that two more naval assault forces (one
British and one American) would be required to lift the two addi-
tional assault divisions, while the proposed attack on a wider front
would also involve a considerable increase in naval strength, par-
ticularly in bombarding ships, escorts and minesweepers. A large
increase of merchant shipping must be found to match the increased
scale of attack and accelerate the rate of build-up. The existing in-
sufficiency of landing craft would also be greatly accentuated.

Hitherto naval support and cover for Overlord had been accepted
as a British responsibility ‘with some augmentation from the United
States’, and the Admiralty at once promised to meet as much as

34 THE SHAPING AND COMMAND OF OVERLORD

possible of the increased requirement by cutting commitments else-
where. They did so eventually only by seriously weakening the
Atlantic convoy escorts, reducing the destroyer strength of Home
commands and the Home Fleet, stopping reinforcements to the Far
East and recalling ships from the Mediterranean. Even so they
could not meet all Admiral Ramsay’s new ‘bill’ for Overlord and the
Americans were at first unwilling to make up the balance. It was not
until April the 15th, when it had been made clear to them that
without additional help General Eisenhower’s requirements could
not be fully satisfied, that Admiral King undertook to meet the out-
standing requests. Then three American battleships, two cruisers
and twenty-two destroyers were promised for bombardment duties
—more than had been asked for*

As for merchant shipping, for the new scale of the assault 224
ocean-going cargo ships and roughly half of the British coastal ship-
ping—about 625,000 tons—normally engaged in the distribution of
coal and other essential commodities would be needed to discharge
over the beaches or in artificial harbours. Though these could be
found only with great difficulty and inconvenience to the civil
population this was accepted as inevitable*

But the problem of assault craft, which had so long troubled
Cossac, was now greatly aggravated by the new demands. Inherent
difficulties were complicated by long and firmly-held differences of
opinion between those preparing in London and the American
Chiefs of Staff in Washington. The latter were not easily convinced
by British calculations nor wholly satisfied that Britain was unable
to supply more from her own resources. The far greater shipbuilding
capacity, and almost boundless room for expansion in America,
doubtless made it hard for them to believe that British effort had
already been stretched to the limit. Yet not only was our potential
capacity very much smaller but our circumstances were very much
harder; our industries and our very life depended largely on im-
ports. We had already been at war for over four years. In that time
we had lost over eleven and a half million tons of shipping, and had
suffered much other damage at sea* Besides meeting the over-
riding requirements of the Navy we had built in the United King-
dom in the same period over four and a half million tons of merchant
shipping while about half a million tons had each year been salved,
repaired and brought back into service; another one and a half
million had been built in the British Commonwealth overseas. The
expansion of British shipbuilding in these years had been without
precedent; in order to achieve it every yard had long been working
continuously at high pressure and there was no room for further
expansion.

We had already postponed for three months the completion of a

OVERLORD AND ANVIL POSTPONED 35

fleet carrier, four destroyers and fourteen frigates which were ur-
gently needed by the Navy, in order to build seventy-five additional
tank landing craft (L.C.T.) for Overlord. By simplified methods of
construction and the employment of some seventy thousand men
who were not shipyard workers we had vigorously stepped up the
production and repair of landing craft. We could not do more at
this juncture and, without disturbing their commitments for other
theatres, the American Chiefs of Staff also were unwilling to supply
what was now required for Overlord.?

Moreover, it did not prove easy to agree on what was really
necessary. There was a stated lifting capacity in men and equipment
for each of the many types of landing ships and craft and it might
be supposed that from these data requirements could be readily
calculated. Unfortunately there were a number of data incapable
of precise assessment. How many of the allotted craft could be ex-
pected to be serviceable on the day of the assault, having regard to
casualties through wear and tear in training, the limited facilities for
repair, enemy action, or the hazards of the sea? How many should be
committed to the opening attack and how many held back for the
early build-up? How many should be allocated to close fire support
at the expense of ‘lift’? What allowance should be made for loss or
damage? In any given operation the length of the voyage from the
base to the scene of operations has great significance. In the cross-
Channel attack craft would be able to make several voyages in the
time required for a single voyage in many of the Pacific actions. On
the other hand, the known strength of enemy defence was incom-
parably greater in north-western France than elsewhere and, there-
fore, prudence demanded a higher rate of build-up and a higher
scale of insurance against loss to counter-balance the enemy’s
inherent advantages.

Finally, how many men or vehicles-could be loaded into a par-
ticular craft? The Washington planners calculated this figure
largely on the designed maximum lift, whereas in London there was
a clearer recognition of the need to allow a margin for the fickleness
of the Channel weather. The two staffs using different data thus
arrived at different conclusions and decision was further complicated
as detailed planning proceeded by a tendency of the Army to in-
crease their demands for space, so as to include more men and
equipment in the assault formations. It became necessary to limit
the number of vehicles accompanying each division in the assault
to 1,450, instead of the 3,000 originally planned and, even so, in the
event many craft were greatly overloaded and a few foundered at sea* 15

* Comparative figures for British and American production of assault shipping and
craft are given in Appendix II.

36 THE SHAPING AND COMMAND OF OVERLORD

Thus disagreement as to the number of landing craft required
sprang from technical questions.

But a second and more serious disagreement, which involved
problems of high strategy, reached its climax when the difficulty of
finding additional resources for Overlord (especially landing craft)
had to be overcome without further delay. It sprang from a difference
of opinion as to whether, in the circumstances then obtaining, the
success of Overlord should be buttressed by a complementary attack
on the French Mediterranean coast—operation Anvil. At Quebec in
August 1943 it had been easy to agree that the possibility of Anvil
should be explored. At Teheran and Cairo in December it had been
more difficult to agree that ‘Overlord and Anvil are the Supreme
Operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May. . .¥By
January, when the scale of Overlord was increased and General
Eisenhower got to grips with the struggle to find the necessary
resources, it was soon clear that the Cairo decision could not be
implemented; for there would not be adequate resources for both
Overlord and Anvil to be ‘carried out during May’. At this point
rival views on the conduct of the campaign in Italy complicated the
decision of what, then, should be done.*

Differences between the British and American approaches to the
conduct of war perhaps explain the vehemence with which opposed
views were pressed and account for the heat which was generated
in protracted argument, but it is not necessary here to examine in
detail either the technical considerations or the strategic issues which
combined to bedevil the progress of planning and preparation; they
are dealt with very fully by Mr. Ehrman in his history of grand
strategy for this period.‘ But it is necessary to realise that all this
argument and delay greatly added to the anxieties which beset
General Eisenhower and his commanders. Although by compromise
and goodwill the gap between what they required and what appeared
to be available was gradually reduced, it was finally closed at long
last only by two cardinal variations of the Allies’ plans.

The first, agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staffon February the
Ist, was a postponement of the target date for Overlord from May
the 1st till the 31st* This would make available for Overlord a
further month’s production of assault craft and have other ad-
vantages—and disadvantages—which will be assessed when the
campaign is reviewed. The second was arrived at more tardily. On
the 25th of February the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that Anvil
might have to be postponed in order that resources in the Mediter-
ranean could be used to nourish the battle in Italy and assault
shipping and craft in the Mediterranean (which would be needed

« Ehrman, op. cit., chap. VI passim.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS STAFF | 37

for Anvil) could be transferred to the Channel and used first for
Overlord; but not until March the 24th did they finally agree that
use of these craft was essential to Overlord, and that therefore Anvil
must be deferred until the progress of Overlord justified the re-
transference of assault craft for subsequent use in Anvil*¥It was well
that planning and preparations had meanwhile been pressed forward
on the assumption, but with no certainty, that the necessary re-
sources would be forthcoming, for when doubt was at last resolved
only ten weeks remained for the completion of final arrangements.
Subsequently the British Chiefs of Staff supported Mr. Churchill in
arguing that because of changed circumstances Anvil should be
abandoned. But the American leaders remained equally convinced
that reasons which had led to the earlier agreement on the import-
ance of Anvil as a contribution to the success of Overlord still held
good and should be implemented without regard to changed cir-
cumstances or other considerations. The dispute continued with
growing asperity till well after Overlord had been launched; how
it was eventually settled will be seen when a decision was at last
reached.

Soon after Genera] Eisenhower landed back in England he set up
his headquarters in Bushey Park near Hampton Court Palace. They
were Officially named ‘Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Force’ but fortunately the initials make a pronounceable word; they
became known as S.H.A.E.F., and will be referred to as Shaef in
this history. Most of General Morgan’s Cossac staff were assimilated
in the much larger organisation which was necessary to mount and
conduct the operations which lay ahead, but many key appoint-
ments were filled by men who had served with General Eisenhower
in the campaigns in North Africa and the Mediterranean. The
layout and principal appointments are shown in ne diagram
overleaf.

The Shaef staff was modelled on a pattern that General Eisen-
hower had evolved for the North African and Mediterranean cam-
paigns. The outstanding feature was its inclusive character. Men of
all three Services and of both nations were closely associated at every
level of its complex structure. In no previous war had any compar-
able provision for unity of direction been made by allied nations.
The overriding authority with which Marshal Foch was charged
during the closing phases of the First World War was limited to co-
ordination of the actions of the Allied armies on the western front.§
No attempt was made to form an Allied general staff or to unify con-
trol of conduct below the level of high strategy. Similarly in the 1940
campaign, when the small British Expeditionary Force served as one

5 See Military Operations in France and Belgium, 1918, vol. I (H.M.S.O., 1935), P- 542:

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OVERLORD DIRECTIVE 39

of the armies under a French supreme commander, there had been
no allied general staff. Both cases were explained by the circum-
stances of their times, but when nations combine for extensive opera-
tions, unification of direction and execution requires something
more than the appointment of a supreme allied commander. A
combined allied staff is no less necessary if mutual understanding
and confidence are to be maintained.

On February the 12th, 1944, General Eisenhower received his
directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff*The overriding order,
quoted at the opening of this history, was to enter the Continent of
Europe, and ‘undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany
and the destruction of her armed forces’. The target date was ‘the
month of May’, but he was to be prepared at any time to take
advantage of favourable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the
enemy from the western front, to effect re-entry to the Continent ‘with
such forces as you have available at the time’. It will be recalled
that a similar order had been given to General Morgan (page 10)
and plans for such an eventuality (operation ‘Rankin’) had been
prepared*As they were never used it is needless to do more here than
to note that the burden of this additional planning was also borne by
Cossac.

The directive instructed General Eisenhower that while he would
be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff he should com-
municate direct with the United States or British Chiefs of Staff
when this would facilitate operations and secure the needed logistical
support.

The concentration, quartering, movement and supply of forces,
in short ‘logistics’, were to rest with British Service Ministries and
with the United States War and Navy Departments so far as British
and United States forces were respectively concerned; but logistical
arrangements on the Continent and the co-ordination of all require-
ments would be the Supreme Commander’s responsibility. He was
also empowered to recommend any variation of the action which
was being taken, by various agencies of sabotage, subversion and
propaganda, in preparation for the Allied campaign.

Finally he was told that Russia would so time her coming offensive
that it should prevent the transference of German forces to the
western front; and that the Allied Commander-in-Chief of the
Mediterranean theatre would launch operations, including an
attack against the south of France, ‘at about the same time’. General
Eisenhower would be given command of forces landed in southern
France as soon as he was in a position to assume it. The subsequent
deferment of Anvil and its occasion have already been told.

The full directive, given in Appendix I, laid down the arrange-
ments for command. It will be noticed that while, under the Supreme

40 THE SHAPING AND COMMAND OF OVERLORD

Commander, there are Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied naval
forces and of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, there is no corres-
ponding Commander-in-Chief of the Allied ground forces. It had
been decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the previous autumn
that in the coming campaign the respective United States and
British army group commanders should each report directly to the
Supreme Allied Commander and that no intermediate commander-
in-chief of ground forces was necessary or desirable*in the opening
assault phase, however, (as already noted) when only two armies
would at first be involved, the commander of the British Twenty-
First Army Group (at that time General Paget) would be respon-
sible for planning and for the command of all ground forces engaged
in the operation until such time as the Supreme Allied Commander
allocated an area of responsibility to the commander of the United
States First Army Group. In a directive issued by General
Eisenhower to Admiral Ramsay, General Montgomery and Air
Marshal Leigh-Mallory on the roth of March this arrangement was
confirmed, General Montgomery’s name being substituted for that
of General Paget.*

As already explained, General Montgomery had meanwhile been
acting for General Eisenhower, in co-operation with the Naval and
Air Commanders-in-Chief, in remodelling the plan of assault, and
in directing preparations for the conduct of initial operations so far
as all ground forces were concerned. It will be seen later that he held
command of these during the first three critical months’ fighting, by
the end of which the German armies in France had received a first
sound beating and were in full retreat.

There is a second gloss which needs adding to the diagram-
matical statement of the chain of command, for it alone does not
fully explain the command arrangements for Allied air forces, The
tactical air forces are shown but not the mighty strategic forces
which were already engaged in an awesome bombing offensive
against Germany. It has been explained (page 21) that since 1943
these had been working under a directive of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff (Pointblank), and when the directive to General Eisenhower
was issued in February 1944 it had still not been decided when, or in
what measure, the strategic air forces should be brought under the
control of the Supreme Commander.

The original purpose of the Combined Bomber Offensive was ‘the
progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, in-
dustrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of
the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resist-
ance is fatally weakened’*Had it succeeded fully there might have
been little armed resistance to overcome. How far it succeeded may
best be judged when the story of the land campaign has shown what

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES 41

resistance was in fact encountered. It would be out of place here to
trace the course of its progress, or the controversies which it occa-
sioned before and when it was related organically to Overlord in
1944, for its history during that period is fully recorded in other
volumes of this series. ®

But the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Janu-
ary 1943, after Casablanca, had concluded its specific instructions
with the following general order to the strategic air force com-
manders: ‘When the Allied armies re-enter the continent you will
afford them all possible support in the manner most effective’¥ That
time was now rapidly approaching and there was good reason for
General Eisenhower to look to the strategic air forces for help. It had
been one of the Allies’ aims when they embarked on the Italian cam-
paign to prevent Germany from transferring substantial reinforce-
ments to France by engaging as many divisions as possible in Italy.
Their aim had been partially, but only partially, achieved. Early in
1944 twenty-two German divisions were engaged in Italy, where
there had been only six early in July 1943* but though Germany had
thus been forced to increase the number of her divisions in Italy the
German High Command had managed, during the same period, also
to increase the number of divisions stationed in France to resist the
expected assault. When the Cossac outline plan was considered in
August 1943 there were believed to be some forty divisions in France
and the Low Countries; by March 1944 there were known to be at
least fifty-one* The Allies could do nothing further to induce the
withdrawal of these divisions, but their combined air forces could do
four things to minimise their effective use and so to ease the way for
the coming campaign—four things of great importance, and growing
urgency. They could weaken if not destroy the power of the German
air force to hinder our operations, by obtaining mastery of the air;
they could make it difficult for the enemy to concentrate his land
forces quickly when battle was joined, by disrupting his com-
munications and destroying his means of transportation; they could
weaken his coastal defences; and they could induce him to disperse
or misplace his forces before the battle, by deceiving him as to the
point of our attack. Some of the tasks in which both tactical and
strategic air forces were already engaged would indirectly facilitate
Overlord, but the time was coming when the help of heavy bombers
in strength would be needed, acting in co-ordination with the tactical
air forces, for tasks of immediate concern to the forthcoming assault
and subsequent campaign. Who then was to determine priorities if
the strategic air forces remained outside General Eisenhower's
control?

* See Ehrman, op. cit., pp. 286-304; Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive,
vols. IT and ITI. re =a sia fe

42 THE SHAPING AND COMMAND OF OVERLORD

To him, it appeared, the only satisfactory answer was that (ex-
cepting only Coastal Command) all Allied air forces in Britain, if not
in Europe, should now come under his command* But this was not
the British view and it was because an agreed answer had not been
found that the diagram which accompanied General Eisenhower’s
directive did not show the command arrangements for strategic air
forces.

Looked at from General Eisenhower’s point of view or in Washing-
ton (where the American point of view naturally tended to pre-
dominate in the counsels of the Combined Chiefs of Staff), his
proposal appeared to offer the logical answer; but from the British
point of view the matter did not seem so simple. Overlord and the
Pointblank bomber offensive were distinct though related operations.
The latter was a strategic affair with implications for all European
fronts including the Russian. In the British view control of strategic
air forces should therefore be retained by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff who should allocate part or all of them to Overlord as and when
they might decide.*

Personalities and labels further complicated the issue. It will be
recalled that months before General Eisenhower was appointed, Sir
Trafford Leigh-Mallory was appointed ‘Air Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Expeditionary Air Force’ for Overlord. As, however, the
future control of strategic air forces had not then been decided only
tactical air forces were included in his command. That was still the
position when the directive to General Eisenhower was issued.
General Eisenhower had had no voice in the appointment of the Air
Commander-in-Chief and when he arrived in England it soon
became clear that he did not contemplate any enlargement of
Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory’s existing command. Air Marshal Sir
Arthur Harris and General Carl Spaatz, who commanded respec-
tively the British and United States strategic air forces and derived
their authority for the Pointblank campaign directly from the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff (with Sir Charles Portal as the latter’s repre-
sentative in Britain), were both opposed to the suggestion that the
Supreme Commander for Overlord and, even more strongly, that
the latter’s Air Commander-in-Chief should now be interposed
between them and the body in Washington which directed Allied
strategy* Remote control from far-away Washington had left them
happily free to interpret the general terms of Pointblank in their own
ways; they did not welcome an interruption of the courses they
desired ardently to pursue, or a change of control that would
inevitably curb their freedom of action.

The question was eventually settled by 2 compromise. Bomber
Command and the United States Eighth Air Force were not, as such,
brought under General Eisenhower’s command but, by decision of

DIRECTION OF HEAVY BOMBERS 43

the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the direction of all air operations out
of England ‘engaged in an approved air programme in preparation
for and in support of “Overlord” and incorporating Pointblank
would pass to the Supreme Commander on April the 14th... until
Overlord is established on the Continent’; thereafter their employ-
ment and the method of their direction was to be reviewed by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff*On April the 15th an approved air pro-
gramme was issued and the Deputy Supreme Commander (Sir
Arthur Tedder) was made responsible by General Eisenhower for the
co-ordination of all air operations—tactical and strategic—under his
commandfrom that date the story of strategic bombing becomes
inseparably interwoven with that of other operations of the cam-
paign, although the control of strategic forces was changed as Over-
lord developed. An account of the new air programme and the
active operations which followed its adoption will be given in later
chapters.

By April the Supreme Commander had thus established his head-
quarters and formed his staff, the scale of operations had been
enlarged and the difficulty of obtaining adequate resources was being
overcome. Planning of the assault and seizure of a bridgehead in
Normandy and its enlargement into a lodgement area from which
further operations could be developed had been entrusted to
Admiral Ramsay, General Montgomery and Air Marshal Leigh-
Mallory; their ‘Initial Joint Plan’ had been issued in February and,
under their direction, the detailed plans based on it were being
elaborated by the three Services.*

Before describing these, however, it will be well to know something
of the conditions which the Allies expected to find in France, on
whose soil the opening battle was to be fought—to know something
of how German occupation had affected the French nation and how
the Germans were preparing to defend their position.

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CHAPTER III
THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

‘Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.’
Julius Caesar—De Bello Gallico.

HE country through which a mighty attack was soon to be
‘aimed at the heart of Germany’ belonged to our first ally;

it was also the country of the only nation at war with
Germany whose government had concluded an armistice with Hitler.
Through this France had secured, at the time, freedom from military
occupation for rather less than half of the country; by 1944, however,
all France was occupied. For the Allies, about to embark on her
liberation, it was important to know what conditions they would
encounter and fortunately they were well informed. Their intelli-
gence was both full and accurate, and although the account that
follows has been clarified here and there by the light of after-know-
ledge, most of its important features and a great many additional
details were known to the Allied commanders when Overlord was
being planned.?

On July the roth, 1940, the French parliament, the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate, sitting as the National Assembly, had voted
itself out of existence. The Third Republic was dead; the Vichy
régime was born. All power was vested in Marshal Pétain in order
that he might promulgate a new constitution, to be ratified by the
nation and applied by the political organs it would create. At the
time when he was given this position of supreme personal authority
he was Premier under the old régime and it was his government that
had accepted Hitler’s armistice terms. By the nation he had long
been held in high honour as the hero of Verdun in the First World
War; now he was regarded by many as the saviour of France from
further useless bloodshed. By politicians he was known to hold
authoritarian and reactionary views.

The Marshal was not slow to assume the trappings of power—or in
any hurry to share them. He took no steps to frame a new constitu-
tion. In the meantime Ministers of State, civil servants, soldiers,
magistrates and officials of all kinds were required to swear fealty
to him in person and were made responsible to him alone. All
representative elements in the state were eradicated or reduced to

1 The first half of this ter is Tees (OLU Po ali) and a coated aay bs

Affairs 1943-1996, entitled Hitler's Europe (O.U.P., 1954), and an bri oy ed atc by
Susan Passant (Mrs. R. Donald) of sources refered te ‘in that vol

46 THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

impotence. The Senate and Chamber were suspended and their offices
abolished; local elections were done away with and the old representa-
tive institutions of local government were superseded by organs
deriving their authority from Pétain, and centrally controlled. He
‘governed’ through a Council of Ministers, with an inner cabinet
council, but authority for all laws derived from ‘Nous, Phillipe
Pétain...’

Yet although the old Marshal of France—he was 84—had achieved
this appearance of power and was in fact able to modify German
demands considerably, and although it suited Hitler to accept him as
the figurehead of French government, real power, in so far as there
was any in the Vichy régime, was exercised to a large extent by the
chairman of his inner council of ministers, known at first as Vice-
President of the Council and later as Chief of Government. For the
first six months that position was occupied by the ex-Socialist
germanophile Pierre Laval; after a short interregnum it was held for
fourteen months by Admiral Darlan, hardly less anti-British though
less pro-German than Laval. Then in April 1942 Laval obtained
reinstatement and he was still in office when the Allies began landing
in 1944.

It is unnecessary to trace here the chequered history of the Vichy
régime. It is less a history of government by Pétain, or anyone else,
than of competing factions who, with various motives, fought for
power over what remained of stricken France—of a long struggle
constrained by the conditions of a world-wide war and by the
dominant force of German authority. Leadership in this struggle was
held by men whose rise and fall was determined by their success or
failure in out-manceuvring rival claimants for Hitler’s approval and
for Pétain’s acquiescence. The former required a policy of collabora-
tion with Germany: the latter required a cunning restraint in its
application. Most of ‘the men of Vichy’ came from the conservative,
Catholic, anti-republican right, who before the war had argued the
desirability of authoritarian measures to curb the growth of pro-
letarian power. Pétain’s repression of representative institutions and
his policy of centralised administration had the ready support of such
men; and since these measures would facilitate German control of
politics, administration, industry and finance, his policy in this regard
was also acceptable to Hitler. The fact that Vichy could effect such
changes without destroying the good-will widely accorded to Pétain
disposed Hitler to support the régime, for it was no part of German
policy to alienate French opinion needlessly; his support required the
inclusion of a leader in the régime—a Laval or a Darlan—who could
secure the measure of collaboration which he demanded.

Centred in Paris there was indeed an anomalous collection of
dissident groups who were dissatisfied with Pétain’s policy and were

BIRTH OF FRENCH RESISTANCE 47

frankly anxious to associate France with Germany on a National
Socialist basis. Some had little political importance, others repre-
sented parties which had been alive before the war. All denounced
fervently their particular bogies—Britain, America, Jewish financiers,
Wall Street—while advocating various and often internecine policies.
In German eyes their pro-German zest had its disadvantages, for
whereas Pétain made collaboration seem respectable the Paris parti-
sans made it look discreditable. The Germans, in this instance, pre-
ferred to look respectable. They could use Paris when need be as a
stick with which to beat a hesitant Vichy but so long as Pétain let
himself be guided by Lavals or Darlans there was no need to include.
more troublesome Déats or Doriots in the Vichy régime.

Except in Alsace and Lorraine, which were promptly annexed by
Germany and assimilated in the Reich, civil administration through-
out the whole of France remained under the Vichy régime but, in
varying degrees, it was everywhere subject to German supervision
and was required to conform to German demands. In the occupied
zone German establishments for military government and civil
control were interlaced at every stage and although in the unoccu-
pied zone control was less obvious and exploitation less severe the
difference was one of degree rather than of principle; in both areas
there was enough to ensure the fulfilment of German requirements.
After the military occupation of all France in the autumn of 1942
differences were progressively evened out, the German stranglehold
on industry was everywhere tightened and economic exploitation
intensified.

Certainly France suffered grievously in these years, when German
officials supervised the French civil service and German troops and
police supervised, or tried to, the behaviour of French citizens; when
banking, business and industry were under German regulation and
the rules and orders of German authorities had the force of law and
took precedence over the law of the land. Demands for positive
co-operation were accompanied by a multitude of repressive
measures; strikes and ‘agitations’ were punishable by hard labour
or even death; and equally severe punishments might be inflicted on
those who failed to make any contribution of goods and services
which was levied by the Military Commander. In these years the
strength of France was sapped by a steady drain of men, materials
and money. Nearly a million Frenchmen, prisoners of war taken in
1940, were retained in Germany and nearly half a million more were
transferred from France to work for German industry. The equiva-
lent of at least five hundred million pounds was taken for the ‘costs’
of occupation and some calculations put the total far higher. Raw
materials and manufactured stocks were requisitioned on a consider-
able scale. By the beginning of 1944 France was short of men, short of

48 THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

money, short of materials, short of food, and commerce was at a
standstill.

The conflict of individual interest and patriotic duty, the haunting
sense of national shame and personal danger, sorrow for the loss or
unknown fate of absent kin, and hatred of Germany’s arrogant assur-
ance, were joined, often, to physical strain and economic uncertainty
and were interwoven in the texture of French life. As frequently
happens in times of national calamity, they brought out, in many,
inherent qualities of self-sacrifice, endurance and courage, but in
others greed and self-seeking, cowardice and even treachery.

Any generalisations about the mood and attitude of the French
people can be only partially true and must be subject to many
qualifications. Yet it may perhaps be said with justice that after the
armistice had signified the national defeat a mood of half-stunned
acquiescence was widely prevalent, in which grief was tempered by
thankfulness that a hopeless fight was ended. A belief that Britain
was also virtually beaten made the acceptance of Hitler’s ‘new order’
seem inevitable.

But before long this passive mood began to be less common. As
Britain fought on and first Russia and then America joined the war
on Germany, French hearts were lifted by a dawning hope that
Hitler might yet be beaten in the end and that France might yet
become herself again—that all was not yet lost. Whereas in 1940
the nation lay bemused by defeat, by 1944 large numbers worked
and waited for liberation from their odious bonds with growing
confidence.

While Overlord was being planned the Vichy régime was rocked
by intrigue and at last representatives of the Paris extremists pro-
gressively gained influence. Pétain’s authority had waned and Laval
only held what power he had by leave of Germany. German demands
increased in severity and outwardly the condition of France was
worsened, but in the soul of France a braver spirit was reviving.
Beneath the surface tiny fires of resistance which had been lit in
1940 had been smouldering and spreading ever since. Now they
burned hotly, bursting into flame with increasing frequency and in
places blazing openly in spite of all German efforts to subdue them.
‘Resistance’ had become a factor of military and political importance
not only to France but to the Allies preparing for her liberation. Its
implications for General Eisenhower—and indeed for the Allied
governments—are explainable only by some knowledge of its origins
and evolution.

Respect for constitutional authority is a characteristic of the
French people, and Pétain had been vested with authority by con-
stitutional process. When he accepted Hitler’s terms there was then
no figure in France of comparable standing to rally opposition; yet

GENERAL DE GAULLE 49

from the first a spirit of resistance stirred beneath the surface, in
groups which had often little in common except the determination to
thwart the enemy’s will and to stultify his purpose. The story of these
early resistance groups and their gradual burgeoning is a long and
tangled one, revealing a ‘blend of courage and patriotism, ambition,
faction and treachery’. Many French men and many French women
lost their lives in brave attempts to win freedom for France, and
although the German authorities succeeded in the discovery of much
secret activity which they ruthlessly repressed, they failed, in spite of
all their power, to prevent a steady growth of organised resistance,
though it was fostered in groups which were themselves handicapped
by internal rivalries and the pursuit of opposed policies. By 1944 the
resistance movement had reached both a measure of unity and a
substantial strength. It had done so to a large extent under the
influence of General Charles de Gaulle.

On June the 17th, 1940, when Marshal Pétain announced that he
had applied to the Germans for armistice terms, General de Gaulle
flew to England. The next evening he broadcast a memorable
exhortation and appeal to his countrymen.

From that day he began to rally members of the French forces in
England and Frenchmen everywhere who shared his faith in French
recovery. He claimed that though France was for the time being
conquered the French Empire was not; that though the Vichy
government was subservient to Germany it did not represent the
French nation. Such leadership as Vichy gave was not the true
leadership of a great people and, with the support of the British
Government, de Gaulle set out to provide it from a headquarters in
London. He had a long and stormy passage through the years which
followed but by the autumn of 1943 his uncompromising hostility to
Germany, his unshakable faith in the greatness of France, his
equally firm confidence in his own leadership, and the moral and
material backing of the Allies, had won for him a position of military
and political ascendancy as the protagonist of French revival.

The Allied landings and subsequent victory in North Africa in
1942 and the simultaneous extension of German occupation to the
whole of France, had convinced even the constitutionally-minded
that de Gaulle rather than Vichy spoke with the true voice of France
and throughout the French possessions overseas his leadership was at
last fully established. His relations with resistance movements in
metropolitan France were not quite so clearly defined for reasons
that are explainable only by reference to their development.

From among the many earliest resistance groups which came into
being, were suppressed by the Germans, succumbed to internal
difficulties, or survived and grew, five principal groups could be
distinguished by 1941. In the occupied zone the Parti des Fusillés,

50 THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

organised by the French communist party, attracted much sympathy
and support in the absence of any effective alternative. The party
had also some organisation in the unoccupied zone, but there three
others exercised between them a wider influence. These were the
Libération Nationale, Liberté and Libération, whose members ranged
from the Catholic right to supporters of the old Front Populaire. These
three soon came together, while a fourth, the Carte, held aloof. In
July 1941 M. Jean Pierre Moulin, a leading representative of the
three linked organisations, came to London to seek aid from de
Gaulle. Till then the latter had been chiefly useful to resistance
groups as a symbol; now he began to be thought of as a source of
supply and a focus of more effective organisation. Following this and
subsequent visits closer relationships developed and by the autumn
of 1942 a central organisation with both military and political objects
had been formed in France, relying largely for its unity on the leader-
ship of de Gaulle. He was less successful with the communist groups,
partly because a mission which he sent to them was quickly captured
by the Germans and partly because they were not in sympathy with
his political aims or those of the associated movements which he now
led. The latter were organising a ‘secret army’ to join with the Allies
on the day of deliverance and meanwhile to carry on a programme
of sabotage and subversive action; but they were also planning to
form an administration which would take charge on the disappear-
ance of the Vichy régime. It was on this political ground that not only
the French Communists but the Allied governments had difficulty in
accepting de Gaulle’s full claims. As the architect of military recovery
and the head ofa reconstituted French army the Allies were ready
to give him their whole-hearted backing provided that in military
action he recognised General Eisenhower as Supreme Gommander;
they were less ready to give unqualified support to his political design
for government and his desire to return to France as the political
head of the French people. Indeed, even the associated resistance
movements were not wholehearted in their agreement with his politi-
cal programme, or ready to surrender to him al] the authority he
claimed.

It will be necessary to examine more fully the Allies’ relations with
de Gaulle during the last few months of preparation for Overlord,
but in this outline of conditions which the Allied armies would meet
in France there is, first, more to be said about internal resistance
movements. By far the largest were the associated movements already
noted, organised now under a National Council of the Resistance in
France, which was in turn represented on a committee of National
Liberation over which de Gaulle presided in Algiers. But there were
other foc: of resistance which must be explained.

First there were the ‘Maquis’ who differed radically from other

HELP FOR RESISTANCE 5!

resistance movements in their origin, aims and methods. During 1942
German demands induced Vichy to impose a scheme—the reléve—
to conscript labour for work in Germany on the understanding that
Germany would gradually release French prisoners of war. By this
means over four hundred thousand Frenchmen were transferred but
when, in April 1943, a further four hundred thousand were
demanded there was widespread and spontaneous refusal by the
younger men affected. Thousands disappeared from their homes and
made their way to the mountains. There they gathered gradually
into camps and in time developed an uneven measure of discipline
and command. By 1944 there were some hundred thousand of these
Maquisards, more or less effectively organised and in relation with,
but only partially controlled by, the Council of the Resistance and
de Gaulle’s organisation—good material for guerrilla warfare but
needing arms.

And here an Allied organisation must be included in the picture
—a conjunction of the British ‘Special Operations Executive’ and of
the American ‘Office of Strategic Services’. The Special Operations
Executive (known in short as S.O.E.) was formed in 1940, by a
reorganisation of earlier agencies, to stimulate and assist subversive
elements in enemy-held countries. The S.O.E. did not concern itself
with the political aspirations of resistance movements in France but
sought to establish communications with individual resistance groups
and to help them by supplying arms and sabotage equipment. In
those early days the limitations of personnel, equipment and above
all of transport aircraft restricted severely what could be done but
throughout the years which followed direct links with resistance
groups in France were slowly but progressively strengthened. The
part played by the British Broadcasting Corporation in stimulating
French resistance movements was also considerable. They started
broadcasting messages to the French people from the moment France
fell and continued them throughout the years that followed. The
growth of all resistance movements in 1943, their association with
the National Council of the Resistance and their recognition of de
Gaulle’s leadership, greatly increased the opportunities and occasion
for S.O.E.’s help; and towards the end of that year the representa-
tives in England of the American Office of Strategic Services joined
forces with S.O.E. in a single organisation which was to come under
the Supreme Command of General Eisenhower and work in future
under his directive.

Special Force Headquarters, as this joint organisation within Shaef
came to be called, concerned itself not only with French Resistance
but, in time, with all resistance movements in North-West Europe.
The Belgian Resistance consisted of the Secret Army (with some
45,000 effectives), and the civilian organisations combined as the

52 THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

Comité National de Co-ordination, which were co-ordinated under
M. Ganshof van der Meersch at the end of 1943; in the second
quarter of 1944 there were fifty-five air operations to supply them
with arms. The Dutch Resistance had a less fortunate history because
from March 1942 until May 1943 S.O.E. had unwittingly dropped
forty-three agents into the arms of two able German officers of the
Abwehr. After this disaster had been discovered by S.O.E. in the
autumn of 1943, a ban was laid on air operations to Holland until the
end of March 1944, and even then priority was low and there were
only nine sorties before August. Thus the three main Dutch Resist-
ance movements with para-military branches, Orde Dienst, Raad Van
Verzet and Landelijke Knokploegen, were still poorly equipped by D-day.

Allied leaders differed in their estimates of the military value
which ought to be attached to these resistance movements, and
indeed it was not possible to obtain the data for an accurate assess-
ment. Actual and potential strength could only be estimated; control
of resistance activities would be difficult and incomplete; require-
ments of security made it undesirable to inform resistance leaders of
Allied plans; and at the last minute the effectiveness of resistance
measures might be ruined by German discovery and suppression.
The Cossac view had been that military reliance should not be
placed on resistance activities and therefore that any success in their
operations should be treated as a bonus. In the early months of 1944
this view was shared by General Eisenhower’s staff, but all agreed
that it was desirable to help resistance forces both in continuous
sabotage activities and in armed risings when the time came. An
account of the steps taken to this end belongs, however, to the story
of preliminary operations rather than to this review of conditions in
France which were taken into account in planning the assault. And
of these the most important factor of all has yet to be described—
namely the strength and nature of the enemy’s defences and of the
armies which must be beaten in France.

The fluctuating course of the war since 1940 had been reflected
in the evolution of German policy for western defence. At first, when
there seemed no possibility of any serious danger from Great Britain,
the High Command regarded coast defence merely as a precaution
against enemy raids, but by the close of 1941 the situation had
changed. Russia and America now had to be reckoned with. A long
war was inevitable and the risk of war on two fronts threatened, for
eventually attack from the west appeared probable. The develop-
ment of coastal defences was ordered by OKW (the High Command
of the Armed Forces) and Hitler’s conception of an ‘Atlantic Wall’
began to take shape. At this juncture Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch,
Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, was retired and Hitler
himself assumed that office. In the following March, that is in March

HITLER'S ATLANTIC WALL 53

1942, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt was for a second time recalled
from retirement and was appointed Commander-in-Chief, West.
Subordinate only to Hitler, von Rundstedt thus became responsible
for the defence of France, Belgium, and Holland. The probability
that Britain and the United States would launch an attack through
one or more of these countries as soon as they were able to do so
had now to be faced, and on March the 23rd Hitler propounded a
policy of defence designed to thwart any attempted landing*Coastal
sectors liable to assault were to be turned into fortified areas and
provision was to be made for the immediate counter-attack of any
troops which effected a landing so that they might be quickly
destroyed or driven back into the sea.

Five days later, on March the 28th, a British raid on the German
naval base of St. Nazaire which put the great dock out of action
stung Hitler to order yet more and stronger defences and his belief
in the efficacy of coastal fortifications was strengthened by what
happened later in the summer at Dieppe* For German Intelligence,
largely based on deceptive rumours initiated by the Allies, together
with German estimates of probable Allied strategy, had led them to
expect a large-scale British landing operation during the summer.
The British and Canadian raid on Dieppe seemed to justify this
foresight and its repulse to confirm the value of coastal defence works.
Self-satisfaction reinforced a wilful misreading of events (for they
captured orders clearly indicating the true nature and limited aim
of the PRED PE raid) and had a lasting influence on German defence
policy.

The Allied landings in North Africa during the following Novem-
ber convinced Hitler that there was, however, no immediate likeli-
hood of a further large-scale operation in the West during the coming
winter and, with the war going badly for Germany in both Russia
and North Africa, the forces under von Rundstedt’s command began
to be drained away and ever greater reliance to be placed on the
virtues of steel and concrete. As Allied operations in the Mediter-
ranean underlined the probable postponement of any major attack
in the West, the draining of trained troops from France continued.
From April to December 1943 twenty-seven divisions were trans-
ferred from the West. In their place the number of divisions in course
of formation and training was increased and additional reserve
divisions were brought in from Germany’s ‘replacement army’
(Ersatzheer) responsible, among other things, for providing trained
divisions for the field force. The immediate fighting value of these
heterogeneous forces was not comparable with the five armoured,
two motorised and twenty infantry divisions which had been taken
from von Rundstedt’s command. *

Von Rundstedt repeatedly represented to the High Command the

5A THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

danger of thus reducing his armies, but events in Russia and Allied
landings in Sicily were held to justify reductions in the West, which
was not thought to be in immediate danger of invasion; the main
threat of invasion lay in the Mediterranean. In any case the removal
of von Rundstedt’s troops was ‘only possible because the Atlantic
Wall had meantime attained a considerable degree of strength’.*

In September 1943 the Allies staged the large-scale feint attack
in the Straits of Dover which Cossac had been instructed to plan
(Operation ‘Starkey’). It was designed to provoke an air battle over
the area, to stop the further transfer of troops to Russia or Italy,
and to encourage the enemy to believe that the Pas de Calais was
where the Allies’ main assault would eventually be made. The
German air force appears to have thought that discretion was the
better part of valour and refused to be drawn, and von Rundstedt
had not moved his forces when our demonstration ended. But it
strengthened Hitler’s opinion that the Pas de Calais would be the
scene of the Allies’ main assault when the time came. Here, therefore,
coastal fortifications were to be strongest. For this there was addi-
tional reason. Hitler had laid it down that top priority of develop-
ment should be given to those portions of the Atlantic Wall where
the projected new ‘V’-weapons would be committed* The chief of
these was the Pas de Calais.

Troubled by the continual bleeding of his best troops and un-
satisfied with the progress of defence works, von Rundstedt had
ordered, in May, a searching enquiry into all aspects of the defence.
On the results he based his own estimate of the situation on the
western front. His report is dated October 28th, 1943. It is a sober
assessment of the Allies’ opportunity, of the value of coastal fortifica-
tions and of the adequacy of the coastal defence troops under his
command. He saw three courses of action open to the Allies, namely,
an attack ‘in the Channel, probably combined with an attack from
the south against the French Mediterranean coast’; or ‘attacks
against Normandy and Brittany to establish bridgeheads with good
harbours and to eliminate submarine bases’; or co-ordinated attack
‘from the south against the French southern coast and from the Bay
of Biscay .. .” ‘Because of our inadequate means of reconnaissance,
the enemy is in a position to ensure surprise to its full extent’, but it
was ‘probable that for military and political reasons the enemy does.
not yet consider the attack as timely and has postponed it (Moscow
Conference). Many indications, however, point to the fact that he is
preparing for it.’

Reviewing the length of coast to be defended he concluded that
many parts of the front could not be defended (Vertetdigung) in the
true sense of the word; they could only be covered (Sicherung); and
on the west coast south of the Loire no more than an armed watch

VON RUNDSTEDT AND ROMMEL 55

(verstarkte Beobachtung) was possible. Although the permanent fortifi-
cations of the Atlantic Wall were ‘indispensable and valuable for
battle as well as for propaganda’, yet ‘in spite of all fortifications a
“rigid defence’ of the long stretch of coast for any considerable
length of time is impossible.’ Defence must therefore be based
ultimately on a general reserve ‘especially of tanks and motorised
units’.

Before arriving at these conclusions he had made a detailed evalua-
tion of the troops provided for coastal defence, and his report sets
out the composition, armament, and state of training of each division,
with his own conclusion as to its capabilities. Of the twenty-three
divisions on the coast between the Scheldt and Spain seventeen were
fit for defence, but of little or no value for any offensive action; five
were only partially fit for defence; one was not mentioned. Many
were insufficiently supplied with artillery and heavy infantry
weapons. Many were armed with captured weapons—he names
French, Belgian, Dutch, Polish, Russian and Italian—and in one
army there were ten types of artillery. “This situation causes difficulty
In ammunition supply.’ He found that the morale and discipline of
the German troops were ‘gratifyingly good’, but he had only
accepted the “Turk Battalions’ (a name used to describe battalions of
anti-Bolshevik soldiers, mostly taken as prisoners of war on the
Russian front) ‘in order to have some “men” to show on the thin
fronts’. He added that they ‘will only be of assistance if they hold out;
otherwise they will be a burden’. His final conclusion was that if the
High Command expect ‘offensive operations by the Anglo-Americans
seeking decision against the heart of Europe’, then it was not only
necessary to increase the inherent value of coastal defence forces and
troops capable of immediate counter-attack, but also to constitute a
centrally-located and completely mobile army at the disposal of the
commander of the western front for counter-offensive action*At this
date his reserves consisted of twenty-three divisions; eleven of these
were only in the process of formation; two more were arriving.

On November the grd Hitler issued his directive No. 51: ‘All signs
point to an offensive against the Western Front of Europe not later
than the spring, and perhaps earlier . . . I have therefore decided to
strengthen the defences in the West, particularly at places from
which we shall launch our long-range operations against England
. .. there, unless all indications are misleading, will be fought the
decisive invasion battle.’ A schedule of arms, tanks, assault guns,
motor vehicles and ammunition to be allocated to the western front
and Denmark within the next three months was to be submitted as
soon as possible and ‘only an unsurpassed effort in the construction
of fortifications, enlisting all available man-power and _ physical
resources of Germany and the occupied areas, will enable us to

56 THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

strengthen our defences along the coast within the short time that
in all probability remains’*

In November 1943, Army Group B, which Field-Marshal Rommel
had commanded in Italy, had been transformed into ‘an army group
for special employment’ directly under Hitler. It consisted only of a
headquarters staff and was to study defence preparedness of the
occupied coasts and to submit proposals; and it was to ‘arrange
operational studies for offensive operations against an enemy landing
force’. Rommel was to report direct to Hitler without any reference
to von Rundstedt, who was not only his senior but as Commander-
in-Chief was already responsible for the defence of the West. This
arrangement, so typical of Hitler’s policy of “divide and rule’, was
however short-lived. On December the 13th Rommel submitted his
report on Denmark, which was not within von Rundstedt’s com-
mand. Then the latter intervened and Rommel’s position was
regularised *

On December the 31st the war diary of the Armed Forces High
Command (OKW) Operations Staff included an entry to the effect
that, acting on the previous day’s request by C-in-C West (that is by
von Rundstedt), Rommel’s command, now known as Army Group B,
would be integrated in the western command machinery. It would
cease to be directly under Hitler and in future Rommel would submit
his proposals and receive orders through von Rundstedt. His com-
mand, Army Group B, would now consist of the Netherlands Com-
mand and the Fifteenth and Seventh Armies whose position is
shawn on the map facing this page.*

On paper the réles and relationship of the two dominant com-
manders in France seemed to have been settled, but differences of
age and outlook remained and were not so easily reconcilable. The
old and sober strategist foresaw that the coastal crust would be
broken, however strongly it was fortified; only strong mobile forces
held in reserve and available for use as the situation required could
defeat an invading army whose point of main attack could not be
foreseen with certainty. The young and ardent tactician accepted
the Hitler view that invading forces must be defeated on the coast,
made up his mind where the main attack would come, and wanted
to dispose available forces, ready for prompt counter-attack, near the
threatened coastal sectors. The result of divided counsels will be seen
later.

During the first three months of 1944 Germany’s deteriorating
position on the Russian and Italian fronts handicapped, and at times
reversed, the last-minute attempt to bolster up the defence against
the Allied attack in the West which now appeared imminent. Some
new formations were created, others were re-graded, re-equipped
and brought up to strength. But orders for the transfer of armoured

GERMAN ARMIES IN THE WEST
June 1944

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58 THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

divisions from Russia and Italy were cancelled because neither front
could spare them. More armour and infantry were, in fact, sent East
in the latter half of March, as well as the assault guns of four first-line
divisions; new divisions supplied to the West were less good than
those which had been taken away though the number of tanks had
been increased. *

Work on fortifications, too, though pushed forward with Rommel’s
newly-imported energy, was handicapped both by insufficiency of
material and by a steadily worsening transport system. The Allied
air operations (and to a less extent sabotage by the French Resistance)
were responsible for a deterioration of the German means of trans-
port which was a most important part of the preparatory operations
to be described later, but one indication of what was already
happening may be given here. Military formations alone reported
the loss of one hundred and twenty-nine locomotives through air
attack and sabotage during the first ten days of March—not yet a
crippling affliction but a gnawing sore.

Before leaving for the time being this outline of conditions in
France which those planning Overlord had to take into account in so
far as it was known to them, the numerical strength of the occupying
forces on March the 1st may be noted. The German ration strength
recorded for that day was as follows:*

Army . ; : , . 806,927
SS and Police ; . : é ; 85,230
Volunteers (Foreigners) : : 61,439
Allies . , i ; : 13,631
Air Force. : : : ‘ ; 337,140
Navy . : ‘ : : : : 96,084
Total Armed Forces... . ; - 1,400,451
Armed Force Auxiliaries : ‘ : 145,611

The air force figures, unless explained, are liable to give a false
impression of the German air strength in France at this time. For
over a hundred thousand of the personnel shown above were in anti-
aircraft artillery (flak) formations, designed for air defence but liable
also to be used against land forces; and over thirty thousand were
‘paratroops’.

The German air forces stationed in France were known as the
Third Air Fleet and were commanded by Field-Marshal Sperrle.
They consisted of miscellaneous squadrons of bombers and torpedo
bombers, long and short-range reconnaissance aircraft, and of day
and night fighter squadrons. The approximate numbers of aircraft
available for operations were 890 and of these some 150 were recon-
naissance or transport aircraft.*

GERMAN WAR OUTPUT 59

The German naval defence of France at the date of the Allied
assault will be described in detail later. Here it need only be noted
that it consisted of a number of heavy naval coastal batteries, with
radar equipment, situated at key points on shore; and at sea, one
weak flotilla of destroyers, a few torpedo-boats, five flotillas of motor
torpedo-boats and a considerable number of small patrol craft and
minelayers; the main sea-going defence consisted of U-boats based
on Brest and other Brittany and Biscay ports. All except the U-boats
were under the command of Vice-Admiral Krancke, commander of
‘Naval Group West’. The fact that some coastal artillery was thus
under naval control and some under army command complicated
defence policy.

It will be found later that the strength of the coastal defences and
of the garrison was increased during the time which remained before
the Allies launched their assault. The ‘unsurpassed effort’ for which
Hitler had called bore some fruit, but a description of the position
when the Allied campaign opened may be deferred till that point in
the story is reached.

This review of conditions which the Allies were to meet in France
may be left here for the time being, though it may be well to look
for a moment beyond France, in order to see how far Germany’s
war-making capacity at this date appeared likely to affect the coming
campaign.

At the beginning of 1944 Germany had over 300 divisions in the
field, outside of the Reich. Of these, 179 were on the Russian front,
26 in the Balkan States, 22 in Italy, 53 in France and the Low
Countries, 16 in Scandinavia and 8 in Finland. In various occupied
countries 24 of these divisions were in process of formation® There
was no general reserve in Germany. All Hitler’s huge land forces
were committed, and without denuding other fronts there could be
no substantial increase of the armies in the West.

With the sinking of the Scharnhorst in Arctic waters on December
the 26th, 1943, Germany could offer no effective challenge to Allied
seapower except with U-boats. ‘Small battle units’ made up of such
unorthodox craft as midget submarines, radio-controlled explosive
motor boats and other ingenious devices which might achieve tactical
surprise were still in course of development. In the air, the enemy’s
1,700 long range bombers and 2,420 fighters which constituted half
his total air force had to face attack in Russia, Italy and the West;
and the growing menace of the Allied bombing of Germany entailed
such a concentration of fighters for the defence of the Reich that
there could be no material expansion of air fleets on any of the
threatened fronts.

The maintenance, armament and renewal of the enemy’s forces
was of course dependent on German industry, supported by

60 THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

contributions from conquered countries; and nowhere was German
ability more strikingly evident than in this field. In 1942, Albert
Speer, a young architect (he was 36) who had worked with Hitler
on the design of various public buildings, was appointed Reich
Minister of Arms and Munitions. He had little or no knowledge of
industrial production, but he brought to his new task an acute mind,
imagination, energy and a gift for improvisation. His quickening
influence on the industrial machine is reflected in the following
astonishing figures in his production survey for 1940-1944: *

1941 1942 1943
Ammunition—metric tons . 540,000 1,270,000 2,558,000
Automatic weapons. . 324,800 316,691 435,400
Artillery—including anti-

aircraft . : , : 7,092 11,988 26,904
Armour—including tanks and

self-propelled guns . 2,875 5,673 11,897

Aircraft—all operational types 9,540 12,950 22,050

And production was still increasing in 1944. The question was
whether it could be maintained in face of the rising scale of Allied
bombing. This had already created much havoc and had at times
slowed down production, but so far Speer’s countervailing measures
had made good the loss. The Allied air leaders believed that the
time was near when this would cease to be possible, but it had not
yet come at the opening of 1944.

During these war years German scientists and engineers had
moreover evolved three new types of weapon which might well have
affected the course of the war if they could have been brought into
full use even at this date. These were a new type of submarine, jet-
propelled aircraft, and rocket or self-propelled long-range missiles.

The new type of submarines embodied revolutionary features.
They could travel at high speed under water and could operate
submerged for long periods without rising to the surface. They were
however only put into production late in 1943 and owing to Allied
bombing none made their appearance till the spring of 1945. Various
other improvements of the normal types of U-boat, to give better
immunity from detection and better powers of defence against air-
craft, had been effectively countered by the Royal Navy and the
Royal Air Force, so that Admiral Dénitz, Hitler’s Naval Commander-
in-Chief, wrote bitterly in his diary for November the rath, 1943,
‘The enemy holds every trump card, covering all areas with long-
range air patrols and using location methods against which we still
have no warning. .. . The enemy knows all our secrets and we know
none of his.’ * It was true. The long battle of the Atlantic had been

® Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London, 1952), p. 152.

NEW GERMAN WEAPONS 61

won at least for the time being. Whether it could be reopened by the
new U-boats in time to affect the course of the war remained to be
seen.

A jet-propelled aircraft had been designed in Germany in 1937
and flown experimentally in 1941, shortly after a first British jet
aircraft began flying trials. Two German armament firms continued
experiments and in the winter of 1943 the great possibilities of a high-
speed, jet-engined fighter were demonstrated to the Fuhrer. Fortun-
ately he was more concerned with the need of greater offensive air
power and, against the advice of responsible air officers, he ordered
the development of jet-engined aircraft as high-speed bombers—a
change which delayed production for six months and denied the
German air force a most valuable defensive weapon during the most
critical months. Neither British nor American jet-engined aircraft
were in use at the time and if the jet-propelled fighters which Messer-
schmitt and Heinkel had evolved had immediately been put into
large-scale production the Allies’ air superiority over Germany might
have been seriously challenged.

The position in regard to the new long-distance missiles—the V-
weapons—was different. In this case Hitler had an exaggerated
belief that they could win the war and he therefore did his utmost
to accelerate their production; it was the action of the Allied air
forces which upset his plans. The story of how they did so belongs,
however, to later chapters.

This glance at the German background to the forthcoming fight-
ing in France discloses both the actual strength and relative weak-
ness of the German position. She had vast armies—but they were
committed on three fronts against yet stronger enemies and there
was no central reserve. She had a huge and still increasing produc-
tion—but it was also increasingly threatened by the Allied air
offensive and, as was proved later, the destruction of key elements or
the disruption of the means of distribution might quickly destroy its
value. She had new weapons, all with great possibilities, preparing
for use at sea, in the air and on land—but they could not be available
in time to hinder the Allies’ operations or affect the course of the war.

In planning Overlord the Allies had a good general appreciation
of what they would have to face in France. They knew that they
would have a hard task to break through Hitler’s Atlantic Wall and
thereafter to defeat von Rundstedt and Rommel and the divisions
under their command. They counted on some aid—of what military
value they could not foretell—from the French Resistance Move-
ment. They realised that they would find a France who had endured
agony under German occupation and Vichy misrule, where, often

62 THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

under enemy coercion, the civil administration of the country had
however been carried on by officials who thought it their duty to
obey legally constituted authority, in this case the shoddy tyranny
of Marshal Pétain and his henchmen. They also realised that, while
the Vichy régime was floundering to a shameful death in the quick-
sand of German appeasement, the framework of a new administra-
tion was developing in association with General de Gaulle, who,
whatever his political future might be, would return to France the
widely acknowledged leader of French resistance and rebirth. Finally
they realised that while the German war-making capacity was still
very great it was also very vulnerable.

CHAPTER IV

THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

‘I have not a doubt, if proper measures are adopted, and

if secrecy is observed, that at present a landing, in spite of

the Batteries, may be effected to the westward of Boulogne.’
Sir John Moore to War Office,

October the 1st, 1805.

HE object of Overlord was to secure a lodgement area on the
Continent from which further operations could be developed.
The area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a
force of some twenty-six to thirty divisions and make possible the
augmentation of that force by follow-up shipments from the United
States and elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units
at the rate of three to five divisions a month. Overlord was to be
carried out in two phases. The first would include an assault landing
on the Normandy beaches between Quineville on the east coast of the
Cotentin peninsula and Cabourg les Bains to the east of the Orne, to
be followed by the early capture and development of airfield sites
and the port of Cherbourg. In the second the area won would be
enlarged so as to include the Loire and Brittany group of ports.*
The first or assault phase was named Operation ‘Neptune’. Once
General Eisenhower had approved the enlargement of the scale of
attack it had not taken long to expand the plans which had already
been prepared. On the assumption, but still with no certainty, that
the necessary resources would be available the Neptune Initial Joint
Plan of Admiral Ramsay, General Montgomery and Air Marshal
Leigh-Mallory was issued on February the 1st®This settled the scope
and method of the projected operation and enabled subordinate
commanders of all three Services to elaborate their detailed plans.
The Initial Joint Plan and the Service plans which were based on it
were set out in many bulky and complicated documents and before
attempting to epitomise them it will be well to point out that, apart
from the obvious need for favourable weather, there are three essen-
tials to success in any seaborne invasion of a defended coast. The first
is such control of sea routes and mastery in the air as will prevent
effective enemy interference with planned operations. Second is the
largest obtainable measure of surprise, so that the enemy’s defence
may be handicapped. The third is ability to land and build up the
invading armies with such speed and in such sequence that they can
go swiftly into action and can maintain their attack with increasing
63

64 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

weight and momentum. It will be seen how these fundamental
requirements were met in the Neptune plans.

To ensure control of sea routes and mastery in the air, to surprise
and confuse the enemy and increase the difficulties of his defence,
various preparatory operations were to begin well before the launch
of the main attack. At sea the Neptune operations were designed to
seal off from U-boats and surface vessels the waters we intended to
use, to keep them clear of mines and to restrict enemy movements in
the Channel and its approaches; the Home Fleet would be ready at
Scapa Flow in the Orkneys to deal with Hitler’s surviving major
warships if any put to sea. In the air, preparatory operations that had
been continued with varying intensity since 1941 were to be greatly
extended so as to damage and diminish the strength of the German
air force and secure for the Allies mastery of the air, to hamper
movement of the enemy’s ground forces towards the battlefield by
disrupting his communications and means of transportation, to
weaken his coastal defences, and to confuse his commanders by
disguising our intentions as to the time and place of our opening
attack. These preparatory air operations were progressively intensi-
fied during the time which remained before the launch of the assault.
They formed the essential prelude, the true beginning of Overlord,
and as such will be described in a subsequent chapter.

The main purpose of the Neptune planning was to determine how,
following the easement of their task by these preparatory operations,
the Allies would land and build up their assaulting armies with such
speed and strength that they could overbear the enemy’s initial
Opposition and win a sure lodgement from which they could strike
in force to compass his destruction. Two basic decisions have already
been mentioned. The attack was to be launched against a stretch of
the Normandy coast extending from the Cherbourg peninsula to the
mouth of the river Orne; and troops of three airborne and five sea-
borne divisions were to make the first landings. All planning was
governed by these decisions and by a further agreement that Ameri-
can armies should be on the right flank and British armies on the left.
Since it was intended eventually to supply American forces directly
from America, their use of Cherbourg and, later, of the Brittany
ports would obviously simplify administrative control; for the
British armies, advancing eastwards with the sea on their left flank,
supply would be facilitated by the use of numerous small ports along
the coast.

It followed naturally that the stretch of coast selected was divided
into two sectors, American and British. These were subdivided into
five areas, two of which, on the right, were allotted to divisions of the
United States First Army and three, on the left, to divisions of the
British Second Army, whose main forces, in each case, would follow

PATTERN OF OPENING ASSAULT 65

their assaulting divisions as rapidly as possible. Thereafter, when an
initial bridgehead had been secured, it would gradually be expanded
to form a lodgement area capable of holding the two armies—
British and Canadian—constituting General Montgomery’s Twenty-
First Army Group and the First American Army. The latter would
subsequently be followed by their Third Army and would then
be formed into the United States First Army Group under Lieut-
General Omar N. Bradley.

But all this depended on the Navy’s ability to effect the safe and
timely arrival of our assaulting forces and the ability of the troops,
supported by naval and air bombardment, to break the German
defence and fight their way inland; and before examining the plans
of the Services it may be useful to sketch in outline the underlying
pattern of the opening assault.

While the Army is at sea it is under naval control and embarka-
tion must be carried out under naval supervision. A marriage of
the assaulting forces would therefore take place in England where
the troops, supporting weapons and essential equipment would be
loaded into the appropriate vessels for despatch in the order in
which they would be needed. Guarded by naval forces and protected
by air cover, the ships would sail in convoy at appointed times
through mine-swept channels to the coast of France. The leading
troop-carrying vessels would be specially adapted passenger ships,
bearing the first wave of the assaulting troops and each carrying on
deck a corresponding complement of small landing craft. In order to
gain as much as possible of the priceless advantage of surprise and to
reduce the danger from coastal batteries, each group of these
‘Ianding-ships infantry’ (L.S.I.) would be stopped several miles from
the shore; there the troops on board would embark in the small
‘landing-craft assault’ (L.C.A.) which would be lowered and formed
up for the final approach and run in with other larger craft loaded
with tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery to assist in piercing the
beach defences. The high proportion of these supporting arms with
the leading waves was to be a special feature of the attack.

Concentrated heavy bombing by Allied air forces and intense
naval bombardment of the enemy’s more important coast defence
batteries and other pre-selected targets would already have opened
and this would later be swelled by the fire of destroyers and special
support vessels as they shepherded the landing craft ashore, drenching
beaches and enemy defence works with fire during the final approach.
At the last moment the naval guns would lengthen range for the
soldiers to fight their way across the beaches. and advance inland,
where certain key positions on either flank would already have been
seized by airborne troops, landed some hours earlier. Succeeding
waves bringing in reinforcements, including ammunition and

66 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

priority vehicles, would follow swiftly till the beaches and hinterland
were wrested from the enemy and a firm footing was secured; and as
soon as the foreshore was in our hands, the beach organisation would
take charge to marshal incoming traffic as it arrived and to direct its
movement. At sea, the continuously mine-swept channels, guarded
by warships and aircraft, would by then be busy fairways for ship-
ping, with craft ferrying men and equipment ashore. That, stated in
its simplest terms, was the pattern of opening assault which was
provided for in the Neptune plans; with that outline in mind the
detail that must be added is more easily understood.

As already mentioned, the front to be attacked was divided into
two sectors and sub-divided into five areas. Each of the latter was
distinguished by a code name as follows:

Area Code Name

1. The Cherbourg peninsula, northe UTAH

wards from the mouth of the river ;
Vire American

2. From the south-eastern limit of OMAHA eee

Utah to Port en Bessin (exclusive)
3. From the eastern limit of Omaha GOLD
to the river Provence.
4. From the eastern limit of Gold to JUNO _ {British
St. Aubin sur Mer. sector
5. From the eastern limit of Juno to SWORD
the river Orne.
A further area extending eastward from Sword was named Band,
but it was not used in the seaborne assault. See map facing page 168.
The naval plan, which was issued by Admiral Ramsay on Febru-
ary the 28th, conformed to the same pattern® Two ‘Naval Task
Forces’ would be associated with the two armies—a Western Naval
Task Force with the American First Army and an Eastern Naval
Task Force with the British Second Army—and within these would
be organised five ‘Naval Assault Forces’ to be associated with the
five assaulting divisions. They would be known by the initials of the
area code names. This five-pronged attack was the feature which all
clse in the naval assault plan was designed to further. An integral
part of each task force would be bombarding warships, close escorts,
minesweepers and numerous auxiliary vessels for special duties;
these would be allotted to the five assault forces during the opening
phase. The general structure of the seaborne assault is shown in the
diagram opposite.
It will be noticed that two additional naval forces were associated
with the troops who were to follow up the first landings—namely
Forces B and L.

67
Naval Commander-in-Chief

Task Western Naval Eastern Naval
Forces Task Force (U.S.) Task Force (British)

Force L
(Follow-up)

Assault Force U Force O Force G Force J Force S
Forces (4 Inf (1 Inf (50 Inf (3 Cdn (3 Brit
Div) Div) Div) Inf Div) Inf Div)

I t { 8 t

i ! 1 { I

i i i f

i 1 1 | t
Assault y + ¥ y y
Areas UTAH OMAHA GOLD JUNO SWORD
Sectors American sector British sector

Before proceeding with the naval plans itshould be explained that
both in peace and war British naval command in the waters of the
Channel is normally divided between the Home Commanders-in-
Chief at Plymouth, Portsmouth and the Nore, but the appointment
of Admiral Ramsay necessitated a temporary variation of this
arrangement. As Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Ex-
peditionary Force he was given full authority over all naval forces
engaged in the invasion except those providing distant cover; he held
direct command within the assault area off the French coast and he
controlled all naval operations forming part of the general plan.
Subject to this arrangement the Home Commanders-in-Chief con-
tinued to exercise their normal functions, carrying out the many
planned covering operations and administering the many base
services required by the expedition.

Altogether nearly 7,000 ships and craft would be operating. They
would include 138 warships ranging from battleships to destroyers
for bombardment duties; 221 destroyers, sloops, frigates, corvettes,
trawlers and patrol craft as convoy escorts; 287 minesweepers and
495 light coastal craft for a variety of purposes. Included in the total
would be 58 vessels forming anti-U-boat escort groups of the Western
Approaches Command which were to control the western approaches
to the Channel.

Landing ships, landing craft and barges of all types would number
over 4,000; of these, nearly half were to cross the Channel under their
own power, the remainder either in tow or on board the larger ships.
In addition to the naval ships and craft there would be 441 ancillary
vessels, exclusive of small craft, including amongst others depot ships,

68 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

tugs, salvage vessels, smoke-laying vessels, mooring and buoy-
laying vessels, survey vessels and telephone cable ships, besides the
ships required to control the laying of the artificial harbours and
submarine pipe-lines for the delivery of petrol. Finally there would
be 805 merchant ships of many varieties comprising store and am-
munition carriers, hospital ships and tankers, besides 59 blockships to
provide ‘artificially sheltered water’ off the French coast*and nearly
goo miscellaneous small craft. Details are given in Appendix II.

Each of the five naval assault forces would consist of ships and
craft to transport and land the attacking troops, of warships partici-
pating directly in the initial assault, close naval escorts, and various
auxiliary vessels allotted for specific duties. Bombarding ships would
be attached to each force during the opening phase. Details of the
ships and craft engaged and of the organisation of the naval assault
forces are given in Appendix II, and the map facing page 136 shows
the convoy routes and naval covering forces.

Arrangements for the assembly and loading of all this shipping in-
volved the use of almost every port and anchorage from Felixstowe
on the east coast to Milford Haven in the west and about 750
additional berths were provided in the Solent to supplement the
berthing facilities at Portsmouth and Southampton; for reasons of
security and to avoid congestion the bombarding forces would
assemble in the Clyde and at Belfast and the blockships at Oban.

Assault forces, protected by naval escorts and shore-based British
and American fighters, were to move coastwise in convoy from their
assembly ports to a rendezvous some fifteen miles south-east of the
Isle of Wight, called ‘Area Z’. In doing so they would follow routes
which were in regular use for normal traffic (and were therefore
continuously searched for mines) for as the enemy was aware of this
considerable coastwise traffic the passage of the assault convoys
would be less likely to arouse his suspicions. From Area Z the five
forces would strike southward towards France and once they had
turned towards the Normandy coast their destination would be
apparent; thereafter, the preservation of secrecy would largely
depend on success in preventing enemy observation from the air and
in confusing his radar watch.

Each force would be preceded by minesweepers, for it was known
that a German mine barrier extended across the line of advance in
mid-Channel and other minefields were believed to exist further
south; mine-free water might reasonably be expected in the Ger-
man swept channel near the French coast and the ‘lowering
positions’ for the landing-ships would therefore be in this area, about
seven to ten miles off-shore. Minesweeping is an unspectacular but
all-important task. In the phrase of the American Rear-Admiral
D. P. Kirk, who commanded the Western Task Force, minesweepers

MINESWEEPING AND NAVAL COVER 69

were ‘the keystone of the arch in this operation® They were required
to carry out the largest single minesweeping operation ever under-
taken, falling into four phases. First they were to sweep and buoy
ten channels, two for each assault force, one for fast and one for
slow traffic, as far as the ‘lowering positions’. This whole system of
swept channels was known as the ‘Spout’. Then they were to search
and mark clear anchorages inshore for the bombarding ships and the
great mass of assault shipping which would follow. Thereafter they
were to widen the channels in the Spout, removing all mines swept,
and finally they were to extend the swept waters inshore and open
new channels along the French coast as required. Their task was un-
ending, for all channels must afterwards be kept clear by continuous
daily sweeping.

Twelve flotillas of fleet minesweepers would be employed, of
which ten were British, one Canadian and one American. Besides
these there would be ten flotillas of auxiliary minesweepers for
_ special tasks and for inshore work, all but two being British. With
attendant motor launches and dan-layers,! 255 of the minesweeping
force were employed in the first phase*Its assembly was delayed and
combined training suffered because several fleet flotillas had to be
drawn from convoys to north Russia, from the Mediterranean, from
Iceland, Canada and the United States; many of the crews thus
lacked recent experience, particularly in the niceties of sweeping in
cross tides by night, which involved unusual technical difficulties.

Fleet sweepers cannot operate effectively at a speed of less than
74 knots, but the speed of some of the convoys for which they were to
clear a passage did not exceed 5 knots. Thus to avoid moving too far
ahead the sweepers would have to ‘waste’ an hour and a half in the
later stages of the approach by reversing course for about forty
minutes. Sweeping would begin in a strong east-going stream and
finish in one setting equally strongly to the west and, in the slack
water between tides, the sweepers would have to change over their
sweeps in the dark without loss of station. These exacting duties
called for very skilful seamanship, courage and endurance and for
unremitting toil. It will be seen later how splendidly the mine-
sweeping crews rose to the occasion.

But mines were not the only danger to be overcome. The volume
of Allied shipping that would be using comparatively limited waters
would offer the nearby submarines and surface vessels of the enemy
a unique temptation to attack. Apart from the protective measures
of the Allied air forces to be described later, naval protection was to
be afforded mainly by a strong defence in depth, for during passage
the close escorts of the assault forces would be mainly engaged in

1 A vessel employed to buoy the channels swept by the minesweepers.

70 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

controlling navigation and preserving the cohesion of convoys in the
swept channels. Responsibility for deep defence was to rest chiefly on
the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, Admiral Sir Charles Little,
supported and covered by forcesunder the Vice-Admiral, Dover, Vice-
Admiral Sir H. Pridham-Wippell on the east and the Commander-
in-Chief, Plymouth, Admiral Sir Ralph Leatham on the west. A
seven-mile gun-zone would be established on each side of the Spout
and along the southern side of the coastal channels; any ship dis-
covered there during darkness must be treated as hostile. Destroyers
were to patrol the outer fringes of this zone while more distant
patrols of coastal craft would range at night over a wide adjoining
area.

On the east, where movements were already restricted by mine-
fields and shoal water, the Dover Command would provide four
destroyers, two frigates and forty-six motor torpedo-boats and
launches, to deal with any opposition. To extend radar cover and to
act as rallying points for coastal craft, frigates were to be placed in
advanced positions between Beachy Head and Cap d’Antifer, near
le Hayre. On the west, in the relatively open waters of the western
Channel, a stronger defence was needed. To meet the threat of
U-boats and surface craft working from Cherbourg and other
westerly bases three patrols would be established, each consisting of
four destroyers from the Plymouth Command. The first, composed
of United States destroyers, was to protect the route followed by
Assault Force U from the west country ports where it would assemble;
the second, known as the Hurd Deep patrol, would cover the mid-
Channel area on a line running north from St. Malo, in Brittany;
the third, known as the Western Patrol, was to concentrate about
fifty miles north-west of Ushant to intercept enemy destroyers
should they appear. The last two patrols would be composed of
British, Canadian and Polish destroyers and by night they would be
reinforced by coastal craft.

Against the U-boats, further defence measures included both air
and naval action. For many months past U-boats had had few
successes in the Atlantic, but it was known that since their decisive
defeat there in 1943 they were being re-equipped and reorganised
and that a special group based on Brest and the Biscay ports was held
there in readiness to intervene in the Channel. It was assumed that
when the hour struck these would constitute the enemy’s main form
of counter-attack by sea. To prevent this succeeding, aircraft of the
Royal Air Force would patrol continuously, by day and night, the
area bounded by the coast of Ireland, Cornwall and the Brest
peninsula in such density that evasion would be difficult if not im-
possible. The western part of the danger area—about a hundred and
thirty miles west of Land’s End—would be covered by aircraft of the

AIR PLANS 71

Fleet Air Arm from three escort carriers, supported by six anti-
submarine escort groups, all drawn from the Western Approaches
Command under Admiral Sir Max Horton, while four more anti-
submarine groups of destroyers would operate from Plymouth and
Milford Haven under the control of the Commander-in-Chief,
Plymouth.

Defence of the anchorages off the French coast had also to be pro-
vided. An extensive programme of minelaying near the Brittany
coast, which was designed to prevent an approach to the Spout by
inshore routes, will be described with other operations which pre-
ceded the assault. In the days following the assault the invasion fleet
might expect an increasing scale of attack as the enemy recovered
his balance and drew reinforcements from elsewhere; his light surface
vessels and aircraft, particularly minelaying aircraft operating by
night, would be the greatest menace. To meet this danger permanent
patrols to seaward and on the flanks of the assault area would
supplement the day and night fighter cover, while organised striking
forces composed of destroyers and coastal craft would be ready to
counter any surface attack. In the anchorages smoke protection
would be available and the many ships present would be ready to
provide a great weight of anti-aircraft fire.

All these measures were planned to bear the armies safely to
France. To support the landings and subsequent advance naval fire-
support on an unprecedented scale would be provided by six battle-
ships, two monitors, twenty-three cruisers and more than a hundred
destroyers. The first targets for the heavy ships would be twenty
coast defence batteries selected in consultation with the Army and
because of the threat they constituted for assault shipping. Many of
these batteries, as well as others, would already have been attacked
by the heavy bombers, but experience elsewhere had shown that only
the heaviest naval guns could neutralise them effectively over pro-
longed periods. As the hour of the landing approached, every avail-
able weapon would join in a crescendo of fire to plaster the beaches
with bombs, shells and rockets so that the defenders could no longer
serve their weapons and must seek shelter or be killed.

Leaving for the time being plans for the naval part in subsequent
operations it will be well to turn to the army and air plans and con-
venient to take the air plans first, since, as will be seen, they were the
first to come into force.

The Overall Air Plan which was issued by Sir Trafford Leigh-
Mallory on April the 15th*was designed to achieve and maintain an
air situation in which the German air force would be incapable of
effective interference with Allied operations, to provide continuous

72 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

reconnaissance of the enemy’s dispositions and movements, to disrupt
enemy communications and channels of supply, to support the land-
ing and subsequent advance of the Allied armies, to deliver offensive
strikes against enemy naval forces and to provide the air lift for air-
borne forces. The foundations of this ambitious programme had been
laid by the actions of both tactical and strategic air forces long before
the Overall Air Plan was finally agreed, and it is well to bear in
mind the distinctive position of the Allied air forces in that respect.
For the past two years they had been actively engaged in what was,
in a sense, an invasion of Europe. They were already involved in a
continuous series of air battles, so that for them Overlord would be
a culmination and intensification of their efforts rather than a new
campaign. For months before the scale and scope of Overlord were
decided they had, among other things, been fighting to win air
superiority and to disrupt enemy communications as a general pre-
liminary to an Allied invasion of the Continent; after the issue of the
Overall Air Plan, and the approved plan for the strategic air forces
which came into force at the same time (page 43), a new phase of the
air war opened in that all Allied air operations were co-ordinated
and specifically related to the Overlord campaign.

The massive scale and wide variety of air operations planned
could only be met from huge resources and the Allies’ combined air
strength was indeed tremendous. As already mentioned (page 28)
they expected to have over thirteen thousand aircraft concentrated
in Britain, over eleven thousand of which would be available for
Overlord. It was doubted whether the enemy could bring to battle
on the day of the assault as much as one-tenth of that number!

In round figures, those available when it began may be classified
broadly as follows:

R.A.F.

and
associ- US.A.A.F. Total

ales
Heavy Bombers : . (day) — 1,970 1,970
29 29 : a (night) 1,470 en 1,470
Medium and Light Bombers (day) _—_100 700 800
99 9 99 99 (night) 130 — 130
Fighters and Fighter Bombers (day) 1,400 2,300 3,700
”» 29 9 9 (night) 490 | 490
Troop Carriers and Transports 460 goo 1,360
Coastal Command aircraft 1,030 40 1,070
Reconnaissance aircraft . 350 170 520
Air/Sea Rescue aircraft . 80 — 80

5510 6,080 11,590

ALLIED AIR RESOURCES 73

In addition, the Allies would have over 3,500 gliders for the
transport of airborne troops.*

The varied nature of the Allies’ planned air operations was well
catered for by the variety of available resources. The highly concen-
trated experience of war had proved a great fertiliser of ideas and
under its impulse rapid progress had been made in the application of
scientific knowledge to the design, equipment and operation of the
air arm.

The tactical air forces, the Allied Expeditionary Air Force of
which Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory was Air Commander-in-Chief, are
shown m outline in the diagram overleaf and in detail in Appendix
VI. These also show the strategic air forces whose part in Overlord
was under General Eisenhower’s direction. The arrangements for
the command of the strategic air forces have already been described
(page 42); it will be well to explain here the command for the Allied
Expeditionary Air Force.*

The headquarters of Fighter Command, renamed Air Defence of
Great Britain, had for years been situated at Stanmore in Middlesex
and an elaborate network of communications had been installed
there. This establishment was now developed by the Air Commander-
in-Chief as his main headquarters during the assault, and he had
with him at Stanmore his deputy, Major-General H. S. Vandenberg
of the United States Army Air Force, and an integrated Anglo-
American staff. From Stanmore he exercised overall air command
except in relation to the strategic air forces which, when engaged on
operations in support of Overlord, were to be directed and co-
ordinated by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder as Deputy to the
Supreme Commander.

At Stanmore the general co-ordination of air policy and plans was
achieved in conferences attended by all the principal air com-
manders, their chief staff officers and senior representatives of other
Services; and from Stanmore Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory main-
tained close contact with the Supreme Commander, with the
Commanders-in-Chief of the other Services and with Coastal Com-
mand, whose operations were under the operational control of the
Admiralty. He retained command of the Air Defence of Great
Britain and of the transport aircraft required for airborne troops, and
he nominated targets of tactical importance which the Strategic air
forces were required to attack. But he delegated to the Commander
of the British Second Tactical Air Force, Air Marshal Sir Arthur
Coningham, operational control of the planning and operations of
both the British and American tactical air forces. Air Marshal
Coningham was known as Commander, Advanced Allied Ex-
peditionary Air Force, with headquarters at Hillingdon House,
Uxbridge.

ALLIED AIR FORCES—OUTLINE ORDER OF BATTLE
6th June 1944

SUPREME COMMANDER
General Dwight D. Eisenhower

DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder

COASTAL COMMAND ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory
DEPUTY
Major-General
Hoyt S. Vandenberg

ADVANCED ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE
Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham

ALLIED STRATEGIC AIR FORCES

BOMBER COMMAND | EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Air Marshal Lieutenant-General
Sir Arthur T. Harris James H. Doolittle

Air Chief Marshal
Sir W. Sholto Douglas

AIR DEFENCE
OF GREAT BRITAIN
Air Marshal
Sir Roderic M. Hill

10 GROUP
Day and Night Fighters,
Fighter Bombers,
Air/Sea Rescue Aircraft

tt GROUP
Day and Night Fighters,
Air/Sea Rescue Aircraft

$2 GROUP
Day and Night Fighters,
Reconnaissance Aircraft

13 GROUP
Day Fighters

SECOND TACTICAL
AIR FORCE
Air Marshal
Sir Arthur Coningham

2 OROUP
Light and Medium Bombers—
Day and Night,
Reconnaissance Aircraft

83 GROUP
Day Fighters, Fighter Bombers,
Reconnaissance Aircraft
A.O.P. Aircraft

84 GROUP
Day Fighters, Fighter Bombers,
Reconnaissance Aircraft
A.O.P. Aircraft

85 GROUP
Day and Night Fighters

34 WING

Reconnaissance Aircraft

AIR SPOTTING POOL

Fleet Air Arm and
Royal Air Force Fighters

NINTH
AIR FORCE
Major General

Lewis H. Brereton

1X BOMBER COMMAND

Light and Medium
Day Bombers

IX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Day Fighters, Fighter Bombers,
Reconnaissance Aircraft

XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Day and Night Fighters,
Fighter Bombers

IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

Troop Carrying, Glider-towing
and Transport Aircraft

10 GROUP

Reconnaissance Aircraft

When in support of Overlord wee
When in co-operation with Overlord © ¢ © ¢ © 6 «

AIRBORNE AND

TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

Air Vice-Marshal
L. H. Hollinghurse

38 GRouP

Troop Carrying, Glider-towing
and Transport Aircraft

46 aroup
Troop Carrying, Glider-towing
and Transport Aircraft

TASKS OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT 75

The reason for taking this step was that as long as General Mont-
gomery had the command of all ground forces it was thought desir-
able that the command of all tactical air forces should similarly be
unified. It was indeed understood and written into the plan that Air
Marshal Coningham would be the only air commander with whom
General Montgomery would normally have to deal. The opening
tactical air battle would thus be directed by Air Marshal Coningham,
to whom all requests for air action would be made. At his head-
quarters at Uxbridge there already existed an established network
of communications and facilities for control, for it was the permanent
headquarters of No. 11 Group, Air Defence of Great Britain, the
group charged with the air defence of southern England and offen-
sive fighter operations over northern France and Belgium. His Joint
War Room, Combined Control Centre and Combined Recon-
naissance Centre were all established at Uxbridge. From there he
would direct executive air action in support of the armies; from
there he would keep the Air Commander-in-Chief posted with the
information reaching him about the tactical situation and with
knowledge of General Montgomery’s intentions and requirements.
Only when the latter required strategic air forces to support opera-
tions would he notify the Air Commander-in-Chief direct, informing
Air Marshal Coningham at the same time.*

Both at Stanmore and at Uxbridge there would be senior Allied
officers of the other Services for liaison duties, and at Uxbridge,
alongside Air Marshal Coningham and sharing his responsibilities,
would be the Commanding General of the United States Ninth Air
Force, Major-General Lewis H. Brereton.

The Overall Air Plan was related first to naval plans which have
been outlined and subsequently to the armies’ operations on land. The
enemy’s opposition would take three forms. In the air was the con-
tinuing threat of aircraft which must be beaten off and destroyed; at
sea there was the threat of U-boats, surface craft and mines; and on
land there was the threat of the coastal defence system and of the
rapid reinforcement of enemy ground forces. Against all these forms
of opposition our air forces were to be heavily engaged. Protection
of our forces while in passage and in the assault would depend
mainly on fighters. Their task would begin in darkness with the
escort of airborne troops and of heavy bombers for the opening of the
bombardment. In daylight the assault forces would present such tar-
gets for enemy air attack that he could hardly ignore this challenge.
A great air battle over the beaches was to be expected and it was
likely to reach its crisis while the success of the actual assault still hung
in the balance. The effectiveness of fighter cover at that time would
profoundly affect the issue. Five squadrons would be maintained to
cover the swept channels. Ten squadrons would be maintained over

76 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

the beaches (five in the British and five in the American sector) and
a pool of thirty-three squadrons would form a striking force for use
as required. Approximately three thousand seven hundred of the
Allies’ fighters would be used in all, distributed as follows:

British American Total

Shipping cover. ; oo 15 15
Beach cover . ‘ : . 36 18 54
Direct support of land forces . 18 18 36

Offensive operations and
bomber escort . ‘ ._ = 33 33
Striking force... ; ; 18 15 33
Total squadrons . e. ° 998 99 171

While the co-ordination of all these fighter operations would be
centralised at Uxbridge their tactical direction was to be exercised
through a number of subordinate control centres at sea, completing
a network of radio communications. In the assault area ‘Fighter
Direction Tenders’,? under naval control, would operate as required
by the air command. One was allotted to each of the British and
American sectors; the third was stationed to seaward in the Spout.
From these specially-equipped ships, personnel of the air forces would
control day and night fighter cover over shipping and the beaches in
those zones. After the beaches had been captured similarly-equipped
stations would be established on shore and the direction tenders
would then serve as satellites to the shore stations,

While fighters protected the assault forces from enemy air attack,
heavy and medium bombers would join in the continued bombard-
ment of the enemy’s coastal defences. Heavy bombers of Bomber
Command during darkness, and of the United States Eighth Air
Force after daybreak, would concentrate first on the selected targets
which would then be subjected to heavy naval bombardment.
Squadrons of medium and light bombers and fighter bombers of the
tactical air forces would attack strong points and defended positions
which covered the beaches, joining with other arms in the final
‘drenching fire’ immediately before the first landings to keep the
enemy’s head down at this vital time. Their further actions would
depend largely on the progress of the troops and on the armies’ re-
quests for air support. Intensive reconnaissance would be main-
tained to observe and report any enemy movements and the bomb-
ing of road and rail centres further inland would be sustained in
order to make his movements difficult and dangerous. And always,
then and thereafter, they would have to ‘cleanse the sky’ of hostile
aircraft.

* For details, see Appendix II, page 515.

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OPERATION ‘NEPTUNE
Air Cover for the Assault on D-day

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TASKS OF THE ARMIES 77

As early as possible five airfield construction groups of the Royal
Engineers and a field force basic construction wing of the Royal Air
Force, and eighteen American aviation engineering battalions—two
of them airborne—would begin work on a large programnte of air-
field construction so that the Expeditionary Air Forces could move to
France in concert with the Allied armies. The programme aimed at
the provision of three ‘emergency landing strips’ on the opening day,
one British and two American; two British and two American ‘re-
fuelling and rearming strips’ by the evening of the fourth day; ten
British and eight American airfields by the end of a fortnight; and
forty-five British and forty-eight American airfields available at the
end of three months. The realisation of this aim would clearly depend
on the speed with which the necessary ground was won and on the
shape eventually taken by the opening battle. And it may be noted
that, whereas the Cossac plan had specified that by the end of the first
three months seventy-five per cent of airfields constructed would be
‘within approximately sixty miles of the Seine’, in the Overall Air
Plan they would be constructed as far as was practicable ‘within sixty
miles of the limit of the Allied advance eastwards’.*

There were of course many other matters covered by the Overall
Air Plan including the air evacuation of casualties, the air-sea rescue
service and the provision of air transport, a matter which assumed
great importance and had considerable influence on operations as
the armies advanced eastwards.

A system of control which could effectively direct the movements
of so many and so varied aircraft in circumstances which changed
from hour to hour depended not only on the structure of command
which has been outlined but on an elaborate network of com-
munications which could not be explained shortly in non-technical
language—communications from land-to-land, land-to-ship, land-
to-air, air-to-air, ship-to-air and ship-to-ship—all were involved.
For the most part the means used was radio telephone but cable was
made available later. During the assault, headquarters ships pro-
vided an essential radio link with air headquarters in England until
stations on the French shore were established and, finally, the
Expeditionary Air Force Headquarters itself moved to France in
association with Shaef and the armies they were supporting. For all
these naval and air operations were designed to help the armies’ rapid
capture of sufficient ground for the deployment of their full strength.

The armies to be employed were:
British Second Army .
United States First Army } peueeanis

First Canadian Army Foll ;
United States Third Armyf “° OW-UP 4tmucs

78 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

The British Second Army, commanded by Lieut-General Sir
Miles Dempsey, was to ‘assault between Port en Bessin and the river
Orne’ and to secure and develop a bridgehead south of the line
Caumont-—Caen and south-east of Caen in order to ‘secure airfield
sites and to protect the flank of the First United States Army while
the latter capture Cherbourg . . .“Lieut-General Omar Bradley’s
United States First Army was ‘to advance as rapidly as the situation
permits, capturing Cherbourg with the minimum delay’ and develop-
ing the Omaha beachhead ‘southwards towards St. L6’, in con-
formity with the advance of the British Second Army. *

As soon as possible the First Canadian Army would follow the
British Second Army and would take over the left or north-eastern
sector of the front which by then should be expanding; the United
States Third Army would follow their First to complete the First
United States Army Group. After clearing the Brittany peninsula,
capturing the Brittany ports and taking over the protection of the
Loire flank, both American armies would face east. The Allied
armies would then attack north-east towards the line of the Seine
from above Paris to the sea.

But this is looking ahead, for it was never expected to reach the
Seine in less than about three months. The armies must first breach
Hitler’s ‘Atlantic Wall’ and must hold off all opposition till they
had gained ‘elbow room’ and gathered force to advance in strength.

The Baie de la Seine where the Allies were to land and to break
through the enemy’s defence 1s enclosed on the west by the Cotentin
peninsula and on the east by the headland from which le Havre
overlooks the mouth of the Seine. The coast—which will be des-
cribed in detail later—varies, a rocky foreshore and steep cliffs in
the west giving place eastwards to low undulating ground, sandy
beaches and muddy flats. Dotted along the coast are nearly a dozen
small watering places and three small harbours, Port en Bessin,
Courseulles and Ouistreham. Inland it is gentle country. Except
near the tip of the Cotentin, where the ground behind and over-
looking Cherbourg rises in places to four or five hundred feet, the
immediate hinterland is seldom more than two or three hundred
feet above sea level and between the base of the Cotentin and the
mouth of the river Orne it is often less; much of the area round the
base of the Cotentin is easily flooded.

Inland, the country rises slowly to a belt of higher ground which
sprawls across the base of the Cotentin peninsula and extends south-
wards for fifty to sixty miles and eastwards towards Chartres. It is
broken country rising in a few places to a thousand feet or more, but
intersected by steep valleys and cut by streams and rivers. It is
served by a few main roads and a larger number of secondary roads
and lanes, and one main railway runs through from east to west.

REVIEW OF PLANS 79

Much of this belt of country, known as the ‘bocage’, is richly clothed
with woods and orchards and starred by clusters of small farms
gathered round their parish church. The chequered pattern of its
little fields, its winding roads and dusty lanes, is bordered by steeply
banked hedges. The pace of life there is slow and its most charac-
teristic machinery is the unhurried ox-drawn plough. The progress
of mechanised armies might well be slow too, for in this close country
advantage would be with the defence.

Once clear of the bocage progress should be easier, for in the low-
lands of the Loire valley to the south and in the plateau to the west
of the Seine the country is more open and farming is done on a
larger scale. Here and to the south-east of Caen are the areas most
suitable for airfield sites. When the Seine had been reached the
Allies would face the most fought-over French and Belgian country
which had often been called ‘the cockpit of Europe’. British soldiers
had last fought there in 1940.

The initial organisation of the Allied armies is shown in the

following diagram.

UNITED STATES FIRST

ARMY GROUP

BRITISH TWENTY-FIRST

Follow-up | United States Third Army First Canadian Army
Armies
Assault United States First Army British Second Army
Armies
Follow-up VIII XIX VIII XII
Corps Corps Corps Corps Corps
(Two (Two (Three (Three
divs) divs) divs) divs)
Assault VII Corps V Corps XXX Corps I Corps
Corps | |
79 Inf Div = 2 Armd Div 49 Inf Div |
Follow-up 9 Inf Div 2 Inf Div 7 Armd Div 51 Inf Div
Divisions go Inf Div 29 Inf Div
Assault 4 ‘| Div 1 Inf Div 50Inf Div 3 Cdn 3 Brit
Divisions | Inf Div Inf Div
!
Assault UTAH OMAHA GOLD JUNO SWORD
Areas

United States First Army under command of
British Twenty-First Army Group in opening phase

80 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

The diagram shows the seaborne divisions which were to make the
assault; it does not show the three airborne divisions which were to
open the assault in darkness, landing behind the coastal defences on
either flank. Of these the United States 82nd and torst Airborne
Divisions, to land behind the right flank, were to be under command
of the United States VII Corps; the British 6th Airborne Division, to
land on the left of the British sector, would come under command of
the British I Corps after landing.

The diagram is enough to show in skeleton the Allied armies and
the manner in which they were to be used in the opening attack. In
the British Second Army, VIII and XII Corps would follow XXX
and I Corps. Fuller detail of the five assault divisions of the leading
corpsis given later in the diagrams at pages 172 and 189 which
indicate the order in which they would attack, the way in which they
would be reinforced with additional troops and the named sub-
divisions of the beaches on which the landings were to be made.

It was planned to have landed the equivalent of over eleven
British and American divisions on the opening day of the assault
(D-day); thirteen by D plus 1, and seventeen by D plus 4, including
in each case the three airborne divisions. The airborne divisions were
then to be relieved and, excluding them, it was planned to have the
equivalent of twenty-one divisions on the Continent by D plus 12,
twenty-six by D plus 20, thirty-one by D plus 35 and thirty-nine by
D plus go.

It could not yet be known what forces the enemy could produce to
oppose this programme. When the Initial Joint Plan was issued in
February some fifty-five German divisions had been identified in the
West, of which eight were armoured divisions. The rate at which
further divisions would be brought against us would depend partly
on the German reading of the situation (and, as will be seen, we
hoped that he might be led to mis-read it) and partly on the Allies’
interference with the movement of his troops by preparatory bomb-
ing and continuous air attack.

The combined plan of assault was explained by General Mont-
gomery, Admiral Ramsay, Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory and other
British and American commanders at a meeting of high ranking
officers which was held at Twenty-First Army Group Headquarters
on April the 7th. There General Montgomery also outlined in broad
terms the course of operations which it was intended to pursue after
the assault had succeeded and a firm footing had been won. It
was obviously impossible to forecast with assurance the exact dates
by which particular positions would be reached, but his intention
was that after a firm bridgehead had been gained and Cherbourg
captured the United States First Army would operate southwards
towards the Loire, one corps of the Third Army, brought in through

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5. Admiral Ramsay

6. Admiral Kirk 7. Admiral Vian

g. General Bradley 10. General Dempsey

EISENHOWER AND FUTURE STRATEGY 81

Cherbourg, moving westwards into the Brittany peninsula. The
British Second Army would ‘push its left out towards the general
line of the river Touques’ and at the same time would ‘pivot on
Falaise’ and ‘swing with its right towards Argentan—Alencon’. After
this the armies would be directed on to the Seine. The First Canadian
Army would by then have taken over the left or northern section of
the front. It would face up to the Seine below Rouen, be prepared
to force a crossing and operate northwards in order to cut off and
capture le Havre. The British Second Army would move forward to
the Seine between Rouen and Paris, while the United States First
Army would be directed on Paris and the Seine above the city; it
would be prepared to cross the river and operate to the north-east,
while the United States Third Army protected its right or southern
flank. General Montgomery thought that we might reach the Seine
by D plus go—i.e. about September the 1st.*

Mainly for administrative planning purposes a map of the battle
area had been drawn showing phase lines which might be reached
by certain dates, so that the armies’ needs would be met if they were
realised. But in view of subsequent misunderstandings it is well to
state here that neither at this meeting nor at any other time did
General Montgomery commit himself to any detailed long-distance
forecast of progress. He consistently emphasised the fact that military
forecasts and projected phase lines are based on too many im-
ponderables to be regarded as more than targets or shrewd con-
jectures. A paper dated the 7th of May was issued to the British and
American army groups setting out his intentions ‘so far as they can be
formulated at this stage’, with a note stating that “Whether operations
will develop on these lines must of course depend on our own and
the enemy situation which cannot be predicted accurately at the
present moment’.?*

Some weeks before the April meeting General Montgomery had
stated that ‘his plan was to maintain a very firm left wing to bar the
progress of enemy formations advancing from the eastwards, while
his mobile armoured formations would press forward in a southerly
direction. Before extending eastwards we should ensure that we had
formed a firm base’;*“and his Chief of Staff, Major-General F. W. de
Guingand, had reported that General Montgomery was not pre-
pared to commit himself as to the time at which an eastern thrust
would be launched ‘as he has in mind the possibility that the enemy
might concentrate their forces on this flank’.*

* The following extracts are of particular interest:
‘ ... The type of country immediately south of the initial bridgehead does not favour
a rapid advance. .. . Once through the difficult bocage country, ... our aim... should
be to contain the maximum enemy forces facing the eastern flank of the bridgehead, and
to thrust rapidly towards Rennes.’
G

82 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

The Supreme Commander was taking a still longer view of the
strategy to be adopted in the conduct of subsequent operations. This
is indicated in a paper dated May the grd which had been prepared
for him by his planning staff at Shaef; with only one small modifica-
tion suggested by his Air Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower
approved it on the 27th of May*It will be found later that he ad-
hered closely to the broad plan of campaign which was thus outlined
well before the fighting began; it will be well therefore to note it
here.

General Eisenhower’s directive from the Combined Chiefs of
Staff was to ‘undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany
and the destruction of her armed forces’. The planners argued that
although Berlin was the ultimate goal the Ruhr was the industrial
and economic heart of western Germany and German resources
would therefore be concentrated to defend it. “Thus an attack aimed
at the Ruhr is likely to give us every chance of bringing to battle and
destroying the main German armed forces.’ A study of the physical
conformation of northern France and the Low Countries, the terri-
tory which lay between Normandy and the Ruhr, led to the con-
clusion that the two most promising lines of approach would lie
‘north of the Ardennes, on the general line Maubeuge—Liége’ and
‘south of the Ardennes, on the general line Verdun-—Metz-Saar-
briicken’. Of these the northern route is the more direct; moreover,
‘an advance along the Channel coast and north of the Ardennes is
through the best airfield country available’ and ‘with the capture
in turn of the Channel ports’ as far east as Antwerp, the adoption of
the northern route ‘would facilitate the maintenance problem and
enable a faster rate of advance to be sustained’. Yet the northern route
alone ‘should not be adopted as it leads only to a head-on collision
of the opposing main forces on a narrow front with no opportu-
nity of manceuvre’. It was contended that ‘as operations progress and
our superiority becomes more marked we must advance on a front
sufficiently broad, to threaten an advance by more than one of the
“gaps” into Germany. By so doing we should be able to keep the
Germans guessing as to the direction of our main threat, cause them
to extend their forces, and lay the German forces open to defeat in
detail’. They concluded that ‘the best method of undertaking opera-
tions aimed at the heart of Germany and the defeat of her armed
forces would be to advance.on two mutually supporting axes, in
order to retain flexibility of manceuvre:—(a) with our main axis of
advance on the line Amiens-Maubeuge-Liége-the Ruhr (5) with
a subsidiary axis of advance on the line Verdun—Metz’. In view of
the fact that General Eisenhower adopted substantially the strategy
advocated in this paper and that the wisdom of this decision was
later and is still challenged by some critics, it is worth noting that

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS 83

it was prepared and signed by Captain P. N. Walter, R.N., Brigadier
K. G. McLean, and Group Captain H. P. Broad, R.A.F., three
British members of the planning staff at Shaef.

Three days after approving the statement of future strategy,
General Eisenhower issued a directive to the principal commanders,
including Montgomery and Bradley, ‘in order to permit advance
planning of command and administrative control incident to
eventual establishment of two distinct zones of advance on the
Continent ...’ When ordered by the Supreme Commander the
command of all U.S. and attached Allied ground forces in the
American zone of operations would pass to the Commanding
General, First U.S. Army Group, which would then become ‘the
Central Group of Armies’ under its own Commander-in-Chief. At
the same time Twenty-First Army Group (possibly strengthened by
attaching a U.S. army or at least a reinforced U.S. corps) would
become ‘the Northern Group of Armies’, with its separate Com-
mander-in-Chief. Meanwhile General Montgomery would continue
to command all ground forces on the Continent until reorganisation
was ordered by the Supreme Commander.*

The army plans covered a wide range of other matters on which
success in the coming battles would largely depend. These included
not only the detailed plans for operations but such general matters
as arrangements for the concentration, marshalling and briefing of
troops and their grouping in the assault formations and in ‘residues’
which would be sent out later; far-reaching provisions for security,
and diversionary operations to mislead the enemy which would in-
volve all three Services. It must indeed be realised that in order to
epitomise the plans of the Commanders-in-Chief and of the three
Services, so that their significance stands out clearly, all but their
principal features have been omitted.

Among these was one of fundamental importance for which the
planning required not only industry and technical skill, but also
great imagination and foresight, namely the vitally important matter
of administration and maintenance. It is easy to ignore these ques-
tions or to take them for granted when all goes well, but the main-
tenance overseas of large modern armies and air forces demands
the very highest quality of administrative planning and executive
ability. Only first-rate organisation will ensure that mighty forces,
frequently on the move and liable to be extended over hundreds of
miles, are continuously supplied with all their requirements. The
material needs of modern armies and air forces are large and com-
plex. Personal clothing and equipment, weapons and ammunition,
and of course rations, are obvious necessities. But much more is

84 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

required than these alone. A modern army moves on wheels or on
tracks and so do the ground equipment and supplies of air forces.
Without an adequate supply of vehicles and of the means to main-
tain and run them modern armies and air forces can neither live nor
fight. So essential are they that it was deemed necessary to land some
12,000 vehicles on the opening day of the assault. It will be found
later that questions of supply and maintenance had direct bearing
on the conduct and conclusion of the campaign, but in this brief
survey of plans it will be enough to indicate the principles and
methods of maintenance laid down in the administrative planning
for Neptune.*

While the Supreme Commander’s directive had made him re-
sponsible for the co-ordination of logistical arrangements on the
Continent and of the requirements of British and United States
forces under his command, responsibility in the United Kingdom
rested with the Service Ministries, so far as British forces were con-
cerned, and with the United States War and Navy Departments in
the case of American forces. Throughout the gradual evolution and
development of plans for a return to the Continent—the Combined
Commanders studies in 1942, Cossac planning in 1943, and finally
the Neptune plans of 1944—each time plans were modified a
multiplicity of committees and staffs on both sides of the Atlantic
worked out meticulous calculations afresh. Logistical planning
probably involved a larger expenditure of thought, time and sta-
tionery than any other section of the campaign plans. It is un-
necessary to describe fully the Joint Outline Maintenance Project/
Administrative Plan which was issued on February the 8th in con-
junction with the Neptune Initial Joint Plan. Some idea of both its
complexity and importance can be appreciated from a mere recital
of the main subjects dealt with. These included the policy for main-
taining the forces engaged; the principles and methods of main-
tenance; control of base areas and reserves; assessment of stores
required; movement and transportation; engineer works connected
with roads, airfield construction, water supply, bulk petrol supply,
hospital depots, electricity supply, accommodation, and the re-
habilitation of civil installations; supplies; petrol, oil and lubricants;
Expeditionary Force Institutes (N.A.A.F.I.); ordnance stores and
vehicles; captured equipment; anti-gas clothing and equipment;
ammunition reserves; repair and recording services; accommodation
for hospital units, workshops, storage and personnel; salvage; water-
proofing; postal service; fire service; printing and stationery; claims
and hirings; local purchase; reinforcements; medical services;
casualties; hygiene; discipline; prisoners of war; pay; burials; wel-
fare; and civil affairs. Moreover, distinctive arrangements had to be
made for administration and supply in United States areas.

MAINTENANCE SYSTEM 85

While it is unnecessary to go into these mattersin detail itis desirable
to understand at least the general system of supply and maintenance
by which the huge forces to be employed were to be sustained during
the campaign that lay ahead.

The War Office was responsible for supply, movement to embarka-
tion points, and despatch overseas of stores and equipment for the
British armies, for certain items for the Royal Navy and Royal Air
Force, and for ‘common user’ supplies (for example, fuel) for both
British and American forces. American headquarters in the United
Kingdom exercised similar duties regarding the movement of stores
and equipment, subject to co-ordination with the War Office.

Before the campaign opened the British Army Main Base in the
United Kingdom had built up reserves of all classes, and of equip-
ment, amounting to seventy-five days’ consumption at intense rates.
Under the Bolero plan (page g) American headquarters in the
United Kingdom had built up ‘a stockpile of two and a half million
tons of equipment’ in ‘twenty million square feet of covered storage
and shop space’ and ‘forty-four million square feet of open storage
and hard standings’.

Logistical arrangements on the Continent, which would eventually
come under the control of the Supreme Commander, would at the
outset be a responsibility of General Montgomery and it may be well
to explain the British Army system of maintenance in the field, as it
had been modified by recent experience. Compared with the needs
of the slow moving armies of previous wars those of modern mechan-
ised armies vary far more greatly from day to day. Demands for
petrol, ammunition, and engineering and ordnance stores, for in-
stance, are liable to fluctuate rapidly and require a correspondingly
flexible supply system; for ability to switch formations from one part
of the front to another at short notice, which is one of the advantages
of mechanisation, is largely dependent on flexibility in the system of
supply. This means that supply and maintenance arrangements
must be controlled and co-ordinated by the staff and that con-
siderable stocks of all important commodities must be held well
forward. To meet this need ‘field maintenance centres’ under corps
control were introduced in the British system of supply.

From stocks held in the main base in the United Kingdom, sup-
plies for current use and to be held as reserves would be accumulated
overseas in a rear maintenance area—in effect the principal overseas
base; from there they would pass along the lines of communication
(by rail, road or air) to army rail or road heads; they would then be
fed to the series of forward dumps in corps areas constituting the
field maintenance centres; these would in turn supply divisional
delivery points and so supplies would reach individual units. The
system may be illustrated thus:

86 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

Main Base (Great Britain)

Rear Maintenance Area or Advanced Base
(in France)

Lines of
Communication

Army Roadheads, Railheads and Airheads

Corps Field Maintenance Centres

Divisional Administrative Areas
and Delivery Points

Units Units

The Rear Maintenance Area (comprising rear maintenance depots
and advanced base depots) would eventually be distributed over a
considerable district. The field maintenance centres would move
forward with the corps they served.

It was of course important to get an overseas base—the Rear
Maintenance Area—and a system of supply operating on the far
shore as soon as possible, but this could only be achieved gradually.
First a ‘beach group’ would be landed with each assault brigade;
from initial dumps formed by these groups would be developed
‘beach maintenance areas’ under corps control, and by about D
plus 5 Second Army would become responsible. During the next
fortnight or so the lines of communication organisation would begin
to take shape and two army roadheads would be established—one
near Caen and the other near Bayeux. By D plus 17 the majority of
Second Army’s troops should have landed and the First Canadian

PORTS AND ARTIFICIAL HARBOURS 87

Army be on its way; this was to come in on the left of the British
sector and in due course the army roadhead near Caen would be
handed over to the Canadians. By then the Rear Maintenance
Area should be able to replace the temporary beach maintenance
areas; Lines of Communication should begin to play its full part,
and field maintenance centres under corps control would be coming
into operation. The final pattern would thus be taking shape.

It was intended to make use of the few little ports on the assault
front, in particular Port en Bessin, and it might be possible to clear
stores landed through them by rail to the Rear Maintenance Area,
but apart from this it was not expected that railways could be of
much use for about three months; meantime lines of communica-
tion would be road-operated. Eventually, road, rail and air transport
would all play their parts. By the time that the railways were in use,
about D plus go, it was planned to have a reserve of twenty-one
days’ stocks in France.

Considerable provision for the assault formations was made by
arranging, first, that unit transport and all ammunition vehicles of
formations would land fully loaded and that an emergency ammuni-
tion reserve of three to four thousand tons would be landed in
beached barges on D-day; second, that all vehicles would embark
with full petrol tanks and would carry in addition three to five
‘jerricans’, each containing four and a half gallons; and, third, that
each man would carry rations for two days. Armoured formations
would land with three days’ rations in their vehicles in addition to
what the men carried.

It was hoped that Cherbourg and the Loire and Brittany ports
would be captured by D plus 40; after they had been cleared and
restored to working order they could be used for the United States
build-up direct from America, and facilities in the Cotentin and at
Omaha would then be available for use by the British until le Havre
and Rouen were freed. Meanwhile, it was planned to construct two
artificial harbours, one to serve the British sector and one the
American. A full account of this remarkable and romantic enterprise,
of the evolution of ideas finally embodied in their design and con-
struction, of the novel problems which had to be solved and the
difficulties which were encountered and overcome—though some of
them only at the last minute—would be out of scale here. But they
were an essential factor in the Neptune plans and as they will figure
largely in the story of later operations it is necessary to explain what
they were and what purpose they were planned to fulfil.

The idea of creating artificially sheltered water has a considerable
history. Mr. Churchill had suggested the use of concrete breakwaters
to form ‘a weather-proof harbour’ during the First World War and
his mind had turned to the question of floating piers in 1942, when

88 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

the Combined Commanders were studying conditions for a return to
France.‘ His minute then (May the goth) to the Chief of Combined
Operations was headed ‘Piers for use on open beaches’. It began,
‘They must float up and down with the tide’, and ended, ‘Don’t argue
the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves.’® Since then

* the War Office had been developing such piers but their combination

with breakwaters to form a complete harbour was first raised as a
matter of urgency by members of General Morgan’s staff, who
attended with him a conference convened by Admiral Mount-
batten in June 1943 to study outstanding technical and administra-
tive problems involved in Overlord. Those taking part included
many of the principal commanders and staff officers of the Services
and Service Ministries as well as American Service representatives.
The conference agreed that the provision of such artificial harbours
was an essential feature of the Cossac plan* Preparatory work could
not begin till the plan was accepted in August; little more than eight
months then remained for the technical development of the project
and for the production of the great mass of equipment required, but
the drive imparted through the Service Ministries and the aid of
eminent engineers and contractors achieved remarkable success, as
will be seen later. The designs finally adopted can be explained in
simple terms though they were in fact highly complicated.

First, sheltered water was to be provided for the five assault areas
by forming in each a breakwater composed of blockships known as
‘Corncobs’, brought in under their own power and sunk in line.
These breakwaters were known as ‘Gooseberries’ and it was planned
to complete all five by the fifth day of the invasion.

The Gooseberries lying off Gold and Omaha were then to be ex-
panded into artificial harbours (each comparable in size with Dover
harbour) by sinking large ferro-concrete “caissons’ (called ‘Phoenix’)
to reinforce and extend the line of Corncobs and to continue them
shoreward at both ends. Each harbour would have two entrances for
shipping and berthing accommodation for a limited number of deep-
draught ships and about twenty coasters, besides large numbers of
landing craft, tugs and miscellaneous small vessels. Within the waters
thus enclosed landing craft would be able to ply freely in all weathers.
Piers would also be built of articulated steel roadway supported by
pontoons and with pontoon pierheads all firmly anchored to the sea-
bed but free to ‘float up and down with the tide’. This equipment of
piers was collectively known as ‘Whale’. At the pierheads coasters
and similar shallow-draught vessels would be able to discharge at
all states of the tide. For deep-draught ships which could not be

*W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. II (1949), p. 214 ef seq.
5 Op. cit., vol. V (1952), p. 66.

CROSS-CHANNEL CONVOYS 89

accommodated within the harbours additional breakwaters com-
posed of heavy floating steel structures called ‘Bombardons’ would
be provided to seaward of each harbour. The whole, including
breakwaters, piers, moorings, buoys and other navigational aids
and anti-aircraft guns for its protection, was known as a ‘Mulberry’
harbour. This outline with the attached diagram explains the general
plan.

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MULBERRY HARBOUR AT ARROMANCHES
4th September 1944 ~ D+90 days

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Apart from the blockships, every main component had to be
towed from its building-site to assembly areas and thence across the
Channel to France, a task requiring the services of every available
tug which could be mustered in Britain and from the United States.
The magnitude of the project may be indicated by a few figures.
Fifty-five merchant ships and four obsolete warships would be used
as Corncobs.* There would be two hundred and thirteen caissons

® Fifteen more were added later.

go THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

varying in size according to the depth of water in which they were
to be settled; the largest would be two hundred feet long, fifty-five
feet wide and sixty feet high and would weigh over six thousand
tons—‘five-storey buildings’ to be towed across the open sea. There
would be twenty-three floating pierheads, ten miles of Whale road-
way and ninety-three Bombardons of cruciform section, each two
hundred feet long, twenty-five feet high and weighing about two
thousand tons when partially flooded. In the aggregate the material
to be moved by sea and installed quickly in exact position on the far
shore, in a tideway and despite possible enemy interference, would
amount to some two million tons of pre-fabricated steel and concrete,
an enterprise to test the skill of many, including seamen, soldiers and
civil engineers*When the time comes to describe how the harbours
were brought into operation their construction will appear more
fully.

Description of the means by which the Allied overseas forces were
to be supplied has so far not mentioned the all-important naval link
in lines of communication which connected those in England with
those which would be developed in France. To appreciate this it is
necessary to return to naval plans for after the opening assault the
twin tasks of build-up and sustenance would depend on the navies’
ability to maintain this link unbroken. On their success all else
would turn.

To ensure a rapid start of the build-up fifteen personnel ships,
seventy-four ocean-going merchant ships and over two hundred
coasters were to be loaded before D-day. Thereafter eight convoys of
ships, besides groups of landing craft, must reach the assault area
every day in order to maintain the momentum of the battle. And the
cargo of each convoy—and indeed of each ship—must match the
particular needs of the force it was to feed. The right troops, ammu-
nition, vehicles, armaments and stores had to be ready at the loading
ports and loaded in the right order; and the route to be followed by
each convoy, out and on return, and the escort to be provided, had
all to be defined and timed as precisely as possible. Everything had
to be planned and organised in duplicate, since separate British and
American supply lines were to be maintained*

To match the day-to-day movements of shipping to the require-
ments of commanders and the planned build-up of overseas supplies,
special inter-Service machinery was set up. A Build-up Control
Organisation (known as BUCO) to co-ordinate and control build-up
plans as a whole; a Movement Control Section (Movco) to direct
the movement of men and vehicles from concentration areas to
embarkation ports; a Turnround Control Organisation (TURCO) to
ensure the smooth and rapid turn-round of shipping in the loading
ports; a Combined Operations Repair Organisation (COREP) with

CHOICE OF D-DAY AND H-HOUR gI

tentacles in the chief ports to control the repair of damaged and
defective ships and craft; and finally a body to control the fleet of

tugs (coTuUG) which would be needed for a great variety of duties.*

The target date on which all planning was to be based was given
in the Initial Joint Plan as May the gist. But though necessary for
planning purposes the target date was only approximate and the
choice of an exact date for D-day was inseparably bound up with the
choice of H-hour, that is the hour on D-day at which the first landing
craft should strike the beach.

The British Army would have preferred to attack in darkness or
at dawn in the hope of gaining a greater measure of tactical surprise,
but for the. Navy the advantages of an attack in daylight on this
occasion far outweighed the risks entailed although, in previous
Mediterranean operations, British practice had favoured landing in
darkness. To subdue strong coastal defence works and so give the
assaulting troops a chance to penetrate quickly without crippling
losses, reasonable time must be allowed for preliminary naval bom-
bardment which needs daylight for observation; the air forces, too,
needed daylight for an accurate final attack on beach defences. A
second consideration, on which only naval judgment was valid,
was the impracticability of controlling with navigational precision
the great number of craft involved in the assault if they had to
approach the shore in darkness; errors in position and timing likely
to result from such an attempt might well cause disastrous confusion,
particularly if the weather were bad. A third factor eventually
placed the matter beyond argument. In February the enemy was
seen to be erecting on the Normandy beaches, and well below high
water mark, obstacles, to be described later, which when hidden by
the tide would gravely imperil approaching landing-craft* These
could only be dealt with in daylight and when they were uncovered,
so a landing in daylight and near low tide was necessary. All things
considered, it was agreed that the best time to begin landing would
be three to four hours before high water and some forty minutes
after ‘nautical twilight’, which is said to begin when the rising sun is
twelve degrees below the horizon. The exact time at which landings
should start (H-hour) on each divisional front could not be deter-
mined till D-day was finally settled, for they would have to be related
to the time of high water on that day at different points along the
coast, and to the existence of shoal water off Juno. Except at Utah,
where the ebb and flow take longer, the tide along the assault coast
rises and falls rapidly and the high tide stands for about three hours.
Good moonlight on the night before was also desirable both to ease
the navigation of approaching shipping and, especially, to facilitate
accurate airborne landings. These conditions could only be satisfied
on about three days in each lunar month, or in every fortnight if the

g2 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

advantage of moonlight were ignored. Even so an overriding con-
sideration must be suitable weather conditions, and weather could
not be forecast far ahead. Until near the time therefore the exact
date and hour could not be fixed but, while the target date remained
as May the gist, General Eisenhower and his principal commanders
knew that D-day would have to be a day in the first week in June,
unless bad weather necessitated postponement.

To complete this account of Allied plans it is necessary now to
turn to those which were already being carried out in preparatory
operations on which success largely depended.

CHAPTER V
PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

fected and those who were to join in that great undertaking

were being given their final training and rehearsal, while
men and material were being assembled and the invasion fleets were
gathering, the Allied air forces were already fighting relentlessly over
the Continent; in support of the navies they were also harassing the
enemy in the narrow seas by vigorous patrolling and the laying of
mines. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of what was
done by the air forces in the months immediately before D-day, for it
contributed largely to the success of the opening assault and ultim-
ately to the outcome of the whole campaign.

If the various air operations of this preparatory phase of Overlord
are seen as a whole (though they originated at different dates and, in
their execution, were interlaced with each other), their aim and
principal features stand out clearly. Their aim, in the months im-
mediately preceding D-day, can be summed up in three words—to
assist Overlord. And in order to realise their aim they set out to
do the four things mentioned on page 41, namely,

We« planning of the cross-Channel assault was being per-

to win and hold mastery of the air;

to hamper the movement and supply of enemy forces;
to weaken the enemy’s coastal defences;

and to confuse and mislead his commanders.

To win air mastery was the first condition of success, for only so
could the offensive power of the Allies be fully exploited. To hamper
the enemy’s freedom of movement was particularly important in the
opening phase of the campaign, because the Allies’ own ability to
build up large armies in France must inevitably be slowed by the
initial handicap of a sea passage and by the necessity to land and
maintain their forces over open beaches. To weaken the enemy’s
fortifications and to achieve surprise, desirable conditions in any
military operation, were doubly $o in this instance, for the Allies
were compelled to make a frontal attack against a fortified position—
a type of attack which any commander would avoid if possible.

Mastery of the air was not, of course, a new ambition; ever since
the Battle of Britain was won the Royal Air Force had been fighting
for it, at first with inadequate resources but as their strength in-
creased with a growing measure of success, and in the past year they

94 PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

had been joined by the American air forces. Now, in the few
months before D-day, a comprehensive series of operations combined
to further this aim and strategic and tactical air forces of both nations
played their parts in an all-round assault on German air power. In
those months it was attacked at its source—in the enemy’s aircraft
factories and production centres; on the ground—at his airfields and
control installations; and in the air—wherever his aircraft could be
found. In this final preparation for Overlord a large proportion of
the Allied air forces attacked the German air power, day after day
and night after night, at one or other of the vulnerable points in its
production and use. The attack went on with merciless persistence;
the enemy air force was given no time for relaxation and insufficient
time to recover from injury.

As indicated in the preceding chapters, the Allies’ programme of
preparatory operations, including this attack on German air power,
was an integral part of the Neptune Overall Air Plan issued by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force on
April the 15th*but its full implementation was only made possible
by another directive, issued by General Eisenhower on April the 17th*
to the strategic air forces, when those to be employed on Overlord
had just been put under his direction (page 43 above). Before that
time the Combined Bomber Offensive, conducted under the Point-
blank directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, had already included,
as a priority in the general onslaught on the enemy’s communica-
tions, industrial system and morale, a specific attack on the German
fighter aircraft and ballbearing industries; and the Allied Expedi-
tionary Air Force had been actively co-operating, both by supplying
fighter protection for the strategic bombers and by searching out and
engaging the enemy’s fighters in aggressive sweeps over his territory.
The night attacks of Bomber Command and the daylight attacks of
the United States Eighth Air Force had kept in check the growth of
German offensive air power and, by forcing the enemy to concen-
trate on the defence of his homeland, had progressively reduced his
ability to defend France and other occupied countries in the West;
simultaneously, the offensive sweeps of the Allied Expeditionary Air
Force had also destroyed large numbers of the enemy’s fighters.
Over France and the Low Countries the Allies had, indeed, won a
large measure of air superiority and the use of the American long-
range fighters had gone far towards winning it by day over Germany
too. Their concentrated attack had culminated in what became
known to them as ‘Big Week’, in February, when a closely spaced
series of daylight attacks were made against a dozen {factories pro-
ducing fighters and fighter components. In that week over 5,800
sorties by bombers and supporting fighters were dispatched by the
Eighth and Ninth Air Forces based in England and over goo by the

FIGHT FOR AIR SUPERIORITY 95

Fifteenth Air Force from Italy. Together this daylight attack cost
the American air force 226 heavy bombers and 28 fighters—but it
dealt German fighters and fighter production a very serious setback
at a most critical time.? On six nights of this Big Week aircraft of
Bomber Command also flew over 2,800 sorties to attack similar
Pointblank targets. These included raids on Leipzig, Stuttgart,
Schweinfurt and Augsburg in which heavy bombers flew over 2,700
sorties and lost 141 aircraft and over 1,000 men. But in darkness air
superiority was not yet won, as 1s shown by the cost of Bomber
Command’s operations a month later. On four nights between March
the 15th and March the 23rd Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Berlin were
heavily attacked. On average, 834 aircraft were employed in each
attack and on average forty-one aircraft were lost each time; and
when 795 aircraft were sent to attack Nuremberg on the night of
March the joth/3Ist, 94 of our aircraft and some 650 men were lost
and 71 aircraft were damaged, 12 irreparably—the heaviest casual-
ties in any single attack by Bomber Command.*

It has been claimed that the Allies had won such a measure of air
superiority by day that they had ensured virtual mastery in the air.
By this is meant that they had such a preponderant air power that
they could dominate the position wherever they wished and could be
confident of preventing serious enemy interference with their pur-
pose. It does not mean that the German air force there or elsewhere
had no longer any ability to hurt. They had a large and still expand-
ing air force in spite of all the destruction they had suffered, and
though they could not prevent the Allied attacks they could still,
particularly at night, make them costly. Moreover, in addition to
their air force they had considerably strengthened their ground
defences against air attack. Allied air forces faced not only German
fighters but flugabwehrkanonen (flak) in every raid. The percentage of
aircraft lost is on record but it was not always possible to learn the
cause in each case. For example, night operations of Bomber Com-
mand during May involved 11,822 individual flights. In these, two
hundred and seventy-seven aircraft (2-4 per cent) were lost and two
hundred and ninety-one (2:5 per cent) were damaged. But con-
ditions varied greatly between different classes of target. Over
German targets losses were 5-9 per cent and over strongly defended
areas in northern France and Belgium they increased from 1-9 per
cent in April to 4-3 per cent in May. This rise was accounted for
partly by the increased number of German night fighters concen-
trated to intercept bombers and partly by improved organisation of
their tactical control in areas which were the main scenes of bomber
operations. The greater length of time which our aircraft had to

1 W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. III (Chicago,
1951), chap. IT.

96 PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

spend in target areas in order to make precision attacks at night was
a further cause of heavier losses. It was estimated that enemy fighters
were still the main cause of our losses in night attacks, only 21 per
cent being attributed to flak.*

The new directive (see below, page 100), issued by General
Eisenhower a fortnight after the costly attack on Nuremberg in
March, related operations of the strategic air forces more directly to
Overlord, but targets in the Pointblank programme were still to be
attacked in so far as the necessary forces were available, and in the
seven weeks which remained before D-day Bomber Command
attacked Brunswick (twice), Dortmund, Diisseldorf, Essen (in the
Ruhr) and Schweinfurt, all Pointblank targets. They had still to face
strong opposition, and of some 2,400 aircraft employed over 100
were lost in action® But these attacks against German towns repre-
sented less than a quarter of Bomber Command’s total operations
during this time, for, in concert with the Allied Expeditionary Air
Force, the strategic forces also engaged in a variety of other prepara-
tory operations, including further measures to weaken German air
power.

Among the latter were attacks on German airfields and ground
installations which had been increasing in strength since November
1943. With the co-operation of the heavy bombers these were to be
greatly intensified in the last month of all-round attack on enemy air
strength. During that time the Allied air forces set out to destroy the
usefulness of the enemy’s airfields and ground organisation including
servicing, repair and maintenance facilities, especially those within
a 150-mile radius of Caen. Beginning on May the r1th, this final
onslaught was compressed into little more than three weeks. In that
time ninety-one attacks were made, seventy-three by the American
Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, who dropped over six thousand tons
of bombs, and eighteen by the British Second Tactical Air Force and
Bomber Command, who together dropped some nine hundred tons.
By putting out of use many airfields adjacent to the assault area, the
German air force was forced to fight from bases as far removed from
the coming battle as were Allied aircraft while still operating from
England.

Simultaneously a further and most damaging step was taken to
weaken the German air force by disrupting the system of radar and
wireless control, the eyes, ears and nerve system on which its
effective employment largely depended. Early detection of approach-
ing aircraft (or shipping) is the first means of defence against invasion.
With eyes half-blinded, ears half-stopped and nerves torn and jangled,
air forces can operate but fumblingly. So on May the roth the Allied
air forces also started to attack the German chain of radar and wire-
less communication stations which stretched from Norway to Spain

11. General Brereton

General Vandenberg

Te.

* -
a a

Air Marshal Coningham
General Eisenhower

Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory

12. BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Cunningham Field-Marshal Brooke Air Marshal Portal

Field-Marshal Dill General Ismay

SS a J

rERS

Mr. Churchill

RESTRICTION OF ENEMY MOVEMENT 97

but was most thickly sited to face Britain from France and the Low
Countries. Between Ostend and Cherbourg there were important
installations every ten miles or so, those on the coast being backed by
others inland.*

The enemy’s defence system comprised installations in depth of
various types and sizes for detecting and reporting the approach of
Allied aircraft from long and shorter ranges; for the control of his
own fighters and anti-aircraft batteries; for shipping watch and the
control of coastal guns; and for the interception of the Allies’ wireless
traffic from which their intentions might be learned. There were
sixty-four installations covering in depth the coast between Ostend
and Cap Fréhel near St. Malo. In view of other tasks it was not
possible to destroy or damage all these; and some were by intention
left virtually intact to mislead the enemy as to the Allies’ intentions,
in accordance with the cover plan; but enough was done in three
weeks to spoil the proper functioning of the system. Most of this part
of the air programme was carried out by the Spitfire and Typhoon
dive-bombers and rocket-firing Typhoons of the British Second
Tactical Air Force, but heavy bombers of Bomber Command were
employed with great effect against some of the largest installations.
In particular, on the night of the 3rd of June, ninety-five bombers
guided by four Mosquitoes virtually destroyed the plant at Urville-
Hague near Cherbourg, the most important headquarters of the
German Signal Intelligence Service in North-West Europe*As these
targets were heavily defended by anti-aircraft guns our own losses
were severe; the saving of life on D-day through the comparative
failure of the enemy’s system of detection and control can be set
against our air casualties in the preceding weeks.

The second thing which the Allies set out to accomplish in this
preparatory air campaign was to hamper the movement and supply
of enemy forces; this part of their programme was governed by what
was known as ‘the Transportation Plan’¥The strategic bombers had
already done much sporadic damage to German railways in the
course of Pointblank attacks on the enemy’s industrial system. The
importance of a more intensive attack on the enemy’s lines of com-
munication had been adumbrated by Cossac; in the Transportation
Plan it had been subsequently developed in detail by the planning
staff of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force under Air Marshal Leigh-
Mallory’s direction, working in collaboration with the planners of
Twenty-First Army Group, and with the help of expert advisers—
notably Professor S. Zuckerman, who had been concerned in plan-
ning the Allied air attack on the enemy’s railway system in the Italian
campaign.

Because in the fight to establish their armies in France the Allies

must be able to build up their forccs more quickly than the enemy
H

98 PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

could bring forward his reserves, it was important to take all practical
steps to delay the movement of his troops. The aim of the Trans-
portation Plan was to achieve this by a concentrated and systematic
attack on the railway and locomotive system on which he must
largely depend and on major rail bridges leading to the battle
area.

It would have been impossible to destroy or to put completely out
of action the whole of the highly developed railway system of
northern France, Belgium and western Germany, especially in the
short time available, and nothing of the kind was planned. Moreover,
it was realised that broken railway tracks could be repaired or
circumvented comparatively quickly and it was known that forty to
fifty thousand German railway workers had already been brought
into France for this purpose. What was planned was first the destruc-
tion of nodal points in the railway system—the big centres with
repair shops, servicing facilities, marshalling yards, and rail junctions
where locomotives congregated—to break the system where its
smooth working could most effectively be deranged; and in a final
intensive phase to isolate the battle area.

Parts of the plan could be carried out by the Allied Expeditionary
Air Force, and these indeed had been in progress since February
the oth alsa General Eisenhower had approved the general policy
of the plan*during March medium bombers of the U.S. Ninth Air
Force made fourteen attacks on rail targets in France. But the whole
plan could not be realised without the full co-operation of the
strategic air forces. It was here that acute differences of opinion were
revealed. Air Marshal Harris questioned whether Bomber Command,
trained for area bombing, could be used effectively at night for
attacks needing such precision. To help in the reaching of a decision
heavy bombers of Bomber Command staged nine trial attacks in
March, the most notable being on the busy railway centre of Trappes,
south-west of Paris, on the night of the 6th of March. Great damage
was done to rolling stock, ee sheds and tracks, and none of the
263 aircraft employed was lost*As a demonstration of the fact that
heavy night bombers could be economically employed on the pre-
cision targets of the Transportation Plan the attack was convincing,
and, as on all these trial attacks, civilian casualties were far lighter
than the opposers of the plan prophesied. Nevertheless, Lieut-
General Carl Spaatz, who was in command of the United States
Strategic Air Forces in Europe (the Eighth, stationed in England,
and the Fifteenth in Italy), strongly opposed the use of heavy
bombers envisaged by the plan, and Sir Arthur Harris of Bomber
Command still held that nothing should be allowed to interfere with
the area-bombing of Germany which (in his view), if fully devel-
oped, might of itself win the war. On the other hand, Sir Arthur

TRANSPORTATION PLAN 99

Tedder and Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory strongly supported the plan.
Decision had to be reached, for it will be remembered that the
strategic air forces were only to come under the direction of the
Supreme Commander when a plan for the air support of Overlord
had been approved jointly by the British Chief of Air Staff (Sir
Charles Portal) acting on behalf of the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
and General Eisenhower.

The arguments for and against the Transportation Plan are not
difficult to distinguish. For the plan it was contended that while the
combined attack on the German air potential must continue to have
first priority, other Pointblank targets should no longer absorb all
the strength of the strategic forces. The first consideration now was
the success of Overlord and there was no alternative to the Trans-
portation Plan which would give comparable assistance to Overlord
in its first and most critical phase. The enemy’s railway system was
already strained severely, and if it were progressively attacked at its
main assembly and repair centres enemy traffic would be dis-
organised, delayed and gradually canalised, so that by D-day it
might well be virtually immobilised at key points. Although all
railway traffic could not be stopped it could be greatly reduced if
running to schedule were made impossible by the dislocation of the
system and the reduction of locomotive power.*

The argument against the plan was put most forcibly by General
Spaatz. He contended that, while some reduction of rail traffic might
be effected, the amount of damage that could be done to the enemy’s
huge rail system in the time remaining before D-day would be in-
sufficient to interfere seriously with the movement of military traffic;
it would not therefore help the Allies to win the opening battle. To
use the strategic air forces against railway targets would be to misuse
their power, for there was an alternative which would have greater
effect on the subsequent campaign. His alternative proposal was that
they should be employed in a sustained attack on the enemy’s
synthetic oil plants and refineries. He listed twenty-seven which, he
said, accounted for 80 per cent of German synthetic production and
60 per cent of their refining capacity. The destruction of these would
weaken, on all fronts, the enemy’s power to fight and so should

‘expedite the success of Overlord in the period subsequent to D-day’.*

In that last sentence lay the crux of the whole matter. General
Eisenhower was chiefly concerned at the moment to ensure the
success of the Neptune assault and the opening fight. The oil plan
would not help at that stage, for it was known that the enemy had
accumulated large stocks in France, and only when these were used
up would a stoppage of oil production affect military operations.
On the other hand, even ‘some reduction’ of the enemy’s railway
traffic would be of immediate value to the Allied armies during their

100 PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

assault and build-up. Since it was admitted by all who were associ-
ated in this discussion that ‘some reduction’ could be effected, General
Eisenhower decided with the full agreement of Sir Charles Portal
that the Transportation Plan would be adopted¥and with this joint
approval of a plan for the air support of Overlord the direction of
Allied strategic air forces passed, for the time being, from the
Combincd Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander.

The strategic air forces were informed of the transfer on April the
15th and on April the 17th they were given their first directive by
General Eisenhower. The Pointblank directive remained in force,
but their ‘particular mission’, prior to Overlord, was ‘to deplete the
German air force and particularly the German fighter forces, and
to destroy and disorganise the facilities supporting them’, and ‘to
destroy and disrupt the enemy’s rail communications, particularly
those affecting the enemy’s movement towards the Overlord lodge-
ment area’.*

But controversy on the Transportation Plan did not end there.
The execution of the plan would involve heavy bombing attacks on
key railway centres, some of which were in closely built-up areas of
France and Belgium. Estimates of casualties varied widely, but there
could hardly fail to be many among native civilians and the possible
effect of these on the Allies’ relations with France and Belgium was
a political question. The War Cabinet, whose sanction was required,
regarded it as a serious one and wanted to rule out all attacks which
were likely to involve heavy civilian casualties. Moreover, they were
not convinced about the efficacy of the plan itself especially in view
of the divided opinion of many of the experts* The Supreme Com-
mander, on the other hand, and most of the air staff held that
restriction of the programme would vitiate the whole plan; and
they regarded the bombardment of key railway centres as an im-
mediate military necessity not to be surrendered for a future political
advantage. The Defence Committee discussed the question at length
during April while bombing continued on the less controversial
targets. Re-examination of the list by Sir Arthur Tedder and a special
committee led to changes which did something to reduce the esti-
mated risk of heavy civilian casualties but did not wholly remove the
Cabinet’s opposition; nevertheless, the Defence Committee pro-
visionally passed all but two of the targets on the 13th of April.*
Thus when on the 2gth of April General Eisenhower suspended
attacks on twenty-seven of the targets at the Prime Minister’s request,
a third of the plan had already been implemented*Although civilian
casualties had continued to prove less than the lowest estimate, Mr.
Churchill’s disquiet was not abated. He tried vainly to persuade
General Eisenhower to abandon the suspended targets and sent a
telegram to the President setting out the reasons for his discomfort®

ATTACK ON BRIDGES | 101

But President Roosevelt replied: ‘However regrettable the atten-
dant loss of civilian life is, 1 am not prepared to impose from this
distance any restriction on military action by responsible Com-
manders that in their opinion might militate against the success of
Overlord or cause additional loss of life to our Allied forces of
invasion.% Seeing that not only the ‘responsible Commanders’ but
also the Government’s own military advisers, the British Chiefs of
Staff, were by now convinced that the abandonment of the full plan
might have both these effects, the War Cabinet’s opposition was
pressed no further. Bombing of the suspended list of centres was
authorised by General Eisenhower on May the 5th with the proviso
that the targets in the most densely-populated areas were not to be
attacked until just before D-day.*

Of eighty targets of first importance, thirty-nine were attacked by
Bomber Command, twenty-three by the American Eighth Air Force,
and eighteen by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. By the end of
April the damage done was already beginning to induce a creeping
paralysis of the main railway systems of north-west France and
Belgium. The attack was intensified in the month before D-day*

Meanwhile the slowing up and congestion which followed these
attacks ministered to the success of the second measure by which the
enemy’s movement of men and material was to be hampered, namely
the attack on locomotives and rolling stock on railways approaching
the battle area. As damaged engines waited for repairs and trains
moved slowly over newly-mended tracks or by improvised branch
lines they became correspondingly more open to attack. On May
the 21st, within a fortnight of D-day, the Allied Expeditionary Air
Force began the final intensive assault. On that day large-scale
fighter-sweeps were directed at such sitting targets—5o4 Thunder-
bolts, 233 Spitfires, 16 Typhoons and 10 Tempests operated through-
out the day. On the same day over 500 of the long-range fighters of
the American Eighth Air Force attacked similar targets in western
Germany. Hundreds of locomotives and many trains carrying per-
sonnel, freight and oil were destroyed or damaged, often beyond all
repair.*

And while these operations continued, attacks began on rail and
road bridges leading towards the Normandy battle area. Destruction
of these would still further hamper the German ability to move up
troops with which to oppose the Allies while they were building up
their armies. Incidentally it would ultimately hamper the enemy’s
retreat if he were beaten in the opening battle.

By the nature of its construction and size a bridge is difficult to
hit and even more difficult to destroy, and there were doubts as to
whether the desired isolation of the battle area could be effected by
air forces. These doubts were quickly ‘dispelled. Among the first

102 PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

experimental attacks was one on the 725-foot steel girder railway
bridge over the Seine at Vernon. Eight Thunderbolts of the American
Ninth Air Force wrecked it by the use of only eight tons of bombs.
More than one attack and a far heavier weight of bombs were
needed in most cases, but by D-day the Ninth Air Force had cut or
made unusable all the twenty-four bridges over the Seine between
Paris and the sea. Twelve other much-used bridges over the rivers
Oise, Meuse, Moselle and Loire and over the Demer, Escaut and
Albert Canal in Belgium were also broken down or made unusable
by fighters and medium bombers of the American Eighth and Ninth
Air Forces, and of the British Second Tactical Air Force.*

The success of an air attack which leaves a bridge broken by a
huge gap, or with steel girders and piers collapsed in the river it had
spanned, is easy to measure. But as the purpose of all these air opera-
tions was conceived as a whole it will be more profitable to judge
their results as a whole. And before doing so there are still other
items to be described—namely the attack on German coastal defences
and measures to mislead and confuse the German commanders.

The enemy’s coastal defences were already being progressively
weakened by the attacks on his radar and wireless communications
that have so far been treated as part of his air power, but these were
also an integral part of his defences against attack from the sea.
Having already lost command of the air he must rely first on radar
to detect the approach of ships. And since he could not hope to fight
the Allied navies at sea he must rely largely on his shore-based guns
to ward them off. Coastal batteries therefore formed an important
part of his ‘Atlantic Wall’. Like the rest of his coastal defences they
were strongest in the Pas de Calais area because it was there that he
expected the main assault to be made, but it was estimated that there
were about forty-nine battery positions in the Neptune area covering
the coastal waters which the Allied navies must command and
through which the Allied forces must be landed and supplied. Some
of these positions appeared to be unoccupied but it was believed that
in others there were about eighty-five guns of large calibre, 150-mm
(approximately 6-inch) and upwards, and a considerable number of
lighter weapons to dispute the landing: about three-fifths of these
were in the British sector. Many of these guns were already heavily
protected by steel and concrete which included overhead cover, but
in other positions construction was incomplete. In the last chapter
it has been explained how these were to be bombarded by Allied air
forces and warships in the opening hours of D-day. In these pre-
liminary operations the chief aim of the Allies was to delay building,
and destroy or damage unfinished work.

Both tactical and strategic air forces were used in this programme,
and about half the known batteries along the whole coast were

DECEPTION AND RECONNAISSANCE 103

attacked. On seventy-three sites nearly 24,000 tons of bombs were
used. Much damage was done and work under construction was
greatly set back. The condition of the German defences immediately
before D-day will be realised when the results of all preliminary
operations are examined.*

At the request of Twenty-First Army Group a number of military
targets—ammunition dumps, camps, depots and headquarters—
were also attacked either by strategic or tactical air forces. Ammuni-
tion dumps at Chateaudun and Domfront in Normandy, for example,
were largely destroyed, the former by aircraft of Bomber Com-
mand, the latter by Thunderbolts of the United States Ninth Air
Force. The large military camp at Bourg-Leopold in Belgium was
twice attacked by Bomber Command and heavily damaged. In some
of these operations against well-guarded targets of military import-
ance our losses, chiefly from enemy night fighters, were considerable
(forty-two bombers were lost out of three hundred and sixty-two
which attacked the tank depot at Mailly le Camp east of Paris on
May 3rd/4th), but the destruction inflicted helped to weaken the
enemy’s military position and so prepare the way for our assaulting
forces. *

The carrying out of all these plans had been largely influenced by
the Allies’ determination to disguise their intentions and to mislead
and confuse the enemy. It was impossible to hide from German com-
manders the fact that preparations for an assault were being com-
pleted. It might be possible, if good security were maintained, to hide
from them knowledge of where and when it would be launched and
to mislead them on both points, and in all the preparatory operations
under review this was borne in mind. In the attacks on the airfields,
radar installations, batteries, railway centres and bridges, great care
was taken to avoid anything which might point to the Normandy
coast as the probable point of assault. So for every installation
attacked in the assault area two were simultaneously attacked outside
it. This greatly increased the labours—and the losses—of Allied air
forces during these hectic days, but it will be clear later that it
achieved its purpose.:

In the Allies’ actions during these months the enemy saw nothing
to indicate that Normandy would be the main point of their attack;
on the contrary, the more heavy bombing of the Pas de Calais area
strengthened his belief that the narrower waters of the Channel
would tempt the Allies to launch their main assault on the nearest
French coast. And as D-day approached other measures, combining
to form a complete ‘cover plan’ (‘Fortitude’), were to support this
belief—measures in which all three Services played their deceptive
parts. A comprehensive cover and deception plan—‘Bodyguard’—
had been made to misrepresent the Allies’ strategy in Europe and thus

104 PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

to induce the German Command to make faulty dispositions. Forti-
tude was designed to give effect to this misleading strategic concep-
tion so far as Overlord was concerned.*

The plan was based on a fiction—that the campaign would open
with an attack on southern Norway launched from Scottish ports,
but that the main attack would come in the Pas de Calais. This they
were to launch about the third week of July, about forty-five days
later than the real D-day. To achieve this deceit steps were taken,
both before and after D-day, to mislead the enemy into the belief
that the Normandy assault was but a diversionary attack. By artificial
and indiscreet wireless traffic, and by means of dummy craft in south-
eastern ports and harbours, it was made to seem that troops and air
forces stationed in south-eastern England were assembled there for
the Pas de Calais attack; various training schemes were arranged to
add additional colour to this misreading of our real intentions.
Other deceptive action taken before D-day and in the days following
will be recounted later.

In describing these arduous air preparations for Overlord an
activity on which all others largely depended has so far been omitted,
namely the continuous air reconnaissance by which targets were
identified and the result of the attacks observed. In 1942 the Photo-
graphic Reconnaissance Unit of the Royal Air Force had started
a photographic survey of a thirty-mile wide strip of the coast from
Holland to the Spanish frontier. Simultaneously a central inter-
pretation unit had been built up, for the expert interpretation of
photographs and the dissemination of results to the Intelligence
departments of the three Services. The work of photographic recon-
naissance had grown vastly since then, for during these months of
preparation it not only provided invaluable information of many
kinds but served as eyes which watched both the progress of enemy
defences near at hand and the results of Allied bombing further
afield. It was they who detected the enemy’s batteries, emplacements,
strong points, military depots and headquarters. It was they who saw
whether a bridge had been broken or must be attacked again. It was
they who built up such a picture of the assault area that the shape
and make-up of the coasts and hinterland were known, and could be
studied in detail before the attack had begun. When D-day came the
coxswains of assault landing craft were given photographs of their
allotted beach, taken from 1,500 yards off-shore at almost wave-top
level so that they knew what it would look like as they approached
land. Platoon commanders were provided with oblique photographs
taken from low level so that they would recognise ground features;
and further obliques from higher level were taken 1,500 yards inland
to help those leading the attack inland to recognise the country and
their own position. It was photographic reconnaissance aircraft that

ASSAULT ON V-WEAPONS 105

first disclosed that the enemy was placing beach obstacles below
high-water level on the shores selected for landings. In all this air
reconnaissance was quite invaluable. Flying often at low levels, the
aircraft were vulnerable to attack from anti-aircraft guns and very
open to sudden attack by enemy fighters from above. Losses were
considerable, but there was no pause in their work.*

Among much else, photographic reconnaissance revealed the
building works from which the enemy planned to launch his much-
vaunted long-distance weapons on England. The detailed account of
the German attack with V-weapons belongs to the history of the
defence of the United Kingdom, by Mr. Basil Collier,? rather than to
the Overlord campaign, yet the steps taken to combat it in these
months before D-day were for the most part taken by air forces pre-
paring for Overlord and were thus a considerable addition to their
many other tasks.

Evidence that the Germans were developing rocket-propelled and
other long-range weapons for military use had been slowly accumu-
lating since the autumn of 1939 but little was known as to their size
and nature until 1943. By then it seemed certain that the rocket
weapon was being developed, and possibly produced, at Peene-
miinde, an island in the Baltic. Photographs taken by a lone aircraft
revealed a good deal about the size and shape of the works there,
but it was not until June 1943 that two further photographic recon-
naissance flights showed objects which appeared to be huge rockets.
Photographic reconnaissance also confirmed reports of a new type of
heavy construction work at Watten in northern France and, although
there was as yet nothing definite to connect the two, close watch was
kept on both. Regular flights to observe developments at Peene-
miinde were flown by Mosquitos and other flights to photograph
further excavations and large structures then appearing in northern
France were made by Spitfires.

In August 1943 a night attack was made on Peenemiinde by
nearly six hundred aircraft of Bomber Command. To ensure the best
results the attack was made in full moonlight, although this gave
every opportunity to the enemy night fighters. Forty bombers and
one of our own night fighters were lost but great damage was done,
and it was learnt through Intelligence sources that several of the
most important designers and technical officers were killed and that
all the production drawings of the V-2 rocket were destroyed. They
had just been completed for issue to firms which were to manufacture
the rockets, and their destruction delayed production for several
months. In the same month the works under construction near
Watten were twice attacked by Fortresses of the American Eighth

* Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (H.M.S.O., 1957).

106 PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

Air Force. As a result work on the site was suspended for over three
months.

During the summer of 1943, however, Intelligence reports indi-
cated that pilotless aircraft were also being built. The threat of this
second long-range weapon took more definite shape during the
autumn when the construction in France of works of a different type
were photographed; they became known to the Allies as ‘ski’ sites.
Sites of the same pattern were identified by further reconnaissance at
Peenemiinde and on one of these a small aircraft with a span of
about twenty feet was recognised. From this and other evidence
there was little doubt that the ski sites in northern France were then
being built to launch ‘flying bombs’. All were within 140 to 150
miles of London, most of them in a belt of country between Dieppe
and Calais, with another group in the Cherbourg peninsula. Photo-
graphic reconnaissance disclosed eighty-eight sites by the end of the
year and in December the code name ‘Crossbow’ was given to all
operations, defensive and counter-offensive, against the threat of
these two long-range weapons.

The counter-measures taken in France were a continuing drain
on the strength of the air forces which could otherwise have been
wholly devoted to preparatory operationsfor Overlord. Handicapped
by recurrent bad weather, and with many Pointblank and Trans-
portation Plan targets still to be attacked, the strategic air forces
could only give limited strength to Crossbow targets and the attack
on launching sites largely devolved on the Allied Expeditionary Air
Force, though they too were needed for Overlord preparations.
Their medium and low level attacks became progressively more
hazardous as the enemy increased the anti-aircraft defences of the
sites, and for all these reasons the endeavour to neutralise them all
was not realised fully. By the end of May it was believed that eighty-
six out of ninety-seven identified ski sites had been put out of action,
and two out of seven rocket sites. In all, forty thousand tons of bombs
had been used against Crossbow targets and the enemy’s original
plans had been largely nullified. But two months before D-day
photographic reconnaissance revealed a new type of what became
known as ‘modified sites’, easier to construct and less easy to dis-
tinguish. In the last three weeks many of these were recognised, but
lack of tame and other claims prevented their being attacked. Yet the
Allies’ counter-measures had at least had one most valuable result.
The bombing of Peenemiinde and other industrial worksin Germany,
the neutralisation of most of the original chain of launching sites in
France and the dislocation of rail communications, by which both
building materials and the weapons themselves must be borne to the
sites, had between them prevented the enemy from launching the
long-range attack on which Hitler built such exaggerated hopes

SEA AND AIR WATCH 107

while the Allied forces and shipping were massed for the Neptune
assault. The first German flying bomb was not launched until June
the 12th, by which time the Allied armies had already won a firm
foothold in France.*

While this aggressive programme of air operations over the Conti-
nent was in progress, measures were also taken to ‘keep the ring’ at
sea for the coming Neptune assault—to prevent U-boats or surface
craft from penetrating waters intended to be used as the Allies’
‘highway’ to France.

In keeping clear the waters round our coasts the Royal Navy and
Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force worked in close partner-
ship. The Admiralty specified the broad requirements; Coastal Com-
mand decided how and with what they should be met; control of
day-to-day operations was effected through combined operations
rooms at bases jointly staffed by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air
Force. The critical south-west approaches to the Channel were
patrolled by 19 Group with headquarters at Plymouth. 15 Group
with headquarters at Liverpool, while mainly concerned with the
defence of Atlantic convoys, was in position to deal with any U-boat
which might evade patrols in the North Sea, where 16 Group
guarded the eastern approaches to the Channel and the southern part
of the North Sea. There the task was not only to protect our own
invasion convoys but also to attack German supply shipping along
the coast of the Low Countries and northern France. In the far north
and east 18 Group*® worked from bases in Scotland and Iceland
against U-boats trying to reach the Channel or the Bay of Biscay
through the Northern Transit Area between Norway and the
Atlantic. There, from the 16th of May to the grd of June, 17 of the
32 U-boats in the area were sighted. Of these 15 were attacked, seven
were sunk and four compelled to return to harbour. Subsequent
research has however shown that only 13 U-boats out of the 32 were
making for Biscay and the Channel. Of these four were sunk, and one
was forced to return to Norway after it had been attacked; eight got
through. But it is significant that, even in conditions of continuous
daylight and fairly dense air patrol, only one of the seven schnorkel-
fitted U-boats making for Biscay was located (and sunk), and then
only because the captain rashly decided to defy air attack on the
surface.*

Thus the enemy’s submarines, naval surface craft and coastwise
shipping were liable to be met at every point by our naval and air
patrols. Writing in his diary for May, Vice-Admiral Krancke, the
Group Commander, West, lamented the fact that his forces ‘were
almost invariably attacked from the air as soon as they left harbour

® Composition of these groups is shown in Appendix VI.

108 PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

and suffered numerous hits . . . darkness provided no relief. . . . The
operations of motor torpedo-boats were handicapped by strong
enemy patrols which prevented intended attacks and the laying of
mines . . .’ In the Admiral’s opinion German minelaying could now
make only a very small contribution to defence against invasion, for
the number they could lay was too small and German minesweeping
resources were insufficient to sweep the large number of mines being
laid by the Allies. *

For an intensive minelaying programme, carried out by the Royal
Navy and Bomber Command, was another of the preparatory
measures included in the Neptune plans. It was known as operation
‘Maple’ and was planned in five phases. Until the early days of
April, routine offensive minelaying was continued by naval forces
and Bomber Command using standard mines; in the next three
weeks new and special types of mine were mixed with the standard
mines. In the last three weeks of May this programme of mixed
mining was intensified; and in the three or four days immediately
before D-day only the special types were laid, the main concentra-
tions being laid by minelayers off Calais, Boulogne, le Havre and
Cherbourg, and by aircraft off the Dutch coasts and Brest. In the
seven weeks before D-day nearly seven thousand mines were laid
between the Baltic and the Bay of Biscay, most of them between
Ijmuiden and Brest. Forty-two per cent were laid by naval forces and
the rest by aircraft of Bomber Command. German records show that
four steamships, fourteen auxiliary naval vessels (including mine-
sweepers) and a tug were sunk, and five steamships, twenty-two
auxiliary naval vessels, a torpedo-boat and a U-boat were damaged
by our mines in April and May. Of the effect of Allied operations
Admiral Krancke also wrote: “The enemy’s air mining... led to
severe losses, and Cherbourg and le Havre had to be closed for
considerable periods because of the initial difficulty of clearing the
mines which were fitted with new types of acoustic firing mechanism.’
So much was the German Admiral troubled by the damage incurred,
one way or another, by his ships at sea that he wrote at the end of
May that he ‘would have to consider a further curtailment of their
sea-going activities’. How different were the considerations affecting
Admiral Ramsay’s decisions™For while the Allies’ naval and air
forces continued to harass the enemy they were at the same time
covering the concentration of their forces in the southern ports of
Britain. Early in April the steady flow of ships and craft began along
both the east and west coasts. Those forming the naval assault groups,
the build-up shipping and numerous auxiliary vessels of many kinds
were on the move to their loading and assembly ports, and as the
weeks passed the flow swelled into a flood without any attempted
interference by Admiral Krancke’s forces.

ALLIED AIR SUMMARY 109

The vast and varied operations of the Allies in these months of
preparation for Overlord merged without interval into the cross-
Channel assault on D-day and the fighting which lasted till the heart
of Germany was reached and the German armed forces were des-
troyed. Yet readers may well pause here and try to realise the magni-
tude of what the air forces had done in eight or ten weeks to prepare
the way for the Allied invasion of Europe.

They had flown over two hundred thousand sorties and had
dropped nearly as many tons of bombs at a cost of nearly two
thousand aircraft and their crews. All the air commands of both
nations played their part in operations against Germany as is shown
by the following analysis of their records from April the 1st to June
the 5th. *

Command

Allied Expeditionary Air Force:

Second Tactical Air Force } pees 133
Air Defence of Great Britain 7 46
Ninth Air Force . —— 30,700 197
Bomber Command . 87,200 523
Eighth Air Force:
III Bomber Command 69,900 763
VIII Fighter Command . 600

In addition, aircraft of Coastal Command made over 5,000 sorties,
attacking enemy coastal shipping, naval vessels and U-boats.

Their actions day by day were spread over the various objects
included in the programme of preparatory operations. To illustrate

this a single twenty-four hours’ work may be quoted, namely that
of May the 28th. *

Atr-
Bombs | _ Air- crew
Command Principal Targets Sorties | dropped| craft | killed
(tons) lost or
missi
Second Tactical | Crossbow and transportation tar- 745 2 2
Air Force gets and radar stations
Air Defence of Offensive and defensive patrols 655 3 5
Great Britain
Ninth Air Force | Crossbow targets, bridges and 1,980 | 2,075 13 62
radar stations
Bomber Military installations, transporta- | 1,110 | 3,900 27 189
Command tion targets and coastal batteries

Eighth Air Force gation factories and industrial 1,575 | 1,974 42 316
plants

| | |

18 <0) PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

How far had the Allies’ preliminary aims been achieved? Their
first aim had been to obtain mastery of the air by hindering the
enemy’s aircraft production, by destroying his airfields, ground
organisation and radar, and by destroying his aircraft in action and
on the ground.

The Allies’ Combined Bomber Offensive had not stopped German
aircraft production, had not indeed prevented some expansion. But
it had prevented anything like a full realisation of the largely in-
creased effort which had been concentrated upon it. It also caused
the enemy to tie up great resources of men and material on an air
defence system over his home territories in efforts to combat that
offensive. It inevitably had its effect on the local air situation in the
Overlord area.

Of the havoc wrought by the Allies’ attack on airfields the enemy’s
own verdict may be accepted. A study prepared by the German Air
Historical Branch (8th Abteilung) two months later states that ‘The
systematic destruction of the ground organisation of the Luftwaffe,
especially of the fighter airfields, was very effective just before and
during the start of the invasion. Hardly a single airfield of those
intended for fighter operations is still serviceable’. The same study
records that ‘Naval Radar Stations were attacked by bombers every
day before the invasion and were largely put out of action’.*

As to the number of enemy aircraft destroyed, the Germans’ own
record of those lost in the two months before D-day may also be
quoted, for at least it is unlikely to be an overstatement. They show
that in air operations against the Allied air forces which were based
in Britain, the German Air Force lost 1,858 aircraft. Of this total 500
belonged to the Third Air Fleet based in France; the remainder were
of the Reich Air Fleet responsible for the day and night defence of
Germany.*

Admiral Krancke considered that by the end of May the Allies had
‘almost complete mastery of the air¥The historical staff of the German
air force wrote that ‘the outstanding factor both before and during
the invasion was the overwhelming air superiority of the enemy’®

Subsequent events were to prove that all were true. Whatever
operations were planned by the Allies, their commanders could now
be confident that enemy air forces could not seriously interfere with
them. The sting had been taken out of the German air force and over
the battlefields of France it was left with little more than nuisance
value.

The Allies’ second aim had been to hamper the German move-
ment of troops and supplies by disrupting his railway communica-
tions—the Transportation plan. The results of these efforts, as
described in contemporary German records, show how it appeared
to them at the time.

GERMAN RAILWAY REPORT III

On May the 15th a ‘Report on the German Transport Ministry’s
view of Recent Air Attacks on Railways’ contains the following
passages:

‘In the occupied areas of the West, particularly in Belgium and
northern France, the raids carried out in recent weeks have
caused systematic breakdown of all main lines; the coastal defences
have been cut off from the supply bases in the interior, thus pro-
ducing a situation which threatens to have serious consequences
. .. large-scale strategic movement of German troops by rail is
practically impossible at the present time, and must remain so
while attacks are maintained at the present intensity... In
assessing the situation as a whole it must further be borne in
mind that, owing to the widespread destruction and damage of
important construction and repair shops, the maintenance and
overhaul of locomotives has been considerably disorganised;
this causes further critical dislocation of traffic.’*

On June the grd, 1944, a ‘top secret’ report on ‘Air Operations
against the German Rail Transport System during March, April
and May 1944’ was prepared by the German Air Force Operations
Staff¥It included the following statement:

‘In the area of northern France and Belgium—the zone of
invasion in the narrower sense of the word—the systematic de-
struction that has been carried out since March of all important
junctions of the entire network—not only of main lines—has
most seriously crippled the whole transport system (railway in-
stallations, including rolling stock). Similarly Paris has been
systematically cut off from long distance traffic, and the most
important bridges over the lower Seine have been destroyed one
after another . . . It is only by exerting the greatest efforts that
purely military traffic and goods essential to war effort, e.g. coal,
can be kept moving’. In the ‘intermediate zone’ between the
German and French—Belgian railway system ‘all the important
through stations .. . have been put out of action for longer or
shorter periods . . . In May the first bridge over the Rhine—at
Duisburg—was destroyed “‘according to plan’’ in a large scale
attack’. Of the Allies’ intention the report deduced that in the
western region the rail network was to be completely wrecked.
“This aim has been so successfully achieved—locally at any rate
—that the Reichsbahn authorities are seriously considering
whether it is not useless to attempt further repair work.’

In March 1945 a German report on the technical experiences of
railway engineers in ‘The Anglo-American iniasion of France in the
summer of 1944’ was sent to the Chief of Transport in the German
Army High Command (OKH)* Overleaf is a photographic repro-
duction of their map showing how the main railway system, leading

112 PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

from Germany through Belgium and north-east France to Paris and
Rouen, was damaged during May by Allied bombing (shown in
green) and by sabotage (in red). It will be seen that the bombing
gave the enemy no indications that an Allied assault on Normandy
was intended. Further maps showing how the pattern of Allied
bombing developed in June and July are given at page 400.

The Allies’ third aim had been to weaken the enemy’s coastal
defences. There is in German records abundant evidence of the
damage done, but since this part of the Allies’ preparatory pro-
gramme was to culminate in the opening bombing and naval bom-
bardment which would precede the first landings on D-day it will
be time enough then to assess results.

While waiting for the further evidence of success which subsequent
operations must provide before a final judgment can be formed it 1s
permissible to record the opinion of the soldier in supreme command.
Two years later, with unique knowledge of what had happened both
before and after the Neptune assault was launched, General Eisen-
hower wrote: ‘... without the overwhelming mastery of the air
which was attained by that time our assault against the Continent
would have been a most hazardous, if not impossible, undertaking’*

The cost at which this achievement was purchased may be stated
simply in the number of casualties. Between the 1st of April and the
5th of June the Allied air forces lost over twelve thousand officers
and men in these operations and some two thousand aircraft. Of
these, approximately four thousand men and over seven hundred
aircraft belonged to the Royal Air Force*But these figures do not
include men who were wounded or damaged aircraft. In any case
the cost should not only be measured by figures; the whole cost was
not paid by those who gave their lives or suffered obvious injury.
The spiritual and physical strain borne by those who survived to fly
their dangerous missions again and again has no measurement. Few
fighting men are by nature fearless: in the minds of most fear is very
present, and the courage which overcomes it, though upheld by con-
fidence gained in training, by trust in equipment and comrades and
by the tradition of his Service, is won by self-mastery and self-control
which each action taxes anew. Something of what such operations
involved has often been described. Nevertheless one illustration may
be given as a reminder of their cost.

On the night of March the 15th, 863 bombers of Bomber Com-
mand were ordered to attack Stuttgart. They dropped 2,745 tons of
bombs and lost 37 aircraft in doing so. This is how one which re-
turned fulfilled its mission. Flying in darkness at a height of 22,000
feet a Lancaster (P2 of 626 Squadron) captained by Flight Sergeant
C. R. Marriot was caught and held by enemy searchlights while still
thirty miles away from the city. A German Ju.88 fighter approaching

Railway destruct

——"

Zerstorungskarte — Mai 1944

(UUs & aruuLaos (26 UL UZY DYURULUH) CapLlained Dy rlgnt sergeant
C. R. Marriot was caught and held by enemy searchlights while still
thirty miles away from the city. A German Ju.88 fighter approaching

ONE BOMBER SORTIE 113

low on the starboard quarter opened fire at about 600 yards range.
The Lancaster was extensively hit and, although the rear-gunner
returned the enemy’s fire, the German made a second attack from
dead astern at only 250 yards range and more damage was suffered
from cannon and machine-gun fire. The enemy was shaken off by
evasive action and it was then found that the Lancaster’s inter-
communication and radio telephone system had been put out of
action; the mid-upper and rear turrets had been made unserviceable
and the oxygen supply to both cut; the tail plane and trimmers,
fuselage and both turrets were badly damaged as well as the astro-
dome and pilot’s cockpit head; one petrol tank had been holed and
two propellers damaged. A fire started below the mid-upper turret
but was extinguished.

In spite of all this Flight Sergeant Marriot decided to carry on with
the mission. The target was identified, the run in was made and the
bombs were dropped without further damage from the local defence.
Then P2 turned for home. The rear-gunner, Sergeant J. V. Brewer,
had remained on duty in his broken turret, without oxygen, wounded
in the foot and ankle and operating the turret with his hands. In the
damaged mid-upper turret the other gunner, Sergeant R. Loughrey,
also wounded, lay unconscious through lack of oxygen, and although
Sergeant W. A. E. J. Willday, the flight engineer, and the wireless
operator, Sergeant W. A. Palmer, succeeded in moving him on to the
aircraft rest-bed he did not regain consciousness till some twelve
hours after being landed in England. On the homeward run Sergeant
C. R. Todd, the bomb aimer, kept observation by moving back and
forth from his own station and the now empty turret. Through all
this the navigator, Sergeant J. H. Barton, had held to a true course
and P2 landed safely at its base. When the wounded rear-gunner,
who had carried on without oxygen in his broken and exposed turret,
was taken to hospital he was found to be suffering from severe facial
frost-bite.

The captain of this crew of sergeants had already conducted night
attacks on February the 22nd, 24th, 25th, 29th, March st, 4th, 5th
and roth, yet he did eight further attacks before D-day* His navigator
and bomb aimer flew with him throughout.

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CHAPTER VI
DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

a further month in which to continue the work on defences

which Rommel was pressing forward. Much that was done
was undone by Allied bombing. Much that was planned and ordered
could not be carried out, for the dislocation of the railway system
prevented the arrival in time of necessary material and air attacks
constantly interrupted the use of what was available. The designed
programme could be nothing like fully completed, yet progress was
made and was daily noted and photographed by Allied aircraft.*

The stretches of beach which were suitable for landings and for
bearing the load of the subsequent build-up are shown on the map
facing page 168: for example, on the British front they only amounted
to less than a third of the total. By the end of May all were protected
by several ranks of obstacles placed irregularly in the upper half of
the tidal range; as seen from seaward there was one for every two or
three yards. Some, known to the Allies as ‘element C’, were steel
gate-like structures nearly nine feet high and nine wide, each weigh-
ing a ton and a half. Even more formidable were ‘hedgehogs’ made of
seven-foot angled steel girders, riveted together so as to present sharp
points in all directions; when struck they would pierce a craft or turn
over, bringing other points up to impale it from beneath. There were
‘tetrahedra’ six feet high weighing nearly a ton, and ramps or heavy
stakes, nearly all armed with mines or shells to explode on impact.
An illustration is given opposite page 160. *

On shore, coastal batteries covered the seaward approaches to the
whole Neptune front, most of the heavier ones being situated in the
vicinities of Cherbourg and the Seine estuary. Not all had been
completed and the use of some had been abandoned before the
Allies attacked. The situation of major batteries which were targets
of the opening naval bombardment is also shown on the map at
page 168.

Minor ports in the assault area, such as Port en Bessin, Courseulles,
and Ouistreham were strongly guarded and along the whole front,
sited to give mutual defence, were strong-points at every thousand
yards or so incorporating pill-boxes, fortified buildings and trench
systems covered by barbed wire and profusely sown minefields.
These positions were usually manned by infantry at platoon or com-
pany strength; they all contained machine guns and most of them a

1I5

Ts Allies’ postponement of their assault gave the Germans

116 DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

mortar or two, and one or more field or anti-tank guns. The country
in between them was frequently traversed by an anti-tank ditch. All
the most likely exits from the shore were blocked by concrete walls or
other obstacles—see sketch map at page 176.

With each increase of our knowledge of the German defences the
way to overcome them was studied intensively. Ever since the con-
struction of underwater obstacles was first discovered in February,
small inter-Service parties had been visiting the French shore by
night to examine the beaches and beach obstacles under the very
noses of the defenders; many were photographed by low-flying air-
craft. Minor landing craft might be stopped by anyof these obstacles;
heavier craft might drive through them but probably at the cost of
severe damage and casualties, It would be necessary to demolish the
obstacles in sttu or to remove them bodily by tracked vehicles, and this
could only be done when they stood above tide level or in less than
two feet of water. Teams drawn from the Royal Navy and the Royal
Engineers were jointly trained for this task. The naval teams
equipped with special craft, explosives and shallow-water diving gear
were to deal with underwater obstacles, the sappers with those still
above water. Both would have to accompany the leading waves of
the assault and at first work under fire. Only the clearance of narrow
lanes ahead of the advancing tide could be attempted until the tide
receded. It was fortunate that the Germans had not time or supplies
to extend underwater obstacles into the lower half of the tidal range
as they had intended to do.*

Ingenuity and inventive skill had produced much new equipment
to facilitate the attack on land defences: mat-laying tanks for crossing
soft clay patches of beach, ramp tanks over which vehicles could
scale sea walls, bridge-carrying tanks for crossing anti-tank ditches,
assault engineer tanks with petards and other explosive charges for
blasting concrete works, armoured bulldozers for moving earth and
debris, flail tanks for mine clearance and Duplex Drive tanks which
could.swim ashore. These were all part of British equipment designed
to out-match German ingenuity and ease the task of assaulting
troops. ! *

Physically the forward defences of the assault coast, covered by
the Channel, were very strong; their characteristic weakness was lack
of depth. Once the outer crust was broken through there was no
second organised line of defence to challenge a thrusting adversary’s
advance inland. Much therefore would depend on the garrison. In

1 Since early 1943 all these ial devices had been concentrated in the 79th Armoured
Division so that one senior officer would be responsible for their development and for
advising on their use. Throughout the campaign the division was to remain under direct
command of Twenty-First Army Group, suitable portions being allotted to armies as
operations required.

Further details will be found in Appendix IV on British equipment and weapons.

GERMAN ARMY IN THE WEST 117

spite of the claims of the Russian and Italian fronts the forces of von
Rundstedt’s army of the West had been somewhat strengthened
during the past two months; the changes of its composition are
shown by the following figures.*

April 4 May 28

Static coast divisions . ; ; : 26 25
Infantry field-force and parachute divisions 14 16
Armoured and mechanised divisions ; 5 10
Reserve divisions . ‘ ; : 10 7

Total 55 58

But the mere number of divisions gives but an imperfect measure-
ment of fighting value. Much of the increase was achieved by refit-
ting, regrouping and training of reserves and some of the additional
divisions shown above were still only in course of formation. Yet one
significant change had taken place. The actual number of tanks in
the West had increased from 752 at the beginning of January to
1,403 at the end of April; and though figures are not available there
is reason to believe that they had been further increased by D-day.*

The field force and so-called ‘parachute’ infantry and armoured
divisions were to prove hard fighters. Although some of the static
divisions were less good in quality and were not fully trained or
equipped for mobile operations, they were to fight in well-prepared
positions which they had occupied for some time and on ground with
which they were by now familiar. Characteristics and strength of
some individual formations will be given as far as they are known
when they are encountered in battle. The disposition of the German
armies in France and the Low Countries are shown on the map facing
page 120. It will be seen that all the infantry divisions were in or
directly behind the coastal defence zone and that the armoured
divisions were widely distributed.

Fortunately it is not necessary here to describe fully the com-
plicated German system of command prevailing under Hitler. After
the war, Major-General von Buttlar, who in 1944 was Chief of Army
Operations on the staff of Hitler’s High Command of the Armed
Forces (OKW), wrote that high-level organisation reflected ‘the
internal influence and inter-play of forces which affected the whole
system of command’. The chain of command in the West was, he
claims, no special handicap to the commander of the western theatre,
for it was ‘a burden to which Commanders-in-Chief in all theatres of
war had to resign themselves’. But if that was how the matter
appeared to General Buttlar at the centre, as seen at the circumfer-
ence by Lieut-General H. Speidel, Rommel’s Chief of Staff, ‘the
organisation and chain of command of the major commands in the

118 DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

West was somewhere between confusion and chaos’*Even if it was
not peculiar to the West, the fact that units such as the occupation
troops, Waffen SS, and divisions stationed in France for rehabilita-
tion and training were under von Rundstedt’s control only for
operational purposes, did not simplify his task; while officials such as
the Chief Transportation Officer and inspectors general of armoured
forces, infantry, artillery and engineers, and even some sections of the
staff of von Rundstedt’s own headquarters were, in different respects
and to varying degrees, subject to control by OKW or other central
Reich authorities*Nor was there close co-operation between the com-
manders of the three Services comparable to that of the Allies. But
the ‘confusion and chaos’ which General Speidel lamented were also
aggravated by the attitude and actions of his own chief, Field-
Marshal Rommel.

It will be remembered (Chapter III) that the western theatre
was not under control of the German Army Headquarters (OKH)
but of what was virtually Hitler’s personal staff, OKW; that the
Commander-in-Chief of the western theatre, Field-Marshal von
Rundstedt, was one of the most senior, most distinguished and
respected soldiers Germany possessed; that early in 1944 the able
but less experienced Field-Marshal Rommel had been appointed to
command an army group of von Rundstedt’s forces consisting of the
Fifteenth and Seventh Armies, responsible for defence of the northern
coasts of France and Flanders; and finally that these two field-
marshals held different views on how the Allied assault, when it
came, should be countered.

Von Rundstedt prepared a directive which made clear Rommel’s
position as subordinate to himself as Commander-in-Chief, but this
definition of their relationship was unacceptable to both Rommel and
Hitler. Instead, Rommel was given a ‘Gummibefeh?’ (an elastic direc-
tive) which was later to handicap von Rundstedt’s power to influence
operations.*

The position of both men was ambiguous. As Commander-in-Chief
von Rundstedt had, nominally, overriding command of all army
forces in the West and was responsible for its defence. The two
strongest and most threatened armies in his command were to fight
under Rommel, but were still under his own headquarters for various
matters such as training, equipment, and supply. Yet while Rommel’s
authority within the area of his own command was to that extent
limited to the tactical conduct of two armies, as Inspector of Coastal
Defences he had an influence outside the area of his operational
command. In this dual réle the importance attached to the Atlantic
Wall and to the part which would be played by Army Group B in
defending the Channel coast gave to Rommel a position of great
intrinsic importance. He took full advantage of this position, for

NO GENERAL RESERVE 119

between mid-December and the end of February he not only person-
ally inspected important stretches of coast from central Holland
southwards to the Somme (particularly the Pas de Calais) but toured
parts of the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. He drove forward
work on the defences with great energy. It was said, for instance, that
‘in several divisional sectors more land mines have been relaid
(verlegt) in the last three weeks than in the previous three years’* But
Allied bombing of communications seriously interfered with supplies
and, although in the first six months of 1944 the number of mines in
the coastal defence zone was tripled, the five or six million laid fell
far short of Rommel’s own minimum estimate of fifty million needed
for continuous defence belts®This indefatigable industry, combined
with his self-confidence, assertiveness and his favoured relationship
with the Fithrer, enabled Rommel to win an influence on policy which
over-shadowed the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

Yet he was not content. In March he asked that the armoured
divisions in his own sector (which von Rundstedt had intended to
form into a reserve as ‘Armoured Group West’ under General Geyr
von Schweppenburg) should be put under his, Rommel’s, command;
and also that he should be given control ‘as far as work on coastal
defences was concerned’ over the armies allotted to the defence of the
remaining coast of France (the First in the Atlantic and the Nine-
teenth in the Mediterranean sectors)* His request was based on the
policy of defence which he was pursuing in contrast with the policy
which von Rundstedt advocated. Rommel held that the Allies must
be defeated on the coast and must never be allowed to break through
the defences of the Atlantic Wall; the coastal battle should be fought
by a single commander and, as all depended on it, he should have all
available forces under his immediate control. Though Hitler had
himself laid down that the Allies must never be allowed to break
through the Atlantic Wall and that the assaulting forces must be
destroyed at sea or on the coast*he found that he could hardly
retain von Rundstedt as Commander-in-Chief if he gave Rommel
not only command of the two armies which were to defend the most
threatened coast but also command of the reserves, and some control
over von Rundstedt’s other two armies. He got over the difficulty
by an application of his favourite policy of ‘divide and rule’ which
led to an unsatisfactory compromise. Neither von Rundstedt nor
Rommel should have control of all the reserves. But by the middle of
May Rommel was left in control of three armoured djvisions (the
and, 21st and 116th) as an Army Group B reserve. The remaining
armoured divisions to be stationed in the north (namely the 1st and
12th SS Panzer Divisions and the Panzer Lehr Division) were con-
stituted as an OKW reserve under Hitler’s direction from the 26th
of April.*

18
19

120 DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

Thus, von Rundstedt had no reserve under his personal command
and Hitler, by retaining personal control of the reserve, would inevit-
ably have to intervene in the conduct of the battle. In an effort to
balance his command and keep his hands free to exercise general con-
trol over the forthcoming battle von Rundstedt, at the end of April,
formed his two armies in the south (the First and the Nineteenth)
into a second army group, G, under Colonel-General Blaskowitz*

When the dispositions of the armoured divisions at the opening of
the battle are examined on the map opposite, it will be seen that
neither Rommel’s views nor von Rundstedt’s wholly prevailed.

According to Colonel-General Jodl’s? diary notes for April the
13th, ‘Rommel says mobile operations with armoured formations are
a thing of the past’*¥ This surprising opinion was apparently derived
from Rommel’s own experience in North Africa. There he had
learned that massed armoured formations could not operate success-
fully where an enemy held mastery in the air. Now he argued that
behind the Fifteenth and Seventh Armies of Army Group B the
movement of armoured divisions from a reserve would be canalised
on roads and railways, and in face of the Allies’ air superiority it
would be severely obstructed. Von Rundstedt on the other hand had
little faith in the Atlantic Wall, which he subsequently described as
‘an enormous bluff’. He felt that the Allies would be able to break
through it but he could not be sure where the break would come,
where therefore ‘a centrally-located army’ would be needed to
counter-attack in force.*

There is a further factor in this story of muddle, cross-purposes and
mutual distrust which characterised the German system of command
in the West. The German army, navy and air forces, charged with
responsibilities for the defence against invasion, were under separate
commands. The unification of command and the integration of staffs
for planning and control which characterised the Allies’ combined
operations had no counter-part in the German system. The Com-
mander-in-Chief in the West had no authority over the air forces
stationed in France—the Third Air Fleet—or over Admiral Krancke,
responsible for the naval defence of all the coasts of France. Many of
the heavier shore batteries forming part of the Atlantic Wall defences
were sited by naval authorities, often in disagreement with the army
commander in the sector. In operations firing to seaward they were
under naval control; firing on to the beaches or landward they
were to come under army control*Similarly the disposal of anti-
aircraft guns of the air force was decided by air force authority*
Early in May, Rommel asked that the III Flak Corps which was
‘scattered over the whole of central and northern France’ should be

3 Jodl was Chief of Operations Staff at OKW.

GERMAN ARMY DISPOSITIONS
Dawn 6th June 1944

SYMBOLS

a AH OBWesr PO Ree

Army Group Ds Panzer Division

Army ims Parachute Division

Infantry Corps — Static Division PKr0s
Panzer Corps Ess GAF Division, Mfontry EAS

P4245
yer
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Ro cal jp — stpke
2) we ROB West ae es 2

VR
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@ hmmm PANZER GROUP WEST

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AIR AND NAVAL FORCES 121

concentrated under his command. Its four regiments—twenty-four
up-to-date batteries—would, he said, provide valuable fire-power for
anti-aircraft and tank defence between the Orne and the Vire. Field-
Marshal Goring refused his request.*

It can be seen from the notes in Appendix VII how puny a force
was the Third Air Fleet to oppose to the air might of the Allies, and
how little it could do to support Rommel’s armies. According to the

German Air Ministry records the Third Air Fleet returned its —

strength on May the 31st as 402 bombers of various classes, 336
fighters, 89 reconnaissance and 64 transport aircraft. But not all
would be operational on any given day, and other contemporary
evidence states that of the fighters, for example, only about 200 were
operationally available on D-day.*

Also important from the Allied point of view were the fighter
forces held by Germany for the defence of the Reich to which refer-
ence was made in the preceding chapter. Some of these were moved
nearer to the scene of battle after the campaign opened, but their
intervention could not make up for the weakness of the Third Air
Fleet, or give the help that the Army would have needed to meet
attack from air, land and sea.*

The disposition of the enemy’s naval forces in the West when the
battle opened is shown in Appendix III. Admiral Krancke had at
his disposal no major warships. Distributed round the coast, from
Ijmuiden in Holland to Bayonne near the Spanish frontierin the Bay
of Biscay, were five destroyers, six torpedo-boats, thirty-four motor
torpedo-boats and nearly five hundred small patrol boats and mine-
sweepers. Forty-nine U-boats were based on Brest and Biscay har-
bours for anti-invasion duty, and forty-three more for other uses.
But not all these vessels were immediately available for service and
they were clearly incapable of serious opposition to the great naval
force to be employed in operation Neptune. Yet they might inflict
considerable damage if they succeeded in getting among the thou-
sands of ships and craft that would be crossing between England and
France.

The damage and disorganisation wrought by the Allied air forces
during the spring of 1944 was not the only handicap under which the
enemy prepared for the coming battle. In the weekly reports of the
German armies and army groups to the Commander-in-Chief (which
were summarised in his own weekly situation estimates to OKW) a
separate heading was included to record damage suffered through
sabotage.

It is impossible to estimate with any exactitude the material
damage wrought by the French sabotage activities. The best sabo-
teurs do not keep the most careful records and such records as there
are cannot produce a grand total which means anything. A list of

122 DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

‘successful’ attacks on factories, for instance, tells little of value unless
it also tells for how long and to what extent production suffered, and
evidence available on such points is both incomplete and conflicting.
Figures that have since been compiled must be treated with great
reserve, but there is no doubt that the considerable damage done by
saboteurs added much to the enemy’s troubles.

One of their targets, perhaps the most effectively hit, was the rail-
way system. Locomotives were sabotaged and derailments were
caused by rail-cutting, which upset military transport of men and
stores. To give one example, sabotage in a tunnel on the Besancon-
Montbéliard line near Belfort blocked all traffic for nineteen days.
The figures given in various calculations of damage done do not
square, but such sustained pin-pricking had more than nuisance
value; joined with the intensive Allied air attacks under the Trans-
portation Plan, they were a continuing embarrassment to the enemy.

So, too, were sabotage activities in factories and other industrial
works, A wide range of plants were damaged more or less seriously.
Among these were electric and hydro-electric power plants, trans-
formers, high tension cables and pylons; aero-engine and motor-
vehicle works, others making air propellers and component parts,
and ballbearing and aluminium factories. Over half a million litres
of petrol! and oil vere destroyed, and a large minesweeper was sunk
in Rouen harbour* Passive resistance, and in some cases bluff, added
to the effectiveness of sabotage. An amusing story is recorded ofa
Canadian officer who went to the round-house of the Dieppe railway
yards, immediately after the town’s recapture on September the rst,
to re-establish the important supply line to Neufchatel. ‘Six engines
were in the shed, all bearing placards stating their defects; the
minimum repair period was stated to be three months. As the officer
was expressing his disgust the foreman came into the shed and took
down the placards, saying, ‘‘Pour les Alliés demain soir’.’ ®

So brief'a survey cannot reveal the drama and dangers of these acts
of sabotage. Many saboteurs were captured or killed, sometimes in
their first venture, sometimes after one or more successes; most of
the evidence of their work was lost with them. Not all were as
competent as the famous ‘Armada’ team who worked in association
with the British Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.). It was built
round a fireman, Basset, and a garage mechanic, Jarrot, better
known under the pseudonyms of ‘Marie’ and ‘Goujon’. Their first
mission in August 1943 was directed against the power supplies of
the Creusot works. In October they carried out two missions against
electric supplies for Paris and the canal system. With many able
satellites (including one ‘who specialised in the execution of Gestapo
agents’) they had a long run of well authenticated success. All their
actions were carried out with sang-froid and discipline and without

FRENCH SABOTAGE AND RESISTANCE 123

loss to the personnel of their teams or to the civilian population, and
unlike many stories of the Resistance theirs had a happy ending.
‘In July 1944 “‘Marie”’ and “Goujon” arrived a third time to organise
the scattered Maquis round Lyon and Chalon sur Saéne, and at the
end ‘‘Marie”’ marched on Lyon at the head of some fifteen thousand
Frenchmen.’ *

In the sabotage campaign French trade unions played a sub-
stantial part, notably the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer, and, on
rare occasions when it was practicable to co-ordinate plans, Allied
bombing was not undertaken when sabotage could achieve the
desired results* But although an astonishing amount of traffic was
maintained between England and Resistance elements in France,
the nature and composition of the Resistance movement inevitably
limited co-operation and prevented its use as a positive factor in the
Allied plans.

It has already been explained in Chapter III that the dispersed
and variously constituted groups which formed the main corpus of
the Resistance were, by the early months of 1944, associated with the
organisation developing in France under the National Council of the
Resistance, in turn represented on the National Committee of the
Liberation over which de Gaulle presided in Algiers; it was repre-
sented in England at this time by General Koenig and his staff,
constituted under de Gaulle’s authority and acting as his Military
Mission at Shaef. On June the 2nd his appointment as Commander-
in-Chief of the Free French Forces of the Interior was recognised by
the Supreme Commander, and he was accorded the status of an
army commander with a right of appeal to de Gaulle. It has also
been explained that while this widely, if loosely, organised movement
was developing the British Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.)
and the American Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) were also
stimulating, guiding and supplying numerous small independent
groups which remained untouched by the larger organisation. Soon
after General Eisenhower’s arrival S.O.E. and O.S.S. were brought
under a Special Force Headquarters, as part of the Operations
Division of Shaef, who subsequently appointed liaison officers to
General Koenig’s Staff. There was thus an attempt to co-ordinate
the actions of both types of resistance operations, but the dichotomy
which had been born of circumstances persisted till well after the
campaign opened.*

As that time approached the amount of assistance provided for
groups of both categories was substantially increased. Ever since 1942
two squadrons of Bomber Command had been employed on this
special duty, carrying emissaries of S.O.E. and supplies into enemy
occupied territory and picking up our own men or French military
or Resistance leaders to bring them to England. They were by now

124 DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

very skilful in finding ‘reception committees’ in obscure or ill-defined
places and in landing and getting away quickly, on average in about
three minutes. Since December 1943 their work had been supple-
mented by two squadrons of American Liberators, and after
February by aircraft of 3 Group, Bomber Command and 38 Group,
Airborne Forces. By May, supplies dropped in France included
approximately 80,000 sten guns, 30,000 pistols and 17,000 rifles as
well as several thousand bazookas, Piats, mortars, grenades and con-
siderable demolition stores*A good deal of this material fell into
enemy hands, but much reached its proper destination and strength-
ened the recipients morally as well as physically. It was calculated
in May that some hundred thousand armed Frenchmen would take
action on orders from London, apart from the thirty-five to forty
thousand armed Maquis, of whom only about a quarter had
ammunition for more than one day’s serious fighting. Behind these
a conservative estimate put the number of unarmed men ready to
co-operate in passive resistance or a general strike at a million and a
half.*

Notwithstanding the growth of the movement and all that had
been done to develop its organisation, its heterogeneous composition,
paucity of equipment and lack of military experience, and the im-
possibility of calculating the size and efficiency of Resistance groups,
prevented its playing an integral part in military operations which
depended on exact and secret plans. From the Allies’ point of view
its achievements were to be regarded as a bonus. Yet as D-day drew
near the need of closer contacts was felt by the Allies’ planning staff
and two further measures were taken. First, Special Force Head-
quarters organised and trained over ninety small inter-Allied teams
of three men (known as ‘Jedburghs’), at least one being an officer
and another a wireless operator. On and after D-day these teams
were to be dropped where needed to serve as foci of Intelligence and
guidance to the neighbouring Resistance groups. Secondly, Special
Air Service Troops, comprising some 2,000 officers and men, and
eleven American ‘Operational Groups’, each of four officers and
thirty men, were to be used as small ‘striking forces’ with specific
objectives in association with Resistance groups.*

In so far as Resistance activities directly affected the campaign
with which this volume is concerned they will find their place in
the story: but the full account of the movement and its achievements
must be sought elsewhere, for much of it lies outside the scope of this
British military history.®

No disinterested student of military affairs will be likely to question
the Allies’ wisdom in withholding their plans from leaders of the

® And see Appendix IX.

SECURITY AND DE GAULLE 125

movement; the risk to security would have been too great. It does
not require much imagination to picture what might have happened
if the enemy had been able to obtain, through that or any other
channel, accurate information as to the place and time of the
invasion. All their major forces could with confidence have been
concentrated behind the threatened coast and they could then have
counter-attacked in overwhelming force. Even if they had failed to
learn the exact date of the invasion they would have been in a strong
position had they known that the main attack was to be made in
Normandy and that the Allies would not attempt to land in the Pas
de Calais or elsewhere. Mercifully the Allies achieved practically a
hundred per cent security. Notwithstanding the fact that a consider-
able number of people had to be in the secret, it was not given away.
Up to the end, even for some weeks after a footing had been gained
in France, the German leaders were still left to guess the Allies’
intentions, and by measures taken to deceive them they were
encouraged to guess wrongly.

Throughout the long stages of planning and preparation infinite
care had been taken to avoid any leakage of information, and as the
day of assault approached and men, material and shipping had to be
concentrated progressively in southern England, unheard-of measures
were taken to prevent even accidental disclosure of the carefully
guarded secret of the Allies’ purpose. Normal civilian travel between
the United Kingdom and Eire was stopped, for the Irish Government
was not at war with Germany and still allowed German diplomatic
representatives and agents in Eire to continue functioning un-
hindered¥In Great Britain, in April, a coastal belt ten miles deep,
on either side of the Firth of Forth and stretching from the Wash to
Land’s End, was closed to all visitors and only authorised travellers
were allowed to enter or leave it. Finally a most drastic and unprece-
dented step was taken. Neither diplomats nor their couriers were
allowed to enter or leave the country and all correspondence for
transmission in the sacred ‘diplomatic bag’ was subject to censorship.
This ban greatly annoyed Hitler when it was published; what was
of more interest to the Allies was the fact that it greatly incensed
General de Gaulle.*

De Gaulle’s political ambition has been referred to in an earlier
chapter. In these last few months he had moved steadily towards the
achievement of his desire to return to France at the side of the Allies
as their partner and as the head of a liberation government. On
May the 15th the Consultative Assembly which had been formed in
Algiers ruled that the National Committee of the Liberation should
henceforth be styled the ‘Provisional Government of the French
Republic’.*

But while de Gaulle increased his authority with Frenchmen he

126 DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

made less progress with the Allies. The fact that no uncensored com-
munications were allowed with his representatives in England; the
fact that neither he nor his military commander in England, General
Koenig, were allowed detailed knowledge of the Allies’ plans; the
fact that his ‘Provisional Government’ was not at once recognised as
such by the Allies, stirred him to unconcealed anger. The political
aspect of de Gaulle’s leadership of the French liberation movement is
only relevant here in so far as it impinged on the Allies’ military
preparations for the coming campaign and therefore little more need
be said about it. On the Allies’ request de Gaulle came to England
on the day before the assault was launched and was then admitted to
knowledge of their plans. He arrived in a difficult and unco-operative
mood. He could not then affect plans, but he forbade the 120 French
liaison officers with the Allied command to accompany the troops to
France, on the ground that they could have no function to perform,
seeing that they were agents of a French authority which had not
reached agreement on civil affairs. He refused to sanction the Allies’
arrangements for the issue of currency in France. He refused to join
in a series of broadcasts to be made on D-day by the Allied and other
national leaders and only consented to broadcast at a separate time
a brief statement in which he omitted any direct mention of the
Allies; ‘immense means of attack, that is to say, of succour for us’
was his only indirect reference. ‘France’, he said, ‘will fight this battle
with fury. . . . That is how, for 1,500 years, we have won each of our
victories. ... There is no problem for our Army, Navy and Air
Force. They have never been more ardent, more skilled, more
disciplined.’ The toil and sweat which the Allied forces had already
borne and the sacrifices of blood and treasure which they were pre-
paring to make left him unmoved. From the Allies’ point of view he
seemed an ungracious and lonely figure. He did nothing to relieve
and much to increase the anxieties which Allied leaders bore in those
troublous days*In his somewhat grandiloquent reference to the
French forces he no doubt had in mind the nucleus of a reconstituted
French army which had been assembled in North Africa, after the
German and Italian armies had been defeated there, and had been
equipped by the Allies. A corps of four French divisions was already
fighting under General Alexander’s command in Italy, and was
later to join in the Anvil attack in the south of France together with
approximately three divisions training in North Africa. The 2nd
French Armoured Division under General Leclerc arrived in Eng-
land at the beginning of June to take part subsequently in Overlord*
A number of French naval units, including two cruisers, were under
Admiral Ramsay’s command, and there were several French
squadrons serving in the Royal Air Force.

The administration of Civil Affairs, which must be controlled by

ALLIED DECEPTION MEASURES 127

the Supreme Commander while the German forces were being
driven out of France and other enemy-occupied countries, is being
discussed in a separate volume‘ and will only be mentioned in this
history of the campaign when it affects military operations. But it
must be noted that it was one of the semi-military, semi-political
matters with which General Eisenhower was charged and in which
his commanders were involved. And it was a continuing source of
conflict with de Gaulle and his colleagues as long as the Allies were
conducting military operations in France.

The necessity to ensure absolute security has been shown to have
increased the difficulty of Allied relations with de Gaulle. Other
foreign governments stationed in England or elsewhere saw the
reasonableness of the ban on free communications during this critical
time and accepted it after some protest with a good grace. And while
all information that might point to the date and place of the coming
attack was closely guarded even from our own forces, the enemy was
encouraged to deduce misleading inferences from evidence provided
specially for him under the cover and deception plan, Fortitude,
which has already been mentioned (page 103). Arrangements to
simulate preparations for a preliminary attack on Norway were
carried out under the Commander-in-Chief, Northern Command,
Lieut-General Sir A. F. A. N. Thorne. The assembly in Scotland of
a fictitious ‘Fourth Army’ was indicated by a volume of contrived
wireless traffic from a skeleton headquarters consisting chiefly of
signals staffs and equipment. This Fourth Army was supposed to
comprise three corps, some of whose units were troops that were in
fact stationed in Scotland while others existed only in imagination.
Troop movements and exercises, indicated chiefly by wireless traffic
(conducted with some purposeful indiscretions), offered evidence of
preparation for landings on the Norwegian coast, and this threat was
maintained until July in order to discourage any movement of
German troops from Norway to France.

Meanwhile the Allies provided similarly false indications that their
main attack on the German western front was to take place about
the middle of July and to be directed against the Pas de Calais coast.
The imaginary force was to comprise twelve divisions and these were
to be built up in France to an army of fifty divisions. To give an
appearance of reality to inspired suggestions that were skilfully
imparted through diplomatic, press and underground channels, the
formations which were in fact disposed in east and south-east England
were made to appear more formidable by a large volume of wireless
traffic with other ‘formations’ which only existed in imagination.

‘ F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government in North-West Europe (H.M.S.O.,
1961). See also Appendix VIII.

128 DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

The assembly of assault forces, real and imaginary, and the develop-
ment of headquarters, camps, roads, airfields and launching facilities
in the south-eastern counties was done openly and in some cases on
an artificially exaggerated scale, while in the south-west similar
activities, wholly necessary to meet real requirements, were hidden
from the enemy as carefully as possible; the enemy’s situation maps
giving what they believed to be the disposition of Allied forces in
Britain show how far the German command was muddled. False
information reinforced the Germans’ long-held belief that, although
the Allies might well attempt a first landing in Normandy, the main
assault would be made on the Pas de Calais coast; on D-day and for
weeks afterwards further steps were to be taken to sustain that belief.
The failure of German Intelligence to pierce the Allies’ screen of
deception and security was remarkable, though their various agencies
at work vied with each other in supplying Hitler with reports.*

Hitler’s original conviction that the Allies’ main assault would be
directed against the Pas de Calais, and that therefore this sector
should be most strongly guarded, was shared by all the German
leaders. The nearness of England to France at that point, and the
fact that it opened the shortest route to the Ruhr, made its selection
obvious. But just as German plans for the invasion of England in 1940
had provided for landings in more than one place, so it seemed
probable to Hitler and other German leaders that the Allies would
launch one or more subsidiary assaults, designed to establish bridge-
heads which would require a diversion of defending troops from the
area of the main assault. Not only Norway, but the Atlantic coast,
even Portugal and the Mediterranean coast of France, were at times
considered to be likely places for such diversionary attacks;"while as
early as October 1943 von Rundstedt had pointed out that ‘Nor-
mandy with Cherbourg, and Brittany with Brest are additional
important areas on the Channel front’*In February, Hitler grew
sensitive to the danger of Allied landings in Normandy and Brittany;
on March the 4th he described them as ‘particularly threatened*On
May the 6th Jodl informed von Rundstedt’s headquarters that Hitler
attached ‘particular importance to Normandy’, especially the Cher-
bourg area, and all possible measures should be taken to reinforce
that area against attack short of committing the OKW reserves*¥As
a result, the Cotentin peninsula was reinforced by the g1st Airlanding
Division, then on its way to Brittany, and by the 6th Parachute
Regiment and some smaller units from elsewhere. Together with
transfers already in train at the end of April, namely, the 21st Panzer
Division from Brittany to Caen and the Panzer Lehr Division from
Hungary to Chartres, these moves amounted to an appreciable
increase of the enemy strength in Normandy.

Von Rundstedt, too, continued to recognise Normandy as in the

GERMAN FORECASTS 129

danger zone; the preparatory Allied air attacks reinforced his view
on the 24th of April that the focal point ‘is still the Channel coast
from the Scheldt (inclusive) to Normandy, perhaps even to Brest
(inclusive)’. On the 15th of May, in his situation report, he stressed
the Allies’ need to win large and capacious harbours, ‘Le Havre and
Cherbourg are primarily to be considered for this purpose, Boulogne
and Brest secondarily. The attempt to form a bridgehead rapidly on
the Cotentin peninsula in the first phase would therefore seem very
natural. ...’ On May the 29th von Rundstedt concluded that the
Allies’ disruption and destruction of the traffic network, and the
cutting off of the Channel front north of the Seine from direct contact
with the Seine estuary and Normandy, by the attacks on the Seine
bridges, ‘may indicate enemy designs on Normandy (formation of
a bridgehead)’* But the Allied air forces had gained such mastery
over the Channel and sea approaches to the United Kingdom that
German aircraft hardly attempted to observe what was going on
in harbours along the English coasts. In a report dated June the 4th
Admiral Krancke, while regretting that air reconnaissance during
the month of May had been insufficient to give a clear picture of the
state of enemy preparations for attack on the Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean coasts of France, wrote that he was ‘doubtful whether the
enemy has yet assembled his invasion fleet in the required strength’*

On June the 5th, with no fresh information on which to base an
opinion, Army Group B considered that the Allied concentration of
air attacks on the Channel coast between Dunkirk and Dieppe

pointed to ‘the previously assumed focal point of the major landing’*

—that is, the Pas de Calais area. On the same day, in the portion of
the weekly situation report reserved for his usual carefully worded
synopsis, von Rundstedt expressed the opinion that the invasion was
not yet imminent. “The systematic continuation and noticeable
intensification of enemy air attacks indicate a more advanced state
of readiness for the descent. The main front between the Scheldt
and Normandy is still the most probable place of attack. Its possible
extension along the north coast of Brittany, including Brest, is not
excluded. Where within this entire sector the enemy will attempt a
landing is still obscure. Concentration of enemy air attacks on the
coastal fortifications between Dunkirk and Dieppe, and on the Seine—
Oise bridges, in conjunction with the paralysing of supply services
and of the southern flank between Rouen and Paris (inclusive), might
be indicative of the main front of a major landing intended by the
enemy. However, the cessation of traffic across the Seine would
equally affect troop movements required in the case of an enemy
attack on the western part of the Baie de la Seine, Normandy and
the north coast of Brittany. As yet there is no immediate prospect of
the invasion.’*
K

130 DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

Nor was there any indication from the German Air Force of what
was to come. While Allied reconnaissance aircraft flew far and wide
over north-west France on the last two days before D-day but found
nothing significant to report about the moves of German armoured
divisions, the enemy failed to send any reconnaissance aircraft over
Britain where there was much more to discover; on June the 5th
—when the whole invasion armada was at sea—only five German
aircraft flew over the Channel to carry out routine runs.*

The German meteorological service, unable to maintain reporting
stations far out in the Atlantic, had failed to catch the significance of
changes taking place and had advised that invasion after June the 4th
would be impracticable for several days. Naval patrols ordered for
the night of June the 5th were cancelled because of the bad weather
prevailing. An army war-game exercise that was to be held at Rennes
on June the 6th was not cancelled and a number of divisional and
other commanders of the Seventh Army were to attend it. Local
leave for officers was open.

As for Rommel, he so little feared an immediate attack that he left
his headquarters in France on June the 5th to spend a night with his
family in Germany on the way to visit Hitler.*

CHAPTER VII

THE END OF THE BEGINNING

paratively few knew exactly where. they were to meet the enemy

and no one yet knew exactly when, but everyone realised that the
meeting was near at hand. Those who bore any measure of responsi-
bility were conscious that the vast and complicated organisation of
which they were a part would only function smoothly and punctu-
ally if no factor had been overlooked, no work scamped, no link
badly forged. Very soon the validity of all the forethought, labour,
and long and strenuous preparation would be tested. Millions of men,
thousands of aircraft and ships, and vast quantities of machines,
vehicles and stores were involved and all the contrivance to bring
them to battle must work as planned; there must be no breakdown
on the railways, no hold-up in congested harbours, no failure of
communications which were to link all together under firm control.
There was a lively sense of approaching crisis.

High morale and buoyant optimism characterised all the Services.
General Eisenhower and his commanders had been indefatigable in
visiting both formations in training and many of the industrial con-
cerns engaged on the production of armaments and equipment. They
had sought thus to establish personal touch with the forces and to
inspire them and industrial workers with a true sense of partnership
in the great enterprise that lay ahead, and to give them confidence
in themselves and in their leaders.

[: was a time of mounting tension for the Services. Only com-

‘So service shall with steeled sinews toil
And labour shall refresh itself with hope.’ 2

To reach a position in which each Service was well manned and
prepared had not been plain sailing. The allocation of manpower
between the fighting forces and industry, and between the separate
Services, had involved continuous review and regulation by the War
Cabinet. Each Service had increased its claims as planning proceeded
and the nature and magnitude of its tasks were defined. Each
Service had its own difficulties to overcome.

Most of the officers and men of the naval forces which formed the
large combatant fleet under Admiral Ramsay’s command had already
gained experience in the long war at sea. But the Navy had also to
train additional officers and crews for the thousands of landing craft

1 Shakespeare—Henry V.

131

132 THE END OF THE BEGINNING

which were to play so large a part in forthcoming operations, for
naval beach parties and many other special duties. These were met
partly by an increased allocation from the joint intake of men and
partly by the transfer of certain soldiers and airmen to the Royal
Navy. The naval allocation to Combined Operations Command for
initial training was greatly increased* The Royal Marine Division,
formed in 1941 for amphibious operations, was disbanded and re-
trained to provide crews for minor landing craft (thus freeing seamen
to man larger craft such as the ‘landing-craft tank’ or L.C.T.), for
service in the Royal Marine Armoured Support Group or in Royal
Marine Commandos. A large proportion of landing-craft crews and
men in ancillary services had only a brief period of training in their
special duties and relatively few had any previous battle experience.
It will be seen later how remarkably successful was the Navy’s
assimilation of such large numbers for employment on an operation
that had little precedent.

As finally constituted at this time, Twenty-First Army Group was
largely composed of seasoned soldiers. There were many who had
fought in France four years before and come home through Dun-
kirk; there were men of the divisions transferred from the Mediter-
ranean theatre* who had fought in North Africa, or more recently
in Sicily and Italy; and there were larger numbers who, though they
had not had battle experience, had by now spent several years in the
Army and were trained and practised soldiers. All were self-confident
and eager to match their prowess against the enemy. By transfers
and promotions, available fighting experience was spread as widely
as possible. A high proportion of senior commanders had experience
of recent fighting and all army and corps commanders and nearly all
divisional commanders had seen some fighting during the war. Their
average age was forty-eight, and that of lieutenant-colonels command-
ing infantry battalions or holding comparable commands of armoured
troops, artillery, engineers or signals was thirty-five, compared
respectively with fifty-four and forty-five in the British Expeditionary
Force of 1940. Because there was some shortage of junior officers 673
were lent by the Canadian Army. Most of them served in their
affiliated British infantry regiments; many were awarded distinction,
and 465 became casualties.3*

To foster regimental pride and the fellowship of larger formations,
regimental and formation badges were to be worn in battle, con-
trary to the recent practice and despite the risk that the enemy might
thereby obtain useful information. The regimental spirit has always

2 The following had been transferred from the Mediterranean: 7th Armoured Division;
4th and 8th Armoured Brigades; 50th and 51st Infantry Divisions; 1st Airborne Division;
XXX Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops.

*C. P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 19399-1945 (Ottawa, 1948), p. 295.

FINAL EXERCISES 133

been a strong characteristic of the British Army; in this war, pride in
the membership of a division or corps was also notably developed.

The Royal Air Force had to face its own manpower difficulties and
at times to surrender numbers to the other Services. The Second
Tactical Air Force had had to convert a static air force (provided
with every need and with much help from civilian labour) to a highly
mobile organisation entirely dependent on Service personnel and on
its own equipment. But many of the airmen engaged in Overlord
had already been fighting for months—many indeed for years—over
France and North-West Europe and they were full of confidence.

After months of individual and combined training forces began to
concentrate on the southern and western areas. In April, Force S4
began to move from Scotland to the Portsmouth area; Force J was
already based on the Solent while Force G, which was only formed
on March the 1st when the expanded scale of Neptune had been con-
firmed, moved from the Weymouth-—Poole area to the west Solent
and Southampton. The American Force O was already in the
Portland area; Force U, recently formed like Force G, began to
concentrate in small west country ports in March, but many of its
units did not reach England until April.

On the 26th of April began a final series of exercises in which each
of the five naval assault forces combined with the troops who were
to be associated with it in a rehearsal exercise at full scale, under
conditions resembling as closely as possible those they would face on
landing in France. Each involved the assembly and loading of con-
voys, a sea passage attended by minesweepers, the assault of a
selected shore (in some cases accompanied by bombardment with
live ammunition) and a build-up of troops and vehicles over the
beach, On the first of these exercises, designed for the still incomplete
Force U and its associated troops, there had occurred the only serious
mishap during the whole series. The escorting destroyer, Scimitar,
was damaged in collision with an American landing ship and had
put into Plymouth for temporary repairs when, soon after midnight,
enemy motor torpedo-boats attacked a convoy of landing ships
engaged in the exercise. The corvette, Azalea, which had been left
in charge of the convoy, was unable single-handed to beat off the
attack before two landing ships were sunk and a third damaged;
and although the enemy boats were sighted and chased by destroyers
they made good their escape in the darkness. Over seven hundred
American men were lost and a number injured, of whom two-thirds
were soldiers. A subsequent German broadcast claimed that three
ships had been sunk in convoy but did not apparently connect the
event with preparations for invasion.*

‘ For reference to this and other Forces mentioned here, see diagram on page 67.

134 THE END OF THE BEGINNING

There was no enemy interference with similar assault-landing
exercises on the south coast during the first week of May—at Slapton
(Force O), Hayling Island (Force G), Bracklesham Bay (Force J),
and Littlehampton (Force S). Admiral Ramsay temporarily assumed
operational control in the Channel for the purpose of these exercises.
When they were concluded the assault ships and landing craft which
had for months been employed in training schemes, often under
extremely severe conditions, were in urgent need of repair. A heavy
burden was laid on all concerned in repair facilities along the south
coast, but so well did they rise to the occasion that, when the hour
struck, 97-3 per cent of British and 99-3 per cent of American craft
were fit for operations—a much higher proportion than was
estimated in planning.

A final conference of high-ranking officers from all three Services
of both nations was held at St. Paul’s School on May the 15th under
the aegis of Shaef. General Eisenhower afterwards described the
meeting that morning as ‘packed with dramatic significance’. His
Majesty the King was present and the Prime Minister. Field-
Marshal Smuts and members of the War Cabinet were there too and
the British Chiefs of Staff. After General Eisenhower had spoken
General Montgomery outlined the intended course of the Allied
armies’ assault, Admiral Ramsay and Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory
described the operations of naval and air forces, and British and
American naval, army and air commanders elaborated the story.
The speakers’ mastery of complex plans and their evident assurance
deeply impressed those who heard them; a sense of sober confidence
pervaded the room and, at the close, this was expressed by His
Majesty and by Mr. Churchill.5*

There had been no substantial change in the Army plan (outlined
in Chapter IV) to attack with five assault divisions; the diagrams
at pages 172 and 189 show in more detail how those divisions
would land. Each division would attack with one or more infantry
brigades, augmented by additional tanks, armoured cars, artillery,
engineers and vehicles drawn from corps, army and G.H.Q. troops,
the enlarged brigade being known as a ‘brigade group’, or in the
American Army as a ‘regimental combat team’. This reinforcement
of basic formations for battle was a characteristic of Army organisa-
tion which four years of war experience had shown to be desirable.
The main structure of the Army was unchanged with its groupings
in divisions, corps, armies and army groups; but although the strength
of an infantry division had been increased by nearly fifty per cent
since 1940, its transport more than doubled, its fire power increased
several times and the wireless sets (on which its communications

§ Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 269; and see Churchill, The Second World War, vol. V,
P. 542 et seq.

ASSAULT FORCES ASSEMBLING 135

largely depended) multiplied tenfold, it was commonly strengthened
to fight as a ‘divisional group’ and its brigades never went into action
without additional support for their three battalions of infantry. A
battalion commander in one of the assault brigade groups would be
able to call on supporting artillery and machine guns, tanks of an
engineer assault regiment, amphibious (‘D.D.’) tanks and flame-
throwing tanks, as well as naval support.

The average assault brigade group would comprise five to six
thousand men, of whom approximately forty per cent were infantry
and commandos and the remainder gunners, engineers, tank
crews, signallers, beach and medical personnel. Eight of these
brigade groups, or their American equivalents, would attack the
named beaches, each having two battalions in the leading wave and
one following in close support; but neither they nor any other unit
or formation would land complete at first. It would only be possible
to accommodate all the essential men and equipment needed in the
initial stages of the attack by a drastic pruning of those not 1m-
mediately required. For example, an assault division would only
take with it for the initial attack about forty per cent of its vehicles,
and an infantry battalion in an assault brigade group only about five
hundred and fifty of its eight hundred men and a minimum of essential
equipment. Once the landings began, units and formations would be
completed gradually as ships and craft brought in men, ammunition,
equipment and stores in planned sequence. It was because this was
so that the composition of every ship-load and every boat-load of the
thousands that were to be continuously employed had to be planned
with reference to its destination and with its task known and pro-
vided for. As for its destination, the beaches selected for attack in
each named area were divided and denoted alphabetically in signal
parlance. It was thus possible to calculate exactly where every par-
ticular craft should land, the time at which it should touch down,
and the anticipated situation that would confront it on shore; from
these data the men and material to go in it could be assembled in
due order. It will be realised how much thought and labour were
involved in mounting the assault with such care for detail, seeing
that troops, equipment and shipping had to be matched accurately
in the scattered harbours of southern England from which they were
to set out.

The magnitude and complexity of the naval arrangements for the
loading and assembly of the vast amount of shipping and craft in-
volved were indicated in the outline of Neptune plans in Chapter IV
(pages 66-71), and the ports from which the various naval forces were
to sail are shown on the map overleaf. The following table gives
some further detail of the way in which the associated forces were
assembled.

136 THE END OF
Covering forces (destroyers) .

39 39 (coastal)
Landing craft of Ferry Service

Tugs, salvage vessels, depot
and accommodation ships

Escorts and minesweepers .

Bombarding ships—Eastern ©

Task Force
Bombarding ships—Western
Task Force ,
Blockships (Corncobs)
Mulberry harbour units:
Phoenix
Bombardon .
Whale .

THE BEGINNING

Assembly Areas

Plymouth and Portsmouth

Dartmouth, Portland, Newhaven
and Dover

Chichester, Langston, and Poole
harbours

Ports between Falmouth and
Southend
With their convoys

Clyde

Belfast
Oban

Selsey, Dungeness and Thames
Portland
Solent and Selsey

Pre-loaded merchant ships

Stores coasters Thames, Solent and Bristol

Channel
Mechanical transport
ships . : . London, Southend and Bristol
Personnel ships : ; Channel
Tilbury and Bristol Channel

In May, units taking part in the assault were assembled in con-
centration areas, mostly south of a line from the Wash to Milford
Haven, where the ‘residue’ of men and baggage not required for the
first stage would be separated and left behind. On May the 26th
troops taking part in the assault moved to marshalling areas near
their ports of embarkation. There they were ‘sealed’ in fenced-in
camps and briefing began four days before they were split up into
ship and craft loads. Until then only lieutenant-colonels commanding
units and one other officer from each had been informed of the plan
of attack; now company commanders and equivalent ranks. were
told, and i in the final three days before formations were split up
junior officers, N.C.O.s and men were briefed* Great trouble was
taken to ensure that everyone understood what his task would be in
the initial assault and immediate follow-up. A large number of
models, photographs and maps were provided to explain this, exact
in other detail but bearing artificial names and map references; in-
formation on these two important points was still withheld for
security reasons. No one could be told the date on which the assault
would be launched for that was not yet decided. And no one was yet
told where they were to land in France, whether the beaches they

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ROLE OF AIRBORNE TROOPS 137

were to capture were in Normandy or the Pas de Calais. They would
only learn this when they were at sea, for only then would real maps
be issued.

Ever since the planners had suggested the geographical limits
within which an invasion of North-West Europe was considered
feasible, and the probable trend of subsequent operations, the
preparation of maps had begun. Before D-day about a hundred and
seventy million were provided by the War Office for British and
American forces, of various scales and for many distinctive uses.
Some required much re-drawing of out-of-date maps, some were
based on photographic survey; over two thousand were newly
drawn. Special maps, diagrams and overprints were provided
through collaboration of the Air Survey Liaison Section of the Royal
Engineers, the Royal Air Force and the Hydrographic Branch of the
Admiralty. ‘Stop press’ editions were published a few days before
D-day for use in the final stages of briefing and assault. With all this
precious and revealing information in print the fact that there was
no leakage was a truly remarkable proof of good discipline and a
high sense of responsibility in those who produced and handled this
vast store of maps.*

The final move of the assault troops was to their ‘embarkation
areas’ at ports or ‘hards’. It had long been realised that the ports
available could not provide all the accommodation that would be
needed for loading landing ships and craft carrying tanks and
vehicles, and that sheltered beaches in their natural state would not
stand up to the heavy traffic involved. So over a hundred and thirty
hards had been specially constructed on selected beaches by the
use of concrete and steel wire ‘mattresses’ which could be moved by
four men; over half a million were made, for each of these hards
needed on average four thousand.*

Before embarkation every vehicle, tank, gun and wireless set in the
assault was ‘waterproofed’ to prevent damage by sea water in wading
ashore, often through four to six feet of water. Special solutions and
other means were used to keep the sea from entering the engine or
other vulnerable mechanism, and because a vehicle that had been
fully waterproofed could only travel a limited distance, the consider-
able work involved had to be done in stages; it started in the con-
centration area, and was completed at the port of embarkation.
Bearing in mind the huge numbers involved the magnitude of this
single task may be indicated by the fact that it took about eighty-
six man-hours to waterproof a single Bren carrier and two hundred
and eighty-six for a tank—and after landing each vehicle had to be
de-waterproofed.*

While all else was now settled one important question was still in
doubt, namely, how the two American airborne divisions should be

138 THE END OF THE BEGINNING

used. There had never been any question that airborne troops could
play a valuable and perhaps essential part in the assault; the
original Cossac plan had assumed the use of two airborne divisions
in the opening assault and the enlarged Neptune plan required the
employment of three. There was no difficulty in finding these for
there were now four airborne divisions available—two British and
two American—in addition to the Special Air Service Troops com-
prising two British Special Air Service regiments, two French para-
chute battalions and independent companies of Belgian and Nor-
wegian parachutists; there was also a brigade of Polish parachute
units. The method of their employment was however conditioned in
large measure by the number of transport aircraft and glider pilots
that had by now been made available. Two troop carrier groups of
the Royal Air Force (38 and 46) would have about 470 troop carrier
aircraft and some 1,120 gliders available, and the Troop Carrier
Command of the American Ninth Air Force would have 896 aircraft
and 2,400 gliders. These could carry, respectively, two brigades of a
British division in a first lift and the third brigade later, and the
greater part of two American divisions by a first lift and the re-
mainder later.

The réle of the British 6th Airborne Division had been settled
months before; they were to begin landing in the Caen area during
the night preceding the first seaborne landings. But when it was pro-
posed that the American rorst Airborne Division should, at the same
time, begin landing behind beaches on the east of the Cotentin and
the 82nd Airborne Division on the west of the peninsula, Air Marshal
Leigh- Mallory expressed serious doubt as to the wisdom of the pro-
posal. As planned it would require two long columns of towed
gliders to take off in the dark, 260 to land at first light on D-day and
400 on the following morning. They would have to land in an area
in which the enemy fighter and ground defence would have had time
to be fully alerted and he prophesied that ‘casualties will not only
prove fatal to the success of the operation itself but will also jeopar-
dise all future airborne operations’** An amended plan was sub-
sequently agreed with General Montgomery and General Bradley,
for which fewer glider-borne units would be used at the outset,
parachutists of both divisions being taken in on the first night, but
only 100 gliders at dawn and 200 at last light on D-day*But on May
25th it was learned that a fresh German division had arrived on the
western side of the Cotentin peninsula in the area where the 82nd
Airborne Division was planning to land. On learning this General
Bradley proposed that the 82nd Division should be dropped some
ten to twelve miles further east, alongside the rorst Division, for
without the help of airborne divisions the attack on Utah would have
to be abandoned* But to this Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory objected

WEATHER AND D-DAY 139

that ‘if you do this operation you are throwing away two airborne
divisions’. Nevertheless, General Montgomery supported General
Bradley’s view that airborne landings there were essential to the
successful capture of the beaches on the east of the Cotentin and
subsequently the decision to proceed was confirmed by Sir Arthur
Tedder. *

Still troubled, Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory wrote to General
Eisenhower in a last attempt to get the plan changed. He pointed
out that 915 aircraft (96 of them with gliders in tow) would have to
fly from west to east across the Cotentin peninsula at less than 1,000
feet, at the time of the full moon and over known enemy concentra-
tions. This would take three hours and at the end of it he doubted
whether fifty per cent of the parachutists and thirty per cent of the
glider loads would be effective for use against the enemy. But the
Supreme Commander replied that ‘a strong airborne attack in the
region indicated is essential to the whole operation and must go on’,
though ‘every single thing that may diminish these hazards’ must be
worked out to the last detail. It was already May the 3oth when this
was finally settled*After the war General Eisenhower said that he
felt the burden of his responsibility even more keenly when he made
this decision than he did when he decided to launch Overlord on
June the 6th. In the latter case he followed the advice of experts—
the meteorologists; they might be wrong, but they were the best
authority available. In his decision to order the airborne operations
in the Cotentin he acted against his Air Commander-in-Chief.*

Early in May, Shaef established an advance command post for
General Eisenhower conveniently near both to the battle head-
quarters which Admiral Ramsay had set up in the last week of April
at Southwick House, Portsmouth, and to the Portsmouth Combined
Headquarters. At the same time Twenty-First Army Group’s main
headquarters moved to the vicinity and shortly afterwards formed the
tactical headquarters for General Montgomery which was to move
to France as soon as a landing was effected on D-day.*

That momentous date had now to be decided, and although in the
course of this campaign General Eisenhower had other decisions to
take of far-reaching consequence, he can hardly have had many that
caused him so much anxiety as this one. For notwithstanding that
he had the advice of his commanders, and of the best meteorological
experts of both the British and American Services with their scientific
paraphernalia for weather prediction, yet the Supreme Commander
must make the final decision—the responsibility would be his and
his alone. Not only the ultimate success or failure of the assault but
the lives of many thousands of men would depend on his choice. He
must have been very conscious of this as the time to choose drew near.

It will be remembered that certain of the conditions which must

140 THE END OF THE BEGINNING

govern the choice had been decided in the earlier planning stage
(page g1). The initial landings should be made soon after sun-
rise, on a day when at that early hour there would still be about three
hours before high water; and it was desirable, if not essential, that
there should be a good moon on the preceding night to facilitate
accurate bombing and the landing of airborne divisions. In the first
week of June, such conditions could only be fulfilled on three days—
the 5th, 6th and 7th. All this was appreciated when the Neptune
plans were agreed, but which of the three possible days to choose
could not be decided so far ahead, for the final arbiter must be the
weather. The wind must not be too strong nor the sea too rough and
low cloud must not too heavily blanket the sky to allow for the
planned operations of shipping and aircraft.

For convenience in long-term planning it had been decided that
June the rst would be referred to as Y-day. D-day must therefore be
Y plus 4, 5 or 6 and it must be decided at latest by Y plus 2 as the
machinery of assault must be set in motion two days before the event.

On May the 8th General Eisenhower decided provisionally that
D-day would be Y plus 4—that is Monday, June the 5th. A signal
to that effect was issued by Supreme Headquarters to the Com-
manders-in-Chief on May the 23rd*

No further action was called for as everything was already in
train. On the receipt of this message the wheels of Neptune machinery
began slowly to turn. First to move were the blockships to be sunk
off the Normandy coast, which sailed south on May the 31st from the
Scottish ports in which they had been made ready.

On June the 1st Admiral Ramsay assumed operational command
of Neptune forces and general control of operations in the Channel*

It had been arranged that as D-day drew near General Eisen-
hower and his Commanders-in-Chief would meet daily, and twice
daily if need be, to consider the weather forecasts. May had been
consistently fine, but on Friday, June the 2nd, when they gathered
at Admiral Ramsay’s headquarters at Portsmouth, less favourable
weather was predicted for D-day; there were indications that the
relatively quiet weather which existed at that time might end about
June the 6th*But the signs were not yet clear, and after discussion
with his commanders General Eisenhower decided that existing
orders should stand. Bombarding Force D sailed from the Clyde that
evening and H.M.S. Nelson left Scapa for Milford Haven. Two
midget submarines—X23 and X20—which were to act as markers
off the French coast for Force S and Force J respectively, sailed from
Portsmouth.*

The mission of these tiny submarines, each manned by only two
lieutenants and an engine-room artificer and each carrying a com-
bined operations pilotage-party of two naval officers, was difficult,

ASSAULT POSTPONED 141

dangerous and responsible. They were to leave harbour before the
assault forces, towed at first by trawlers; continuing the passage un-
escorted they were to reach the Normandy shore some twenty-four
hours before anyone else. They were to identify the narrow Sword
and Juno beaches—and then to submerge and lie hidden there till
darkness came. On the morning of D-day, while it was still dark,
they were to surface and show lights to seaward that would serve as
leading marks for the assaulting craft destined to land on those
beaches. These two beaches were not easy to identify. The few land-
marks on the low shore would be hard to distinguish when approach-
ing in darkness and even small inaccuracies in making a landfall
might prove disastrous; for there were rocky outcrops off shore in
some places and just east of Sword, where the Orne flows into the sea,
mud flats stretch seaward for over a mile.

Cloud was lowering, wind increasing and the sea rising when dawn
came on Saturday, June the 3rd. During the day the Western Task
Force bombarding vessels sailed from Belfast and H.M.S. Rodney and
Bombarding Forces E and K left the Clyde: late in the afternoon part
of the first assault force convoys of Force U put to sea from Dart-
mouth, Salcombe and Brixham.*

When General Eisenhower and his commanders met again at half-
past nine that Saturday evening the experts’ forecast for Monday
was yet more pessimistic. Since Friday morning the whole meteoro-
logical situation had been growing less favourable; there had been
doubt for a time as to how various factors should be weighed, but by
now the unfavourable balance had swung too far to be righted by
Monday; it looked as if D-day would have to be postponed. After
full discussion General Eisenhower decided, however, to wait until
one more report could be received.

Shortly after four o’clock on Sunday morning (the 4th) the
commanders’ conference met again. The forecast of worse weather
on Monday was endorsed and was now too unfavourable to be
ignored any longer, though outside the sky was practically clear and
there was little wind. After discussion with his naval, army and air
commanders General Eisenhower decided to postpone D-day for
twenty-four hours. Accordingly D-day was moved forward to
Tuesday, June the 6th, by the issue of a signal which meant that
Overlord was postponed one day. In telegraphing his decision to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, General Eisenhower gave as his reason
that approaching adverse weather conditions might make air and
airborne operations impossible. He added that a second postpone-
ment of twenty-four hours might well be necessary*But any further
postponement would have very serious effects. To put off the attack
for one day was possible but on the following day ships already at
sea would have to return to refuel and by the third day the required

142 THE END OF THE BEGINNING

conditions in regard to time and tide would no longer obtain. They
would not again obtain for a fortnight, even if the phase of the moon
were ignored. The machinery of the assault, now wound up like a
steel spring, would have to be released in that interval and rewound
later. Apart from the trouble involved the risk to security would be
greatly increased and acute disappointment would be likely to lower
the forces’ present high spirits.

On the postponement for twenty-four hours, convoys already at sea
were ordered to reverse their courses and go to sheltered anchorages;
those which had not yet sailed were to remain in harbour. The
blockship convoys which were on passage from Scottish ports were
diverted to Poole Bay and the bombarding forces already on the
move reversed their courses, intending to remain at sea. Troops on
craft still alongside the quays were taken on shore to stretch their
legs, but those on ships which were loaded and lying at anchor
remained aboard. Alternative air programmes for use in the event
of postponement were put into operation. Before eleven that night
the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, reported that all Neptune
convoys were anchored except one. This was one of the assault force
convoys of Force U mentioned above as having put to sea on
Saturday. It was a very large convoy, including 128 tank landing
craft, nine escorts and a rescue tug; it had got some distance ahead
of its planned positions and apparently missed the postponement
signal issued early on Sunday morning. At nine o’clock that morning
it was twenty-five miles south of the Isle of Wight and still steering
for France, but within another hour it was turned back by a naval
aircraft, hastily sent from Portsmouth, and was ordered to anchor
and refuel in Weymouth Bay. The return progress was much delayed
by the strong westerly wind and short steep sea and none of these
craft were at anchor till after midnight; some did not anchor at all.*

The submarines X23 and X20 had reached the French coast just
before daybreak on this Sunday, the 4th of June; they have the
honour of being the first of the Neptune forces to have done so. They
lay at the bottom of the sea until daylight enabled them to fix their
exact stations by rising to periscope depth to take bearings on the
shore. There were no signs of movement on the sea around them or
on land and having anchored they sank again. Throughout that day
they remained on the bottom resting*

During the day the expected bad weather began to arrive. At
eleven in the morning the Admiralty issued a gale warning to all
shipping in the Irish Sea, and as the day wore on the weather grew
worse. By half-past nine on Sunday evening, when General Eisen-
hower’s conference met again, it was a rough and stormy night.

But while the gloom deepened outside, the spirits of those who
assembled in the conference room had been dramatically raised

D-DAY FINALLY DECIDED 143

already. During the afternoon the leaders had been told that the
Chief Meteorological Officer, Shaef (Group Captain J. M. Stagg),
and his colleagues now expected better weather on D-day. Their
earlier forecast of unfavourable weather was being fulfilled near at
hand (it was still raining heavily and blowing hard outside the con-
ference room), but there had been rapid and unexpected changes
over the Atlantic. A ‘front’ from one of the deep depressions in the
north-west Atlantic had swept much further south than was ex-
pected; it was already almost over Portsmouth and would clear the
Channel, at least on the English side, during the night. It would be
followed by an interval of fair conditions which would last at least
till dawn on Tuesday. Wind speeds and cloud should decrease.
Cloud might increase after Tuesday night but there would be
variable skies with considerable fair periods till Friday; it was too
early to forecast conditions further ahead with any assurance, for
they were likely to be unsettled by the vigorous shake-up which was
taking place over the north Atlantic. Low pressure systems were
forming, deepening and crossing at a rate that was more appropriate
to mid-winter than to June.*

Having heard the opinions of the three Service commanders,
General Eisenhower decided to hold to his provisional decision that
the postponed D-day would be Tuesday, June the 6th, but this
would only be made firm if the new forecast still held good at four
o’clock next morning. When the meeting dispersed it was blowing
half a gale, low clouds swept overhead and it was still raining
heavily.

If the assault were to be launched on June the 6th naval move-
ments must begin without further delay. Admiral Ramsay therefore
ordered them to proceed¥ The time of H-hour could now be decided.
On the assault beaches in the Sword and Gold areas landings would
begin at 7.25 a.m.; in Juno (where there was an off-shore shoal)
at 7.35 and 7.45 a.m. The American landings were to start about
an hour earlier, at 6.30 a.m., for reasons which will be noted when
their landings are described. It should be remembered that British
Double Summer Time was being used, and that these times for
H-hour would have been two hours earlier if Greenwich Mean Time
were used. ®

The midget submarines, still believing Monday to be D-day, kept
wireless watch till at one o’clock in the morning they received a
wireless message that D-day had been postponed for twenty-four
hours. They must lie hidden at their stations for another day:

When the conference met again at four o’clock on Monday morn-
ing Group Captain Stagg reported that he and his colleagues held

* British Double Summer Time corresponded with German Summer Time (i.e. Central
European Time plus one hour).

144 THE END OF THE BEGINNING

to their more favourable forecast of the evening before. “The fair
interval, which had set in then at Portsmouth and would clear all
South England during the night, would probably last till into the
later forenoon or afternoon of Tuesday; conditions in this interval
would be less than 5/1oths [cloud], based 2,000-3,000 feet with good
visibility and wind on the coast of the assault area not more than
force 3. Later in the day a period of 10/1oths with cloud base 1,000
feet would come over the area, associated with a warm front. Over
Wednesday to Friday, when the front had passed, there would be an
average of 7/1oths cloud based mainly at 2,000 to 3,000 feet. In this
period there would be periods of 10/roths at 1,000 feet but there
would also be considerable fair to fine periods. Visibility would be
good throughout and wind not above force 4 on the English side
and force 2 to 3 on the French side.’ It was too early to predict the
weather after Friday.*

The provisional decision which General Eisenhower had taken on
Sunday evening had now to be confirmed or countermanded (with
the serious consequences that have been described), for soon it would
be too late to recall shipping already at sea and heading for the
French coast. At this most critical moment the Supreme Commander
did not hesitate. After hearing the views of his commanders he
quickly gave the fateful order to go ahead. It was half-past four on
the morning of the 5th when the date of the assault was at last
‘finally and definitely settled’*

D-day would be Tuesday, June the 6th.

Once the decision was taken, the long-prepared organisation went
at once into action. All along the coast of Britain a torrent of ships
and craft began pouring out into the Channel. Enthusiasm was in
the air; the twenty-four hours’ postponement had not damped the
spirits of the troops, for the signs of the last few days were un-
mistakable; this was clearly the real thing and not just another
exercise. The sorely-tried slow groups of Force U which had already
been at sea for two days were the first to move; after turning back
the previous day some had had scarcely four hours’ respite in the
comparative calm of Weymouth Bay, others had not entered harbour
at all. From east and west the great armada gathered, and once at
sea the soldiers began their final briefing with the newly-opened
maps which no longer bore bogus names, each man studying in
detail his individual task. Grenades were primed, weapons stripped
and cleaned once more and a final check made of all fighting equip-
ment. Messages from the Supreme Commander and the respective
Commanders-in-Chief, making clear the great issues at stake, were
read out and were supplemented by personal messages from the
several Force Commanders.

As the first British units, the leading groups of Force S, sailed from

16. Field-Marshal von Kluge 17. Field-Marshal Model

18. Aircraft for the British airborne assault
PREPARATION FOR D-DAY

19. Landing craft for the naval assault

ASSAULT FORCES SAIL 145

Spithead at 9 a.m. that Monday morning, June the 5th, Rear-
Admiral A. G. Talbot ran up the signal ‘Good luck: drive on’—and
kept it flying till his flagship sailed in the evening. All day the craft
streamed out from the Solent, Southampton Water and harbour
and from Portsmouth (in the twenty-two square miles of the Solent
there was not one vacant berth) and from Poole, Portland and
Weymouth: American ‘follow-up’ groups started from ports further
west and similar British groups from the east coast. The reserve
group of Force S coming from Newhaven battled its way to the
westward against a head wind and sea to join its consorts off the
Isle of Wight and had a hard fight to make this westing on time.

The sailing of the British forces from the Portsmouth area pro-
ceeded smoothly. Force J and the main part of Force S from Spithead
and Cowes used the Nab entrance while Force G came through
the Needles channel, some craft finding difficulty in rounding
the Needles in the stiff westerly weather. Force O was somewhat
delayed in clearing Portland harbour by the congestion in Weymouth
Bay owing to the presence of many weather-bound craft of Force U.
Yet by the evening all was in order and off St. Alban’s Head Rear-
Admirals J. L. Hall and D. P. Moon in their respective flagships
U.S.S. Ancon and U.S.S. Bayfield were joined by their bombarding
squadrons which had sailed from Belfast two days earlier.* 30

The wind, slightly south of west, was force 5 (sixteen to twenty
miles an hour) with a moderate sea and a slight swell, severe con-
ditions for the heavily laden landing craft and their complement of
soldiers and sailors, but in the words of Rear-Admiral Sir Philip
Vian, who commanded the Eastern Task Force, ‘their spirit and
seamanship alike rose to meet the greatness of the hour and they
pressed forward in high heart and resolution; there was no faltering
and many of the smaller craft were driven on until they foundered’¥ 31
As the meteorologists had predicted, the early bleak conditions im-
proved as the day wore on. The wind veered to N.N.W., both wind
and sea decreased slightly and the clouds lifted before evening.

The protective measures which had been and were being taken by
naval and air forces have already been indicated in Chapter V;
the anti-submarine patrols between south Ireland and Brittany, over
coastal waters used by the assault forces, and in the Channel on
either flank of the ships in passage, are shown on the maps at pages
76 and 136. The anti-submarine patrols in the main area of U-boat
threat, the south-west approaches, were carried out by squadrons of
Coastal Command, while their twin-engined aircraft helped in
protecting the assault convoys against attacks by E-boats’ and other
enemy light surface craft. Cover for squadrons engaged in operations

7 The term E-boat, as used in contemporary British reports, covered not only the

German motor torpedo-boats but various other types of small surface craft.
L

146 THE END OF THE BEGINNING

near the French coast was provided by fighters of Air Defence of
Great Britain, and for convoys, sailing along the south coast of
England to the assembly points for the assault, by squadrons of the
Fleet Air Arm under the operational control of Coastal Command.
At four o’clock that afternoon, as the ships were about to turn to-
wards France, four groups of Lightnings from the U.S. Eighth Air
Force flew out to cover their passage. They maintained patrols till
half-past eight, when their place was to be taken by three groups of
the U.S. Ninth Air Force. From ten o’clock until the sun rose on
D-day night-fighters patrolled over the shipping lanes and assault
area. *

For the passage each British assault force was organised into sixteen
or eighteen groups according to the speed of the various units and
their intended times of arrival in the assault area; the Americans
favoured a larger grouping, planning that only craft required in the
opening phase should arrive on the first tide. Rear-Admiral Moon
with Force U had perhaps the most exacting task. It had by far the
greatest distance to cover from its embarkation ports. It was the last
to be formed, the craft assigned to it had only recently arrived in
England and in many cases had had practically no special training;
owing to the limited resources of the west country, its 865 ships and
craft had to be loaded.and sailed from nine different ports in twelve
convoys, assembling and meeting their escorts in most cases at sea.*

Forces J, G and O made for the rendezvous in Area Z south-east
of the Isle of Wight. From there they continued in a south-easterly
direction to the northern end of the group of approach channels,
through the enemy minefields in mid-Channel, to the assault area.
The minesweeping flotillas were already busy cutting ten lanes for the
safe passage of the convoys, a fast and a slow lane for each of the five
assault forces—the group of channels known as the Spout. Force S,
having to pick up its group from Newhaven, kept slightly to the east
of Area Z, while for Force U on the west a special channel was swept
to the northern end of the Spout to shorten the distance its convoys
had to travel. On June the 4th just after the postponement signal had
led to the turning back of the Force U convoys, the minesweepers
had discovered newly laid mines south of the Isle of Wight. On his
own initiative their commanding officer had remained to sweep and
buoy a channel through this dangerous area, destroying seven mines.
Force U now passed through safely, but the minefield claimed the
first casualty of the operation—the U.S. minesweeper Osprey.

The leading groups pressed steadily on and were entering the
Spout before darkness fell to cloak their further advance, by this
time pointing directly to the Normandy coast. During the afternoon
Admiral Vian in his flagship H.M.S. Seylla closed the various groups
and judged that the larger landing craft should have no great

MINESWEEPING AND PROGRESS 147

difficulty in keeping up, but for the minor landing craft and the
Rhino ferries in tow it was a question which time alone would answer.

Meanwhile, minesweeping operations were going almost precisely
as planned in spite of unexpectedly strong tidal streams. The leading
fleet minesweepers were protected by minesweeping motor launches
of shallow draft ahead of them and two mines were cut by them
- in Channel 7 ahead of the flotilla leaders. The intricate business of
changing over sweeps at the turn of the tide was safely accomplished
by all flotillas, even though two of them were forced to do so while
actually in a minefield. A total of twenty-nine mines were cut in
Channels 2, 6 and 7, while in Channel 5 sweep-cutters were en-
countered but no mines. Equally rmportant was the buoying of the
safe channels with lighted dan-buoys and this too was admirably done
by the danlayers. All these activities were completely disregarded
by the enemy, even though one flotilla was in sight of the French
coast near Cap Barfleur by 8 p.m. and two hours later, despite the
gathering dusk, could distinguish individual houses ashore. Only
then could the sweepers turn back to carry out the process of ‘wasting
time’ while the leading slow convoys overtook them.*

The convoys in general found little difficulty in locating the swept
channels, the entrance to each of which was pointed by a motor
launch, but a few mistakes were made. Four groups of Force J and
one of Force S entered the wrong channels, all to the westward of the
correct ones, but without immediate inconvenience to the proper
users. Later the importance of the error was shown, for when
approaching the assault area in the early morning they had to cross
over to the eastward to regain position and in consequence some of
them were too late to take their planned place in the assault. The
American forces had a similar experience, but such divergencies
were no more than was to be expected with slow-moving craft,
navigating in heavy weather and in a strong cross tide. Some groups
were forced to steer as much as forty degrees off their true course
to allow for the tidal set, and station keeping in the dark was very
difficult. The tail of the long columns trailed down tide, but although
some of those in the rear were carried out of swept water no harm
resulted. Apart from the U.S.S. Osprey, already mentioned, the only
casualties due to mines at this stage were the British destroyer
Wrestler and one tank landing craft belonging to a later convoy in
Force L. The Wrestler had been rounding up stragglers in unswept
water in order to further their punctual arrival. At 6.45 a.m. on
the 6th she was mined while a short distance outside channel, but
managed to limp back to Spithead.

At battle headquarters Admiral Ramsay and his staff were closely
watching progress. Before midnight he felt able to report that
although conditions in the Channel were unfavourable only a few

148 THE END OF THE BEGINNING

major craft were falling astern and a number of small craft in tow
had been cast adrift; the assault forces in general were conforming
to the plan.

Three miles from the French shore the two midget submarines
surfaced just before midnight, having lain all day on the sea bottom
in eleven fathoms. Soon after surfacing they received a wireless signal
confirming the earlier message that the assault would take place next
day. Then they bottomed again to wait till they should show lights
to guide in-coming craft.*

CHAPTER VIII

D-DAY: AIRBORNE ASSAULT AND
OPENING BOMBARDMENT

‘Twas on a Summer’s day—the sixth of June—

I like to be particular in dates,

Not only of the age, and year, but moon;

They are a sort of posthouse where the Fates

Change horses, making History change its tune,

Then spur away o’er Empires and o’er States.’
Byron—Don Juan.

nearing the coast of France, British and American airborne

divisions began their flight to the scene of battle. The British 6th
Airborne Division’s task was to seize and hold the Orne bridges
between Caen and the sea, to deny the enemy use of the country
between the Orne and the Dives and to silence a battery which
threatened the left flank of the seaborne landings*To soldiers of the
division this meant that they were to be flown through the windy
night until, on an order, they must jump into darkness which
shrouded both the ground below and the enemy who held it, or must
land in a glider to meet they knew not what unseen obstructions or
German troops. From their training they knew full well the hazards
involved; their courage is the more noteworthy.

Two brigades of the division were to carry out the first operations
in darkness before the seaborne landings began—an advanced guard
of the British armies which were to fight their way to victory. The
5th Parachute Brigade were to capture and hold the Orne crossings
while, to the east and south of them, the 3rd Brigade Group were to
cut the bridges carrying roads over the Dives, by which the enemy
might bring up troops to attack the British left flank, and occupy
high ground from which they would command these approaches;
they were also to capture the battery near Merville referred to
below (page 154)*In each case advance parties would land by para-
chute or glider at a selected ‘dropping zone’; with them would go
‘pathfinders’ to mark the zone by lights for the guidance of following
aircraft when they flew in the main bodies in two successive waves.

When darkness fell on this evening before D-day, 38 and 46 Groups
of the Royal Air Force had formed up on airfields south of Oxford to
carry the soldiers to Normandy. The map at page 212 shows the

149

T: the middle of the night, when the leading ships were steadily

150 D-DAY: AIRBORNE ASSAULT

dropping zones for which they were destined—‘N’ near Ranville,
‘K’ near Touffreville and ‘V’ near Varaville. The first was to be used
by the 5th Brigade, the other two by the 3rd Brigade, and both
brigades’ pathfinders and advance parties were timed to drop at
twenty minutes after midnight; the second wave would take about
twenty minutes to land the main bodies and was timed to begin
dropping them at a quarter to one; the third wave, with divisional
headquarters, heavy engineering equipment, anti-tank guns, bull-
dozers, jeeps and other stores would land about two hours later at
twenty past three*It would be dark till about five o’clock, for it must
be remembered that the Allies were using double summer-time: the
sun would not rise until about five minutes to six. Since the two
brigades had objectives which were not directly connected they must
be separately described, but it should be borne in mind that their
actions were taking place at the same time.

From Caen—past Ouistreham to the sea—runs the river Orne:
beside it, five hundred to a thousand yards away, the Caen Canal
follows a parallel course. The only road which crosses these water-
ways is carried by twin bridges at Bénouville on the west and Ran-
ville on the east; from there, at Hérouvillette, it joins the road from
le Havre to Caen via Houlgate and Cabourg. The task of the 5th
Brigade was to capture these Bénouville and Ranville bridges, to
establish bridgeheads on both and to clear and protect the nearby
dropping zone N, so that further airborne troops could be landed
there later in the night and next evening.

A coup de main party consisting of five platoons of the 2nd Oxford-
shire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and thirty officers and
men of the 249th Field Company, Royal Engineers, crossed the
French coast in six Horsa gliders a few minutes after midnight; there
the gliders were released. ‘Everything was so quiet that it seemed we
were merely carrying out an exercise over England.’ The first three
gliders landed on time and, although it was dark, in exactly the right
place. The nose of the first was in the barbed wire round the German
post guarding Bénouville bridge and the second and third within a
hundred yards. The bridge was rushed and captured intact though
the leading platoon commander was killed. Two of the other gliders
landed a hundred and fifty yards from the Ranville bridge and also
quickly captured it. Within fifteen minutes both were in our hands.
They were checked by the engineers and found free from explosives,
but it remained to prove whether they could be held till troops of the
main body arrived, for the enemy occupied the villages of Bénouville
and Ranville on either flank. There was a good deal of sniping and
shortly afterwards a patrol of three tanks approached but withdrew
after the leader had been hit and set on fire by a Piat. The German
officer in charge of the bridge defences drove up in a car and was

6TH AIRBORNE DIVISION 15!

taken prisoner: other prisoners taken came from the 736th Grenadier
Regiment of the 716th Infantry Division*

While this well executed coup de main was in progress the sixth
glider of the party had been released too far east and had landed
some eight miles away and the drops of the pathfinders and the
advance parties on the nearby zone N were less successful. The men
were heavily laden with equipment, weapons and ammunition and
so encumbered the rate of their release from moving aircraft was in
some cases slower than had been calculated. As a result they were
widely dispersed across the south-east corner of the area. The
position was complicated by the fact that a pathfinder party of the
3rd Brigade destined for K was dropped by mistake on N, set up
guiding lights and began sending the code-letter K thinking that
they were there; more troops of the 3rd Brigade followed them before
the mistake was rectified *

The 5th Brigade consisted of the 7th, r2th and 13th Parachute
Battalions and within half an hour all but five of their hundred and
twenty-nine aircraft had dropped their troops, though not all in the
right places. For again they were dispersed and had to search the
darkness both for equipment-containers and for the rendezvous* By
half-past one about half of the 7th Battalion, and a detachment of
the 591st Parachute Squadron, Royal Engineers, had reached the
rendezvous, and although without most of their machine guns, mor-
tars and wireless sets they went to reinforce the troops that had
seized the Bénouville bridges. There was confused and continuous
fighting round the nearby village and le Port. The regimental aid
post was at one point overrun by the enemy; the medical officer was
missing and the chaplain killed. Fighting was still going on when day
broke, but the bridgehead was held.*

The 12th Battalion had set out in thirty-two aircraft. Fifteen loads
were dropped accurately, seven were within a mile of the area, the
rest were widely dispersed. The battalion was to hold the approaches
to the Ranville bridge from the east and by four o’clock had occupied
le Bas de Ranville, having taken prisoners from the 736th Grenadier
Regiment* The 13th Battalion was to protect, clear and improve
landing strips on zone N in conjunction with a detachment of the
286th Field Park Company and the 591st Parachute Squadron of the
Royal Engineers who had come with them, and to complete the
bridgehead by clearing and capturing Ranville itself. By four o’clock
they had done so, prisoners having come from the 125th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment of the 21st Panzer Division stationed south-east
of Caen. Landing strips were ready by three-thirty when the third
wave began to arrive. Ofsixty-eight Horsa gliders which had brought
them from England, fifty were released over the landing area with
few casualties, though twenty-five aircraft had been damaged by

152 D-DAY: AIRBORNE ASSAULT

flak as they came in. Either the tow ropes of those missing had parted
or they had been cast off in the low cloud which now obscured the
coast of France.*

Major-General R. N. Gale commanding the division, with some
of his headquarters, had arrived with the third wave, bringing
heavy engineer stores and equipment and guns of the 4th Airlanding
Anti-tank Battery, Royal Artillery. Nine 6-pounders and two 17-
pounders were soon in position. The commander of the 5th Brigade
had flown in with the main body two hours before, and when he met
General Gale he was able to report that the Orne bridges had been
captured and bridgeheads were being held.*

The main body of the division’s 3rd Brigade was by this time dis-
posed in or making for positions on the ridge of high ground which
runs from Sallenelles to Troarn along the west side of Bavent woods;
but a great deal had happened before this. For the brigade’s three
battalions—the 8th and goth Parachute Battalions and the st
Canadian Parachute Battalion—and the 3rd Parachute Squadron,
Royal Engineers, had carried out five widely separated tasks while
the 5th Brigade was capturing and consolidating their hold on the
Orne bridges. Taking first the actions of the 8th Battalion; it was to
land further south near Touffreville in zone K and from there to
cover the engineers while they destroyed the bridges over the river
Dives at Troarn and Bures. Unfortunately the battalion was split
in the early drops. As mentioned above, half the pathfinders and
advance party and some of the following second wave troops landed
in error on zone N three miles away to the north. In both cases too
there was a good deal of dispersion and loss of equipment. Those
landed correctly on zone K included the battalion commander, who
had only been able to assemble about a hundred and sixty men and
had ascertained by reconnaissance and the questioning of local resi-
dents that Escoville, Sannerville and Troarn were all occupied by
German troops. There was a good deal of sporadic enemy fire and
his battalion was clearly not yet strong enough to attack Troarn, so
he concentrated his small force on high ground to the south-west of
Bavent woods to cover the party who were blowing the Bures bridge.

The troops which had been landed by mistake in N zone had
meanwhile congregated in two parties—the mortar officer and about
sixty men of the battalion in one, and in the other Major J. C. A.
Roseveare with about sixty of his sappers of the 3rd Parachute
Squadron, four or five hundred pounds of explosive and demolition
equipment in six trolleys, and a jeep and trailer with medical stores.
Twenty or thirty infantry of the battalion also joined his party and
marching south-east by different ways the two parties met on the
high ground on the west of Bavent woods. Here the infantry were
left to form a firm base, the main body of sappers and most of their

THE DIVES AND MERVILLE 153

material were sent to blow the Bures bridge, while Major Roseveare
with an officer and seven sappers remained. They reloaded the jeep
and trailer with the rest of the demolition equipment and, crowding
into them, the audacious party of nine set out to blow the Troarn
bridge.

The road into the village had been blocked by the garrison and the
jeep ran into a barbed wire knife-rest from which in the darkness it
took them twenty minutes to cut their way clear. While they did so
a scout who had been sent forward shot a German cyclist and this
roused the garrison. When the jeep entered the village ‘the fun
started as there seemed to be a Boche in every doorway shooting like
mad’. The sappers fired back as well as they could from the swaying
overloaded jeep and trailer as, gathering speed, they careered
through the village down the road which falls steeply to the river.
One man with a Bren gun who had been covering their rear from the
trailer was missing when they reached the bridge but no one else had
been hit and a wide gap was quickly blown in the centre span. Then,
abandoning the jeep and swimming a number of small streams, they
went northwards across country to rejoin the men who meanwhile
had blown the bridge at Bures. When day broke the 8th Battalion’s
first tasks were accomplished and they were disposed on the ridge
down the western side of the Bavent wood*

Further north the drop intended for the Varaville zone V fared
badly. The advance party was larger than the others, for it included
a company of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion to capture an
enemy headquarters and signal station before the main body arrived.
Most of the company were landed west of the Dives, but again they
had exit troubles and other misfortunes. One of the pathfinder
parties made a good landing and had a beacon light in position for
the main body; the other was about a thousand yards away, and
though some of the men reached the area later, nearly all their
equipment was lost among flooded dykes near the river. The main
body when it began coming in at about a quarter to one was no more
successful. Just before they arrived Bomber Command had made a
heavy attack on the battery near Merville and dust and smoke
added to the clouds which obscured the approach to the landing
area. Only one of eleven gliders landed in the right place and less
than half of their parachute aircraft dropped their loads on the
zone or within a mile of it; several loads were dropped in flooded
ground on either side of the Dives, more than two miles away.

The advance company of Canadians with some sappers of the
grd Parachute Squadron blew the Varaville bridge and attacked the
nearby headquarters in a chateau defended by a 75-mm gun in a
pill-box and surrounded by weapon pits, mines and wire. The
chateau was cleared, the gatehouse taken and the pill-box closely

154 D-DAY: AIRBORNE ASSAULT

invested, and three sections of enemy infantry who had tried to rein-
force it were killed or captured; but the Canadians had considerable
casualties and the pill-box was not taken before daylight came. The
nearby woods were full of snipers; three were shot by a Frenchman
who had collected a red beret and rifle in the fight. Other French
civilians helped by tending the wounded. The brigade commander
and his headquarters then moved on towards le Mesnil. Meanwhile
other men of the Canadians were making their way to Robehomme
on the Dives and by six-thirty about sixty had collected. The
demolition material had not arrived but with the help of an engineer
sergeant and explosives carried by the infantry, enough was made
up to put the bridge out of action. Then a position was taken up
on the hill which overlooks the river and road with a good observa-
tion post in the church tower.*

The fifth of the 3rd Brigade tasks, and a very stiff one, fell to the
gth Parachute Battalion; it was to destroy the enemy battery just
clear of the woods to the south of Merville—Franceville Plage. This
was thought to contain four guns that could dominate the most
easterly beach on which the British 3rd Infantry Division was to land.
They must therefore be destroyed before daylight, when the seaborne
landings would begin. The guns were in steel-doored concrete em-
placements six feet thick, two of which were also covered by twelve
feet of earth. They were in a fenced area of seven hundred by five
hundred yards within which was a belt of barbed wire, double in
places, fifteen feet thick and five feet high. An anti-tank ditch was
incomplete but mines had been sown profusely and there were a
dual-purpose gun position and about fifteen weapon pits. Outside
the main position was a wired-in strong-point with five machine-gun
emplacements and several other anti-aircraft gun positions. Not
only would brave and resolute men be needed to destroy the battery
but also equipment to deal with obstacles and minefields and to
blow up the guns. And the drop, assembly, march from Varaville
and capture of the battery must all be done in the four and a half
hours of darkness which remained before the seaborne landings
began. It was intended to use a small reconnaissance party and three
companies. One company was to hold a firm base on which to rally
and make a diversion against the main entrance, one to breach the
defences, one to assault, and a party in three gliders was to crash-
land on the battery as the assault went in.

The reconnaissance party dropped accurately twenty minutes after
midnight with the pathfinders and the former set off for the Merville
battery at once. But only half of the three companies dropped within
a mile of the rendezvous. Moreover, the mine-detectors and marking
tape and much other equipment were lost in marshy land. At five
minutes to three the commanding officer marched with a hundred

RESULTS ON LEFT FLANK 155

and fifty men. No engineers had reached them and they had no
engineer stores, mortars or anti-tank guns; one Vickers machine gun
and twenty Bangalore torpedoes! were all they had besides their
personal weapons.

On reaching the position it was found that the reconnaissance
party had done their work well. Having cut the outer wire they had
marked with their feet paths through the minefield to the inner
fence and had neutralised a number of trip-wire booby-traps. On
hearing this seven parties were formed: two to breach the main wire,
four to make for the four guns and one to make the diversionary
attack on the main entrance. At this moment two of the Albemarles
towing gliders which were intended to make a crash-landing on the
battery arrived and circuited low over the position. It was hard to
locate in darkness for the troops had not been able to put out lights;
both pilots of the Albemarles took great risks while flying around
to look for it. Eventually the gliders were released; they landed
about two hundred yards away and their troops were at once
involved in fighting in the outer defences. But gaps in the wire
had been blown and the assault parties made for the guns; the
breaching parties joined them and the diversionary party forced the
main gate. After a short sharp fight the garrison were overcome and
the guns (found to be 75-mm) were put out of action. The success
signal was sent up at quarter to five and the battalion signal officer
took a somewhat ruffled pigeon from his pocket and released it to
carry the news to England.

Eighty survivors of this stout-hearted band rallied at the firm base.
Of the five officers and sixty-five other ranks who were casualties,
the wounded were left in a nearby building under the care of two
medical orderlies and a captured German doctor. A party of the
1st Canadian Parachute Battalion came up and acted as rearguard
to the little column which marched away to the oth Battalion’s
next objective—high ground near le Plein.*

Before continuing the story a provisional assessment may be made
of the 6th Airborne Division’s achievement by the time that day-
light relieved something of the strain they had been bearing. All
their primary tasks had been accomplished. The bridges over the
Orne had been captured and bridgeheads on both sides were being
held and strengthened. To the east three bridges over the Dives had
been cut, at Troarn, Bures and Robehomme, and a fourth over the
tributary stream near Varaville. The battery at Merville had been
put out of action and troops of the 3rd Brigade were disposed at a
number of places on the high ground which runs from le Plein to

1 A Bangalore torpedo is a prepared c for making a gap through a wire obstacle.
It consists of 5-foot lengths of 2-inch pipe, filled with osive, which are joined together
and pushed through the obstacle. When exploded it blows a gap about 12 feet wide.

156 D-DAY: AIRBORNE ASSAULT

Troarn, in positions to delay, even if not strong enough to prevent,
an enemy attack on the left flank of the British assault. Out of 264
parachute aircraft despatched from England only seven were missing:
and out of 98 gliders twenty-two. On the other hand, many were
landed in the wrong places. Exact figures are not obtainable but it 1s
thought that not more than sixty per cent (and possibly less) of the
four thousand eight hundred who were landed in France were able
to join in the early operations described. Similarly a large proportion
of equipment was released—17 anti-tank guns, 44 jeeps, 55 motor
cycles and 1,214 containers—but not all was recovered at the time; *
some was retrieved when men who had failed to join up in dark-
ness were able to do so later. The risks taken and the losses incurred
may well be considered to have been justified by the measure of
safety assured to the left flank of the seaborne troops. It was due
to the courage of those who took part in the airborne operations and
fought in darkness on this memorable morning. And among those
it may not be thought invidious to notice especially the men of the
Glider Pilot Regiment. They had to land their precious charges in
the dark, in some places where the enemy had planted high stakes
(‘Rommel’s asparagus’) on purpose to destroy them. Of 196 em-
ployed 71 were casualties. Many of those who landed safely joined
in the fighting which followed.

While the 6th Airborne Division was thus engaged on the left
flank of the British assault the American 82nd and rorst Airborne
Divisions were in action in the Cotentin peninsula behind the right
of the American sector. They had a more ambitious and in some
respects a more difficult programme, for double the number of troops
were to be dropped, not in such open, hedgeless country as is found
eastward of the river Orne but among the close hedgerows which
characterise the Normandy bocage and in an area constricted by
extensive floods. Moreover, German troops were in the vicinity in
greater numbers and ‘all units in the Cotentin had been briefed to
expect airborne operations’.*®

Put shortly, the réle of the American airborne divisions was to aid
the assault of the United States First Army and facilitate the capture
of the Cotentin peninsula. The rorst Airborne Division was to secure
the western exits of the flooded area behind Utah beach and the line
of the river Douve on the north side of Carentan, to capture Caren-
tan and join up with the troops landing on Omaha beach. The 82nd
Airborne Division, dropping further inland astride the river Mer-
deret, was to seize Ste. Mére Eglise and bridgeheads over the river to
mactate a subsequent thrust across the Cotentin by forces landed at
Utah.

2 os A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Dept. of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1951),
p. 278.

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157

158 D-DAY: AIRBORNE ASSAULT

The indirect approach by the airborne forces (shown on the
map on page 157) made the task of the aircraft of the American IX
Troop Carrier Command more complicated than those which bore
the British 6th Airborne Division straight from the south coast near
Littlehampton to the dropping zones near the Orne. The Americans
were protected en route by Mosquitos of the Air Defence of Great
Britain and their passage was masked from enemy radar by Stirlings
of Bomber Command, dropping ‘window’,® which preceded them
2nd went further south to simulate diversionary landings. But when
the airborne forces turned east near the Channel Islands and crossed
the Cotentin coast they met heavy anti-aircraft and small-arms fire
and thick cloud; ‘formations tended to break up, and even the
trained pathfinders experienced difficulty in identifying their drop
targets... The main drops... were generally scattered.’ ¢

The American historian states that ‘Records of airborne operations
in the Cotentin are very sketchy: those of the rorst Airborne Division
in particular are all but useless’. The account he gives is, he says,
‘based on a set of comprehensive interviews ... with officers and
men of the airborne units’, subsequently developed in a number of
battalion and regimental studies. ‘The first actions of all airborne
units in the Cotentin on D-day were attempts by small groups of men
to carry out in the fog of the battlefield their own portion of the
assigned plan. There could be little over-all direction from above.’ ®
His account does not distinguish what was done in the hours of dark-
ness before the seaborne assault, which is the theme of this chapter.
Later on, when their battle develops, it will be possible to gain more
light on the part played by American airborne troops.

Over a hundred Mosquitos of 2 Group, Second Tactical Air Force,
carried out offensive patrols throughout the night, covering both the
British and American airborne operations.*

To complete the story of this night it 1s necessary to go back to the
hours around midnight when the assault fleet was ploughing its way
across the Channel and the airborne divisions were being carried
into France and the heavy bombers of Bomber Command were
setting out to attack ten of the enemy’s most formidable coastal
batteries—map at page 168. The first three of these—near Merville
east of the Orne and at Fontenay and St. Martin de Varreville in the
Cotentin—had to be attacked early, for soon after midnight the

Pe Metallised strips of paper dropped from aircraft in order to confuse the enemy radar
ences.

* Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. III, p. 188.

5 Harrison, op. cit., pp. 278, 279 n. 26.

SURPRISE AND DECEPTION 159

airborne troops would be landing in their vicinity; the remaining
seven—at la Pernelle, Maisy, Pointe du Hoe, Longues, Mont
Fleury, Ouistreham and Houlgate—were to be bombed between
quarter past three and five o’clock so that their defenders would have
little time to recover before the naval bombardment opened with the
coming of daylight. Altogether over five thousand tons of bombs
were dropped by 1,056 Lancaster, Halifax and Mosquito aircraft, an
average of about a hundred aircraft and five hundred tons for each
battery; eleven aircraft and seventy men were lost*Flares and the
glow of explosions from these attacks were increasingly visible to the
oncoming ships. All night the latter pursued their arduous way.
Conditions at sea had somewhat worsened and to the troops on
board, waiting in the acute discomfort of throbbing, labouring ships
and lashed by the cold spray driving across their decks, the night
seemed interminable. The hours passed slowly in growing tension
and the chill of suspense; to many who suffered the sheer misery of
sea-sickness, their present ordeal seemed to them less bearable than
what lay ahead. Seldom have modern armies gone straight into
battle from such uncomfortable conditions, yet seldom have troops
set out with more ardent spirit or higher morale. Physically and
mentally they were in fine training, and if the night seemed long
while they could only wait for it to end, their discomfort would soon
be forgotten when day called them to action.

One thing was puzzling commanders. It has already been men-
tioned that before darkness had fallen on this historic night some of
the Allies’ minesweepers could have been seen off the coast of Nor-
mandy and already the assault fleet was at sea. During the few dark
hours of the early morning thousands of ships and craft of many sorts
were streaming across the Channel, thousands of airborne soldiers
were landing in France, and a thousand or more heavy bombers
were plastering key points in the Atlantic Wall. Yet the enemy made
no sign at all. His complete inactivity at sea and in the air was
disconcerting, even sinister. Had he something unforeseen up his
sleeve? Apparently the Allies had again won tactical surprise as they
had done in the landings in Sicily and at Anzio. They had indeed
been at great pains to do so in the preparatory operations already
described. Now, while two squadrons from 100 Group of Bomber
Command fitted with radar jamming equipment masked the
enemy’s coastal radar warning system, further deceptive measures
were being taken. To confuse the enemy’s reading of the British and
American airborne landings, dummy landings were being made at
Maltot south-west of Caen and at Marigny west of St. L6; and a third
was being made at Yvetot, twenty miles inland of the coast between
Dieppe and le Havre, to supplement naval and air operations and
suggest that an Allied attack was impending north of the Seine. Four

160 D-DAY: OPENING BOMBARDMENT

squadrons of Bomber Command carried out these diversions, drop-
ping large quantities of ‘window’, dummy parachutists and fireworks
which sounded like rifle and gun-fire. About midnight two other
misleading operations began up-Channel. Off the Pas de Calais
feint attacks were made against suitable beaches near Boulogne by
six harbour-defence motor launches of the Dover Command and a
squadron of Bomber Command. The radio counter-measures of the
motor launches, towing balloons with reflectors and using special
equipment and smoke, and of the aircraft dropping ‘window’, were
intended to emulate the echoes that would be received by radar
from large ships and give the impression of an approaching convoy;
other aircraft patrolling in the Somme area and also using window
would suggest the presence of a large air force to give top cover for
the shipping. The ruse had some measure of success for the enemy’s
shore guns and searchlights were turned on the imaginary convoy
and for three hours before daylight his night fighters hunted for the
ghost air force.

A similar combined feint was made off the coast further south
between Dieppe and le Havre by eight motor launches of the Ports-
mouth Command and a squadron of Lancasters. The aircraft,
forming a ‘box’ twelve miles wide by eight miles deep which ap-
proached the coast at convoy speed, dropped window as they
circuited. The aim was to disguise the true left flank of the Allies’
actual assault and in this case there was no visible reaction. Nor can
the effectiveness be measured separately of a third deceptive action
down-Channel in which four motor launches under the naval com-
mander of Force U, and aircraft of Bomber Command, operated
about six miles off Cap Barfleur to distract the attention of the
enemy’s radar installation at the north-east of the Cotentin* Apart
from these deceptive operations and the air forces’ direct attacks on
the enemy’s chain of radar stations, two hundred and sixty-two ships
and craft employed in the assault were fitted with specially-designed
radar jammers to avoid early detection by any remaining enemy
radar stations and to distract their attention from the approaching
ships. This jamming barrage was also planned to prevent the enemy
from using radar to control his coastal batteries, a measure of pro-
tection which was vitally important to the successful operation of
battleships, cruisers and monitors in the bombardment of enemy
defences*It was too early to know how all these measures affected the
enemy’s conduct, but his inactivity certainly appeared to show that
he did not yet appreciate what was happening.

At eight minutes past five a green light showed to seaward off
Sword beach and shortly afterwards a second appeared off Juno

20. Enemy beach obstacles

21. Engineer tanks of the 79th Armoured Division

22. Mine-clearing (flail) tank

-
9

ed
-
“s

aya: “ie

23. Gliders near Ranville

AIRBORNE ASSAULT
24. Benouville bridge and gliders of coup de main party

WARSHIPS AND FIGHTERS 161

beach. The first came from the midget submarine X23 and the other
from X20. Seventy-six hours had elapsed since they left Portsmouth
on the evening of June the 2nd; sixty-four hours had been spent
under water. For the five men confined in each of these tiny craft it
had been a severe test of nerve, skill and endurance. Their sense of
relief must have been very great when at last their long and exhaust-
ing vigil was over and the log entry could be made: ‘o500. Surfaced
and checked position by shore fix in dawn light. Rigged mast with
lamp and radar beacon’ and, shortly after, ‘Commenced flashing
green light ...’* 20

Four miles further out to sea the British bombarding squadrons
which had reached ahead of the landing ships were now following
the minesweepers down the approach channels to their allotted
anchorages almost as if taking station for a review. To the distant
sound of explosions a glow spread in the east as 114 Lancasters
dropped 580 tons of bombs on battery positions near Ouistreham* 21
It was growing light when the last of the night bombers left the target
area at quarter past five and quiet reigned on the coast for a few
minutes. On the American front the bombing had stopped earlier.
Now at about half past five the guns of the fleets roared out along the
whole front.

Never has any coast suffered what a tortured strip of French coast
suffered that morning; both naval and air bombardments were un-
paralleled. Along the whole fifty-mile front the land was rocked by
successive explosions as the shells of the ships’ guns tore holes in
fortifications and tons of bombs rained on them from the skies.
Through billowing smoke and falling debris defenders crouching in
this scene of devastation would soon discern faintly hundreds of ships
and assault craft ominously closing the shore. If the sight dismayed
them, the soldiers borne forward to attack were thrilled by the
spectacle of Allied power that was displayed around them on every
hand.

At the approach of dawn a great shield of day fighters had been
spread overhead—over the ships in passage and the seas on either
flank, over the assault coast and its hinterland, over the country from
which enemy aircraft or army reinforcements might approach the
battle area. While aircraft of the Air Defence of Great Britain
guarded shipping within forty miles of the English coast, the pro-
tection during darkness which had been given outside that limit by
night fighters of the Royal Air Force was now taken over and ex-
tended by day fighters of the American Eighth and Ninth Air
Forces. From now on four squadrons of Lightnings maintained
ceaseless patrol over the mineswept lanes across the Channel and the

162 D-DAY: OPENING BOMBARDMENT

adjacent seas, their operation controlled from a fighter direction
tender (F.D.T. 13) stationed in the swept channels leading to the
assault area; and a further six squadrons were held in readiness to
reinforce them immediately if required. Over the assault coast itself
six squadrons of Spitfires from the Second Tactical Air Force gave
low cover, flying beneath the cloud base at three to four thousand
feet, or less if need be; while above the clouds, at eight thousand feet
or more, flew three squadrons of Thunderbolts from the United
States Ninth Air Force. To maintain constant patrols at such
strength, thirty-six British and sixteen American squadrons were
needed, while in order to ensure flexibility and readiness to reinforce
swiftly in case of need, thirty additional squadrons were reserved of
which, throughout the day, six were always ready to act as an im-
mediate striking force. Two fighter direction tenders controlled this
double fighter cover over the coastal areas, one (F.D.T. 217) over
the British sector and the other (F.D.T. 216) over the American
sector* The sight of Allied fighters in such strength, serenely demon-
strating their unchallenged supremacy over the battle areas, inspired
confidence in the seamen and soldiers below them, but their eager
pilots saw no German aircraft during the whole of those fateful hours.

Beneath the protection of this great force of fighters the bombard-
ing warships had taken up their stations, moving to the positions
shown on the map facing page 168. On the most vulnerable and
therefore most strongly-defended eastern flank the powerful bom-
barding force (Force D) included three ships mounting 15-inch guns
—H.M.S. Warspite, Ramillies and Roberts. Shortly before 5.30 a.m.
these opened fire on the coastal defences east of the river Orne, War-
spite engaging the most distant battery at Villerville from a range of
about 30,000 yards, Ramillies and Roberts attacking the batteries at
Bénerville and Houlgate respectively*All along the British front the
battleships and cruisers opened fire on the targets shown on the
map. Later the destroyers and support landing craft would join in
the attack. Admiral Krancke entered in his war diary, ‘it was only to
be expected that no effective blow could be struck at such a superior
enemy force’*

In fact one attempt to intervene was made by German surface
craft. Warspite, Ramillies, Roberts and Arethusa were already anchored;
Scylla, Mauritius, Danae, Frobisher and the Polish cruiser Dragon were
anchoring along the swept loop channel; the bombarding squadron
had opened fire but the destroyers were waiting to be swept into their
inshore positions; a convoy, bringing up amphibious tanks, was just
coming up to the lowering position.

‘Our own aircraft streaked low across the eastern flank at about
this time and laid a most effective smoke screen to shield the
Force from the heavy batteries at Havre. Unfortunately, three

THE LOWERING POSITIONS © 163

German torpedo-boats took advantage of this to carry out
a torpedo attack and, although engaged by the bombarding
squadron, were able to make good their escape in the smoke.
Two torpedoes passed between H.M.S. Warspite and H.M.S.
Ramillies and at 0530 one hit H.Nor.M.S. Svenner close on the port
beam of H.M.S. Largs. Another torpedo was seen approaching
H.M.S. Largs; her engines were put emergency full astern and
the torpedo passed a few feet ahead of her. It then came to rest
and sank just short of H.M.S. Virago (one of the destroyers of
Force S).’*

The Suvenner had been hit under the boiler room; her back was broken
and she sank rapidly but most of her men were picked up, and after
this brief excursion the German navy made no further effort to
interfere that morning.

For the most part the reply from batteries ashore was desultory
and ineffective and soon faded away almost completely; but a few
garrisons showed more spirit and determination. The four-gun
battery at Longues was engaged by Ajax at 5.30 a.m., but just before
six o’clock it opened fire on the headquarters ship Bulolo anchored in
the lowering position in Gold area. By 6.20 a.m. it had been silenced
but soon afterwards resumed the attack on Bulolo, causing the ship
to move seaward. After further engagements by Ajax and Argonaut it
was at last silenced at about 8.45 a.m.; its reduction had needed a
hundred and seventy-nine shells from the cruisers; two of its four
guns had been put out of action by direct hits through the embrasures.
The battery at Bénerville, silenced initially by the Ramillies, after-
wards opened on the Warsjite (who had to shift berth), and during
the day prompt counter-battery action was called for when some
other batteries showed renewed activity.*

Control of all naval bombardment was exercised from joint com-
mand posts in the headquarters ships in which the naval com-
manders and the divisional generals with their staffs were carried,
with air force representatives. These headquarters ships were the
nerve centres from which the battle was fought until the military
command was established on shore.®

Before landings were effected the bombarding ships relied solely
on aircraft to observe and report the fall of their shells. They were
provided by four squadrons of Seafires of the Fleet Air Arm, five
squadrons of Spitfires and Mustangs from the Royal Air Force and
fifteen Spitfires manned by United States naval pilots. Single-seater,
high-performance aircraft had never attempted this on such a scale
before, and with about a hundred and sixty employed, each main-
taining radio communication with the particular ship to which it was

* Details of these specially equipped headquarters ships are given in Appendix II.

164 D-DAY: OPENING BOMBARDMENT

allotted, it is not surprising that contact was occasionally broken; but
the airmen served the naval gunners faithfully though seven aircraft
were lost that day. Air spotting continued for many weeks but
with the initial landings specialist Army observers on the ground
were also used. These, known as ‘Forward Observer Bombardment’
(F.O.B.), with naval signallers and radio sets, moved forward with
the troops to transmit calls for fire, point out targets and observe
and report the results. *

The convoy of ships and craft bearing the troops who were to
capture the chosen beaches in Sword, Juno and Gold areas—con-
voys named correspondingly S, J and G—had begun reaching their
lowering positions at about half past five. Their headquarters ships
Largs, Hilary and Bulolo, flag ships respectively of Rear-Admiral
A. G. Talbot, commanding Force S, Commodore G. N. Oliver,
commanding Force J, and Commodore C. E. Douglas-Pennant,
commanding Force G, anchored in position (map at page 168).
From the shelter of their bridges commanders could see how well
their charges had come through the ordeals of that troubled night.
In general they were arriving fairly punctually. There were some
stragglers but these were now making up lost time; and there had
been some losses among the landing craft which had set out to make
their way across Channel under their own power or in tow. Some of
these, notably assault craft carrying tanks of the Royal Marine
Armoured Support Regiment, were over-weighted with top hamper
and proved to be unseaworthy in prevailing weather conditions, and
others being towed across armed with mortars and sixty-pound
spigot bombs to blast lanes through beach minefields also fared
badly. In all the loss of fifty-four small craft in passage was attributed
to weather, twenty of them being Rhino ferries or their tug units.
This was a very small proportion of the thousands engaged in an
operation which required, in Admiral Ramsay’s phrase, ‘a degree of
efficiency and seamanship never attempted hitherto with landing
craft’* Considering the number and various characteristics of the
ships and craft engaged, the widely dispersed harbours from which
they had gathered, the distances they had covered and the conditions
they had weathered, it seems little short of a miracle that all this
energy and effort was so skilfully focused on the French shore that
troops would soon begin landing there almost to the minute.

The scene at the lowering positions was beginning to look like
some fantastic regatta. The manning and lowering of the assault craft
carrying troops from the decks of the large landing ships, and their
formation in groups for the run-in to the beaches, were proceeding
smoothly. Soldiers and sailors had been well practised in the drill for
getting the small craft away from thcir parent ships, but when
loaded each weighed over thirteen tons and great skill was needed

APPROACH AND BOMBARDMENT 165

to release them smartly and safely into the short steep seas. These
shallow craft are lively and wet and the fact that all were got away
without a single mishap was proof not only of skilled seamanship but
of good training, good organisation, and good discipline.

The leading groups already heading for the shore could be seen
deploying into their assault formations. In the van were landing
craft carrying D.D. tanks which would be launched at sea to swim
in ahead of the assault, covered by guns in support craft lying off
shore. Behind these other craft were forming up or already moving
forward in succession, carrying assault companies of infantry,
engineers and their armoured vehicles, self-propelled artillery, more
engineers, more infantry, more tanks, more artillery and equipment.
On either flank destroyers waited to close the beaches while auxiliary
minesweepers swept ahead of them. All round the headquarters
ships craft were waiting to take their places in succeeding groups and,
from the north, ships and craft could be seen approaching in endless
sequence.

On the map facing page 168 the blue boundary line defining the
swept channels looks clear enough, and the lowering positions do
not look far from the coast. The sailors saw no such guide lines on the
sea but only a wilderness of tumbling grey waters, and the coast was
still seven miles away and not yet visible from water-level. The final
seven miles severely tested the seamanship of sailors responsible for
clumsy, unweatherly assault craft and not all could reach the shore
in exactly the right spot or at precisely the planned time; wind and
sea, enemy fire, accidents or personal error intervened in some cases
but that was only to be expected in the seas that were running. A
stiff wind blew and the waves of a rising tide were already breaking
on the seaward line of exposed beach obstacles as the craft drew in
to the shore.

While they drove uneasily forward towards their destination, a
new note was added to the roar of the heavy naval guns. For now the
destroyers closed the shore in groups of ten or more ‘Fleet’-class
destroyers, mounting four or eight 4:7-inch guns, reinforced by
“Hunt’-class destroyers with 4-inch guns and shallower draft. Some
approached to within a few thousand yards of the beaches and, all
firing by direct observation, attacked strong-points and other targets
on their immediate front until the landings began; then they would
support the troops, first attacking other targets on their flanks and
behind the beaches, and afterwards giving fire when called for.
Destroyers played a notable part in the reduction of the enemy’s
defence throughout the assault and gave invaluable assistance to the
troops.

In the American sector similar scenes were being enacted. At
Omaha eight United States destroyers and three British were filling

166 D-DAY: OPENING BOMBARDMENT

the same réle. ‘Lacking complete knowledge of their own troops’
position and hard pressed to pick out enemy positions, they closed in
some cases to within eight hundred yards of the beaches. It is certain
that they destroyed many enemy positions and it is probable that
without their assistance the casualties on the beach would have been
considerably higher. *At Utah, too, the naval bombardment was
very effective.

But the guns of destroyers could produce only part of the close
support planned. All targets were not suitable for attack by high
velocity, flat trajectory naval guns; some could be attacked more
effectively from the air or by close-support weapons mounted in
special craft. In the last phase of the combined bombardment the
intensity of fire was stepped up to a new level as the fire-power of all
three Services was focused on the beaches and their defences. To the
merciless fire of the naval guns there was added, first a great outburst
of covering fire from specially adapted support landing craft carry-
ing 4°7-inch guns, 6-pounders or 2-pounders and self-propelled guns
of the army’s field artillery which would land later to join the fight of
their divisions ashore. Details of these close-support craft are in
Appendix II, page 506. On each brigade front they went into action
about forty-five minutes before the first landings, when their fire
was lifted or diverted to the flanks to avoid endangering the assault
troops. From the destroyers and close-support craft over thirty
thousand shells of 4-inch and upwards had been directed on the
beaches and beach defences in the British sector before the first
troops began to land.*

On top of this great combination of fire power there was next
imposed a concentrated attack from the air by some sixteen hundred
aircraft of the United States Eighth and Ninth Air Forces. The con-
figuration of the coast and its effect on the tide had led to the adop-
tion of plans which differed in two main respects as between the
British and American sectors. The areas in which American troops
were to land—Utah and Omaha—lay at right angles to each other in
the west of the bay. Ships at anchor off the coast there would thus be
exposed to the fire of heavy guns from their front and in particular
from those on the embracing arm of the Cotentin peninsula; more-
over high tide occurred earlier on the Cotentin shore. Taking these
facts into account, it had been decided by the American com-
manders that in their sector the lowering positions (in American
terms the ‘transport areas’) should be eleven miles from the shore as
against seven miles in the British sector; and that H-hour would be
approximately half past six, whereas in the British sector it was to be
about an hour Jater, the exact time varying somewhat to suit con-
ditions on each beach. The final bombing of the beach defences,
which was timed to end only ten minutes before landings began, had

BOMB AND ROCKET ATTACKS 167

therefore started earlier in the American sector when 269 medium
bombers (Marauders) of the Ninth Air Force had bombed the
defences of Utah beach. Flying low, under the cloud base, they were
able to take visual aim and they largely succeeded in silencing the
defence. But because of bad visibility over Omaha and the British
front the heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force were unable to make
a visual pin-point attack on batteries and strong points covering the
beaches but had to adopt an alternative method; successive waves
of aircraft were to fly in line abreast over the shore, releasing their
bombs on orders of pathfinders aiming by instruments*

Because of the earlier H-hour for Omaha, there next came 329
Liberators. Flying high over cloud, and delaying the release of their
bombs so as to avoid endangering assault craft and troops nearing the
shore, many of the bombs they dropped ‘did not hit the enemy beach
and coast defences at all but were scattered as far as three miles
inland’, according to the American historian.” The successful bomb-
ing of Utah defences and the comparable failure to hit those at
Omaha were to be reflected in the sharply contrasted experience of
troops who had to capture these American beaches. Over the
British beaches the heavy bombers were also only partially successful.
By the masterly performance of a ‘Pre-dawn Assembly Plan’ over a
thousand Flying Fortresses and Liberators, drawn from airfields
distributed through England, had carried out a series of complicated
movements which began while it was still dark. Now at about
twenty minutes to seven they flew over in successive waves, each of
thirty-six bombers flying in line abreast, and together they dropped
nearly three thousand tons of bombs. But as at Omaha they bombed
from above the cloud-overcast on the instance of pathfinders relying
on instruments to distinguish their targets; they observed similar
precautions to safeguard oncoming assault troops; and, broadly
speaking, their attack had similar results. Some bombs fell on the
close defences of the shore but many of them fell well inland. Besides
inflicting widespread damage the severity of their attack certainly
helped to shake the nerves of garrison forces, and if it did less des-
truction to the beach defences than was intended it induced the
enemy to keep under cover while it lasted, as planned, till within ten
minutes of H-hour. And with that short interval came the culminat-
ing feature of the Joint Fire Plan, the final addition to the attack
which had been opened by the heavy bombers of Bomber Command
while it was still dark, and had been followed in daylight by the
continuing fire of the naval guns, by guns of the Royal Marines and
the Royal Artillery firing from support craft during the run-in and
by the successive attacks of American medium and heavy bombers.

7 Harrison, op. cit., p. jor.

168 D-DAY: OPENING BOMBARDMENT

Now, about five minutes before the first troops landed, clouds of
five-inch explosive rockets rose in succession to fall on the beaches in
a deluging rain of destruction.* They had been electrically fired in
quickly following salvos from assault craft (L.C.T.(R)) each of which
could discharge about a thousand in the space of a minute and a half.*
As the noise of exploding rockets died away troops of the British

Second Army began landing in France.

® Over twenty thousand were fired on the British front and some eighteen thousand in
the American sector.

HE NAVAL BOMBARDMENT

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Nautical Miles (approx)
0°30’ \ Q°

CHAPTER IX
D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

HE enemy’s long-range fire had been effectively subdued by

naval bombardment and air attacks, and under cover of the

support-fire of all arms the assault craft approached the shore
with little to trouble them except the difficulty of navigation in the
turbulent sea and sea-sickness, which was not confined to soldiers.
In spite of this some of the men sang as their craft moved shorewards
and a bugler of the East Yorkshire Regiment sounded the General
Salute as his craft passed their command ship¥ But as they neared
the beaches in the last lap of the run-in, when supporting fire had to
be switched to the rear and flanks of the beaches, the enemy’s artillery,
mortars and machine guns that had escaped destruction opened on
them. Not much damage was done while they were still afloat, but
along the fringe of waves breaking on the shore craft grounding and
unloading in the surf provided the enemy with easy targets and
casualties increased.

Amphibious tanks, obstacle clearance groups, flail tanks, assault
engineers and infantry were all timed to land within a few minutes
of H-hour. Such exact timing could not everywhere be maintained;
all were soon landing practically at the same time. On some beaches
D.D. tanks landed first, on others naval and engineer obstacle clear-
ance groups, flail tanks, engineers’ armoured vehicles (AV REs) or
infantry were the first to reach the shore. At the water’s edge naval
parties, often submerged by the waves, began their dangerous work
of clearing mined underwater obstructions which were being rapidly
covered by the incoming tide, while sappers worked on those which
were still exposed. Across the beaches flail tanks began beating lanes
through possible mined areas while armoured vehicles of the sappers
bridged or battered their way forward to make exits from the shore
for incoming vehicles. All worked at high pressure often under
enfilading fire, and there were many casualties to men and vehicles.
The infantry, not waiting for the completion of these tasks, broke
across the beaches to gain cover and to capture the positions from
which fire was sweeping the foreshore. The enemy’s fire increased
along the coast, still punctuated by the roar of bursting shells from
the continuing naval bombardment, now countered by the fire of
tanks which had swum ashore or been landed already, by bursting
petards of the assault engineers’ tanks, and by the crackling of
machine-gun and rifle fire. Overhead flew clouds of fighters and at

169

170 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

frequent intervals the din was increased by the roar of fighter-
bombers and rocket-firing Typhoons of the Second Tactical Air
Force, attacking strong-points or other targets inland.

Eighteen squadrons of Typhoons from 83 and 84 Groups and
twelve squadrons of Mitchell and Mosquito bombers from 2 Group
attacked in the British sector, and Thunderbolts of the Ninth United
States Air Force in the American sector. Most of the Typhoon
fighter-bombers were armed with eight rockets, each with a 60-
pound warhead, the remainder carried 2,000-pound bombloads. A
few minutes before the touch-down the leading squadrons dive-
bombed strong-points near the beaches, particularly le Hamel and
la Riviére in Gold, Courseulles in Juno, and Hermanville in Sword.
Other formations of Typhoons then attacked batteries, defended
localities and military headquarters further inland. They continued
their attacks throughout the morning, either working to previously
made plans or on requests received from the army in the course of the
fighting. In response to an early morning request from Twenty-First
Army Group a vicious attack was made soon after 8.30 a.m. on the
headquarters of the German LXXXIV Corps near St. L6 which
bad visibility had prevented our pilots from finding the evening
before.*

While trying to picture the scenes that were developing all along
the coast the reader will do well to consult the diagram at page
172 and the map facing page 212. He will see there the line of
the French coast where the Second Army was to land; the Gold,
Juno and Sword areas into which it was divided and the named
beaches to be captured in the first instance. The diagram shows the
details of the five brigade groups who were now beginning to land
and the rest of the assault divisions—that is of the 50th, g3rd Canadian
and 3rd Divisions—in the order in which they would follow; the
further formations of XXX Corps and I Corps are also indicated.
It thus shows at a glance who they were who had the honour of
opening the ground attack on Hitler’s Atlantic Wall. Yet in one
respect it may be misleading, for the diagram is apt to give an im-
pression that the troops were much thicker on the ground than was
really the case. The coast-line of the British sector stretched for
twenty-four miles, but less than five miles were to be attacked at the
outset. Each of the five beaches to be captured was only about a mile
wide, some a little more and some a little less. There was a gap of
over ten miles between the most westerly British beach in the Gold
area and the American beach in Omaha; there was approximately
a mile-wide gap between each of the beaches to be captured by the
four brigade groups of the 50th and 3rd Canadian Divisions, and of
about five miles between the Canadians and the assaulting brigade
group of the 3rd Division. Until landings were effected and these gaps

50TH DIVISION IN GOLD AREA 17I

closed it is necessary to follow the happenings on each assault beach
in turn, although in reality all were under simultaneous attack. It
must also be borne in mind that the D-day task of the assaulting
divisions was not only to capture and then link up the beaches along
the coast between Port en Bessin and the Orne, but to strike rapidly
inland and, by the evening of D-day, to occupy a bridgehead which
would include Bayeux and Caen and be joined to the ground east of
the Orne which the 6th Airborne Division had already seized. It was
known that the enemy’s nearest armoured division available for
prompt counter-attack was stationed immediately east and south of
Caen; the quick capture of that key city and the neighbourhood of
Carpiquet was the most ambitious, the most difficult and the most
important task of Lieut-General J. T. Crocker’s I Corps*The cap-
ture of Bayeux, eight miles inland, and the high ground on which
it stands, and the protection of the American army’s east flank were
the tasks of XXX Corps under Lieut-General G. C. Bucknall.*

It will be seen from the diagram that the 50th Division (the leading
division of XXX Corps, associated with Assault Force G) was to
attack in the Gold area with two brigade groups. The 231st Brigade
was to capture ‘Jig’ beach, the 69th was to take the beach named
‘King’* The coast in both is low-lying and sandy, offering no such
natural obstacles as the bluffs of the rock-bound shore which stretches
from Arromanches to Port en Bessin in the western half of Gold.
Only low sand dunes fringe the shore of Jig and King but there are
soft patches of clay in the tide-washed foreshore on which heavy
vehicles would be liable to sink; and behind the lateral road which
runs near the sea front much of the ground is soggy grassland, criss-
crossed with dykes which must hinder movement. Jig beach could be
covered by fire from strongly defended positions at le Hamel and
Asnelles sur Mer and from a smaller strong-point near les Roquettes;
King beach was protected by defences at la Riviére and by strong-
points at Hable de Heurtot on the coast, and on higher ground near
Mont Fleury and Ver sur Mer. The whole front between le Hamel
and la Riviére was defended by beach obstacles and by a continuous
belt of mines and barbed wire.

For the 231st Brigade, attacking on a two-battalion front with the
1st Hampshire on the right and the 1st Dorset on the left, it was
obviously important to capture quickly the position at le Hamel.
This was known to include on the west a number of fortified houses
and entrenchments, well protected by barbed wire and mines and by
an anti-tank ditch; on the east, commanding Jig beach, the defences
consisted not only of more fortified buildings, including a large and
conspicuous sanatorium, but also a number of concrete and steel
pill-boxes and infantry positions, again protected by barbed wire and
minefields. The position was held by about a company of infantry

172 The Seaborne Assault

XXX {-
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British Second Army 173

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174 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

well supplied with mortars and machine guns and with two anti-tank
guns and at least one field gun.

About seven hundred yards east of le Hamel, where a by-road leads
past les Roquettes to a customs building on the coast, there was a
small well-wired post with several machine guns. Landing craft bear-
ing the leading companies of the 1st Hampshire were carried by
wind and tide some distance eastward of their intended landing place
and touched down nearly opposite les Roquettes* D.D. tanks which
were to have preceded them were still at sea, for on this front it
was considered to be too rough to swim them ashore and they were
being brought in by their landing craft which did not arrive till later.
Misfortunes had overtaken the 1st Royal Marine Armoured Support
Regiment* Of the ten tanks which were to have landed on Jig beach
at H-hour, in order to join with the D.D. tanks in giving support to
the attacking troops until the field artillery could be brought in, only
five were landed and about a quarter of an hour late, and all but one
of these were hit by shell-fire from le Hamel soon after landing. Thus
the first troops to land on Jig beach had no tanks to support them
and had little answer to the gun, mortar and machine-gun fire
which swept the shore. It was obvious that the defence of le Hamel,
although it had been attacked shortly before by twelve Typhoons
using 1,000-lb bombs, was unsubdued.” Owing to the loss of two
control vessels during the passage, le Hamel had to be omitted from
the field artillery’s shoot during the run-in; most of the Eighth Air
Force bombs had fallen well inland and the destroyers were unable
to silence guns and other weapons sited to take the shore in enfilade
and protected from seaward by massive earth-banked concrete walls.
Interpretation of photographic reconnaissance here and elsewhere
along the front had failed to reveal the fact that many of the guns
near the shore were thus sited solely for enfilade fire on the beaches;
they could not fire to seaward but neither could they be effectively
attacked from the sea, except by cross-fire. Had this been known the
naval fire plan might have been differently framed. On the flat sands
craft grounded some distance from dry land. The engineers’ arm-
oured bulldozers, track-laying, bridging and ramp tanks had there-
fore to negotiate a considerable stretch of surf, while men of many
units often bearing heavy loads of explosives or other equipment,
had to struggle ashore through the waves, raked all the way by the
enemy’s fire.

Yet the leading men of the 1st Hampshire had comparatively light
casualties in getting ashore and they quickly rushed the post at the
customs house near les Roquettes and turned to attack le Hamel.
At once they met intense fire. Their commanding officer and with
him the forward observation officer for the supporting ships and a
battery commander from the field artillery all became casualties. The

LE HAMEL AND LA RIVIERE 175

battalion headquarters wireless sets were put out of action and they
were thus unable to call for support from the destroyers or the self-
propelled artillery ready to fire whilst still at sea. When the remain-
ing companies of the Hampshires came in, twenty minutes after the
first landings, an out-flanking attack through Asnelles was organised;
without artillery support direct attack by way of the beaches was
proving costly and making little progress. To handicap the battalion
still further the second-in-command was killed soon after taking
charge. *

Meanwhile the naval and military obstacle clearance teams, work-
ing under fire and suffering heavy casualties, partially cleared one
narrow gap on Jig before the rising tide put a stop to this work. The
breaching teams of sappers with the assault vehicles were at the same
time busy clearing exits from the beaches to the coast road behind
and the build-up of the brigade continued steadily, though the beach
was still under fire from le Hamel.

While this was happening on Jig beach the brigade’s second
battalion, the 1st Dorset, landing east of les Roquettes, had fared
better. Flail tanks of the Westminster Dragoons and armoured
vehicles of the engineers had landed punctually and were quickly at
work clearing mines and beach obstructions. The infantry crossed the
beach and leaving a company to form a firm base at les Roquettes
they pushed inland. After capturing a machine-gun post at
Meuvaines they by-passed le Hameland advanced westwards towards
Buhot and an enemy position, at Puits d’Herode, which covered
Arromanches and the nearby shores from the south. Though troops
on the beach east of les Roquettes were less exposed to fire from le
Hamel the breaching teams were still having casualties in clearing
two exits to the coast road.*

At about a quarter past eight the brigade’s third battalion, the
and Devon, began landing as planned close to le Hamel. Beach
obstacles were still intact and le Hamel still unconquered, so they
had a hazardous time in landing and getting clear of the beach. One
company joined the Hampshire in the fight for le Hamel and the
rest of the battalion moved round Asnelles on the south and pressed
westwards towards Ryes, about two miles south of Arromanches.*

Close on the heels of the Devon the 47th (Royal Marine) Com-
mando landed. Since H-hour the tide had risen considerably, sub-
merging obstacles before it was possible to clear them. On these,
three of the five landing craft bringing in the Commandos were
damaged and sunk by attached explosives. Many of the Marines
swam ashore, but forty-three men and much precious wireless equip-
ment were lost; yet in spite of the fire from le Hamel about three
hundred concentrated at the back of the beach. After acquiring
another wireless set from 23 1st Brigade Headquarters (which by then

176 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

had landed) the Commando started off across country. They were
to move inland and, avoiding contact with the enemy, to make
westwards for Port en Bessin on the inter-Allied boundary*

About a thousand yards further east, the 50th Division’s 69th
Brigade had begun landing punctually on King beach—the leading
companies of the 6th Green Howards on the right and on their left
the 5th East Yorkshire*Obstacle clearance groups and AVREs
had begun landing just before them. The main enemy defences here
were the fortified positions at la Riviére on the left flank and on
higher ground near Mont Fleury and round the lighthouse; there
was also a strong-point at Hable de Heurtot where a by-road from
Ver sur Mer reaches the coast. On the map opposite, German
defences as recorded by Allied Intelligence are marked. Similarly
overprinted maps were issued for all sectors of the assault front.

The Green Howards, landing to the west of la Riviere, quickly
cleared the strong-point at Hable de Heurtot where they were
closely supported by engineer tanks. When four pill-boxes had been
reduced! with the help of petards, two of the tanks charged over the
sea wall and routed the rest of the garrison who had been firing and
throwing grenades from behind it. The advance was quickly resumed
and the Green Howards next took the battery position near Mont
Fleury* It had been struck by the bombers and H.M.S. Orion had
registered twelve hits¥There was no sign that its four guns had ever
fired a shot and the gun crews, cowed by the bombardment, offered
no resistance.

The East Yorkshire landed near the outskirts of la Riviére and for
a short time were pinned down by fire under the sea wall. They
called for naval support, and destroyers and support craft closed the
shore and shelled the position heavily. A flail of the Westminster
Dragoons silenced an 88-mm gun in a concrete emplacement and
the East Yorkshire captured the position, taking forty-five prisoners.
Even so it needed several hours’ fighting to clear the whole village
and its capture cost, in killed and wounded, six officers and eighty-
four other ranks. The rest of the battalion had gone on to capture the
strong-point at the lighthouse near Mont Fleury. From there they
took two guns and thirty prisoners and then moved on towards Ver
sur Mer*

The 69th Brigade’s third battalion, the 7th Green Howards,
landed at about twenty past eight, and made at once for Ver sur
Mer. There were no enemy in the village and the battalion continued
to the battery beyond it. Bombing and a two-hour bombardment
by H.M.S. Belfast had left the garrison with little further will to fight
and fifty were taken prisoner; their four 10-cm gun-howitzers in

7 Sergeant-Major S. E. Hollis of the Green Howards was awarded the Victoria Cross
for his ‘utmost gallantry’ in this action.

ORGANISING THE BEACHES 177

concrete emplacements had apparently fired eighty-seven rounds
before they gave in.*

The two assault brigade groups of the 50th Division were now
ashore and fighting their way inland. On the coast the engineers had
cleared two paths through beach obstacles and two exits for vehicles;
and the two brigades were being steadily built up. D.D. tanks of the
4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards and the Nottinghamshire Yeomanry
had been brought in by landing craft soon after the leading infantry,
with more tanks of the 6th Assault Regiment, Royal Engineers, and
flails of the Westminster Dragoons. Self-propelled guns, of the 86th,
goth and 147th Field Regiments, Royal Artillery, Bren carriers,
machine guns, mortars, anti-tank guns, jeeps and small trucks were
being landed.

Shortly before nine o’clock two tanks of the 1st Royal Marine
Armoured Support Regiment had landed on King beach and in the
next hour or so six more came ashore. The circumstances of these
Marine regiments need explanation. They had been formed only a
few months before D-day to meet the army’s desire for guns to
support early-landing troops until the field artillery could be brought
in. They were armed with 95-mm howitzers mounted in out-moded
Centaur tanks with troop leaders in Shermans carrying 75-mm
guns. After firing on the run-in they were to land a few minutes
before the infantry, to fire from the beaches or within a mile of the
sea. Unfortunately they were not given much chance to fulfil this
important réle, since they were despatched in landing craft, hurriedly
adapted and fitted with side armour, which made them unsea-
worthy in the prevailing weather. Some foundered on passage, some
broke down at sea and had to put back; others were damaged by
under-water obstacles or enemy fire as they grounded on the French
coast. On all five beaches only twenty out of eighty Centaurs landed
within the first quarter of an hour after H-hour and only twenty-eight
more within the first four hours. Those that were not quickly put
out of action after landing did good service, the Marines showing
their characteristic enterprise.*

Among others who had begun landing on each assault beach with
the first troops and had started work while the shore was still under
enemy fire were men whose task it was to resolve the confusion which
was inevitable at first, when craft of every sort were arriving minute
by minute to discharge men and vehicles hurriedly on beaches which
the rising tide was narrowing rapidly, and from which an adequate
number of exits were not yet cleared. They were the naval assistant
beachmasters with small advance parties, forerunners of the naval
organisation on the far shore that would eventually be needed for
the reception and direction of ships and craft, the control of unload-
ing operations, and the turn-round and despatch of return convoys;

178 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

and the beach groups which were an essential part of each assault
brigade group, to be gathered later into the divisional sub-area and
the vast supply organisation that would subsequently be needed.

The first task of these reconnaissance elements of naval and
military beach organisation was to make a rapid survey of local
hazards, both off-shore and on land, and to decide the precise
location of beach exits to be cleared; to begin marking positions for
ammunition and supply dumps for the guidance of incoming craft
and of vehicle drivers; and at the earliest possible moment to set up
signal stations. The Main Beach Signal Station on each brigade
front, manned on an inter-Service basis, was to enable local com-
manders to control both the tactical situation and the flow of traffic
to the beaches and to be the clearing-house for all loca] information.
This work of beach organisation began while beaches were still under
enemy fire and in some cases men engaged in it joined in fighting to
overcome near-by enemy posts which were hindering progress. Like
others employed on the beaches in this early stage they had a full
share of casualties. It will be seen later that as ships and craft con-
tinued to arrive and men, vehicles and supplies were landed in ever-
increasing numbers, naval and military organisation of the beaches
was a determining factor in the progress of operations. Unless the
incoming flood of craft and troops was well directed and efficiently
distributed and controlled, congestion on the shore would delay
movement and the momentum of the assault must suffer.

Apart from the hold-up at le Hamel, the leading brigades of the
50th Division were making good progress and about eleven o’clock
the first of its reserve brigades—the 151st—began to land on the
beaches that had been captured by the 69th Brigade*About an hour
later the 56th Brigade started landing near Hable de Heurtot so as
to avoid fire from le Hamel which was still sweeping across Jig
beach where it was to have landed* By early afternoon all four
brigades of the 50th Division were ashore. But this is anticipating
events and before following the division’s movements inland it will
be well to see how the simultaneous assaults of the 3rd Canadian and
British 3rd Divisions had fared in these early hours.

Nearly two miles away to the east of la Riviére leading troops of
the 3rd Canadian Divisional] Group had been landing on ‘Mike’ and
‘Nan’ beaches in the Juno area¥ The same low-lying coast is pro-
tected there by a reef of off-shore rocks, exposed at low water; only
in a mile-wide gap, opposite the mouth of the river Seulles and the
little seaport of Courseulles, is the approach free from navigational
danger, and there the beach obstructions had been thickened and the
water-front fortified. Behind mined areas and barbed wire, houses
had been strengthened for defence and concrete protection built for
numerous machine guns and mortars; guns, sited to fire east and

3RD CANADIAN DIVISION IN JUNO AREA 149

west along the shore, were emplaced on either side of the harbour
entrance and were well protected by concrete from bombing and
naval bombardment. The town itself lies mainly to the east of the
river, stretching nearly a mile inland along the road which runs
southwards to Caen. Behind the harbour, on the west bank of the
river, lies the village of Graye sur Mer. The capture of Courseulles
and Graye was the first task of the division’s 7th Canadian Brigade
Group*A mile or more further east the 8th Canadian Brigade Group
was to land at Berniéres sur Mer and at St. Aubin sur Mer*There,
again, houses on the front and behind the sea wall were fortified and
barbed wire and minefields covered machine-gun and mortar posi-
tions protected by concrete. The only road which leads directly from
the shore had been blocked by a concrete wall.

It had been planned to begin landing the 7th Brigade at 7.35 a.m.
and the 8th ten minutes later, but in view of the fact that rough
weather seemed likely to delay some of the landing craft, the local
joint commanders postponed both landings for ten minutes*Even so
some groups were late in arriving and the planned sequence could
not be adhered to. Most D.D. tanks were swum ashore (though some
from a shorter distance than had been planned). On only one sector
of the divisional front did the D.D. tanks beach ahead of the infantry
and at once engage the defences; on all other Canadian sectors the
tanks arrived after the infantry* Most of the craft which carried the
engineers’ tanks were delayed through having got into the wrong
swept channel during passage, and the leading infantry were a little
late too. The covering fire of destroyers and support craft, including
the field guns firing while still at sea, was accurately timed and so
effective that there was little enemy shooting before craft touched
down. But although by delaying the time of landings they gained the
advantage of higher water over off-shore rocks, they now had to
land among beach obstructions instead of ahead of them. The
obstacle clearance groups could do little before the rising tide put a
stop to their efforts, for the sea was too rough for under-water work.
The larger landing craft had therefore to drive on-shore in spite of
obstructions and the smaller craft to worm their way through if they
could. The courage and resolution of their crews matched the
occasion and they showed much skill and daring in bringing them
in; there was no pause in the landings but the loss and damage to
landing craft was severe. Out of three hundred and six landing craft
of all sorts employed by Force J on that morning ninety were lost or
damaged in breaking their way ashore or in withdrawing after
discharging their loads.*

One illustration must typify what was happening all along the
British front. The extract is from the report of a lieutenant of the
Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve on the performance of

22
23

180 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

five landing craft from the flotilla under his command, carrying:
infantry in the initial assault.

“The lowering of craft began at 0617... The forming up with
other assault flotillas ... carrying troops was satisfactory...
and the passage to the release position . . . uneventful... Upon
leaving the release position ... the beach was clearly visible
. .. the tide was considerably higher than had been anticipated
and the beach obstructions were partly covered with water.
There were six rows of obstructions but we were able to weave
our way through them. At 0840 all craft... were beached.
There was quite a heavy swell and a strong current on our star-
board quarter . . . On the beaches there was considerable enemy
fire, mostly from mortars.

About three quarters of the troops had been disembarked from
L.C.A. 1150 when an explosion caused either by a mine or by a
mortar bomb blew in the port side. One soldier was wounded.
The port side of L.C.A. 1059 was blown in by the explosion of
one of the mined obstructions after about one third of the troops
had been disembarked. Casualties in this craft were two soldiers
killed. Another explosion holed L.C.A. 1137 and stove in the
starboard bow. All troops were cleared from the craft without
casualties. All troops had been disembarked from L.C.A. 1138
and the craft was about to leave the beach when a wave lifted it
on to an obstruction. The explosion which followed ripped the
bottom out of the craft . . . the boat officer in the craft suffered
several shrapnel wounds in his legs, a fracture of the right fibula
and slight head injuries. All troops were discharged from L.C.A.
1151 without loss . . . I ordered the crews of the sunken craft to
embark for return passage to the ship. By this time there was a
cleared channel through the obstructions ... but as we were
leaving an approaching L.C.T. forced us to alter course. An
obstruction ripped the bottom out of L.C.A. 1151. The crews
then transferred to an L.C.T. and were eventually brought back
to the ship.’*

The flotilla had done its job but at a cost of four out of the five land-
ing craft involved. It was indeed a common experience that, despite
all difficulties, landing craft bearing infantry made their way to the
shore and landed the soldiers with very few casualties. It was while
lying in the breakers among the obstacles or when withdrawing from
this perilous position that they suffered most heavily. Mercifully most
of their crews were saved.

The Centaurs of the 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regi-
ment again fared badly owing to trouble with their unseaworthy
landing craft, three of which were capsized and two had to return
to port: out of forty tanks with which the regiment was to support
the Canadian landings only about six were ashore on D-day.*

COURSEULLES AND BERNIERES 181

Of two groups of small landing craft “‘Hedgerow’ allotted to Juno
to clear lanes through beach minefields, one arrived intact and
delivered its bombs across the beach near Berniéres ahead of the

infantry. Of the other group only one craft survived the sea passage*

The 7th Canadian Brigade was attacking the beaches on both
sides of Courseulles harbour, The Royal Winnipeg Rifles on the right
and The Regina Rifle Regiment on the left, with D.D. tanks of the
6th Canadian Armoured Regiment supporting them. One company
of the Winnipegs attacked the defences on the west of the entrance
while the rest of the battalion moved round behind the harbour to
capture Graye sur Mer*But the main defences of the port lay in
Courseulles, east of the river, and these were attacked by The Regina
Rifles. Like le Hamel, Courseulles was stubbornly held and eventu-
ally a troop of the Royal Marine Centaurs and tanks of the 26th
Assault Squadron, R.E., also became involved in the bitter street
fighting. It was not finally captured until well into the afternoon.
One of the reserve companies of The Regina Rifles coming ashore
twenty minutes later suffered heavily when two of its landing craft
were mined on obstacles, yet although reduced in strength it straight-
way set out with the battalion to capture Reviers, two miles inland
at the junction of the rivers Seulles and Mue.*

The brigade’s reserve battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regi-
ment, had sent forward with the first wave of the assault one com-
pany under command of The Winnipeg Rifles. Landing on the west
flank they had met little opposition and finding that the naval
bombardment had demolished a nearby coastal post, which included
a 75-mm gun in a concrete emplacement, they went on to Vaux.
There also they found the gun abandoned and they pressed south-
wards towards Ste. Croix. The rest of their battalion landed behind
the Winnipegs and, avoiding Courseulles, they also struck south-
wards for Ste. Croix.*

The hold-up at Courseulles, which meant that the nearby beaches
were still under enemy fire, and the fact that landing craft carrying
the assault engineers’ breaching crews were coming in late and
irregularly, was delaying the clearance of exits from the shore;
already there were signs that congestion might delay the movement
of troops and vehicles as these continued to come in.*

The development of beach exits may not seem a difficult task; here
is an illustration of what it might involve. Half of the 26th Assault
Squadron, Royal Engineers, landed just west of Courseulles, after
infantry and D.D. tanks had already begun to gain ascendency, and
set out to make an exit from the shore. Facing them was a line of sand
dunes twelve to fifteen feet high, then two to four hundred yards
of low-lying land which had been flooded by the damming and
heavy cratering of a stream, and beyond that the lateral road from

182 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

Courseulles to la Riviére to which the exit was to lead. Mines had
been thickly scattered among the barbed wire, which was in large
quantities in the dunes and the ground to be crossed.

A bridging tank of the sappers laid its bridge against the dunes and
three flail tanks of the 22nd Dragoons went up it. The first had
flogged its way for about forty yards through the minefield when a
mine exploded under its track; the second was stopped by mechanical
trouble and the third so entangled in wire that it could not get
further. Progress was now impeded by a German tank trap, fifteen
feet wide and nine deep. A fascine was laid in it and a bulldozer
set to work to fill it in. Beyond the trap the flooded stream had
passed through a culvert; this had been blown up and a huge crater
full of water took its place. Another fascine-carrying tank tried to
fill it but the ‘tank slid into the crater and gradually disappeared
from view except for its fascine.’ The crew baled out but were all
killed or wounded by mortar fire before they could reach cover.
Other sappers freed the fascine by explosives and a bridge ‘was
dropped from the seaward side on the sunken tank which acted as
a pier’ but left a gap on the far side; this was filled with logs carried
from the shore where the Germans had collected them for the con-
struction of obstacles. ‘A causeway was built out and about 0915
hours the first D.D. tank got across behind the assaulting companies’
and more followed. Then field guns arrived but the first ‘totally
misjudged the bridge and bellied itself on it... Three bulldozers
were linked together but failed to pull him off; two AVREs were
therefore brought up and, after a lot of trouble, succeeded in getting
him off.’ The horse and cart of ‘a disinterested farmer’ was impressed
to complete the track with rubble from damaged houses, and from
then on the way was open for traffic.*

The 8th Canadian Brigade’s leading battalions—The Queen’s
Own Rifles of Canada and The North Shore (New Brunswick) Regi-
ment—landed meanwhile on Nan beaches opposite and a little east
of Berniéres. The D.D. tanks of the roth Canadian Armoured Regi-
ment had been launched close to the shore from their landing craft,
one of which with four tanks on board was sunk by shell-fire. The rest
of the tanks waded in. Two were lost at the water’s edge but thirty-
four arrived in time to support the infantry already ashore.*

The front at Berniéres was bounded by a sea wall, in places twelve
feet high, and houses behind it had been fortified. Although many
had been demolished by naval bombardment the place remained a
formidable strong-point whose defences had largely survived. These
included two 50-mm anti-tank guns, two heavy mortars and eight
machine guns, in addition to infantry in prepared positions. Landing
on the right of the sea front The Queen’s Own Rifles suffered severely
from enfilading fire as they rushed the beach and stormed the sea

38RD BPLTISH DIVISION IN SWORD AREA 183

wall, but once they had done so they attacked from the flank and the
enemy soon surrendered. *

East of Berniéres leading companies of The North Shore Regiment
had a similar experience in landing near St. Aubin sur Mer. It is
a somewhat larger watering place and it too was firmly defended.
Its reduction with the help of the assault engineers’ tanks took about
three hours and, even after the main position had been taken,
sporadic fire from hidden snipers continued intermittently till night-
fall. The battalion’s reserve company, which landed twenty minutes
after the initial landing, immediately moved southwards towards
Tailleville.*

The division’s third brigade—the 9th Canadian Brigade—began
landing at about half past eleven* By then many damaged landing
craft encumbered the water’s edge; only a narrow strip of beach was
still uncovered by the rising tide and this was crowded by men and
vehicles. Some beach exits had been cleared but these were being
jammed from time to time by vehicles hit by enemy shells or tempor-
arily broken down. Until Berniéres was cleared and additional exits
facilitated movement, not only the beach but Berniéres itself became
choked with troops and vehicles struggling to assemble and get for-
ward. Nevertheless by two o’clock the whole of the 3ru Canadian
Division was ashore with its four regiments of field artillery (12th,
13th, 14th and 19th) and its third regiment of armour (the 27th).

On the left of the Canadian brigade No. 48 (Royal Marine)
Commando had landed at about nine o’clock in the morning. By
that time most of the beach obstacles were submerged, and in rough
water many of their landing craft (L.C.1.(S)) suffered widespread
damage; being built of wood this type was particularly vulnerable.
Three, carrying headquarters of the 4th Special Service Brigade, and
two with troops of the Commando on board, struck mined obstacles
and another was hit by shell-fire. The men who reached the shore
came under close-range machine-gun fire from St. Aubin as they
rushed the sea wall and little more than two hundred (about half
their strength) started eastwards to attack Langrune sur Mer,
hitherto kept under fire from the sea by guns of the support craft.*

Only three miles away along the coast to the east of St. Aubin lies
a little watering place called Lion sur Mer and two and a half miles
still further east 1s the larger seaside town of Ouistreham, at the
mouth of the river Orne. The coast between Lion and Ouistreham
is flat and the coastal road which joins them is fringed with houses
along its whole length. Lion and Ouistreham were both fortified as
strong-points and about halfway between them was another strong-
point at la Bréche, with the familiar casemated guns, mortars,
machine guns and wired trench positions for infantry. This stretch of
coast was the Sword area and the beach to the west of la Bréche was

184 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

known as ‘Queen’; the British 3rd Division was to attack there on a
single brigade front. Its 8th Brigade Group was to land first and be
followed in turn by the 185th and the gth Brigades* This concentra-
tion of attack on a narrow front was planned to put as much weight
as possible into the blow which the division was to strike for the
rapid capture of Caen and the link-up with the airborne division.
Details of the supporting troops are shown on the diagram at
page 172.

The experience of the 8th Brigade was similar to that of the other
assault brigades. It landed at the time fixed and in the chosen place.
The protection given by the fire of destroyers and support craft
during the run-in was so effective that there was little enemy fire
till the shore was neared. Thirty-four out of forty of the D.D. tanks
of the 13th/18th Hussars were launched at sea and only two failed to
reach the coast; six more were taken in in landing craft and all were
landed. Six tanks were knocked out in the surf and four shortly after;
twenty-eight were available to support the infantry though they were
not there before the first infantry landed. Two troops of the 5th
Independent Battery, Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment,
reached the land within the first quarter of an hour and a third
came in later; craft carrying the breaching teams and armoured
vehicles of the assault engineers and Dragoons were landed with the
leading infantry and were the only supporting troops ashore at the
outset. The wind was driving the sea inshore so rapidly that obstacle
clearance groups could only mark one clear passage until the tide
receded. In trying to neutralise mines and shells attached to the
obstacles some sappers were soon exhausted and several were swept
away; for the time being they could only work above the water’s
edge. The majority of craft arriving with the first assault troops had
to risk obstacles and drive ashore as best they could and there were
inevitably many casualties.*

The landings here, as on the other assault beaches down the coast,
were on the whole so successful that it is easy to miss the significance
of how much was due to the faithfulness of those in charge of the
landing craft. The majority were organised for the run-in as small
flotillas under the immediate command of young officers of the Royal
Marines or the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. The records of what
happened to craft under their command, in spite of their bald state-
ments of fact, must fill the reader with pride.

A flotilla of ten landing craft carrying assault engineers and their
armoured vehicles, under command of a lieutenant of the Royal
Naval Volunteer Reserve, touched down at 7.26 a.m., one minute
late. All craft succeeded in unloading with the exception of one which
only managed to unload one flail; as a second was about to move
down the ramp it was hit by a mortar shell which exploded the

LANDINGS AT LA BRECHE 185

Bangalore torpedoes being carried. The explosion killed Lieut-
Colonel Cocks, the Royal Engineers’ commander, and two other
ranks; seven other ranks were wounded; three vehicles were disabled
on board which prevented further unloading. None of the other craft

was seriously damaged though two were hit by shells and mortar fire.*

Of seven craft carrying tanks of the Royal Marine Armoured
Support Regiment two were lost after unloading. One of them
received several direct hits from mortar bombs and was soon on fire.
It was commanded by a temporary sub-lieutenant of the Royal
Naval Volunteer Reserve with two other officers of the same rank; all
three and some of the crew were killed. The second craft was mined
and hit by shell-fire; one of the crew was killed and a junior officer
and four ratings were wounded; the craft became a total wreck.*

And here is the story of one craft commanded by another temp-
orary lieutenant of the Volunteer Reserve; it carried self-propelled
guns of the field artillery and ‘received a hit from a mortar shell
when about a hundred yards from the beach. The shell hit the after
end of the tank deck and ignited the petrol supply of the three field
guns. A few minutes later the craft beached and disembarked all but
the three burning guns and the fire was soon brought under control.’
No soldiers were available to move the damaged guns, for two of their
detachments had landed with those not damaged and the rest were
casualties from burns. In spite of the ‘unpleasant experience’ of fire
on board and shell damage the craft unbeached and went to the
assistance of another damaged craft which was in danger of sinking.
Its crew and some wounded soldiers were taken off and it was taken
in tow stern first. The tow rope parted three times but both craft
reached the southern exit of the swept channel where the towed craft
was handed over to a tug and the wounded transferred to a vessel
with a surgeon on board. On continuing its own return journey to
England the engines failed as water had entered the fuel tank
through a shell hole. The official report concludes: ‘This gallant
craft was then taken in tow... and eventually reached the collect-
ing area at Portsmouth at 1600 on 7th June4&In spite of all they had
gone through the crew had suffered no casualties since it had sailed
from England two days before. It was one of eighteen that carried the
self-propelled guns of the 7th, 33rd and 76th Field Regiments, Royal
Artillery, which were landed after firing while at sea during the
opening phase of the assault. Of these eighteen craft six were dam-
aged by enemy fire, five by obstacles and three by mines; two of these
fourteen became total wrecks. *

But although these are typical examples of what many experi-
enced, there were many others which came through unscathed.
Twenty landing craft, for instance, bore the first wave of assaulting
infantry of the 8th Brigade to the shore and, successfully avoiding all

186 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

obstacles, landed them without a casualty* They were the leading
companies of the 1st South Lancashire Regiment on the right
and the 2nd East Yorkshire Regiment on the left. They started
landing at half past seven on the beach between la Bréche and Lion
sur Mer and were to be joined about twenty minutes later by the
rest of their battalions.

The tide was rising fast and the foreshore was already narrowed to
about fifteen yards. A belt of barbed wire separated it from the road
along the sea front and, irregularly spaced behind it, were a number
of machine-gun posts. Fire from the la Bréche strong-point swept the
water’s edge and the beach but the troops crossed this without many
casualties to break their way through to the narrow built-up area
which faced them. One company from each battalion joined in an
attack on the strong-point, the others started to clear the enemy from
the housing belt along the coast. A company of the South Lancashire
moved out to guard the right flank and was soon joined by No. 41
(Royal Marine) Commando, much weakened by casualties on the
beach, whose task was to pass through and capture the enemy posi-
tion at Lion sur Mer? the East Yorkshire turned left towards Ouistre-
ham and were followed, shortly afterwards, by No. 4 Commando
and two French troops from No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando whose
primary réle was to capture Ouistreham and destroy the battery
there* While the fight for the la Bréche position continued, the rest
of the South Lancashire battalion landed and struck inland for
Hermanville sur Mer which they occupied by nine o’clock. The rest
of the East Yorkshire battalion set out to capture two enemy positions
near the south-west corner of Quistreham.

Soon after ten o’clock, after nearly three hours’ fighting, the la
Bréche position was captured. Its three guns and three heavy
mortars, machine guns and rifle posts had done much damage to
incoming and unloading craft during that time and had caused the
attacking troops many casualties. Among those killed was the com-
manding officer of the South Lancashire, who lost, in all, five officers
killed and six wounded with ninety-six other ranks killed or wounded.
The East Yorkshire losses were equally heavy. And here as elsewhere
along the British front the fact that with few exceptions the near
defences of the coast had been silenced did not yet mean that the
beaches were free from danger. A high wind had driven the full tide
up the beaches to within ten yards or so of the sand dunes. Vehicles,
now being landed in large numbers, were so tightly packed along the
water front that it was almost impossible to move along the shore to
a prepared exit; the delay was already upsetting the time-tables. The
narrow beaches were still under fire from gun positions inland and
from beyond the Orne—the exposed left flank of the British assault.
Barrage balloons were put up as protection from air attack but were

THE AMERICAN ASSAULT 187

soon cut adrift when it was found that they were being used as rang-
ing marks by enemy gunners. The 8th Brigade’s third battalion—the
1st Suffolk—also had a troublous experience in landing.*

The rest of the 3rd Division, the 185th and the oth Brigades, and
the 1st Special Service (Commando) Brigade came ashore during the
morning and early afternoon.

The initial American landings were made by troops of VII Corps
in association with the Naval Force U on the Utah beaches of the
Cotentin coast; and by V Corps with Force O on Omaha beaches
between the mouth of the Vire and Port en Bessin (map, page 222).
The first landings at Utah had been made under more favourable
conditions and against less opposition than any others on the whole
Allied front; at Omaha, on the other hand, conditions were in some
respects more difficult and the local opposition was certainly more
effective than anywhere else. It is therefore not surprising that widely
different results had been achieved during these early hours.

As already mentioned, the American leaders had decided to begin
landings at half past six,? that is about an hour earlier than the
British; the tide would be lower then, thus giving more time for the
clearance of obstacles. They had also decided not to open the naval
bombardment till ten minutes to six as against the British opening at
half past five. The prearranged fire support had thus lasted for only
forty minutes when the American landings began, whereas the British
front had been bombarded for two hours before H-hour. Admiral
Kirk, commanding the Western Task Force, subsequently reported
that ‘the period of bombardment was extremely heavy but was of too
short duration to silence or neutralise all the defences, particularly in
the Omaha area’* Rear-Admiral Hall who commanded Force O
held the same view: ‘the time available for the pre-landing bombard-

ment was not sufficient for the destruction of beach defence targets’*

The lowering positions (‘transport areas’) were about eleven miles
from the coast (as against the British seven) so troops had to endure
at least three hours in small craft while closing the shore. During
much of this long run-in craft making for Utah moved in compara-
tively sheltered water under the lee of the Cotentin peninsula; those
making for Omaha were exposed to a stronger wind and rougher
seas. Behind the sand dunes at Utah the land is only a few feet above
sea level for the first few hundred yards inland; the chief protection
of the coast consisted of a further wide extent of meadow land below
sea level, normally drained by dykes but now flooded. At four widely-
separated points there were banked-up roads serving as narrow

a Soha hours earlier the undefended St. Marcouf Islands flanking Utah beach had been
occupied.

188 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

causeways through the inundations, and American airborne troops
were already fighting to gain possession of their western exits. By
contrast, the foreshore at Omaha is everywhere overlooked by
formidable bluffs which, rising in places to about a hundred and fifty
feet, command the water’s edge and the beaches to be captured. The
close defences on the narrow strip of unflooded land behind Utah had
been effectively bombarded and bombed; the bombers had missed
the defences covering Omaha which were so protected from seaward
attack that the naval forty-minute bombardment had not silenced
them. Finally, to complete this comparison of conditions which
affected the American assaults, the troops defending the Omaha
beaches were of better quality and in greater strength than those at
Utah.

One disadvantage encountered by Force U was an undetected
minefield offshore. This caused the loss of the navigational leader
(control vessel) of the left-hand assault group, a landing craft carry-
ing four D.D. tanks and, later, the destroyer Corry. The other control
vessel of this left group had been disabled in the transport area. Of
the right hand group only one control vessel remained in the van to
lead the assault, the second having turned back to guide the group of
craft carrying the D.D. tanks, delayed by the mining of one of their
number. Owing to these misfortunes, the obscuring of landmarks by
smoke and the effects of a strong current, craft were beached about a
mile further south than had been planned, but this turned out to be
an advantage for both beach obstacles and forward defences were
less formidable there than they were further north.*

The organisation of the American assault is shown in the diagram
opposite;* from this it will be seen that the opening attack on Utah
was to be made by the United States 4th Infantry Division. The
division consisted of three ‘regimental combat teams’ (the 8th, 12th
and 22nd), each of which was composed of an infantry regiment
of three battalions and of artillery, tanks, engineers and other
supporting troops, and thus corresponded approximately to a British
brigade group. The initial attack was made by the 8th Regimental
Combat Team, with two of its battalions landing first and the third
following in close support. The infantry started landing punctually
at half past six and meeting very little opposition they quickly over-
came the adjacent enemy posts defending the shore. The twenty-
eight D.D. tanks which were available, after the landing craft men-
tioned above had been sunk, were all launched at sea about three
thousand yards from the shore and all swam in safely but were a
few minutes after the infantry. The tide had not yet reached the
beach obstacles and little enemy fire was directed at them; within an

* For a detailed account of the American assault, see Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack,
chap. VIIT.

The Seaborne Assault— United States First Army

VII gala
go Div Group
357 R.C.T.
358 R.C.T.

Follow-up Formations

Assault. Divisions 4 DIV GROUP

327 G.I.R. (101 Div)

Initial Follow-up Regiments 359 R.C.T. ( go Div)

Parent Formations for
clearance teams & D.D. tanks

Reserve Regiments and Rangers

Assault.Regiments

Reserve Battalions 3/22 3/8
| Naval & Engr demolition |
Assault Battalions 1/8 and clearance teams 2/8 1/116
, | D.D. & bulldozer tanks '
| ' , 4+
Landing Beaches TARE UNCLE DOG

Assault Areas

VC 5 RPS
29 Div Group
115 R.C.T.
175 R.C.T.

26 R.C.T. (1 Div)

1 DIV GROUP

5 & 6 Engr Special Bdes

3 Armd Group

[Ranger Group
116 R.C.T. (29 Div)

3/116

D.D. & bulldozer tanks | |

DOG/EASY EASY

18 R.C.T.
16 R.C.T.

1/16

Naval & Engr demolition
and clearance teams
D.D. & bulldozer tanks

la
'

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FOX

—_ A ———_—$5 I TA es Oe OO MM A

189

190 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

hour the engineers and naval demolition parties had cleared them
so that landing craft had an unobstructed run-in—the only beach on
the whole Allied front on which this could be achieved so quickly*

As soon as the infantry who had landed first had overcome the
defences they set out to capture the three southern causeway roads
leading to Pouppeville, Ste. Marie du Mont and Audouville la
Hubert. A sea wall separated the land from the shore and until this
was breached and exits for vehicles had been cleared, movement off
the shore and along the narrow causeways through the floods was
inevitably slow. Troops, vehicles and equipment continued to arrive
undisturbed but their movement inland was hindered by the limita-
tion of exits from the shore.

Pouppeville had been attacked at about eight o’clock by some of
the parachutists who had been dropped during the night. The force
was a small one and some of the garrison held on till noon; a few who
tried to escape to the coast were taken prisoner by infantry pushing
inland from the beach; it was there that contact was first made
between seaborne and airborne troops.*

By ten o’clock in the morning six battalions of infantry with a
considerable quantity of supporting arms were ashore, the beach was
not under accurate fire and beach organisation was taking shape, but
movement along the narrow causeways available was still slow.
Some of the infantry tried to quicken the pace by wading through the
flooded fields, but the water was waist deep and where it covered
dykes men were often out of their depth. In these early hours it was
delay imposed by the flooding rather than enemy resistance which
prevented rapid progress. Apart from this everything was going well.

Fifteen miles away to the east the leading troops of V Corps had
begun the attack on beaches in the Omaha area. The attack was
opened by two regimental combat teams, the 116th (of the 29th
Division) landing on the right and the 16th (of the rst Division) on
the left. Both were under the commander of the 1st Division who
was given the 115th Combat Team of the 29th Division to support
the landings on the night and had his own division’s 18th Combat
Team to support the attack on the left beach: in addition, two
battalions of Rangers (corresponding approximately to British Com-
mandos) were employed in the assault, their task including a special
mission to capture the enemy position on Pointe du Hoe.*

As the transport area was so far from the shore, and as H-hour was
only about half an hour after sunrise, the assault craft had to start
for the shore in darkness. ‘Due to the darkness and confusion in the
Transport Area’ the landing craft carrying D.D. tanks, artillery and
demolition parties ‘straggled considerably in their approach toward
the line of departure’. Two, carrying artillery, had foundered before
reaching the transport areas: one strayed to the Force U area and did

OMAHA BEACHES Ig!

not return until several hours later: two more ‘had gone so far to the
eastward that they could not get back in time for their part in the
initial assault wave’*Of thirty-two D.D. tanks which were launched
six thousand yards from the shore twenty-seven foundered; fifty-one
were taken to the shore in landing craft but eight of them were
knocked out in the surf by enemy gun-fire. ‘At least ten’ of the craft
carrying infantry were swamped on the way in and much of the
artillery was sunk.‘ The Americans had planned to ferry the leading
artillery ashore in DUKWs.§ In the prevailing weather the heavy
loads proved too much for these craft. Twenty-two out of thirty of
the howitzers of two field artillery battalions and an infantry cannon
company were lost. ‘In short, the artillery that was planned to sup-
port the infantry attack particularly in the advance inland did not
reach the shore.’ ¢

Off Omaha no enemy gun was fired while the assault craft moved
in towards the coast. But once assault craft reached the shore and
landings began, a withering fire from guns, mortars and machine
guns opened on beached craft and soldiers wading to land. Faulty
navigation and ineffective control of the landing craft made the task
of the troops more difficult since they were scattered and many were
landed too far to the east, not always with the formation to which
they belonged.

While making their arduous course from the transport areas land-
ing craft moved under the direction of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’
control vessels. Of these, Admiral Hall states in his official report on
Force O that ‘neither were adequately trained’: the former had
received only ‘a few days instruction’, had taken part in one large-
scale exercise and had been taken out ‘several times’ for special drill
as control vessels; the latter ‘had had no instruction and no training’.
He adds, ‘they did not arrive in the theater soon enough’* Wind,
waves, the set of the tidal current and the masking of landmarks by
mist and smoke from the naval bombardment proved too much for
them. The American historian gives a grim account of what
happened.

.-. units became scattered on the final approach. Since the
men had been briefed only for their particular areas, they were
confused by the changed picture . . . Debarking in water some-
times up to their necks, the troops on some sectors of the beach
were met with a hail of bullets that drove some to seek shelter
under the surf, others to scramble over the sides of the craft...
The troops, overladen with heavy clothing and equipment,
waded slowly through the surf and through fire that increased as

* Harrison, op. cit., p. 309.
® Amphibious lorries—a most valuable American equipment.
* Loc. cit., p. 313.

192 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

they approached the beach. Some stopped to rest or seek shelter
behind obstacles. Some lay at the water’s edge and were able
eventually to crawl in with the tide ... The first wave should
have landed nine companies evenly spaced along the beach.
Because of withering enemy fire and mislandings, however, the
right wing all but disintegrated; two companies bunched in
front of les Moulins, and the remainder of the landings (elements
of four companies) clustered in the Colleville sector. One com-
pany was carried so far to the east that it landed an hour and a
half late.’ ?

Immediately after the leading infantry were to come the engineers to
clear obstacles and exits from the shore. ‘Half the demolition teams
were delayed in landing and only a third of them touched down on
their appointed sectors’ and much of their equipment was lost. They
had very heavy casualties and after half an hour the rising tide had
made further clearance of the beach impossible. The American
authorities had decided not to use the variety of armoured vehicles
which proved so valuable to the Royal Engineers in the British land-
ings, relying mainly on bull-dozers for clearance work. Of sixteen
bull-dozers allotted to the 116th Infantry ‘only three could be put
into operation on the beach, and onc of these was prevented from
maneuvering freely by riflemen who sheltered behind it’. ®

When the succeeding waves began coming in the surviving men
who had landed in the first wave were still at the water’s edge, or
sheltering either under the bank of shingle at the top of the sands
or the wall at the foot of the bluff. Obstacles had not been cleared
and were now largely under water; no exits from the beaches had
been opened; the enemy’s gun-fire was still unsilenced and machine-
gun fire from the overlooking bluffs swept the water’s edge and the
beach. Admiral Hall wrote, of this time:

‘, .. the landing craft were allowed to fall into confusion, and
wave after wave was dispatched from the line of departure close
in on the preceding wave, where the combined effect of the wind
and tide soon converted the waves into a milling mass in which
little semblance of order remained. Had it not been for the
appearance on the scene of the Deputy Assault Group Com-
manders and their prompt action in withdrawing and reforming
these craft, the success of the entire landing would have been
jeopardized.’ *

The American historian, with a German report before him, adds:

‘To the German officer in command of the fortifications at
Pointe et Raz de la Percée it looked in these first hours as though

’ Harrison, op. cit., p. 313.
® Loc. cit., p. 317.

25. British warships open fire
Detail from painting by Norman Wilkinson

SEABORNE APPROACH

26. Assault craft head for the beaches

27. Infantry and amphibious (DD) tank

LANDINGS ON D-DAY
28. Royal Marine Commandos

ABSENCE OF LUFTWAFFE 193

the invasion had been stopped on the beaches. He noted that the
Americans were lying on the shore seeking cover behind the
obstacles, that ten tanks and a ‘great many other vehicles”
were burning. The fire of his own positions and the artillery,
he thought, had been excellent, causing heavy losses. He could
see the wounded and dead lying on the sand.’ ®

Yet the German officer was mistaken in thinking the invasion had
been stopped. From about seven-thirty onwards small parties of
soldiers had broken through the barbed wire which bounded the
shore and had been working their way up through the mine-sown
slopes. At this juncture eight United States and three British des-
troyers closed the shore and opened fire on many of the enemy
positions. Almost imperceptibly at first the general situation began to
improve. Individual movements forward began to take effect and by
about nine o’clock parties of soldiers had reached the crest between
defence posts and were turning to attack them and to feel their way
forward towards St. Laurent and Vierville. Opposite Colleville a
small gap had been opened with the help of fire from a destroyer and
a strong-point guarding the defile through the hills was being
stormed.

Three companies of the Rangers landing near Pointe du Hoe had
scaled the cliffs with ropes and ladders and under cover of fire from
the destroyers Satterlee (U.S.) and Talybont (British) had stormed the
battery positions and ‘eliminated’ the garrison remaining. The guns
had been removed but were found later well concealed inland.

By ten o’clock there were indications that the assault was making
some progress as more American troops climbed the heights above
Omaha, and the British 50th Division pressing inland began to
threaten the German position by turning its eastern flank. The
invasion was far from being ‘stopped’, but the American troops were
to have much hard fighting before the Omaha sector was securely
won.

By now the world knew that the Allies had begun their long-
deferred attack from the West, for at five minutes past nine a press
communiqué had been issued from Supreme Headquarters which
read:

‘Under the command of General Eisenhower, Allied naval forces
supported by strong air forces began landing Allied armies this
morning on the northern coast of France.’ *

It was too early to disclose the most astonishing news of all, namely
that no German aircraft had yet appeared. How different from the
days, four years before, when British troops were withdrawn from
France! Then ships and small craft lying off the beaches at Dunkirk

® Loc. cit., pp. 319-320.
fe)

194 D-DAY: SEABORNE LANDINGS

or alongside the mole of its outer harbour, and three hundred thou-
sand soldiers holding the bridgehead or on the sand hills and in the
surf waiting their turn to leave, had endured the all-out attempt of
the German air force to stop evacuation. Now a far larger target of
Allied shipping was offered and far larger armies had begun landing
on the coast of Normandy. On the British beaches alone over thirty-
one thousand men, over three hundred guns and another seven
hundred armoured vehicles had already been landed within two and
a half hours of the opening of the assault*In all that time the German
air force was conspicuous by its absence; it appeared to be com-
pletely daunted by the Allied air forces covering and furthering the
assault. Absolute immunity from air attack was perhaps the most
surprising phenomenon of these early hours of D-day.

Another disclosure was the failure, amounting to fiasco, of the
Atlantic Wall. Nowhere were the defence works on which so much
labour and material had been expended providing any decisive
hindrance to the Allied landings. It is true that some strong-points
had still to be taken, it is true that the captured beaches had still to
be joined up and it is of course obvious that, until the Allied armies
were ashore in greater strength and occupied firmly a larger bridge-
head, the Allies’ foothold in France would be precarious. Yet it was
already true that the-coastal defences of the assault beaches which
had taken years to construct were being swept away in almost as
many hours.

In spite of what has been said it would be wrong to pretend that
everything was going exactly as planned. Though leading troops had
broken through the beach defences and were pushing inland, most
of the beaches were still under enemy fire from gun-positions able to
reach the shore. Under-water obstacles were still reaping a harvest
of damaged landing craft and the clearance and construction of
tracks to enable tanks and vehicles to move inland was still very
incomplete; as a result there was serious congestion on most of the
beaches and progress everywhere was behind schedule. It has been
explained that the beaches being attacked by the British were, in total,
less than five miles wide. On that small space there had been landed,
by about half past ten, fifteen infantry battalions, seven commandos,
seven tank regiments; two engineer assault regiments; nine field
artillery regiments; portions of two Royal Marine armoured support
regiments and elements of five beach groups with detachments of
the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force.*

It is hardly surprising that while all these men with large quantities
of vehicles and equipment were being landed without pause there
were times when they appeared to be so jammed together that move-
ment was impossible. Tanks and self-propelled guns were on the
beaches in some cases for an hour or more before they were able to

CONGESTION ON THE BEACHES 195

move off the shore. Some field guns were deployed so near the sea
that, as they opened fire in support of the troops moving inland, the
tide lapped against them. At one place the beach was only fifteen
yards wide where a hundred and fifty yards was expected, for the
wind had raised an unusually high tide.

It is impossible to say exactly when the first beach exits were open.
People were too busy to keep looking at their watches and some exits,
opened fairly quickly, were later blocked by knocked-out vehicles or
traffic jams. It had been foreseen that the rate of landing would be
governed by the availability of exits and it had been planned to open
twenty-eight in the first hour. The 3rd Division and the 50th appear
to have had their first exits opened not much later but not nearly all
that were needed; two hours or more had elapsed before the first was
opened on the Canadian beaches. The delay in each case had slowed
the landings of the reserve brigades and this inevitably had far-
reaching effects on the day’s progress. But before following their
movements inland it will be well to get a clearer understanding of
what they were up against and to learn what the German com-
manders were doing in these early hours of the assault.

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER X
D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

defences within three or four hundred yards of high water

mark that have already been described and the so-called
coastal batteries; behind these was a defended coastal belt of country
from four to six miles deep, whose southern edge is marked on con-
temporary German maps as ‘land front’; in the rear area beyond
that there were a very few unfinished defence works.

The twenty-four mile length of coast which the British Second
Army had set out to capture on D-day was defended by eight
battalions of infantry, ten of whose companies occupied the forward
beach defences while the remainder held defensive positions in the
coastal belt. With the infantry in these beach defences were some ninety
single guns of 88-mm calibre or less, nearly fifty mortars and between
four and five hundred machine guns. In addition to the infantry in
the coastal belt, and largely within range of the beaches, were twenty-
two batteries of field, medium and heavy artillery containing a
further ninety guns, and two companies with twenty-one heavy anti-
tank guns. In the rear area were five more battalions of infantry or
panzer grenadiers, five more batteries with twenty-two medium and
heavy guns, and two more battalions of anti-tank artillery mustering
thirty-four self-propelled ‘88’s. Thus the assault divisions of the
Second Army faced in all some thirteen battalions of infantry, about
two hundred and sixty guns of all kinds and about five hundred
mortars and machine guns. Moreover, some artillery stationed out-
side the British sector, east of the Orne on their left and in the
American sector on their right, could also fire on the flanks of the
British assault.*

The German army principally concerned was the Seventh, but
the Fifteenth on their east flank was also involved to a less extent.
In the Seventh Army area the corps responsible for the defence of the
British sector was LX XXIV Corps, its forward defences from the
neighbourhood of le Hamel to just east of Franceville Plage being
held by the 716th Infantry Division and those from le Hamel
to Port en Bessin by part of the 352nd Infantry Division which
was also responsible for Omaha. The former was a ‘static’ division
which had been occupying the coast for many months; the latter
was a ‘field’ division, trained for mobile operations, which had
recently been brought forward to strengthen the defence in Gold
and Omaha areas. In the Fifteenth Army area its LXXXI Corps

197

T HE German opposition did not only consist of the beach

198 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

was responsible, forward defences being held by the 711th Infantry
Division. Stationed south-east of Caen (but with some of its troops
pushed forward on either side of the Orne between Caen and the
sea) was the 21st Panzer Division of Army Group B,; in the Fifteenth
Army area, but held in OKW reserve under Hitler’s control, were
the 12th SS Panzer Division, south of Rouen, and the Panzer Lehr
Division, near Chartres. These and the German forces defending the
American sector are shown in the map facing page 120*

On June the 5th the German naval, army and air forces were all
completely ignorant of the fact that the huge invasion fleet had
already put to sea. The weather deterred naval surface craft from
venturing out on patrol and the presence of Allied aircraft discour-
aged any serious attempt at reconnaissance by the Third Air Fleet.
So neither knew anything of the forces driving relentlessly towards
them. The British Broadcasting Corporation’s ‘Voice of Shaef?’
broadcast that evening coded messages to the French Resistance,
which led the German Fifteenth Army to warn its corps and head-
quarters at about half past ten that night that intercepted code
messages were pointing to invasion within forty-eight hours’ German
post-war statements are contradictory but no contemporary evidence
has been found that Seventh Army knew of the issue of that warning
message; as already mentioned, orders requiring certain divisional
commanders to attend an exercise at Rennes on June the 6th were
not cancelled.

But Admiral Krancke’s headquarters knew of the Fifteenth Army’s
warning and his diary comments that Naval Group West did ‘not
attach any special significance to this news’, believing the B.B.C.
messages to refer to acts of sabotage as former messages had done.
At half past one on the morning of D-day he learned of the American
airborne landings from the Admiral Commanding Channel Coast.
The news must also have reached the headquarters of von Rundstedt
and of the Third Air Fleet, for the naval diary says that all three took
the view that ‘no major enemy landing is imminent’. Nevertheless,
Krancke himself ordered a state of ‘immediate preparedness’ for his
own command and both the Seventh and Fifteenth Armies issued the
‘highest alert’, At about the same time both the 711th and 716th
Divisions reported British airborne landings east of the Orne to the
headquarters of LXXXI Corps at Rouen and LXXXIV Corps
at St. Lé.*

At a quarter past two the Seventh Army Chief of Staff (Major-
General Pemsel) told General Speidel, Rommel’s Chief of Staff at
Army Group B, that ‘the sound of engines can be heard coming
from the sea on the eastern Cotentin coast...’ and that ‘Admiral
Kanalkiste [Channel coast] reports presence of ships detected in
the sea area Cherbourg’. In Pemsel’s view this activity pointed to

ENEMY COMMANDERS IN TWO MINDS _ 199

a major operation. Speidel did not agree and von Rundstedt did
not agree either: ‘OB. West does not consider this to be a major
operation’. Pemsel, however, stuck to his opinion. From then on
reports of Allied action multiplied. At ten minutes to three came
a naval report of ‘sea targets’ north of the Cotentin peninsula and
off the 716th Division’s sector; at half past three landing craft
were noted for the first time off the mouth of the Vire and ‘sailing
quickly to the Orne estuary’*A few minutes before this Admiral
Krancke had ordered his mobile forces to patrol coastal waters in the
Baie de la Seine. This brought the 5th Torpedo-boat Flotilla and a
flotilla of patrol craft from le Havre and led to the attack on the
bombarding ships off the mouth of the Orne described in Chapter
VIII; they had fired fifteen torpedoes but their only victim was the
destroyer Svenner. Further west two flotillas of motor torpedo-boats
left Cherbourg but they were back in harbour by six-thirty ‘having
found nothing’. In the Bay of Biscay the three available ships of the
8th Destroyer Flotilla were ordered north to Brest and the Landwirt
group of U-boats, held especially for anti-invasion duties, were
brought to instant readiness. *

Further reports of airborne landings came in from many quarters
and at a quarter past five Seventh Army told Army Group B that a
‘large-scale enemy assault’ was indicated by the depth of Allied air-
borne landings on both flanks, in conjunction with radar-located
targets at sea off the Orne, Port en Bessin, the mouth of the Vire and
the Cotentin. Soon after this the Allied heavy bombing of coastal
defences was reported and at six o’clock, ‘naval forces in some
strength have opened fire on the coast near the Orne estuary, near
Berniéres s.M., Arromanches, Colleville, Grandcamp. Landing craft
approaching Berniéres s.M.’ The Seventh Army, though convinced
that a large-scale attack was indicated by the depth of the parachute
landings, yet added ‘. . . purpose of coastal bombardment not yet
apparent. It could be a diversionary attack in conjunction with
attacks to come later at other points. Air and sea reconnaissance have
brought no further news since daybreak.’ #

Uncertainty and disagreement as to whether this was the beginning
af the Allies’ main attack or a diversion to cover a major assault
elsewhere was already hindering firm decision. The two armies
directly concerned took the threat of airborne landings seriously from
the outset. As early as 2.35 a.m. Seventh Army had given the gist
Airlanding Division, which was in reserve in the Cotentin, to
LXXXIV Corps which, with the 7ooth Division in the Utah area,
was to clear up the situation created by the American airborne land-
ings on the western flank. At seven o’clock the 21st Panzer Division
was also put under LXXXIV Corps to help in dealing with the
British descents on the eastern flank beyond the Orne*

200 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

Some of the British airborne troops had been landed in the area
of the 711th Division whose boundary with the Seventh Army ran
south from a point on the coast about two miles west of Cabourg and
passed along the Dives valley just east of Troarn. News of these
descents alarmed the Fifteenth Army. Before two o’clock in the
morning they asked that the 12th SS Panzer Division should be
alerted and moved up. After a first refusal by Army Group B, further
argument so far prevailed that before five o’clock (that is before the
Allied naval bombardment opened) von Rundstedt gave orders to
Army Group B for the division to be moved up in rear of the 711th
Division to be ready for ‘immediate intervention’, and the Panzer
Lehr Division to make ready to do so* Before seaborne landings
began he put 12th SS Panzer Division under Army Group command.
But it was in OKW reserve under Hitler and von Rundstedt’s
action was soon countermanded. At ten o’clock he was informed that
the 12th could move but Panzer Lehr was not to move, and neither
would be committed without orders from OKW.*And there for the
time being the matter rested.

During these early hours of D-day it was the Allied airborne land-
ings which occupied the attention of the German Command. In the
east, detachments of the 736th Grenadier Regiment of the 716th
Division and of the 125th and 1g92nd Panzer Grenadier Regiments of
the 21st Panzer Division attacked (and continued to attack repeat-
edly during the morning) the various positions on both sides of the
Orne held by the British 6th Airborne Division, but failed everywhere
to dislodge them. The 7th Parachute Battalion and the 2nd Oxford-
shire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry detachment holding the
Bénouville-Ranville bridges across the Caen Canal and the river
Orne, the 13th Parachute Battalion near le Mariquet, and the 12th
Parachute Battalion on rising ground south of le Bas de Ranville
repulsed all attacks, though at times they were all hard-pressed and
a party in the village of Bénouville, a mile or so to the south of the
bridge, were cut off and surrounded but held out.*

In the west, in the area of the Cotentin, the unintentionally wide
dispersion of the American airborne troops made it difficult for the
Germans to appreciate clearly the size or seriousness of what was
happening. The appearance of airborne troops in so many places
magnified the apparent scale of the threat, and soon after half past
two German troop movements began. Well before any seaborne
landings, the g1st and 7ogth Divisions in the Cotentin and the 915th
Regiment near Bayeux had been ordered in turn to move against the
airborne threat that was developing to westward of the Vire.

But after the seaborne landings began it was the British area which
occupied the Seventh Army’s chief attention. At 8.45 it first heard of
British tanks landing east of Asnelles and fifteen minutes later

ADVANCE ON CAEN 201

LXXXIV Corps reported that ‘from 7.15 a.m. onwards landings in
some strength were being made from the sea on both sides of the
Orne Estuary, especially to the west of Berniéres, Asnelles, Meuvaines,
Grandcamp, with infantry and armoured forces. . . .“*Apparently
news of the landings at Utah had not come through, and though it
was known at 9.25 a.m. that there had been some penetration of the
g52nd Division’s front at Omaha, that division took an optimistic
view of the situation—and continued to do so all morning. Rather
naturally therefore the area of the 716th Division was regarded as
the more dangerous. British tanks had reached the German artillery
positions and seeing that the defence in this sector was beginning to
disintegrate the LX XXIV Corps Commander decided to modify his
plans and to pull out the 21st Panzer Division from the east of the
Orne and send it into action against the British landings west of the
river. The 21st Panzer was a well-found division of about sixteen
thousand men, some of whom had fought in Rommel’s Africa Corps
against the British Eighth Army. It included a hundred and twenty-
seven Mark IV tanks, forty assault guns and twenty-four 88-mm
anti-tank guns. But on this morning its troops were widely dis-
tributed. Its two grenadier regiments had one battalion forward on
either side of the Orne, facing the British 6th Airborne and grd
Divisions; its anti-tank guns had been put on the Périers ridge with
a battalion of field guns to the south of it; its anti-aircraft guns were
around Caen and the rest of its artillery on high ground about fifteen
miles south-east of Caen; its tanks were disposed a few miles north-
east of Falaise. The forward infantry which were already involved in
fighting the 6th Airborne Division were left to contain their bridge-
head beyond the Orne and to keep open the road from Troarn, but
the two battle groups containing the tanks, which the divisional
commander himself had launched against the airborne troops, were
now ordered to change direction and to cross the Orne at Colom-
belles and Caen.*

The 3rd Division’s assault brigade group (the 8th) had indeed
made good early progress. By the middle of the morning the South
Lancashire had taken Hermanville, the East Yorkshire were clearing
the defences south of Ouistreham and the Suffolk, having taken
Colleville, were attacking two strong-points a mile or so to the south,
known to the Allies as ‘Morris’ and ‘Hillman’. The former, contain-
ing four field guns, was taken easily since the area had suffered
heavily from naval and air bombardment and its garrison of sixty-
seven came out with their hands up as soon as the attack opened.
But Hillman, half a mile further south, was a stronger position cover-
ing about four hundred by six hundred yards, well protected by
wire, mines and weapons and containing a concrete redoubt and
underground accommodation. It proved to be the headquarters of

202 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

the 736th Regiment. The Suffolk’s first attack, with artillery and mortar
support and assisted by a squadron of the 13th/18th Hussars, took the
outer defences but failed to capture the inner redoubt and a further
full-scale attack was organised. It was launched late in the afternoon
but the position was not captured till after eight o’clock in the even-
ing. During the whole day’s fighting the Suffolk casualties were light
(seven killed and twenty-five wounded), but the failure to take
Hillman earlier was to cost another battalion dearly.*

The company of the South Lancashire and the 41st Commando
who had started early to capture the strong-point Lion sur Mer
(page 186) had been unsuccessful. After severe casualties in a series of
hand-to-hand fights among the houses a fresh attack was made with
the help of three armoured vehicles of the 5th Assault Regiment,
Royal Engineers, but all these were quickly knocked out by the
strong-point’s gun and the position remained untaken.

On the opposite, Ouistreham flank the clearance of the coast was
more successful. There four Centaur tanks of the Royal Marine
Armoured Support Regiment had assisted the commandos to capture
the strongly fortified but heavily bombarded Riva Bella battery
position (from which the guns had been removed), and ten armoured
vehicles of the 79th Assault Squadron, Royal Engineers, had pushed
on to the mouth of the canal, taking sixty prisoners and three anti-
tank guns. The lock gates and bridge were checked for demolition
charges but the enemy had blown the bridge’s eastern span.

The 185th Brigade Group had landed nearly up to time and the
infantry were assembled in woods half a mile inland by about eleven
o’clock. The brigade was to be the spearhead of the division’s attack
inland; it was to advance with all speed and if possible to capture
Caen and the ground immediately south of it that day. The advance
was to be led by a mobile column of the 2nd King’s Shropshire Light
Infantry, riding on tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry and sup-
ported by the 7th Field Regiment, R.A.; but at noon the infantry’s
heavy weapons and vehicles were still not clear of the congestion
on the shore and the tanks that had succeeded in getting through
were being held up by a minefield. Leaving these to overtake them
as quickly as possible, the infantry started marching south en route
to Caen at about half past twelve and by two o’clock they had
climbed the Périers rise. The leading Yeomanry had overtaken them
but enemy guns in woods to their right knocked out five tanks of the
Staffordshire and four flails of the Westminster Dragoons and a com-
pany of the infantry were sent off to join the Yeomanry in taking the
position. The rest of the column moved on towards Beuville and
Biéville while a squadron of the Staffordshire occupied a command-
ing position at Point 61. *

The main body of the 185th Brigade (the 2nd Royal Warwickshire

GERMAN TANK ATTACK REPULSED 203

and the 1st Royal Norfolk) did not advance till some hours had
elapsed. At three o’clock the Norfolk were ordered to secure high
ground on the left of the Shropshire Light Infantry and, believing
that St. Aubin d’Arquenay was occupied by the enemy (though
in fact the rst Special Service Brigade had passed through it at
noon), they struck across country between it and the still uncaptured
Hillman. Moving through a large field which the strong-point could
command, about half the battalion lost direction in the high stand-
ing corn covered by the Hillman machine guns; in a very short
time they had had some 150 casualties. The rest of the battalion
pressed on and overcoming the few enemy in front of them they
were established on high ground between Beuville and Bénouville
by seven o’clock in the evening. There they were halted for the night.
The 2nd Warwickshire were not ordered forward till later in the
afternoon and did not reach St. Aubin till about six o’clock¥ By
then events were beginning to vary the planned programme.

At intervals throughout the morning air reconnaissance indicated
that the 21st Panzer Division was moving up on Caen and as early
as eleven o’clock General Dempsey had asked the air forces to attack
troop movements into Caen from the south and south-east. From
then on German movement towards Caen was attacked from the
air almost continuously. Early in the afternoon it was learnt that the
21st Panzer Division’s reconnaissance unit was probing far afield and
other reports pointed to the fact that the division would be com-
mitted north and north-west of Caen that evening. The divisional
commander, Major-General Feuchtinger, has since stated that once
over the Orne (where it flows through the southern outskirts of Caen)
his armoured regiment with ninety effective tanks and two battalions
of infarftry attacked northwards.*

The situation of the grd Division at about that time—four o’clock
in the afternoon—was as follows. The 8th Brigade was well estab-
lished in Hermanville, Colleville sur Orne and Ouistreham, with one
of its battalions, the 2nd East Yorkshire, closing with the battery
position known as ‘Daimler’ south of Ouistreham, and the rst
Suffolk about to renew its attack on Hillman strong-point. Just
clear of the beach the oth Brigade was assembling but was not yet
ready to debouch into the four-mile gap of country between Herman-
ville and the Canadian sector. The 185th Brigade’s main body (the
Norfolk and Warwickshire battalions) were moving in the direction
of Caen by the west bank of the canal. Ahead of them the Shropshire
Light Infantry and accompanying troops had reached Beuville and
Biéville on the direct road to Caen; the infantry’s 6-pounder anti-
tank guns had caught up and were disposed to cover the advance
and they had near them some 17-pounder self-propelled guns of the
2oth Anti-tank Regiment. One squadron of the Staffordshire

204 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

Yeomanry was with them, another was supporting the Suffolk
attack on Hillman, and a third was disposed on the Périers ridge
commanding the brigade’s right flank.*

Soon after four o’clock a troop of the Staffordshire Yeomanry
scouting ahead reported enemy tanks advancing from Caen. The
squadron with the Suffolk at Hillman strong-point was hastily
moved to Biéville and had just taken up position to the west when
about forty enemy tanks, moving very fast, attacked. Two were
knocked out by the Yeomanry and two by the Shropshire anti-tank
guns and the enemy turned away into the woods. They were pursued
by the Yeomanry and by field-gun fire, and when they showed again
some more were destroyed. They swung off again and were joined
by others, and making a wide détour they came in towards the
Périers ridge. There they met the squadron of the Staffordshire
posted at Point 61 for just such an occasion. Three more were
knocked out and again they drew off. Thirteen had then been
knocked out to our knowledge (our only loss was one self-propelled
gun), but they had already been persistently harassed by aircraft
while they were south of Caen. On the western outskirts of the town
eight Typhoons of the Second Tactical Air Force had dive-bombed
tanks moving up to join the fight and had left two in flames and four
others smoking. Feuchtinger has since said that his division started
the day with 124 tanks and by nightfall had only 70 left. In view of
his figures British records were over-modest. *

Once the enemy’s attack near Biéville was driven off a company
of the Shropshire led off again down the road to Caen, but their way
was blocked by enemy holding strongly the Lebisey woods athwart
the road. It was growing dusk and with the necessity to guard their
right flank against renewed attack by the German armour it was
decided to halt for the night, holding Biéville and Beuville. Caen
was about three miles away.*

Of the 185th Brigade the Warwickshire had found that le Port
just north of the Bénouville bridge still contained a few of the enemy.
Shortly before nine o’clock as they prepared to attack, two columns
of transport aircraft of 38 and 46 Groups, towing gliders, came in low
from the Channel, strongly escorted by fighters. One column of about
100 released their gliders over Colleville to land near the canal north
of Bénouville; the other column of about 140 went on to Ranville for
the gliders to land on the nearby zone N¥This mass fly-in, which was
seen by both sides, greatly cheered British troops but had an opposite
effect on the German commanders. Their Seventh Army telephone
log records a statement that ‘Attack by 21st Panzer Division rendered
useless by heavily concentrated airborne troops’, and their report to
Rommel said that it had ‘been halted by renewed air landings’*
According to other German statements, a few forward tanks had

6TH AIRBORNE DIVISION REINFORCED — 205

reached the coast near Lion by seven o’clock and others were trying
to slip past the British guns on Périers ridge when the sight of large
airborne reinforcements to their rear led the panzer division to call
off its counter-attack, and to withdraw to a line running eastwards
from Cambes to the canal, that is between the Shropshire positions
and Caen. *

The Warwickshire cleared le Port and, after making contact with
the airborne troops holding the bridge, went on to attack Bénouville
and the chateau to the south of it. It was nearly midnight when at
last the stalwart party of the 7th Parachute Battalion who had held
out in Bénouville since early morning, surrounded by the enemy but
unconquefed, were at last relieved. Then, with the troops who had
held the bridge, they joined the rest of their battalion on the east of
the Orne. The Warwickshire continued southwards till halted for
the night at Blainville. *

The effective strength of the 6th Airborne Division had been
doubled by the reinforcements flown in, namely twostrong battalions
of infantry, the armoured reconnaissance regiment with light tanks
and jeeps, some light field artillery, anti-tank guns and medical and
supply units; and six hundred containers of stores and ammunition,
dropped by parachute. *

The original position of the airborne troops had already been
improved when the rst Special Service Brigade, marching to the
skirl of the Brigadier’s piper, had crossed the Orne bridges to join
them during the afternoon*The main danger appeared to lie to the
south, for the enemy still held Longueval (from which the bridge-
head can be overlooked) and Hérouvillette. The parachutists’ posi-
tions at le Bas de Ranville and le Mariquet had warded off several
attacks with difficulty; No. 3 Commando was diverted to reinforce
them, and No. 6 Commando and the 45th (RM) Commando were
turned north to take the Bréville feature and to secure Merville.
Meanwhile parties of engineers from the 17th and 71st Field Com-
panies, and part of the 106th Bridging Company of the Royal Army
Service Corps, began the construction of Bailey bridges over the canal
and river that would carry any existing British or American tank.
The sites had to be cleared of mines and booby traps and the sappers
suffered heavily from snipers and mortar fire as the work continued.*

Enemy attacks continued at intervals till the late evening, and at
one time the forward bombardment officer directed fire from the
destroyer Serapis on German infantry near Longueval. The reinforce-
ments to this sector (the rst Royal Ulster Rifles and the 2nd Oxford-
shire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry who had just arrived in
the gliders) prepared to attack Hérouvillette and Escoville at first
light next day. *

At the southern end of the high ground to the west of the Bavent

206 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

woods, German troops attacking the 8th Parachute Battalion from |
near Troarn had been thrown back in confusion, leaving behind
them a large lorry full of stores. In the centre round the cross roads
at le Mesnil the Canadian Parachute Battalion had not been
molested. Further north the position was not so satisfactory, for the
enemy still held Bréville and the gap in the wooded ridge near the
village. Beyond the gap airborne troops held the hill at le Plein and
Hauger, but the Bréville area, where a battery of artillery lay hidden
in an orchard, was to cause trouble for a week*

During the afternoon the 3rd Division’s plans had been modified
by events. With the 21st Panzer Division loose in the country between
the 185th Brigade and the Canadians, Major-General T. G. Rennie
decided to make sure of the British left flank and ordered the goth
Brigade to establish itself so as to cover the Orne bridges against
attack from the west. The brigade had been late in coming in
and while moving to the assembly area a German mortar bomb
had landed on the headquarters, severely wounding the brigade
commander and several of his staff. The commanding officer of the
and Ulster Rifles had assumed command and the brigade took up
positions on the high ground between Périers sur le Dan and St.
Aubin d’Arquenay for the night. In front of them was the 185th
Brigade and behind them the 8th who, after the Suffolk had finally
captured Hillman and the East Yorkshire Daimler, were ordered to
concentrate for the night in the Hermanville area*

The final positions held that night by the 6th Airborne Division
and the 3rd British Division are shown on the map facing page 212.
Forward positions held by the enemy are also indicated. From the
latter it will be seen that the 12th SS Panzer Division was coming
up. Hitler’s ban had in fact been removed at about two-thirty in the
afternoon, when von Rundstedt was at last authorised to move both
the 12th SS and the Panzer Lehr Divisions up to the front. Move-
ments of the SS Division had been observed and reported by our
reconnaissance aircraft and it was realised that it could not now
reach the battle that day but must be expected on the day
following *

In the 3rd Canadian Division’s sector, as elsewhere, congestion on
the beaches delayed the start of movement inland. Not only was it
difficult to clear the shore while troops, vehicles and equipment
continued to land more quickly than exits could be made and kept
open; as long as the Courseulles defences held out on one side, and
part of St. Aubin on the other was still unconquered, those who got
off the beach were almost inevitably led to congregate where there
was freedom from enemy fire. Owing to wrecked craft and congestion,
disembarkation could not be spread as widely as planned and most of
the reserve brigade (gth Canadian) was landed opposite Berniéres.

CANADIAN ADVANCE 207

Berniéres was no sooner clear of Germans than it was filled with
Canadians, for at first any attempt to debouch into open country
drew heavy fire from ‘88’s and machine guns. Soon it was so choked
that reorganisation of troops crowded in the town was a slow pro-
cess and it took longer still to get up heavy weapons and vehicles
and to marry them and the units with which they were to move
inland.*

The country to be seized by the Canadian division is, for the first
few miles inland, undulating, slowly-rising agricultural land whose
wide fields stood deep in corn. South of the Seulles, contours are
steeper and the valleys of the river and of its tributaries are in many
places narrow and wooded; especially is this true of the Mue valley
which separated, broadly speaking, the areas to be captured in the
first instance by the Canadian 7th and 8th Brigades. The advance of
the former was led by The Royal Winnipeg Rifles and the assault
company of the rst Canadian Scottish, with tanks of the 6th
Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars). They were followed by
the rest of the Canadian Scottish and later by The Regina Rifle
Regiment. Their task was to secure the high ground south of the
Seulles between Creully and Fontaine-Henry and then to push on
and get astride the Bayeux—Caen road. There were no major strong-
points in their path, but infantry with machine guns and artillery
were widely distributed to cover the principal villages, roads and
river crossings. A contemporary German map of coastal dispositions
shows eleven anti-tank guns of the 716th Division spaced across the
Canadian front between la Riviére and Berniéres, within a mile or so
of the coast; and widely disposed in the country south of the Seulles
another eighteen ‘88's. *

The Winnipegs leading, and the Canadian Scottish closing soon
afterwards, made good progress in capturing Banville and Ste. Croix
sur Mer, taking ‘hordes of prisoners’ in the field positions which they
overran. Then the Winnipegs made for the Seulles crossing at
Tierceville, and the Scottish for Colombiers sur Seulles*The Regina
Rifles meanwhile occupied Reviers and the crossing there. By four
o'clock most of the 7th Brigade Group were across the Seulles and,
half a mile away on their nght, troops of the British 50th Division
held Creully. There was evidence that three companies of the 726th
Infantry Regiment had withdrawn in some disorder in face of the
Canadian advance.

The Regina Rifles with tanks of the Hussars moved south again
at about four o’clock. In the neighbourhood of Fontaine-Henry they
were heavily shelled by °88’s but the advance was continued. Leaving
the Mue valley, they struck south-westwards and took le Fresne-
Camilly on the Arromanches—Creully-Caen road. *

During this time the second assault brigade—the 8th—had

208 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

advanced on the left. The reserve battalion, Le Régiment de la
Chaudiére, had assembled at the southern edge of Berniéres by ten
o'clock, but it was noon when with artillery and a squadron of the
1oth Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse) their
advance began. Then they worked forward capturing a battery
about a thousand yards west of Tailleville and skirting another of
eighty fused rockets, which had not been fired as their cables had
been cut by the bombing. Bény sur Mer was taken by half past two
with some fifty prisoners and another battery of four 10o-cm guns of
the 1716th Artillery Regiment on which the cruiser Diadem had
rained over two hundred 5:25-inch shells.*

Further left, The North Shore Regiment had advanced on Taille-
ville, leaving one company to clear the strong-point at St. Aubin on
the coast. A battalion headquarters and a company of the 736th
Grenadier Regiment were holding Tailleville with cover in shelters
connected by tunnels. Much of the housing had been destroyed by
the bombers but the ruins were not cleared till late in the afternoon.
Shortly after four o’clock the Chaudiére Regiment began to advance
southward from Bény with tanks of The Fort Garry Horse. Soon
after five they were in Basly and shortly afterwards they seized
Colomby sur Thaon. On their left The Queen’s Own Rifles, moving
south, captured Anguerny and neared Anisy, but skirmishes with
enemy detachments continued till nearly midnight.*

Back on the coast St. Aubin had been captured (though sporadic
shooting continued during the night) but further east Langrune sur
Mer still defied capture. Tanks of the Royal Marine Armoured
Support Regiment and the fire of naval close support craft offshore
had reinforced the repeated attacks of the 48th Commando, but the
enemy in fortified houses protected by minefields and road blocks
were not subdued. About two and a half miles still separated the
Canadians and the British 3rd Division.

While the assault brigades thus advanced some four to five miles
inland the gth Brigade had struggled through Berniéres and assem-
bled south of the town by about half past two. Its objective, Car-
piquet just west of Caen, was ten miles away and its route lay through
Bény sur Mer. But the 8th Brigade was not clear of Bény till late
afternoon and the gth was not all there till after seven o’clock. Half
an hour before, The North Nova Scotia Highlanders had set off with
companies carried on the tanks of the 27th Canadian Armoured
Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers). Mortars and anti-tank guns
firing from their right were surrounded and captured, and by dusk
the head of the column reached the outskirts of Villons les Buissons.
It was too late to go further. Tanks of the 21st Panzer Division were
between them and the nearest troops of the British 3rd Division
about three miles away and they were ordered to form a ‘fortress’

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2g. Canadian troops

LANDINGS ON D-DAY
30. Follow-up units

56TH DIVISION CLOSE ON BAYTEUX 209

round the point where the road between Anisy and Villons les
Buissons crosses the Courseulles—Caen road. The rest of the gth
Brigade had been held in the neighbourhood of Bény sur Mer.*
During the evening the 7th Brigade had been ordered to halt for
the night in the positions they had reached at Fontaine—Henry, le
Fresne-Camilly and the high ground south of Creully. Earlier in the
evening two troops of the 1st Hussars had lost touch with their
infantry and had reached the day’s final objective—the main road
and railway between Bayeux and Caen. Meeting no opposition
worth mentioning, they went through Bretteville ?Orgueilleuse and

almost to Carpiquet. Then finding that they were not followed they .-

rejoined their squadron about an hour and a half later. The Canadian
armoured regiments had indeed done well throughout the day;
between them they had knocked out more than a dozen of the
enemy’s ‘88's.

The country in which the Canadians fought on D-day and the
positions occupied that night are shown on the map facing page 212.

In the last chapter it was told how the assault brigades of the 50th
Division (the 231st and the 69th) had landed in Gold area to the
west of the Canadian beaches.

Starting at about eleven o’clock the reserve brigades, the 151st
and the 56th, had landed in succession; the whole of the 50th Division
was ashore by soon after midday and its task can be seen as a whole.
On the right the 231st Brigade was to push westwards in the coastal
area, taking Arromanches and the battery at Longues, while the 47th
(Royal Marine) Commando went ahead to capture Port en Bessin
and join up with Americans from Omaha. On the left, the 69th
Brigade was to strike southwards and crossing the Seulles in the St.
Gabriel-Creully area to secure the Bayeux—Caen road near Ste.
Croix Grand Tonne. The reserve brigades were to advance between
these two—the 56th on the right to Bayeux and beyond it to the
river Drome; the 151st on the left to seize the Caen road and railway
between Bayeux and the Seulles.*

By the time le Hamel was finally conquered the 23 1st Brigade had
just taken Ryes and had already occupied the radar station at
Arromanches. The battery south of the village had been heavily
shelled by the cruiser Emerald and its four 105-mm guns had been
abandoned without being fired. The western half of Arromanches
was then attacked after bombardment by a destroyer and the 147th
Field Regiment, R.A.; the place was taken but was not finally cleared
until about nine o’clock that night. The light was fading, Tracy sur
Mer was full of enemy snipers, and after la Rosiére had been occupied
it was decided to postpone further advance until first light next day.
The 47th Commando making for Port en Bessin had had a sharp
fight at la Rosiére earlier that evening and it was dark when they

210 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

reached Point 72, the prominent hill a mile and a half south of
Port en Bessin; they dug in there for the night ready to attack in the
morning.*

Leading troops of the 56th Brigade had also passed through la
Rosiére and turned southwards astride the road to Bayeux. As they
approached Pouligny radar station the enemy set fire to it and
decamped. The South Wales Borderers, in the van, pushed on to
Vaux sur Aure and secured the Aure bridge shortly before midnight.
The nearby battery had been shelled by the cruiser Argonaut and the
vicinity had been bombed; it was now found deserted. The 2nd Essex
on the left of the brigade advance had meanwhile reached St. Sulpice
after meeting ‘light enemy forces’ and the 2nd Gloucestershire had
followed into Magny. In those positions they were halted for the
night. The brigade had been concentrated in the woods between
Buhot and Ryes before six; it had taken four to five hours to advance
about three miles, though virtually unopposed, and Bayeux was
untaken.*

On the left of the 56th Brigade, the 151st had moved forward in
two groups supported by the goth Field Regiment, R.A. Starting
from near Meuvaines the right-hand group, led by the 9th Durham
Light Infantry, took roughly the line of the Crépon—Bayeux road.
On their left, the 6th Durham Light Infantry and a squadron of the
4th/7th Dragoon Guards went south from Crépon to Villiers le Sec
and there turned westwards towards Bayeux* Between Crépon and
the Seulles the 69th Brigade met considerable opposition from a
battle group of the 352nd Division. Its 915th Grenadier Regiment
stationed near Bayeux had been ordered, early that morning, to
move westward to deal with a reported airborne landing between the
Vire and Carentan. When it was proved that no such landing had
taken place but that a battalion round Mont Fleury had been over-
whelmed, the grenadier regiment was ordered to retrace its steps,
to move eastwards and to counter-attack towards Crépon. On the
way back one of its battalions and some assault guns were diverted
to oppose the threatened American penetration at Omaha. The rest
of the battle group consisting of the 1st Battalion, 915th Regiment,
the 352nd Fusilier Battalion and ten guns of the 352nd Anti-tank
Battalion reached the country between Villiers le Sec and Bazenville
at about 4 p.m. In the ensuing fight with the 50th Division, the
German commander was killed and his infantry forced to withdraw
across the Seulles, where some were taken prisoner near St. Gabriel
by troops of the 69th Brigade who were already south of the
river.

An entry in the German Seventh Army log records a ‘strong
penetration in the area of the 915th Grenadier Regiment east of
Bayeux...’ and another German account states that only ninety

ALLIED AIR FORCES UNCHALLENGED QUI

men survived of the battle group engaged. The remnants were
attached to the 726th Regiment which was now ordered to establish
a line from Coulombs to Asnelles—that is through the country
already occupied by the 50th Division! But although this task was
obviously beyond their power there was still much mopping-up to
be done before the area was wholly free of the enemy. Near Crépon,
for instance, an ‘88’, four ‘75’s and fifty prisoners were captured from
a hidden position in the nearby woods early on the following day.*

By about half past eight, advance troops of the 151st Brigade had
reached the Bayeux—Caen road and were ordered to halt for the
night in the Sommervieu-Esquay sur Seulles area. Tanks of the
4th/7th Dragoon Guards were by then reporting that there was little
resistance for three thousand yards to the south in the direction of
St. Leger, but earlier in the evening the situation had looked very
different. Advanced troops of the 69th Brigade, brushing opposition
aside, had crossed the Seulles at Creully after fighting in which the
Dragoon Guards lost four tanks* At about half past six aircraft
reported forty German armoured fighting vehicles between Rucque-
ville and Brécy. On the request of a forward observer bombard-
ment officer these were engaged by H.M.S. Orton about an hour
later, and though some shells fell among our own troops, three enemy
armoured vehicles were hit and the remainder scattered. Again at
half past eight the spotting aircraft reported three large guns which
moved south ‘when engaged’, presumably by Oron’s guns. Typhoons
of the Royal Air Force on armed reconnaissance also reported attack-
ing a few ‘tanks’, half-tracked vehicles and lorries north-east of St.
Leger just before nine o’clock. *

In addition to the early morning bombing, to the maintenance of
continuous air cover over ships crossing and recrossing the Channel,
the successive carriage and landings of airborne troops, the anti-
submarine and anti-shipping patrols further afield and the protec-
tion of the assault area and beaches, the Allied air forces were
engaged all day in giving tactical support to the armies advancing
inland. The daily log of the Second Tactical Air Force records more
than a hundred operations over the British area in which alone over
two thousand Mitchells, Mosquitos and Bostons, Typhoons, Spitfires
and Mustangs were employed. They attacked army headquarters,
strong-points, batteries and gun sites, road junctions, troop move-
ments and airfields with bombs, rockets, cannon and machine guns;
and both by visual and photographic reconnaissance they watched
and recorded the situation in order to keep Allied Intelligence up to
date* Thunderbolts and Mustangs of the Eighth Air Force attacked
similar targets south and east of the battle area. In the American
sector these operations were carried out by nearly three thousand
aircraft of the Ninth Air Force whilst, in order to increase further

212 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

the difficulties of enemy reinforcements moving up to the battle area,
over six hundred heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force bombed
‘choke points’ in such towns as St. L6 and Caen, or transportation
targets near the assault area from Coutances in the west to Lisieux
in the east. *

Hardly any of these thousands of Allied aircraft saw any sign that
the German air force still existed. In the British sector thirty-six
German aircraft were seen at wide intervals during the whole
twenty-four hours; only twelve of these showed fight, of which seven
were brought down and three damaged. The Ninth Air Force
claimed another five destroyed and one damaged, but it seems that
these Allied claims were over-modest. For the Third Air Fleet’s own
return of air losses on June the 6th gives thirty-one destroyed and
seven damaged ‘by enemy action’; and (surely an illustration of the
lack of experienced pilots) five destroyed and eleven damaged on
operations ‘but not by enemy action’.*

The tasks which the Third Air Fleet had been given were: recon-
naissance of Allied preparations, attack on convoys and shipping,
destruction of all enemy forces which had landed, attacks on airborne
and parachute forces, fighter protection of bombers, and cover and
close support to prevent air attack on ground forces What a contrast
there was between programme and performance! Never has the
meaning of ‘air mastery’ been more clearly exhibited than it was that
day by the Allied air forces. The German Third Air Fleet had been
prevented from trying to carry out even one of its many tasks; for all
the damage they did that day they might almost as well not have
existed and certainly they had no effect on the progress of Allied land
forces.

The positions reached by the 50th Division on the night of D-day
are shown on the map opposite. This also shows the location of each
divisional commander’s battle headquarters. Generals Bucknall and
Crocker went ashore during the day and visited their divisions but,
in order to maintain good signal communications, their head-
quarters remained afloat for the night, XXX Corps in Bulolo and
I Corps in Hilary. General Dempsey, with a small staff, had crossed
the Channel during the afternoon. After seeing Admiral Vian he
joined Hilary, where he remained until the next morning.

The operations of all three divisions had made a good start but
had subsequently developed too slowly for the main (and perhaps
over-ambitious) object to be fully realised—namely, the capture of
Bayeux and the road to Caen, the seizure of Caen itself and the safe-
guarding of the Allies’ left flank with a bridgehead east of the Orne.
Partly this was due to a physical cause—the unexpectedly high tide
and the resulting congestion on the shore which delayed the start
of the advance inland. Partly it was due to the strength of the

Digitized by Google

OMAHA BEACHHEAD 213

opposition at certain points and to the fact that the 21st Panzer
Division had had time to intervene. But partly it was also due to the
pace at which the assault divisions’ operations were carried out. Caen
is eight miles from the coast from which the attack was launched and
Bayeux six or seven. There was no possibility of taking them that
day unless the advance was made as rapidly as possible, and at
times there was little evidence of the urgency which would have to
characterise operations if they were to succeed fully. Yet it must be
remembered that the troops had had little time for rest and no
relaxation of strain since they left England on the previous day. Their
attack had been launched not from a firm base but from unstable
waters breaking on an enemy-held coast. Starting under such con-
ditions, to have swept away all but a few isolated fragments of Hitler’s
Atlantic Wall and to have fought their way inland for an average
depth of four to six miles on most of a twenty-four miles front, was
surely a notable feat of arms.

The grim struggle to win a foothold at Omaha continued all day
and casualties and confusion made it difficult for both the opposed
commanders to measure progress with any certainty. The American
corps commander was able to report at one o’clock that his troops
were beginning to reach high ground beyond the beaches; half an
hour later the German 352nd Division reported ‘the division has
thrown back invaders into the sea’. In fact, American troops had
begun climbing on to the high ground three hours before and the
two further regimental combat teams under the command of the Ist
Division had begun landing soon afterwards; by four o’clock in the
afternoon both were ashore and moving inland and the German
commander was then reporting developments as ‘unfavourable’.*

During the morning the position on the beaches had not greatly
improved. The mined beach obstacles could not be cleared while the
tide was in, and the naval group which brought in the 18th Regi-
mental Combat Team that morning lost, in doing so, twenty-two
small assault craft, two larger infantry landing craft and four tank
landing craft. The impression of the troops who were landed was that
‘the beach shingle was full of tractors, tanks, vehicles, bull-dozers,
and troops—the high ground was still held by Germans who had all
troops on the beach pinned down—the beach was still under heavy
fire from enemy small arms, mortars, and artillery’.! But the position
soon changed. A destroyer close in to the shore turned quick and
accurate fire on the pill-boxes guarding the nearby re-entrant and
when the infantry attack opened the garrisons surrendered. Soon

1 Omaha Beachhead (War Dept. Historical Division, Washington, D.C., 1945), p. 83.

214 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

engineers were clearing mines from the track which led from the
shore to higher ground, bull-dozers were busy and a way inland was
open and in working order. There were five places on the assault
front at which a track from the shore led up to a re-entrant in the.
bluffs. Each was covered by a strong-point which commanded the
entrance and the shore, and the initial penetration had been made
by soldiers who climbed up the mined hillside on to high ground
between them. Three of these natural exits had now been captured
but two were still in enemy hands.*

Even when the coastal plateau was reached the country favoured
the defender. Small parties of German infantry were sited among the
hedgerows, well placed to delay advancing formations which in-
evitably needed reorganisation after all they had gone through to
reach the high ground. And the troops they met here came from two
regiments of the German 352nd Division, holding ground on which —
they had exercised and knew well. Units of the American 116th,
115th, 18th and 16th Regimental Combat Teams, in Vierville,
Chateau de Vaumicel and le Grand Hameau, were in contact with
German forces. Some in the centre had advanced south of the road
between St. Laurent and Colleville, and the 26th, arriving later,
moved south in support. Colleville was still held by the enemy but
was almost surrounded. The Rangers and infantry in Vierville and
Chateau de Vaumicel had had a hard fight and, no further reinforce-
ments reaching them, held on to their positions two miles away to the
west of the main penetrations near St. Laurent. Further west still the
Rangers who had taken Pointe du Hoe were virtually besieged but
maintained their lonely position with support from destroyers which
stood by throughout the day*Similarly the troops holding le Grand
Hameau in the east had not been reinforced.

It had been a very hard day for the infantry. A high proportion of
the tanks had been lost in the approach to the land and only a few
reached them by midnight. They were short of field artillery and of
ammunition. In fact, there was a shortage of everything. Engineers
got to work energetically on beach obstacles as soon as the tide fell
but only about a third were cleared that day. Some exits were not
yet open and vehicle parks on shore had not been established.
Pockets of enemy still held on at places along the coast and the
beaches were under observed artillery fire most of the day. Casualties
had been heavy; the official history puts them at about two thousand
though frankly admitting that this is a guess.* Of the larger craft
that had brought them ashore, six large infantry landing craft and
thirty-one tank landing craft had been lost or damaged.

The position of the American troops at Omaha that night is

® Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 330.

PROGRESS AT UTAH 215

shown on the map facing page 222. In spite of all misfortune and in
face of strong opposition they had secured, in the words of the
American historian, ‘a toehold on the enemy shore nowhere more
than a mile and a half deep’.* Over thirty-four thousand men had
been landed.*

The bridgehead positions in the Utah area of the Cotentin penin-
sula, which had been seized early in the day by troops of the 82nd
and rorst Airborne Divisions and by the 8th Regimental Combat
Team landed from the sea, had not been significantly increased but
had been considerably strengthened. The quick clearance of beach
obstacles and possession of causeways through the flooded area
behind Utah had facilitated the landing of the rest of the 4th Division
unhampered. At about half past seven in the morning the United
States destroyer Corry had been sunk by a mine and during the day a
control vessel, three tank landing craft and a flak craft had also been
lost, apparently from a similar cause. But apart from these, Force U
had landed the division without loss and that day about 23,250 men,
1,742 vehicles and 1,695 tons of stores had been put ashore.*

The right flank of the American position had been pushed north
by the 4th Division’s 22nd and 12th Regimental Combat Teams
which had been landed intact during the morning; it now extended
from a point on the coast just short of Hamel de Cruttes to Beuzeville
au Plain about four miles inland. Further west a small detachment
of the 82nd Airborne Division fought all day to hold Neuville au
Plain on the Cherbourg—Carentan road, down which a battle group
of the German g!st Division were trying to advance on Ste. Mére
Eglise, where the airborne division’s strongest concentration was.
To the west of Ste. Mére detachments of airborne troops were on the
east bank of the Merderet covering the crossings near la Fiére and
Chef du Pont, and smaller scattered parties of two parachute regi-
ments that had been landed on the west of the river were gradu-
ally collecting, the strongest on Hill 30; these were not yet able to
co-operate with other detachments on the eastern bank but their
presence helped to delay a counter-attack from the west by the
German 1057th Regiment.

Troops of the 8th Regimental Combat team working westwards
towards Ste. Mére Eglise were still opposed by Germans in strength.
Some reinforcements for the 82nd Airborne Division were landed
from the sea to prepare ground north of les Forges for additional
airborne reinforcements, but all their efforts to advance were un-
successful and when the airborne troops arrived in gliders they were
greeted by intense enemy machine-gun fire and had heavy casualties,
some landing in the enemy lines.*

® Op. cit., p. 329.

216 D-DAY; ADVANCE INLAND

Another thirty-two gliders of IX Troop Carrier Command
brought reinforcements for the rorst Airborne Division near Hies-
ville; eleven landed in or near the correct position but many crashed
or fell into enemy hands* Detachments of the ro1st Division held
scattered positions on the south flank of the beachhead, covering
bridges near la Barquette and near Brévands; but the German 6th
Parachute Regiment, ordered to counter-attack from Carentan, had
infiltrated two battalions between these detachments and other
American troops further north.

While therefore troops of the American VII Corps had not yet
extended the beachhead at Utah, either westwards across the
Merderet or southwards to Omaha, and although there was a large
enemy pocket between Turqueville and Fauville and some pene-
tration from the south, yet the area Held was large enough
for manceuvre and safe enough for the build-up to proceed with
confidence.

Shortly before 5 p.m. the German Seventh Army’s Chief of Staff was
told that it was ‘the desire of OKW that the enemy in the bridgehead
be destroyed by the evening of June 6 as there is a danger of fresh
landings by sea and air. According to General Jodl’s orders all avail-
able forces must be diverted to the point of penetration in Calvados. *
The bridgehead must be cleared. today.’ General Pemsel declared
this to be impossible; the 12th SS Panzer Division could not attack
until the next day and Panzer Lehr would be another twenty-four
hours behind it. Nevertheless, on Rommel’s instructions he was told
that the 21st Panzer Division must attack immediately (it was
already doing so) with or without reinforcements, for OKW had
given orders that the bad weather conditions must be utilised to the
full for bringing up reserves during the night of June 6th-7th.*

By this time in the afternoon orders had been issued for the two
new panzer divisions, with 21st Panzer and the 716th Division, to
come under I SS Panzer Corps and the corps commander had re-
ceived his instructions from von Rundstedt. He was to ‘.. . attack
from the vicinity of Caen and drive the British into the sea’.*

With the main effort thus set in train, further complementary
measures were concerted during the course of the evening. A battle
group from the 346th Division near le Havre was to be ferried across
the Seine after dark and join the 711th Division in attack against the
6th Airborne Division the following day. On the opposite flank the
275th Division was ordered from St. Nazaire by rail towards Bayeux
and a battle group of the 265th Division from Lorient by road to St.
Lo. But a request by the Seventh Army commander for the 77th
and 266th Divisions, on the north coast of Brittany, to be moved

“The Department of France in which the landings had taken place.

BUILD-UP IN BRITISH SECTOR 217

up was rejected by Rommel. They were to be alerted but the field-
marshal would not agree to their being moved for the time being* 61

In the British sector, as the morning tide fell, naval ‘frogmen’ and
engineers renewed their efforts to clear the beach obstacles which
were Causing so much trouble. Some idea of the strenuous nature of
their task may be gathered from the fact that in a three and a quarter
mile stretch of the assault beaches in Gold (i.e. Jig and King sectors)
there were found to be nearly two thousand five hundred obstacles,
embodying nearly nine hundred tons of steel, concrete or wood,
most of which had fused mines or shells attached to them*All these 62
obstacles—the larger ones having to be first systematically crushed
or broken by explosives—had to be dragged to one side. Similar
conditions were met on all other assault beaches. Yet by midnight all
sectors of the beaches in use had been cleared and craft were able to
land on the next tide with comparatively little damage or delay.

The risks and dangers braved by assault shipping before obstacles
had been removed have already been illustrated. By the end of the
day in the British sector 258 landing craft of various kinds had been
lost or disabled but over seventy-five thousand men, over six thousand
vehicles and over four thousand tons of stores had been landed* 63
Exact figures are not available, for inevitably some records are in-
complete and it is often not clear whether a particular landing was
made before or after midnight. A careful study of all available
evidence suggests that while the number of men landed approxi-
mated closely to the number planned, the number of vehicles
represented about fifty to sixty per cent and the weight of stores
about sixty to seventy-five per cent of the planned totals. The
vehicles landed included about nine hundred tanks and armoured
vehicles against a planned total of a thousand and fifty, for one
armoured regiment (the 24th Lancers) was not disembarked till the
following day. Some 240 field guns, about 80 light anti-aircraft guns
and approximately 280 anti-tank guns came ashore for the Second
Army during the day, and three machine-gun battalions with
Vickers guns and heavy (4:2-inch) mortars. The main deficiencies
were in medium artillery and heavy anti-aircraft guns.* 64

Considerable anxiety was caused by the knowledge that on both
British and American fronts operations were somewhat behind
schedule, particularly as it was thought that the boisterous weather
might get even worse during the next few days. The ultimate success
of Allied operatfons would clearly depend on the ability to build up
forces and supplies more quickly than the enemy could bring up
reinforcements to oppose them. For this the Navy bore the first
responsibility. With every increase in the number of troops landed,

218 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

the volume of stores, supplies and ammunition must match their
needs and good organisation must ensure that they were readily
available. Beach organisation was a most urgent task in which all
three Services were concerned. The landing of their advance parties
early in the morning has been noted (page 177). The naval task, to
direct all movements of shipping and craft in the assault area with
regard for the army’s operational requirements, involved the estab-
lishment of naval] control centres on shore and afloat.

While naval organisation for the control of incoming and out-
going shipping and craft (under the naval officers in charge with their
beachmasters and naval personnel) was being developed, army
organisation of the congested beaches gradually took shape. On each

INITIAL BEACH ORGANISATION — BRITISH SECTOR

104 Beach Sub-Area 102 Beach Sub-Area
(50 Div) (3 Cdn Div)

101 Beach Sub-Area
(3 Div)

36 Beach Brick 4 Beach Group 6 Beach Group
1 Bucks
(Reserve)

10 Beach Group 9g Beach Group 7 Beach Group 8 Beach Group 5, Beach Group
6 Border 2 Herts 8 Kings 5 R Berks 5 Kings
(231 Bde) (69 Bde) (7 Cdn Bde) (8 Cdn Bde) (8 Bde)

! ! | | :

’ i] i] e t

v t v v v
JIG KING MIKE NAN QUEEN

t——————-G OLD——#_s J UNO ———1 +—SWwWORD——1

of the assault beaches the basis of the army organisation at first was
the ‘beach group’, a loosely knit formation, eventually four to five
thousand strong, with which naval and air force units were associated.
Later on these groups were joined to form ‘beach sub areas’ for each
of the divisional areas in Gold, Juno and Sword. Each beach group
contained units of the Royal Engineers, Royal Army Service Corps,
the Royal Army Medical Corps and other specialist formations, and
a specially trained battalion of infantry whose commanding officer
was the beach group commander. The main task of the infantry
was to provide working parties for the specialist units concerned with
the unloading of stores and vehicles and clearance of beach defences
and wreckage, the salvage and recovery of ‘drowned’ or damaged
vehicles, the formation of dumps and depots, the development of
beach exits and lateral roads, the establishment of field dressing

BEACH ORGANISATION 219

stations, and the control and direction of traffic; but at first most of
the beach battalions (shown on the diagram opposite) were involved
in fighting to subdue enemy posts which had not been cleared when
the assault troops moved inland. In this fighting they had consider-
able casualties, including the commanding officer of one battalion,
and much of the day passed before they were free for other tasks.

But as time wore on the position steadily improved. By midday
shore exits were generally available, if not so many as had been in-
tended; lateral roads were being developed and traffic control was
working, though at times long blocks formed and held up movement;
field dressing stations were dealing with the wounded and the
confusion of the early morning was largely resolved.*

The Royal Air Force not only played its part in organising the
reception and distribution of its own stores and material for the con-
struction of the first airfields, but also provided for the control of the
balloon barrage to protect the shore and anchorage from enemy air-
craft. They too suffered casualties and loss of equipment while the
beaches were still under enemy fire.

The Air Force beach organisation consisted of a ‘beach squadron’
each for Gold, Juno and Sword, with a ‘beach flight’ for each sub-
sector, comprising sections dealing with landings, ammunition,
equipment, motor transport, fuel and provost duties. All their
advance units were under 83 Group, which was to be the first group
established in the bridgehead. Part of 83 Group Headquarters and
staff came ashore during the afternoon and an advance party began
setting up a group control centre; its ground control interception unit
for the control of night fighters was able to begin operating that night
though less progress was made than had been planned.*

During the day the shipping awaiting discharge had moved
further inshore to prearranged anchorages to save time in unloading
but the rough weather was interfering everywhere with the ferrying
of stores ashore from tank landing ships and coasters, and the un-
loading of landing craft and beached barges was also behind schedule.
Admiral Talbot who landed at Sword beach during the afternoon
arranged for naval working parties to go ashore next morning to help
in clearing the beaches.*

The convoys of Force L bringing the first follow-up formations—
the fighting echelons of the 7th Armoured Division and the 153rd
Brigade of the 51st (Highland) Division—were due to arrive from
the Thames in time to land on the second tide. They included a con-
voy of large personnel ships, the first big British ships to pass through
the Straits of Dover for four years. Enemy gun-fire from the French
coast had sunk a motor transport ship in the preceding convoy,
but, using radio counter-measures and smoke, the passenger ships
passed through without interference.

SEAWARD DEFENCE SYSTEM

ASSAULT AREA

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British — American Boundary

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DEFENCE OF THE ANCHORAGE 221

During the day Admiral Vian had visited each assault area and
his flagship Scylla had joined in the bombardment of targets in
_ Sword and Gold. At six o’clock in the evening he met his assault
force commanders off Juno to concert with them naval dispositions
for the coming night. The safety of the mass of shipping now lying
off the coast was the first consideration. It was improbable that
U-boats or warships could penetrate the area in view of the Allied
naval strength; the laying of mines by ships or aircraft seemed the
enemy’s more likely form of attack. To meet the threat of surface
attack in the British sector a cordon of minesweepers was anchored
at half-mile intervals about six miles from the shore, covering all
shipping near the beaches. Admiral Vian in Seylla anchored off
Sword near the eastern end of the line. Along the eastern flank the
line was extended shorewards into shallow water east of the Orne by
support landing craft, anchored two hundred yards apart, forming
what was known as the ‘Trout line*To seaward of the minesweepers
roving patrols of destroyers and motor torpedo-boats covered the
approach channel from the Spout, while inside the assault area lay
the Captain (Patrols) in a frigate under way, ready to reinforce any
threatened point. Assault force commanders were responsible for the
inner defence of the anchorages where auxiliary minesweepers were
anchored to observe the fall of any mines laid by aircraft. Smoke was
also used to screen shipping but this was discontinued as it obscured
observation.

In the American sector destroyers and patrol craft under way con-
tinued the British defence line to westward and motor torpedo-boats
patrolled the shallow water of the northern approaches to Utah; a
group of four destroyers under way inside the western end of the line
provided further protection.

The defence system, covered during the night by six squadrons of
Mosquitos and at dusk and dawn by British and American squad-
rons of day fighters, was successfully maintained throughout the
Neptune operation, though modified in detail as a result of experience.

Admiral Vian had returned to Sword area soon after ten o’clock
that evening and saw the fly-in of airborne reinforcements described
on page 204, as many of the gliders passed over the anchorage. It
was an impressive spectacle, but at 10.50 p.m. orders were given to
cover the anchorage with smoke in anticipation of an enemy air
attack. About half an hour later the attack began, just before the
arrival of the last re-supply mission by transport aircraft of 46 Group.
This was precisely the contingency Admiral Ramsay had foreseen
when, discussing the airborne plan, he had emphasised the danger of
routeing aircraft in proximity to naval forces at dusk or in darkness;
should a simultaneous enemy air attack develop their safety could
not be guaranteed though all anti-aircraft fire was forbidden.

222 D-DAY: ADVANCE INLAND

Admiral Vian saw a German bomber pass down the side of Scylla
at masthead height and a few minutes later two of our Dakotas flew
overhead at about a thousand feet* Anti-aircraft fire opened up on
the British aircraft from certain merchant and landing ships and
later from anti-aircraft batteries on shore—some of them British. In
all, five aircraft were lost and fourteen damaged and there was con-
siderable dispersion; only twenty tons of supplies out of a hundred
and sixteen they had brought were collected. With the original air-
borne attack some equipment had been brought in by gliders, and
twelve hundred containers had been dropped from parachute air-
craft; earlier in the evening of D-day further equipment had been
landed in gliders, and six hundred containers dropped by tug
aircraft. Much material had been lost, but the following supplies
and equipment had been received during the course of the day: over
a hundred thousand rounds of -303 ammunition; eleven hundred
3-inch mortar bombs; five hundred anti-tank mines; fifty-eight light
machine guns; ninety-seven wireless sets; eight 75-mm_ pack
howitzers; thirty-five 6-pounder guns and two 17-pounders; eight
light tanks and a hundred and fifty jeeps*

The British and Canadian casualties among troops landed from
the sea are believed to have been in the region of three thousand, of
whom about a third were Canadians. So far as can be ascertained
casualties to airborne troops by the end of the day were about six
hundred killed and wounded and about the same number missing;
in addition nearly a hundred glider pilots were killed, wounded or
missing. The total American casualties on this day in both airborne
and seaborne assaults amounted to approximately six thousand.*

Before leaving this account of a day which was ‘making History
change its tune’ some of the figures that have been quoted and a few
others may well be brought together.

Other

Personnel employed in British Allies
Warships : , 78,244 20,380 4,988
Landing ships, craft and t 32, 30,009

Naval shore and miscellaneous parties 1,700

112,824

Total, Allied navies 170,701
Allied merchant navies (estimate) 25,000

Grand Total 195,701

A full measure of success was due to the hundreds of thousands of
men and women in all three Services whose work in Great Britain
lay behind the day’s operations, and to the still greater number of

OMAHA

CHARLIE

THE AMERICAN ASSAULT AREA
Situation Midnight 6th June 1944

Ye 0 3

MILES

Main roads
Railways ; Double line, Single line, ===,

Assault areas; beaches OMAHA; EASY
Divisional HQ. x ; EK (Airborne)
Regiments 505 ; 914
Boundaries: Army; Corps —oO— 5; — + —
— troops are shown in red and German troops
in blue.

V Corps

Digitized by Google

SOME FIGURES FOR D-DAY 223

those in civil employment who had laboured unceasingly in ship-
yards and factories, in workshops and offices to prepare and equip
these forces. This cannot be shown by statistics.

In naval operations over a hundred and ninety thousand men
were engaged afloat on this first day. The above approximate
figures are based on Admiralty records and the reports of Force
Commanders which are not, however, always complete. *

In air operations during the night of June the 5th and on D-day,
Allied aircraft of all types had flown over fourteen thousand sorties.
For that huge total a hundred and twenty-seven aircraft had been
lost and sixty-three damaged.*

Of the Allied armies, over a hundred and thirty thousand men
were landed from the sea on D-day as nearly as can be calculated.
Their distribution along the Normandy shore was approximately
as follows: *

British Sector Gold 24,970 American Sector Utah 23,250
Juno 21,400 Omaha 34,250
Sword 28,845

Total British and Canadian 75,215 Total American 57,500

In addition, over twenty-three thousand airborne troops were
landed by the Allied air forces. The records are not complete but,
including glider pilots, their approximate numbers appear to have
been 7,900 British and 15,500 American® Thus in spite of the Atlan-
tic Wall over a hundred and fifty-six thousand men had been landed
in France during the first day of the campaign.

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER XI
CONSOLIDATING GAINS

enemy but the short hours of darkness gave little rest to the

commanders and their troops. Some, after a night of active
patrolling, would have to resume the advance at an early hour;
others, having laboured to straighten out affairs on the beaches,
must be ready to accept a flood of supplies and reinforcements as
soon as day broke. Those fortunate enough to snatch a few hours’
sleep were roused more than once by a few German aircraft which
dropped bombs or mines on the beaches or in the crowded anchor-
ages, and by the answering noise of anti-aircraft fire from ships and
shore* So far the German air forces had shown little desire to give
battle and had made only feeble attempts to hit the wonderful tar-
gets offered to them. Allied air forces, on the other hand, had had a
busy night. Air reconnaissance on D-day had reported that the 12th
SS Panzer Division was already on the march from near Rouen and
had noted that military trains were being loaded near Chartres and
Amiens, where two armoured divisions—Panzer Lehr and the 2nd
Panzer—were known to be, and south of the Loire where the 17th
SS Panzer Grenadier Division was* To delay the movement of
troops from these areas and from Brittany, Bomber Command
attacked in darkness rail and road junctions along an arc which
stretched from Paris to the base of the Cherbourg peninsula; they
flew over a thousand sorties that night, from which twelve aircraft
failed to return. Mosquitos and Mitchells of the Second Tactical Air
Force also dealt with roads which converged on the bridgehead,
creating choke points at key places such as Falaise and Villers-
Bocage, and attacking columns on the move.*

At dawn on the first day after the landings the Allied armies were
quickly on the move. Behind their forward troops were many enemy
pockets to be cleared and their D-day tasks had still to be com-
pleted. The Americans had to take Isigny and Carentan, join up
their two bridgeheads, and in the Cotentin thrust westwards across
the peninsula and isolate Cherbourg in preparation for its capture.
The British had to take Caen and Bayeux and establish their left
flank on the Dives, while on their right they would link up with the
American army at Port en Bessin. When General Montgomery saw
General Bradley and General Dempsey between six and eight o’clock
that morning he had no need to issue any fresh orders but only to
emphasise the urgency of these tasks. He added that the newly

Q 225

T= night of D-day passed without serious interference by the

226 CONSOLIDATING GAINS

arriving 51st Division might cut in behind Caen, moving east of
the river Orne*(Map at page 197.)

Except near Caen, where there is an area of hedgeless, big-field
cultivation, Normandy is close and broken country, thickly hedged
and heavily wooded, a land of hill and valley intersected by winding
roads and waterways—lovely to look at but difficult to fight in. Each
thrust forward was likely to leave ground on either hand still held by
a by-passed enemy. Progress in such country, if stoutly opposed, must
inevitably be slow, and with each advance clearance of the enemy
left behind must occupy many troops and many hours. There was as
yet nothing like a firm German front, nothing to show where the
enemy would make a firm stand; a small gain, here recorded in a
sentence, was often the result of a strenuous day’s fighting and many
casualties to those engaged. Our forces were as yet comparatively
thin on the ground and between the forward positions there were
still wide gaps. General Montgomery had impressed on his army
commanders the need to link up the initial bridgeheads as quickly
as possible, but while this was being done the Allies must retain the
initiative and must guard against any setbacks or reverses. It would
take time to ‘get the whole organisation sorted out and working
smoothly; while this was happening there was a danger of the enemy
catching us off-balance’.}

The next few days were indeed largely occupied in consondating
and strengthening the hold gained on D-day, but the initiative was
retained by pressure all across the front. Least progress was made on
the vulnerable left flank, for it was there that such armoured forma-
tions as the enemy had already available were concentrated to re-
strict, if not to eliminate, our bridgehead and to prevent nearer
approach to Caen. Sustained efforts were made to enlarge the small
bridgehead east of the Orne which had been won by airborne troops,
but casualties on D-day had reduced the strength of the six parachute
battalions to some two hundred men each, and though two of the
airlanding battalions had had very few casualties the third did not
arrive (by sea) till the afternoon of the 7th; the commandos of the 1st
Special Service Brigade had about four hundred men each. With
these small forces not much immediate progress could be looked for
in face of strong opposition.*

While the 3rd and 5th Parachute Brigades engaged in active
patrolling, in warding off enemy attacks and in strengthening the
defences of the main position covering the Ranville bridges, Royal
Engineers were already putting up the first of the 1,500 Bailey
bridges which they were to build for Twenty-First Army Group in this
campaign*¥To the north, commandos tried to extend the bridgehead

1B. L. Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic (1947), p. 50.

SECOND ARMY?S LEFT HOLDS 227

to Franceville Plage and along the coast, and to recapture the
Merville battery position which the enemy had again occupied. At
both places there was hard fighting but, though supported by the
cruisers Arethusa and Mauritius, the commandos were too weak to
achieve success and were eventually withdrawn to the positions
already held along the le Plein ridge* It was essential to deny the
enemy the advantage of observation which its high ground would
afford and there were not yet enough troops to do that and also to
extend the bridgehead to the coast. Meanwhile the 6th Airlanding
Brigade sought to enlarge the bridgehead southwards towards Caen.
The 1st Royal Ulster Rifles and the 2nd Oxfordshire and Bucking-
hamshire Light Infantry took and held Longueval and Hérouvillette
on the 7th, but after strenuous fighting they failed to wrest from
the enemy Ste. Honorine and Escoville on that day or in renewed
attacks two days later.*

By then the German Fifteenth Army had been made responsible
for all troops east of the Orne and the destruction of the British air-
borne bridgehead there had been made the task of LXXXI Corps.
Its troops comprised not only the 346th and 711th Divisions and
elements of the 716th Division but also a battle group from the
aist Panzer Division made up of infantry, tanks and assault guns*

Each day the Germans attacked at one point or another, but all
these attacks were beaten off with loss. The most serious was on the
oth when, after we had made a second unsuccessful attack on Ste.
Honorine, our positions around Ranville were heavily shelled and
mortared and, shortly afterwards, a two-pronged attack was made
by the battle group of the 21st Panzer Division. But when the left
prong, having by-passed Longueval, came out into the open,
devastatingly accurate, pre-arranged defensive fire of the 3rd Divi-
sion’s guns from across the Orne broke the back of the attack and
local sorties brought it to an end. The other prong had meanwhile
attacked Hérouvillette but there too it failed; the enemy got a foot-
hold in one company area but a counter-attack drove them out,
leaving forty dead and four tanks and armoured cars behind.*

In view of the strength of the opposition it was clear that the
bridgehead east of the Orne could not be enlarged without further
troops. The 51st (Highland) Division was being sent there and mean-
time the airborne division did well indeed to hold the ground
already won; nowhere had the enemy been able to dislodge them.
Behind their defence the engineers, often working under shell-fire and
frequently attacked by enemy aircraft,* were steadily strengthening

* A troop of the 3rd Division’s light anti-aircraft regiment brought down a number
of enemy planes which attacked the bridge site. In addition to the divisional and

light anti-aircraft regiments, eight anti-aircraft brigades with searchlights and
both: heavy and light guns were ede in G.H.Q. Troops. One brigade landed with

228 CONSOLIDATING GAINS

the life-line, by bridges over the river and canal, which joined their
bridgehead to the ground to the west of the Orne that had been won
by the rest of I Corps. They too were not yet strong enough to make
much headway against the enemy’s determination to hold Caen.

The immediate task of the 3rd Division was to seize the high
ground north of Caen, to close the gap on their right where the 21st
Panzer Division had pcos on D-day, and to link up there with
the 3rd Canadian Division*On the morning after D-day the 185th
Brigade renewed the attack on Lebisey. Though assisted by the fire
of three regiments of field guns and a cruiser, the attack was not
successful. North of Lebisey is open country through which the road
to Caen passes over a ridge crowned by Lebisey woods. The attack,
started by the 2nd Warwickshire early in the morning and re-
inforced later by the 1st Norfolk, continued all day. The Warwick-
shire penetrated for some distance into the thickly grown woods and
a few reached the outskirts of the village on the far side; but the
enemy held the main attack in the woods with machine guns, well
disposed in thick undergrowth, that were hard to reach, and when
darkness fell the troops still fighting there were withdrawn. They had
had heavy casualties, and while they reorganised in the next two days
the attack was not renewed*(I Corps orders issued before D-day had
recognised that if the enemy prevented our seizing Caen on the first
day it would be necessary to mask the city for three or four days till
the 51st Division and the 4th Armoured Brigade were available to
join in a general attack.)

The goth Brigade on the right had meanwhile occupied Périers sur
le Dan on the 7th and had unsuccessfully attacked Cambes, one of
the enemy’s strongest positions in this part of the front, but a junction
with the Canadians was made and two days later the 2nd Royal
Ulster Rifles and the East Riding Yeomanry again attacked. They
had to cross over a thousand yards of flat open land, shelled, mor-
tared and machine-gunned heavily, and they had nearly two hundred
casualties and lost four tanks, but after hard fighting they gained
their objective. Later in the evening the 1st King’s Own Scottish
Borderers joined them in making the new front secure at this im-
portant point. -

On the 7th the 3rd Canadian Division bore the brunt of a strong
counter-attack by the rath SS Panzer Division which had begun
moving up on D-day (page 206) and was the second armoured
division to be opposed to the British advance. *

each assault corps and two more followed during June. Closely linked to the naval and
air force commands in Normandy, these brigades were nsible for abe ote the
base area, the Mulberry harbour and, until relieved by the Ro yal Air Force R ent
in July, the British airfields. As June passed, with the enemy’s air attacks on a scale,
a number of heavy anti-aircraft regiments joined in the support of ground operations—a
practice which became general as the campaign pr :

ENEMY TANKS REPULSED IN CENTRE — 229

The Canadian gth Brigade led by the 27th Canadian Armoured
Regiment and The North Nova Scotia Highlanders, struck south-
wards down a by-road that leads through Villons les Buissons, Buron
and Authie to Carpiquet. Les Buissons was soon cleared and an
‘88’ and a six-barrelled mortar (the first seen) were accounted for;
Buron was taken, with another ‘88’, but as the Canadians pushed on
and entered Authie they were heavily shelled from St. Contest on
their left. Cambes at that time had not yet been taken by the British
grd Division and the left flank of the Canadian attack was therefore
exposed to the enemy holding Cambes, Galmanche and St. Contest;
supporting field artillery was out of range or on the move and calls
for naval fire were not getting through. In view of this it was decided
to halt the advance and make good a position to the north of Authie,
but as this move was in progress tanks of the 12th SS Panzer Division
broke in among them, overrunning some of their positions. The
27th Canadian Armoured Regiment became fully engaged and there
was a stern fight and many casualties on both sides as the Canadians
fell back on Buron. The German tanks pressed their attack till they
reached the outskirts of the village, but there a counter-attack beat
them off. Both sides had lost heavily, and when darkness fell the
Canadians were withdrawn to the higher ground at les Buissons;
Buron was left as a ‘no man’s land’ between the contestants*On the
west of the Mue stream the 7th Canadian Brigade had meanwhile
pushed southwards for about four miles and had occupied Putot en
Bessin and Bretteville l’Orgueilleuse and established outposts at la
Villeneuve and Norrey en Bessin, on either side of the railway and
south of the Caen-Bayeux road*

Before daylight on the 8th German patrols were active and there
were soon indications that an armoured counter-attack was immi-
nent. The outpost at Villeneuve was withdrawn and a first attempt
by enemy tanks to cross the railway was driven off, but thereafter
attacks on Putot and Bretteville developed and went on far into the
night. Tanks from a second battle-group of the 12th SS Panzer
Division got into Bretteville in the growing darkness. ‘Altogether
twenty-two Panthers circled about battalion headquarters [of The
Regina Rifle Regiment] and A Company’s position during the night
and it is hard to picture the confusion which existed. Contact with all
but D Company was lost. Fires and flares lit up the area, and the
enemy several times appeared to be convinced that the opposition
had ceased... .!*But the opposition had not ceased. The Regina
Rifles were still there and there they stayed despite several more
attacks, holding all their positions until relieved some days later.

About half past six on the morning of the 8th The Royal Winnipeg
Rifles drove off infantry and tanks from a battle group of the 26th
SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, a battalion of ‘Panther’ tanks and

230 CONSOLIDATING GAINS

some self-propelled guns which tried to cross the railway. With in-
creasing support of their guns and mortars, the enemy’s infiltration
between the Canadian positions became general; by early afternoon
all three of the Winnipeg’s forward companies were encircled and
short of ammunition and some of their positions were overrun. A
withdrawal was made on to the reserve company between Putot and
the Caen road and the village was shelled heavily. Then the Cana-
dians counter-attacked with the rst Battalion, The Canadian
Scottish Regiment and a squadron of tanks, supported by two field
regiments and some 4:2-inch mortars. Though costly, the attack was
successful. The railway crossing and the village were once more in
our hands.*

A strong counter-attack by I SS Panzer Corps (21st and 12th SS
Panzer Divisions) had been ordered for this day, to “drive the British
into the sea’, but the British and Canadian operations had forced the
enemy to commit his available forces in order to hold them; no
large scale counter-attack was now possible.

On XXX Corps front the 50th Division was the only division
landed on D-day and the following days were spent in consolidating
and expanding the ground they had won. Their 69th Brigade,
adjoining the Canadians, had made the deepest thrust on D-day by
reaching Coulombs and Brécy; on the 7th they advanced a further
three or four miles southwards and, crossing the high ground and the
Bayeux—Caen road at St. Leger, joined the Canadians near Bronay
and captured Ducy-Ste. Marguerite. A German radar station pro-
tected by concrete installations, minefields and wire was taken with
few casualties and about fifty prisoners. But enemy infantry and
tanks were still in the wooded country on the east bank of the Seulles
river when, on the 8th, the 8th Armoured Brigade moved down
through the front of the 69th Brigade to exploit southwards through
Audrieu and to capture the high ground above Villers-Bocage,
fifteen miles south of Bayeux.*

The advanced guard of the 8th Armoured Bngade Group,
mainly composed of the 50th Division’s 61st Reconnaissance Regi-
ment on the right and the 24th Lancers on the left, was hotly en-
gaged as soon as it neared the railway line near Loucelles and
Bronay, and the Lancers were involved with troops of the 12th SS
Panzer Division who at that time had temporarily driven the Cana-
dians out of Putot en Bessin. While this fight was in progress the
Nottinghamshire Yeomanry from the main body of the brigade made
a detour on the right and, outflanking the resistance at Loucelles,
forced its way across the railway and made a speedy run up to
Point 103, two miles beyond it. Anti-tank guns and machine guns
were brought up after dark and during the evening infantry of the
Dorset Regiment (detached from the 231st Brigade) and tanks of the

JUNCTION WITH AMERICANS 231

4th/7th Dragoon Guards cleared the opposition at Loucelles and
reached the Audrieu area but had to share the straggling village with
the enemy for the night. *

Early next morning (the 9th) Audrieu was cleared and the 8th
Durham Light Infantry were brought up from the 151st Brigade.
They reached Point 103 in the afternoon and about six o’clock,
following a preliminary bombardment, they advanced and took
Saint Pierre, a village on the right bank of the river Seulles, opposite
Tilly. It had been a costly attack but, with the assistance of tanks,
the infantry eventually cleared the place except for a bridge over the
river which remained in the enemy’s hands. There was thus a small
salient at this position with enemy forces building up on each side of
it. Tanks, frequently reported to be in the neighbouring woods in
the Seulles valley, were from the first elements of the Panzer Lehr
Division which was now coming into action—the third armoured
division opposing the British advance.*

While the 8th Armoured Brigade was thus fighting its way south-
wards towards Tilly sur Seulles the 151st Brigade had reached the
high ground astride the direct road from Bayeux to Tilly between
the Seulles and the Aure. The 56th Brigade on its right had taken
Bayeux (on the 7th) and, having occupied defensive positions block-
ing approaches to the city from Caumont and St. Lé6, captured
Sully on the Drome after a tough fight but were unable to take the
enemy’s main defences west of the river. In the coastal area the
231st Brigade had pushed westward taking the Longues battery
position with 120 prisoners. Empty shell cases showed that the Ger-
man guns had fired 115 rounds before they were finally silenced by
H.M.S. Ajax on D-day; two had been put out of action by naval
shells which passed through the embrasures and the whole area was
heavily cratered. *

Two miles further westward the 47th (Royal Marine) Commando
had begun a stiff fight for Port en Bessin early on the 7th. It lies in a
hollow between high cliffs on which commanding strong-points had
been constructed in positions which were difficult to reach. While
a damaged wireless set was being mended and supporting fire
arranged, fighting began in the narrow streets and packed houses of
the town. In the afternoon H.M.S. Emerald and three squadrons of
rocket-firing Typhoons attacked the overlooking strong-points and
first a post on the edge of the town and the positions on the west cliff
were taken. Then in the gathering dusk the Marines began to scale
the eastern heights and attack the stronger position on the cliff-top.
Fighting went on throughout the night and not until four o’clock on
the morning of the 8th was the position taken; the commander with
three hundred of his men surrendered. The capture of Port en
Bessin had cost the Marines heavy casualties but the harbour was

232 CONSOLIDATING GAINS

to prove of great value, and almost before it was safely in our hands
naval parties had been landed to survey its facilities* The 291st
Brigade had gone on to capture a strong position on the river Drome
near Port en Bessin on the 8th and had made first contact with
American troops fighting eastwards, but between there and Sully
the enemy still held the west bank of the river Drome in an effort to
prevent the link-up of the British and American bridgeheads.

The American V Corps had meanwhile steadily enlarged the
foothold gained in the assault on Omaha beach. There had indeed
been a complete metamorphosis of the position there in the first
forty-eight hours. At the end of D-day it had been still the most
tender spot in the Allied line; two days later the defence of the Ger-
man 352nd Infantry Division, which had opposed the landings at
Omaha so strongly, had been broken and the Omaha bridgehead
firmly established. The American 1st Division had pushed eastwards,
and as mentioned above by the evening of the 8th had made contact
with the British near Port en Bessin. Later that day they attacked
down the main road to Bayeux from Formigny. Reaching Ste. Anne
after dark, they had a violent and confused fight with German units
striving to keep open a way between Ste. Anne and the British on the
east bank of the Drome. During the night surviving elements of
the German 352nd Division and the formations attached to it
escaped southwards; its right flank had given way after losing
heavily. The Americans followed hard on their heels and during the
gth reached Agy four miles south-west of Bayeux on the road to St.
Lé. A serious gap was thus opening in the German defence. Al-
though the 352nd Division had avoided capture its left flank had
now gone too and the American 29th Division captured Isigny and
pushed southwards almost to the Carentan—Bayeux railway. Patrols
from Isigny had also made contact with troops of the ro1st Airborne
Division, the first junction of the American V Corps from Omaha
and their VII Corps from Utah*(Map facing page 248.)

After clearing-up operations on the 7th, VII Corps in the Coten-
tin had organised a stfong attack northwards in order to eliminate
batteries still firing on the Utah beaches and to widen the base for
a drive westwards. On the morning of the 8th the 82nd Airborne
and the 4th Infantry Divisions attacked abreast with the Quineville-
Montebourg ridge as their first objective. Aided by naval guns and
air support they made steady progress, and by the evening of the gth
had advanced four or five miles beyond Ste. Mére Eglise. A bridge-
head across the Merderet had also been formed by the evening and
was being exploited westwards, and contact had been made with the
isolated detachments of the 82nd Airborne Division, while an attack
on Carentan had been launched from two directions*Its capture was
most important, for it was there that the two American bridgeheads

GERMAN AIR FORCE INEFFECTIVE 233

were to be joined together. Thus everywhere the Allied gains on
D-day had been solidified and extended in spite of all that the
Germans could do. In these achievements guns of the Allied navies
had continued to support the armies’ operations with powerful long-
range fire and the Allied air forces to play their essential part; for
the moment only operations on land are being noted, but both the
other Services were also deeply involved in maritime operations in
the Channel, where the great volume of Allied shipping had to be
protected from surface, submarine and air attacks. These maritime
operations will be described later.

The immediate tasks of the air forces during these first few days
may be bracketed under three heads. First they had to maintain their
protection of the home base in England and the shipping areas,
assault beaches and bridgehead; secondly they had to prevent or
delay the enemy’s reinforcements and supplies from reaching the
battle ground and to deny their air forces the use of convenient air-
fields; thirdly they had to join in supporting the fighting troops in
prearranged attacks or, where called to help, in the course of the
battle. In fulfilling all these tasks they sought to destroy the German
aircraft wherever and whenever they were met. The importance of
fighter cover increased after the first few days as the German Third
Air Fleet’s aircraft were gradually reinforced and showed rather
more enterprise. Yet so effective was the Allies’ air activity that no-
where did the Luftwaffe’s attacks have any effect on the movements of
Allied troops, nowhere were Allied plans interfered with by enemy
air forces. How different was the effect of Allied air attack on the
enemy’s operations! But then how different was their strength and
their attitude, the scale of their operations and the objectives to
which they were matched. It has been shown (page 121) that the
German Third Air Fleet in France had 891 aircraft of all types when
the campaign opened. Only 497 of these were serviceable on D-day,
but no doubt they brought some more into operation in the days that
followed. Be that as it may, their return of daily losses shows that in
the first four days they lost 208 aircraft and had 105 damaged*After
a few days they began to receive some reinforcements and their
records show that in the first thirty days they flew on average be-
tween four and five hundred sorties a day; but a large proportion of
these were defensive patrols, well outside the battle area, attempting
to ward off the Allied attacks on communications which were so
seriously hampering the movement of reinforcements and supplies.
A contemporary German report says: ‘The policy of never operating
in strength in good weather against enemy bomber formations’ was
adopted; ‘there was no point in attacking four-engined formations
since the destruction of a single aircraft would make little difference
to the effect [of bombing] on targets’. They realised that Allied air

234 CONSOLIDATING GAINS

forces avoided combat on the way to their targets and sought to en-
gage German aircraft on their return flight. “The losses on these
occasions’, the report said, ‘were two to three aircraft out of every ten
sent up’ and ‘fighter losses on average worked out at three to one
in the enemy’s favour’.*

In these first few days the bombing of transportation targets was
concentrated on routes leading to the battle area. By day, bombers
and fighters of the American Eighth Air Force attacked such junc-
tions as Lisieux, Falaise, Flers, Argentan and Laigle astride the two
main rail and road routes from Paris, and in the Nantes—Rennes-—
Laval area routes running north from the Loire. The heavies were
supplemented by mediums of the Ninth Air Force attacking sub-
sidiary junctions between the two main areas. On top of all this came
the Bntish and American fighters and fighter-bombers ranging over
the roads and railways between the choke-points. The combined
effort was on an immense scale but the area was large, the country
was close and the routes many. It was not expected that all day-
movement could be stopped but the delaying effect was immediate
and considerable*The Panzer Lehr division was forced to move after
daylight on a very wide front, using five roads. Its commander,
Lieut-General F. Bayerlein, described the air attacks as ‘terrible’
and ‘incessant’; the road out of Vire, he said, was a “Jabo Renns-
trecke’ or ‘fighter-bomber race-course’. He estimated that over eighty
of his half-track vehicles, self-propelled guns and prime-movers
were destroyed*A battle group of the 275th Division, ordered by
train from St. Nazaire to Bayeux, took all D-day and most of the
night to assemble and load under the Allies’ air attacks, and not
till the morning of the 7th were its trains at last on the way. A few
miles from Avranches the first was attacked by medium bombers
and then by Thunderbolts and was destroyed with all its vehicles
and equipment, while the troops suffered heavy casualties. The
second train had meanwhile been halted by an attack which cut the
line short of Avranches. It, too, was then attacked and had to be
abandoned and the rest of the journey to the front had to be made
on foot.*

While attacks such as these went on at some distance from the
bridgehead there were many others closer in—for example on
traffic centres and batteries in the Cotentin, junctions between
Carentan and Bayeux, on Tilly sur Seulles and Villers-Bocage
opposite XXX Corps and on Mézidon in front of I Corps.

Supplementing the flow of information from the reports of return-
ing aircraft, the tactical and photographic reconnaissance squadrons
flew far and wide and fighters and fighter-bombers of the tactical air
forces were out daily on armed reconnaissance. They also answered
an increased number of support calls, and air spotting for naval

ALLIED AIRCRAFT DELAY ENEMY MOVES 235

gunfire was continuous. American squadrons dealt with targets such
as the Cotentin batteries, Montebourg, Carentan and St. Lé, while the
British Typhoons and Mustangs operated between Lisieux, Falaise
and Caen, or further south about Alencon and Vire* On the 8th the
hard-pressed Canadian brigade at Putot en Bessin and the airborne
troops east of the Orne were among the several British formations
which called for Typhoon attacks on the enemy opposing them.
There was a notable example of Anglo-American co-operation at
Omaha where Typhoons combined with fighter-bombers of the
Ninth Air Force to attack enemy positions at and east of Isigny
in response to calls from the 29th Division. On that day over one
thousand of the Eighth’s fighters had, as the Americans described it,

. a general beat up of railways outside the battle area .. .’ and

. . roamed a great area stretching from the south of Nantes to the
north-east of Paris, shooting up everything they saw moving’.*

Each night Bomber Command continued the air attack. On the
night of the 7th 330 heavies attacked key points on the Paris Ceinture
railway. It was moonlight and the bombing was made from a low
level. Twenty-eight aircraft were lost from the enemy’s flak defences
and night fighters but the results were rated ‘... a considerable
success’. At Juvisy, for example, every track was cut and the Seine
bridge was wrecked—a further blow to the passage of formations
from the north. Also that night another two hundred heavy bombers
bombed the Forét de Cerisy south-west of Bayeux where the Ameri-
can First Army believed there was a build-up of German armour.
Next night they sent over five hundred bombers to attack railways at
Alengon, Mayenne, Fougéres, Rennes, Pontaubault and the railway
tunnel at Saumur on the Loire. A special force from Bomber Com-
mand’s 5 Group attacked this with 12,000-lb bombs—‘Tallboys’
used in action for the first time. Eighteen Tallboys were aimed at the
tunnel’s southern end (previously marked by a salvo of flares from
Mosquitos), a direct hit was scored and the tunnel made unusable;
it had not been repaired when captured by the Americans two months
later. On the 8th the weather deteriorated and many places were
eventually obscured by cloud. Out of nearly 1,200 bombers des-
patched in the morning by the Eighth Air Force only 735 were able
to attack, and of 250 Ninth Air Force mediums all but thirty had to
be recalled.*

On the evening of the pth conditions improved slightly and
Bomber Command flew five hundred aircraft to Etampes, targets in
the Orléans gap, and airfields which the weather had prevented the
day bombers from attacking. Despite the thick cloud the bombing
was well concentrated, especially at the le Mans airfield. On each
night, too, light and medium bombers of the Second Tactical Air
Force patrolled the approaches to the battle area, attacking all

236 CONSOLIDATING GAINS

movements seen; but the enemy made good use of cover and camou-
flage and were quick to halt on the approach of an aircraft*

Though not so affected by weather as the bombers, the fighters
were forced to work at much lower heights and their losses from
ground weapons were increased appreciably. Covering the western
sector the Ninth’s protective patrols saw very few Germans, but the
Spitfire formations of the Second Tactical Air Force were more
fortunate, particularly near Caen and over the Sword beaches. On
the 8th Australian, New Zealand and Belgian squadrons made contact
with over thirty aircraft and shot down seven of them without loss*

Rommel’s opinion that massed armoured formations could not
operate successfully where an enemy had mastery of the air (page
120) was being abundantly justified and the effectiveness of the
Allies’ air policy is witnessed in all contemporary German records of
this period—especially in the official war diaries of the Commander-
in-Chief, West (von Rundstedt), Army Group B (Rommel), the
Seventh Army (General Dollmann), and those of subordinate com-
mands. Hitler was a long way off and at first could only reiterate
orders that the bridgeheads must at once be eliminated and the
Allies driven back into the sea. Von Rundstedt and Rommel, nearer
to the scene of action, were quick to realise the failure of this
prearranged strategy and how large a share Allied air forces were
taking in the frustration of German designs; for these presupposed
the ability to strike back in armoured strength while the enemy’s
foothold was still insecure, but in fact the Allied air attack on com-
munications was preventing any quick concentration of the necessary
troops.

The German commanders claimed that the delay in getting per-
mission from OKW (page 200) to counter-attack at once with three
armoured divisions—the 21st, 12th SS and Panzer Lehr Divisions
—had meant that only the 21st Panzer Division was able to attack
on D-day, and that its failure single-handed to secure any material
result had allowed the Allies to renew their advance on the 7th.
Certainly the delay was of advantage to the Allies. Yet it seems
very unlikely that either the 12th SS or the Panzer Lehr Division
could, in any case, have intervened in the battle on D-day seeing that
the former had to come from the south of Rouen (over seventy miles
away) and the latter from the south-west of Chartres (over one
hundred miles) and that both went by road under constant Allied
air attack and could not move quickly. It was the fact that the Ger-
man command were taken by surprise and that movement was
delayed by Allied air attack, as much as Hitler’s delay, which pre-
vented any concerted counter-attack by ISS Panzer Corps on D-day.
And when, on the 7th, the first elements of the 12th SS Panzer
Division reached the front, they had to be committed at once on the

VON RUNDSTEDT’S PLANS DISLOCATED 237

left of the 21st Panzer Division in order to stem the advance of the
Canadians at Authie. It was two days later before the first units of
Panzer Lehr Division, much delayed and damaged by air attacks en
route, began to arrive and were put straight into battle on the left of
the 12th SS Panzer Division in order to hold the attack of the
British XXX Corps near Tilly sur Seulles. Thus the British divisions
were given time to improve their position and maintain their
offensive. By the 1oth of June the already damaged armoured divi-
sions of the enemy were strung out across the British front, trying
precariously to hold their ground under pressure which gave them
no time to concentrate for a major counter-attack or make good
their losses.

While these steps were being taken to check the British advance
others were ordered against the Americans. It is not always possible
to discover from the records who initiated orders, for both von
Rundstedt and Rommel record them in the war diaries as if they
were their own; the point is not very important, however, for there is
little to suggest that now there was any difference of opinion between
them. Everything had to be done to ensure that the Allies did not get
a firm foothold.

Apart from the danger of the British landings in the east, the
American bridgehead at Utah and airborne landings in the Cotentin
together implied an attempt to cut off the peninsula and capture
Cherbourg. Early on the 7th, in agreement with von Rundstedt,
Rommel ordered two divisions to move at once to the west of the
Cotentin—the 77th Infantry Division from near St. Malo and (with
Hitler’s consent) the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division in OKW
reserve from south of the Loire*On the same day it was agreed that
the 3rd Parachute Division should also be moved up from Brittany;
all three divisions were to be under II Parachute Corps which in
turn would be subordinated to LX XXIV Corps*

The German capture of some American orders on the 7th con-
firmed von Rundstedt’s expectation that the American forces landed
at Omaha and Utah were to join up and the latter to thrust north
and take Cherbourg; the danger of ‘a new enemy land front’ was
apparent, and ‘our attempts to build a new defensive front between
Bayeux and the Vire ... are being severely impeded ...’ The
Allies were striving to delay arrival of II Parachute Corps and ‘our
troops without new reinforcements must be forced on to the defensive’*

Von Rundstedt now ordered three more armoured divisions to the
battle area, namely the 2nd Panzer and the Ist and 2nd SS Panzer
Divisions,* the 8th Werfer Brigade, and artillery units mobilised

® and Panzer Division was in Army Group B reserve near Amiens, but the 1st SS, in
OKW reserve and only movable with Hitler’s permission, was in Belgium, and the 2nd
SS, in Army Group G reserve, was near Toulouse.

238 CONSOLIDATING GAINS

from three named artillery schools. He also ordered the preparation
of two infantry divisions to relieve the armoured divisions already
committed and sent OKW a personally signed request for further
reinforcements. By the goth ‘the point of main effort’ was said to be
in the region of the Vire estuary and Carentan, where the flank of
352nd Division had been torn open by American attacks and orders
had been given for its withdrawal to a line covering St. L6. IT Para-
chute Corps was now directed towards Carentan, though its 77th
Infantry Division was to move up through the western side of the
Cotentin to Valognes for defence and counter-attack and placed
under command of LX XXIV Corps.*

There had been a further change of German commands. All
Seventh Army formations between the Orne and the Vire (I SS
Panzer Corps, 716th and 352nd Divisions) were put under General
Geyr von Schweppenburg of Panzer Group West whose head-
quarters, given an operational réle on D-day, had been transferred
to Army Group B and allotted to the Seventh Army. As it rnoved up
to the battle from Paris three-quarters of its wireless equipment was
destroyed by fighter-bomber attacks and it was not fully operational
till the 9th. The task of holding the Cotentin had been laid on General
Marcks commanding LXXXIV Corps, which had ITI Parachute
Corps coming up on its right*

But the Allied air forces had almost as much say in such move-
ments as the German commanders. Where were the divisions of the
II Parachute Corps on the evening of the 9th when the Seventh
Army was urging movement ‘with the greatest speed’? Although the
17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division had some reconnaissance ele-
ments within ten miles of Bayeux, one of its two grenadier regiments
was near Avranches and the other east of Laval. According to
Seventh Army the whereabouts of its tracked vehicles and other units
moving by train were ‘. . . not exactly established at this time...’
The bulk of the 77th Division was about Avranches with, it was
hoped, one battalion on ahead. The 3rd Parachute Division had
most of a battle group about ten miles east of Avranches, but two of
its parachute regiments were still well back in Brittany.*

It was claimed in the C-in-C West war diary that the transfer of
Allied reinforcements from the British Isles ‘which are near and
abundantly equipped is more rapid [by sea] than the movement of
our reserves by rail and road’, and the build-up of strength was
described as ‘a race in which conditions inevitably favour the enemy’*
To consider that travel by road and rail was now more difficult in
France than the crossing of a hundred miles of tempestuous sea,
subject to the danger of attack by aircraft, surface vessels and sub-
marines, was a pleasant compliment to the Allied air forces but a
landsman’s under-valuation of maritime power and naval skill.

MARITIME OPERATIONS 239

Moreover, the worsening weather was a greater handicap to the
Allies’ build-up than any German opposition, and the maintenance
of cross-Channel communication was only achieved by perpetual
vigilance and not without cost.

In the first week the effect of weather, shortage of craft and con-
sequent delay in turn-round, combined to hinder the progress of the
Allied build-up, which was falling considerably behind schedule; but
if we were not realising all that had been planned, either in that
regard or in the operations on land, the battle was going well for the
Allies and badly for the enemy. General Montgomery had been
quick to see that while, tactically, operations were not making the
progress aimed at, strategically the piecemeal absorption of German
armour on the left flank was to our advantage. On the other hand,
von Rundstedt and Rommel had already come to the hopeless con-
clusion that for successful counter-attack it was ‘important for the
Luftwaffe so to eliminate, at least temporarily, the activity of enemy
warships on the coast that the attack can be pressed through and
the main defensive line finally re-occupied’ and ‘to prevent enemy
bombers intervening at the central point of attack’*

The German war diaries for this period are indeed full of references
to the effect not only of air force attacks but also of naval gunfire in
land operations. Of the opening assault the Seventh Army recorded
that:

“Weapons sited in defensive field works had to be dug out before
use Owing to the preliminary bombardment by enemy warships.
Coastal defence guns were in most cases put out of action by
direct hits on emplacements.‘ Counter-attacks, successful every-
where at first, later suffered unusually high casualties in the
neighbourhood of the coast through enemy naval gunfire.’*

Five days later von Rundstedt was reporting to Hitler that ‘the guns
of most enemy warships have so powerful an effect on areas within
their range that any advance into the zone dominated by fire from
the sea is impossible . . . The ships keep constant watch on the coast
inland, up to the limit of the range of their guns.’*

During the first few days all types, from battleships to gun landing-
craft, helped to give fire support along the whole front; later, as the
fighting moved inland calls from the armies for naval support were
less frequent but an average of two battleships or monitors, from
four to ten cruisers and a few destroyers were held in readiness
in the British sector with corresponding provision on the American
front.

* This was an overstatement, but the main object of the Allies’ naval bombardment
was to silence the German batteries and undermine morale—and in that they certainly

240 CONSOLIDATING GAINS

The main concern of the Allied maritime forces was, however, to
ensure the safe conduct of reinforcements and supplies for the build-
up of the battle ashore. The German Naval Commander-in-Chief,
Admiral Krancke, with the meagre resources of his command, was
doing his best to interfere; but their few successes had no noticeable
effect on Allied operations in the Channel and, leaving for the
moment the story of the fighting in Normandy, it will be well to
trace the course of maritime operations during the first ten days of
the campaign.

From the table in Appendix ITT it can be seen that apart from five
destroyers in the Gironde and la Pallice (of which only three were
serviceable) the only offensive surface vessels at Krancke’s disposal on
D-day consisted of six torpedo-boats (five at le Havre and one at
Brest) and thirty-four motor torpedo or E-boats of which fifteen were
at Cherbourg and the rest at Boulogne, Ostend and Ijmuiden. The
other surface craft shown in the table—minesweepers, patrol boats,
artillery barges and tugs—were of little offensive value, though some
could be used for minelaying. There were also the thirty-five U-boats
of Group Landwirt that were ready for sea on D-day, and five of
Group Mitte in south Norway which had just cleared past Iceland
into the Atlantic and were ordered to the Channel area.

Early that morning (June the 6th) the three available destroyers
sailed northwards from the Gironde and all thirty-five U-boats of
the Landwirt that were ready were ordered out; the nine fitted with
schnorkel apparatus were to make for an area twenty-five miles south
of the Isle of Wight; seven without schnorkel were to operate off the
south coast of England between Start Point and the Scilly Isles; the
remaining nineteen were to form an off-shore screen across the Bay
of Biscay to guard against any further Allied landing there. The five
of Group Mitte that had cleared Iceland were told to make for
western France*The motor torpedo-boats waited for the cover of
darkness, for they could not risk movement in daylight in face of the
Allied sea and air strength. To get a clear picture of the German
naval effort, and of the Allies’ reply during these first weeks, it will
be well if the actions of destroyers, U-boats and motor torpedo-boats
are followed separately.

Two of the destroyers belonged to the German Z class of 2,600
tons with a speed of thirty-six to thirty-eight knots; each had eight
torpedo tubes and five 15-cm guns. The third was an ex-Dutch
destroyer of 1,600 tons with similar speed. All three were spotted by
reconnaissance aircraft as-they left the Gironde, and at once the roth
Destroyer Flotilla of the Plymouth Command was ordered from the
Hurd Deep patrol to a new position off Ushant in order to intercept
them. Beaufighters and Mosquitos of Coastal Command attacked
them twice on their passage northwards and damaged one before

DESTROYER AND U-BOAT ACTIONS 241

they put into Brest. They left Brest on the 8th with the torpedo-boat
there (one of the T class, with six torpedo tubes and a speed of
thirty-three knots).

The Allied flotilla of eight destroyers waiting for them, led by
H.M.S. Tartar, established contact by radar at 1.15 a.m. on the gth
and ten minutes later opened fire at a range of five thousand yards.
The Germans turned to fire torpedoes but the British pressed on,
throwing the enemy into confusion. The torpedo-boat and one
destroyer turned away southwards: they were pursued and damaged
by the Canadian destroyers Haida and Huron but escaped in the dark-
ness to Brest. Of the other two, one (the ex-Dutch destroyer) was hit
by the Zartar and stopped. The other, commanded by the German
leader, turned away northwards firing at the Tartar. Four of her
shells burst in rapid succession about the Tartar’s bridge, bringing
down her trellis foremast and radar gear and causing damage and
casualties. Tartar returned the fire and, though reduced in speed,
pursued the German with Ashanti in company; but sighting her
original opponent—the ex-Dutch destroyer—she sank her, the ship
blowing up with a ‘spectacular explosion’. Meanwhile the Hatda and
Huron returning from their pursuit of the Germans to Brest met the
German leader now also trying to reach harbour. Turning and twist-
ing she sought in vain to escape, but was hotly engaged and finally
driven ashore a burning wreck. What was left was destroyed later by
Allied bombers. The only German destroyer force in the West was
thus eliminated in the first three days, for the torpedo-boat and
destroyer that had got back to Brest never fought again; when, later,
American armies advanced into Brittany both were withdrawn to
la Pallice and eventually scuttled there*So much for the destroyers.
In such night-fighting between fast ships the need for quick decision
in a rapidly changing scene is vividly illustrated by this affair.

The sixteen U-boats ordered to the Channel made but slow pro-
gress, for naval forces and aircraft of 19 Group Coastal Command®
hunted them relentlessly as they worked their way northwards and
day by day their numbers were reduced. On the night of the 6th one
was sunk, on the 7th three, and on the gth and roth one was sunk
each day. Already by the evening of the roth, of the seven non-
schnorkel boats on these missions five had been sunk and two dam-
aged by air attack. An entry in the German war diary records that
‘on account of the large number of air attacks and the extensive
damage suffered, above all on U-boats without schnorkel, all
further sailing of these boats has been stopped for the present’*

Of the nine schnorkel boats striving to reach the ‘Spout’ one had
been sunk and two others damaged and forced to return to Brest. The

_§ Which included four Fleet Air Arm and three U.S. Navy squadrons. Four Fleet Air
Arm squadrons were also with 16 Group.
ai |

242 CONSOLIDATING GAINS

six remaining worked slowly northwards almost continuously sub-
merged—tactics which limited their movement and proved exhaust-
ing to their crews. When a week had elapsed one turned back with
defects, another entered St. Peterport, Guernsey, with empty
batteries, a third followed there next day and subsequently went back
to Brest. The fourth succeeded in sinking the frigate, H.M.S. Black-
wood, between Cherbourg and Portland but was herself so damaged
by counter-attack that she too made back to Brest; the fifth was sunk
by a Wellington bomber on the 18th. Only the sixth ever reached
her intended position south of the Isle of Wight where she arrived on
the 15th and only remained for three days, harried continuously by
Allied patrols. Her only success was the destruction of one tank land-
ing craft and, after having attacked but missed two battleships, she
withdrew and returned to Brest*

On the 15th the first of the five U-boats from Group Mitte had
reachcd the western entrance to the Channel. There she had an
early success by torpedoing the frigate H.M.S. Mourne of the 5th
Escort Group which blew up with heavy loss of life. The U-boat
succeeded in evading subsequent counter-attacks only to be sunk on
the 18th by the 14th Escort Group of destroyers (Fame, Inconstant and
Havelock)* Little had come of Admiral Dénitz’s U-boat offensive in
the first fortnight, but the U-boats had shown their fortitude and
devotion and were still far from being defeated.

Finally, the third form of naval attack, by fast motor torpedo-
boats, had also only very limited success. Responsibility for defence
of the main convoy routes from the Isle of Wight lay with the
Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth, on the west and the Commander-
in-Chief, Portsmouth, on the east while additional groups operated,
up Channel, under the command of the Vice-Admiral, Dover; their
forces deployed on the flank consisted of groups of motor torpedo
craft supported by destroyers and frigates. Each night the E-boats
tried to penetrate these covering forces and to reach the cross-
Channel convoy routes and the assault area. In most cases they were
detected, but these small go-ton boats with two torpedo tubes and a
37-inch gun had a speed of thirty-five to forty knots and, working in
darkness, it was almost inevitable that such fast-moving little craft
could sometimes elude the protecting forces, to make tip-and-run
attacks on shipping streaming across the Channel.

Each night the German 5th and gth E-boat flotillas from Cher-
bourg. and later others, which were transferred to le Havre from
ports further east, attempted to penetrate the defence. On the first
night they met with no success; some were intercepted by British
M.T.B.s, one group reached the Spout but was driven off by the
destroyer Hambledon, another group was forced into a German mine-
field off Cherbourg where two were sunk. On subsequent nights an

BOMBERS HIT NAVAL BASES 243

occasional minor success could be set against their own increasing
losses.

On the night of the 8th, a group of E-boats from le Havre reached
the Spout unobserved and attacked a convoy of seventeen landing
craft with only one motor launch in close escort. In the ensuing
mélée three landing craft were torpedoed. Two sank with some loss
of life; others and the motor launch were damaged by gun-fire before
the E-boats were driven off. In the darkness and confusion the con-
yoy had scattered and at daybreak the motor launch still guarding a
group of the craft found herself close to the French coast near Cap
d’Antifer. Fortunately they were hidden from enemy shore batteries
by morning mist and made their way safely to their destination in
Juno area. But in most cases E-boat attacks were beaten off by
destroyers or coastal forces before they reached the convoy routes.

The damage inflicted by E-boats in their nightly sorties was in-
significant when compared with the volume of Allied shipping that
was crossing the Channel daily and was certainly not enough to have
any effect on the Allies’ build-up in France. Losses from E-boats were
one motor torpedo-boat, two tank landing ships (American), three
small merchant ships, two landing craft and two tugs towing Mul-
berry components; in the same period six E-boats were sunk and
ten others damaged but in the next week their challenge was virtually
eliminated.

Air reconnaissance had revealed a quantity of ships and craft
in le Havre and at Admiral Ramsay’s request 346 aircraft of Bomber
Command made daylight attacks on the port twice in the late even-
ing of June the 14th. By a fortunate coincidence the Germans had
banned the use of anti-aircraft fire at that time to safeguard their
Own operations and the bombers struck with devastating effect.
Eleven E-boats were destroyed outright in their shelters and three
others seriously damaged; only one remained operational. And in the
harbour three of the five T class torpedo-boats, twenty minesweepers
and patrol boats and nineteen tugs were sunk and eight other craft,
including another T class torpedo-boat, were damaged. Admiral
Krancke described it as a ‘catastrophe’ and his war diary recorded:
‘it will hardly be possible to carry out the operations planned with
the remaining forces ... the naval situation in the Seine Bay has
completely altered since yesterday’s attack on le Havre’. That was
written on the 15th, but almost as it was written Bomber Command
did it again. On that evening 274 bombers struck at the shipping in
Boulogne harbour. They destroyed a depot ship and twenty-six
light craft, and damaged eight others as well as the floating dock
and harbour installations.*

244 CONSOLIDATING GAINS

In addition to the losses in U-boats which have already been told,
the German naval casualties in surface vessels inflicted by Allied
naval and air forces from the 6th to the 16th of June, inclusive,
according to the war diary of the German Group Command West,
were: *

Sunk Damaged

Destroyers . . : ‘ : ; 2 I
Torpedo-boats . : : : : 3 2
E-boats. 47 13
Minesweepers, patrol vessels and other

small craft. : . 826 29

This destruction was not achieved without cost to ourselves. During
the same eleven days 26 aircraft of Coastal Command were lost in
attacking U-boats or coastwise shipping, mostly from anti-aircraft
fire; in the attacks on le Havre and Boulogne Bomber Command lost
two bombers* Allied shipping losses at sea during this period, from
these and other causes, are summarised later, for a more serious
menace to shipping was the enemy’s nightly air attack in the assault
area, partly by bombs but mainly with mines. On every night save
one in the first half of June up to fifty or more low-flying aircraft,
often operating singly, attacked shipping in the anchorages of the
assault area. The bombing attacks achieved comparatively little.
The headquarters ship Bulolo was damaged by bombs on June the
7th, the frigate Lawford was sunk on the 8th, and the destroyer
Boadicea was sunk by a torpedo bomber on the 12th/13th while
escorting a convoy off Portland; in addition one landing craft and
two merchant ships were sunk by air attack in this period¥ Thus out
of the hundreds of ships at sea up to June 16th only five were des-
troyed by direct air attack. Air-mining, coupled with some mines
laid by surface craft, took a heavier toll of shipping.

Although a number were brought down by our own air forces,
defence in darkness against single, low-flying aircraft laying mines
was difficult, for a low cloud-base on most nights forced Allied night
fighters also to fly low, and the fact that radar efficiency was much
reduced in low altitudes increased the difficulty of identification.
The greatest danger was from the enemy’s two newly-introduced
types of mine. Both were actuated through the momentary reduction
of pressure on the sea bed when a ship passed over them in shallow
water. One defied all known methods of minesweeping and the
other could only be swept in favourable weather; in any case the
sweeping of a congested anchorage was very difficult. Fortunately
a mine fell on shore in Sword area and was recovered and the

vital parts were at once flown to England* Counter-measures were

* Included one depot ship and ninctcen tugs.

ALLIED LOSSES AT SEA 245

quickly evolved, and although no complete answer was found the
risk was reduced by drastically reducing the speed of all vessels moor-
ing in shallow water and by towing large ships when moving in the
anchorage. Up to June the 16th in the British sector losses from
mines were remarkably small, namely a motor gunboat, three land-
ing craft and the Trinity House vessel Alert, used as a buoy-laying
ship. In the American sector losses from mines in the same period
were much heavier for they included five destroyers and other
vessels, some of which were lost in the moored minefield off the east
coast of the Cotentin peninsula (as shown in the map facing page 136)
which was only located on D-day.

Apart from ships and craft lost on D-day in the original assault, the
Allied losses at sea owing to enemy action from the 7th to the 16th
of June are shown in the following table.

Allied Losses at Sea
7th Fune to 16th Fune inclusive

Cause

Warships |1M.T.B. | 2 Frigates | 4 Destroyers | 1 Destroyer
(3 U.S., 1 Frigate
cepers

Landing 3 L.S.T. 1 L.C.I. (L) | 21 L.C.
ous and & Lor.
Merchant 1 M.T.ship | 3 Coasting | 14
ships 1 Buoy layiw 1 Coasting tankers
essel tanker
TOTAL II 2 21 5 25 64

In the same period seven warships, seven merchant ships (includ-
ing two hospital carriers), the headquarters ship Bulolo and three
landing craft were damaged by enemy action, but in four cases the
damage was slight and the ships remained operational. In addition,
seven warships were damaged by grounding or collision.*

Against these losses should be set the fact that, not counting shipping
which arnved on D-day, up to midnight on June the 16th, 93 passenger
ships, 636 other merchant ships and 1,300 landing ships and craft
had crossed the Channel safely.*

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CHAPTER XII

EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

account of fighting ashore was interrupted on the evening of

June the gth. By then the Allied front was already a continu-
ous one from the east of the Orne to the Vire at Isigny and the
junction of the two American corps across the Vire estuary was
imminent. The American V Corps was now ordered to capture
Caumont and to secure a firm junction with Carentan, while on their
right VII Corps was to take Carentan and drive westwards in order
to cut the Cotentin peninsula and to isolate Cherbourg.

In the British sector the German armoured divisions’ strong
opposition to a direct advance on Caen decided General Mont-
gomery to outflank and encircle the position. On the east wing
I Corps would pass the 51st Division into the bridgehead east of the
Orne, from there to attack southwards towards Cagny, six miles
south-east of Caen; to the west XXX Corps would launch the 7th
Armoured Division southwards to Villers-Bocage and Noyers, and
then strike across the Odon to high ground above Evrecy. When
these positions had been reached the 1st Airborne Division, waiting
in England, would be flown in to close the gap between Cagny and
Evrecy, but though operations would start on the roth this final
stage would not be reached for some days.*

When General Montgomery made this plan known Air Marshal
Leigh-Mallory opposed the intended use of the 1st Airborne Division,
arguing that for various reasons it would not be landed in sufficiently
concentrated strength to fulfil General Montgomery’s intention¥As
however neither British corps attained its objective, and neither
Cagny nor the high ground above Evrecy was reached when these
operations were broken off, no opportunity to use the 1st Airborne
Division in fact arose.

Of the twin attacks that were designed to outflank Caen, the start
of the operation from the airborne division’s bridgehead east of the
Orne was delayed, for neither the 51st Division nor the 4th Armoured
Brigade, each of which was to attack southwards, had completed its
assembly there by the morning of the roth; the 51st Division’s 1 53rd
Brigade was to cross the Orne that evening and the new operation
should be developing by the 12th*Meanwhile fighting round the
airborne bridgehead continued.

The position of the opposed forces on the morning of the roth
is shown on the situation map overleaf. That morning the enemy

247

TT: describe the maritime operations of the first ten days, the

248 EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

renewed the attack on both sides of the Bréville gap. Commando
positions on the ridge north of Bréville were attacked early and a few
of the enemy succeeded in reaching Hauger and Anfreville villages,
but local counter-attacks ejected them and by early afternoon the
situation had been stabilised again* During the morning other
enemy attacks were made further south against the 3rd Parachute
Brigade’s positions near St. Céme and its chateau. In the late after-
noon these reached their climax with an assault by about a battalion
of infantry and some self-propelled guns, But the bombardment
officer (F.O.B.) was in wireless touch with H.M.S. Arethusa and
within fifteen minutes the cruiser’s 6-inch salvos were falling among
the enemy. The parachutists then went in with the bayonet and fin-
ally disposed of the Germans. A badly wounded unit commander of
their 346th Division, taken prisoner in the action, remarked that his
battalion had been virtually wiped out in the last twelve hours*

Meantime the enemy’s main attack was against Ranville. After
an hour’s heavy shelling and mortaring, about 9 a.m. the Germans
began to work across the old landing ground, making good use of the
cover afforded by the wrecked gliders after their supporting fire had
stopped. But the defenders held their fire till the enemy were only
fifty yards away and opening up with every rifle, machine gun and
mortar, broke up the attack. Some German troops took cover in the
adjacent woods but a counter-attack helped by tanks summoned
from across the river drove the Germans back towards Bréville,
leaving behind them a hundred prisoners and still more dead. The
German corps war diary admitted that the 2nd Battalion of their
858th Regiment had been reduced to a hundred men; another
battalion had been badly shaken and disorganised.*

Late in the evening the 51st Division’s 153rd Brigade crossed the
Orne but owing to the troublesome situation was held near Ranville
and only the 5th Black Watch was put under the 3rd Parachute
Brigade to capture Bréville on the 11th. A detachment of the para-
chutists meanwhile occupied the chateau of St. Céme so that it
would serve as the jumping-off place for the attack*

At 4.30 a.m. on the morning of the 11th, after a bombardment by
mortars and five field regiments, the Black Watch advanced from the
chateau but when the guns stopped the enemy quickly came to life
and inflicted severe casualties on the leading companies and others
preparing to follow; with the Germans bringing mortars, assault and
anti-aircraft guns into action, the Black Watch eventually withdrew
to the chateau having had about two hundred casualties in this their
first action in Normandy.*

Elsewhere east of the Orne the day had been quieter but there was
much probing and patrolling by both sides during the night and
the sound of tracked vehicles moving up to Bréville could be heard

'
a
,

/ |

JERSEY

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FIGHTING ON THE ORNE 249

plainly. From midday on the 12th shelling and mortaring of the
British positions continued and about three o’clock an enemy attack
was launched by the grd Battalion of the 858th Regiment supported
by a company of assault guns. A desperate fight ensued with the
Black Watch in and around the chateau and with the 9th Parachute
Battalion in the woods behind*Casualties were severe on both sides
but all our positions were held. As the Germans were reinforced by
odd companies and platoons from other regiments, the British
battalions were joined by tanks of the 13th/18th Hussars and a
company of the Canadian Parachute Battalion of the 3rd Parachute
Brigade. Attack and counter-attack went on until after nine o’clock,
at which time the German commander returned to his command
post at Bréville to collect what further troops he could. As he got
there the British began a heavy bombardment of the place.*

For the fighting had convinced General Gale that the Bréville gap,
the one hole in his otherwise intact perimeter, must be filled once and
for all, and reasoning that ‘after the extreme severity of the day’s
fighting [the enemy] would scarcely credit us with the ability to stage
a counter-attack, anyhow until the following day . . .’ he decided to
attack that night.

He had on hand only the 12th Parachute Battalion ‘sadly under
strength’, about sixty:men of the Independent Parachute Company
and a squadron of the 13th/18th Hussars. Preliminary bombardment
of the enemy’s Bréville position by the supporting artillery opened
at a quarter to ten (just when the German commander was trying to
collect his troops) and at ten o’clock the attack was launched through
the commando positions at Amfreville. From the first, the parachu-
tists had heavy casualties from the enemy’s defensive fire, the com-
manding officer of their battalion being killed and the commanders
of both the commando and airlanding brigades badly wounded.
Le Plein, Amfreville and Bréville were burning fiercely when the
attack went in with great dash, the tanks being well up in support.
Two enemy companies were overrun, Bréville church was quickly
reached and the whole village was in our hands before midnight.

The cost was grievously high. The parachute battalion, who had
started with only about 160 officers and men, had 141 casualties,
but the 3rd Battalion of the German 858th Regiment which had
borne the brunt of the day’s fighting could now only muster 146 of
the 564 men who had entered battle three days before.*

General Gale afterwards summed up the action in these words:

“There is a turning point in all battles. In the fight for the
Orne bridgehead the Battle of Bréville was that turning point.

Neither in the north nor in the south were we ever seriously
attacked again.’ !

1R. Gale, With the 6th Airborne Division in Normandy (1948), pp. 99-101.

250 EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

The day before, that is on June the 11th, the rest of the 51st
Division’s 153rd Brigade had secured Touffreville without difficulty
as flank protection for the projected attack southwards. The 152nd
Brigade, by then assembled near Ranville, was to advance on the
13th against Ste. Honorine, Cuverville and Démouville. That morn-
ing an advance from Longueval got a footing in the northern half
of Ste. Honorine but troops moving on Cuverville met a strong
counter-attack by the ‘Luck’ battlegroup of 21st Panzer Division.
Both the leading battalions became embroiled and after several
hours of severe fighting the brigade was withdrawn to Longueval
and the high ground south of Ranville. For the time being the
attempt to expand the bridgehead was discontinued.*

Meanwhile the complementary attack on the west of the British
front had begun on June the roth. General Montgomery’s intention
has already been indicated—to attack through Villers-Bocage and
Noyers and from there cross the Odon to seize the high ground above
Evrecy. Orders by XXX Corps for the opening phase of this opera-
tion gave as the immediate aim ‘to seize the ground in the area of
Hottot ... and the high ground east of Juvigny’—objectives which
were south and south-east of TillysurSeulles (map, page 256). The 7th
Armoured Division was to attack through the 50th Division’s front
between the Seulles and the Aure and to capture Hottot: the 8th
Armoured Brigade, at present in the salient east of the Seulles, would
then pass from the command of the 5oth to the 7th Armoured
Division to join it in the further attack southwards.? The junction with
the Canadians would still be held by the 69th Brigade, but the main
task of the 50th Division was to guard the right flank of the 7th
Armoured Division as far south as the Tilly-Balleroy road* Before
the operation began on June the roth the cruiser H.M.S. Orion fired
186 rounds on Lingévres. In all she fired over a thousand rounds
of 6-inch shell that day on key points ahead of the advance with a
relay of seven aircraft observing her fire. The naval long-range
support then and on the following day included the shelling of
Hottot at a range of 33,100 yards by H.M.S. Nelson’s 16-inch guns
and of other positions by the Netherlands gunboat Flores, who
increased range by ‘listing’ ship to elevate her guns.*

4 The 7th Armoured Division’s main tank was the Cromwell of 28 tons, which mounted
a 75-mm gun firing both H.E. and armour-piercing shot.

The main tank of the independent 8th Armoured Brigade was the Sherman of 32 tons
with the 75-mm gun.

In both cases the armoured ou a included Sherman ‘Firefly’ tanks, roughly in
the ratio of 1 to 4. These mounted a 17-pdr. gun but it was only provided with armour-
piercing shot at this time.

For reconnaissance work every armoured regiment had in addition ten Stuart (‘Honey’)
tanks of 14 tons with a 37-mm gun.

SLOW PROGRESS SOUTH OF BAYEUX 251

The Second Tactical Air Force (which included four naval fighter
squadrons) played a conspicuous part in co-operation with the naval
and army artillery. Close armed reconnaissance was maintained
over the battle front and for some fifteen miles or so further south,
searching places which the Army named where the enemy was
expected and flashing information and urgent calls to England where
sorties were held ready for prompt action.

But on June the roth it was the enemy who attacked first. Early
that morning after a sharp artillery and mortar bombardment of the
8th Armoured Brigade’s position at Saint Pierre, German troops,
making good use of the narrow lanes and deeply hedged orchards,
worked their way into several parts of the village and also attacked
the nearby positions round Point 103. By the stubborn resistance of
the infantry and the fire of tanks, artillery and warships, our main
positions were held and after the fighting died down Point 103 and
the northern half of Saint Pierre remained in our hands at the
end of the day. While our advance from this flank had been checked,
the main effort west of the Seulles had meanwhile made little
progress. * |

Taking the road from Bayeux to Tilly sur Seulles as its main axis
the 7th Armoured Division began its advance at half past six with
the 22nd Armoured Brigade in the lead. First contact was made by
the reconnaissance screen as it approached Bucéels, about two miles
north of Tilly. Then, by using an additional route a mile further to
the west, two armoured regiments were deployed across the front.
This hedge-bound bocage country was new to the ‘Desert Rats’ and
the enemy’s small infantry detachments, each with a tank or anti-
tank gun or two and a couple of ‘eighty-eights’ lurking in the back-
ground, were able to cause considerable delays by skilfully exploiting
the close country. Some, hidden in the hedgerows, tried to lob
grenades into the tanks’ turrets or to fix ‘sticky’ bombs on them as
they moved through the deep lanes. Fortunately the enemy bowled
a good proportion of ‘wides’ and their bombs were not lethal enough
to cause major damage, but it was clear that our tanks must have
infantry to work with them. The infantry brigade had however been
ordered to follow in rear of the armour and it was early evening
before they caught up and joined the battle. Then they cleared
Juaye Mondaye on the right and occupied the high ground beyond
it at Hill 112. On the left they dealt with snipers along the original
centre line and joined the tanks in mopping up Bucéels. During the
day there had been few casualties and only four tanks had been lost,
but no further progress was made. Major-General G. W. E. J.
Erskine, commanding the 7th Armoured Division, recognised that
progress had been slow; yet he reported that he ‘never felt serious

252 EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

difficulty in beating down enemy resistance ...’ He proposed to
continue the advance towards Villers-Bocage at first light on the 11th*

But no better progress was made on the 11th. The attack was re-
organised; two groups were formed with tanks and infantry in each
—the first, under command of 56th Infantry Brigade to renew the
attack on Tilly sur Seulles: the second, under the 22nd Armoured
Brigade to capture Lingévres on the Tilly to Balleroy road. At Tilly
the 56th fought their way into the middle of the town by the evening
but the tanks failed to make progress round the flank; the enemy still
held the main part of the town when it grew dark and the group was
withdrawn for the night to a nearby position on the north. The other
group had taken the wooded Verriéres country north of Lingévres
by the evening and its armour drew off to harbour for the night.
Shortly afterwards enemy tanks broke into the infantry positions
among the woods. They were eventually driven away but about
midnight, after a bombardment by guns and mortars, the enemy
launched a stronger attack with tanks, infantry and a self-propelled
flame-thrower. The 2nd Essex had about a hundred and fifty
casualties in the grim night-fighting that ensued but they lost no
ground and, by calling down artillery fire ‘almost on top of them-
selves’, they beat the Germans off.*

While the 7th Armoured Division had thus spent the day fighting
between the Seulles and the Aure the 50th Division was engaged in
the country on either flank. East of the Seulles the 69th Brigade had
sought to enlarge the salient which ran through Audrieu to Saint
Pierre. From le Haut d’Audrieu the 6th Green Howards and the
4th /7th Dragoon Guards had moved to attack Cristot, advancing in
waves of tanks followed by others of infantry, but the two got separ-
ated. Lying low in the hedgerows and ditches the enemy infantry
left the first wave of tanks to be dealt with by anti-tank guns in the
rear, and then came to life and held up the infantry. There was
severe and confused fighting and the attack made no more progress.
Nine Dragoon tanks pushed forward alone through the Cristot
orchards but one by one they were hit by guns which, for the most
part, they never saw. Only two got back when the attacking troops
were withdrawn to join the reserve holding high ground round Point
103. Following up, the Germans then tried to recapture that position,
tanks and infantry having worked round both flanks; but it was
firmly held and as night fell the enemy withdrew.*

While all this was happening the 3rd Canadian Division had been
involved on the 69th Brigade’s left. More than once the enemy had
infiltrated parties through the open flank along the Mue and the
position in front of Putot en Bessin and Bronay needed strengthening.
It had therefore been decided to carry out a limited offensive with
the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade to clear up the Mue valley

THRUSTS ASTRIDE THE SEULLES 253

thoroughly on the 11th and then, on the 12th, to push the front
southwards to higher ground at le Haut du Bosq and Grainville sur
Odon. Before the Mue clearance began, General Dempsey decided
to bring forward the armoured brigade’s whole operation to the
11th in order to relate it to that of the 69th Brigade which has
already been described above. Unfortunately orders did not reach
the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade and their associates The
Queen’s Own Rifles till the morning of the 11th. There was little
time for reconnaissance and not enough either to brief the troops
adequately or to plan artillery co-operation before the advance
started. In the result it was a costly failure.*

The 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment started with infantry
riding on their tanks and, passing through Norrey en Bessin in spite
of considerable shelling, they deployed in the open cornfields north
of le Mesnil Patry under machine-gun and mortar fire. The leading
squadron drove forward into le Mesnil Patry, getting well among the
enemy and doing considerable execution; but when they emerged
they found enemy tanks and anti-tank guns waiting for them in
position across their front and others opened fire on the Canadians
both from St. Mauvieu on their left front and Cristot on their right.
Touch with the leading squadron was lost and, seeing that his small
force was in danger of being surrounded, the regimental commander
ordered a withdrawal to the Caen road. The regiment had lost
thirty-seven tanks and the infantry ninety-six killed, wounded and
missing from the vanguard company alone. That night the 2nd
Canadian Armoured Brigade concentrated about three miles behind
the front. It was believed that thirteen enemy tanks (mostly Pan-
thers) had been destroyed.*

On the other flank of the 7th Armoured Division, west of the Aure,
the 50th Division had pushed southwards to the cross-roads at la
Belle Epine while American troops on their right, meeting little
opposition, advanced towards Caumont.

On the morning of the r2th XXX Corps (General Bucknall)
realised that Panzer Lehr’s obvious determination to hold firmly the
ground between the Seulles and the Aure made it unlikely that the
7th Armoured Division could achieve a rapid advance there. But
west of the Aure there seemed to be a ‘soft spot’ in the German defence
which should be exploited, for the Americans were nearing Caumont
without serious opposition. In fact, as is now known, the enforced
withdrawal of their 352nd Division on the night of the gth had left
a gap which the German commanders were finding it hard to fill
(page 238). XXX Corps accordingly decided (after consultation
with General Dempsey) that while the 50th Division continued the
battle for the existing front, the 7th Armoured Division would
side-step across the Aure and, outflanking the German front on the

254 EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

Tilly-Balleroy road, would push southwards to the Caumont neigh-
bourhood; turning then to their left they would seize the Villers-
Bocage ridge from the west. Their capture of this high ground
behind Panzer Lehr Division might compel its withdrawal or
surrender. *

Most of the 7th Armoured Division started that afternoon (the
12th) and since its own brigade of lorried infantry, the 131st, was
now available to move with it the 56th Brigade reverted to the 50th
Division. The move went well. Crossing the Aure the 7th Armoured
turned south and by ten o’clock that night the leading troops of its
22nd Armoured Brigade reached Livry, two miles from Caumont
and five from Villers-Bocage. In order to hide their intentions they
halted near Livry for the night while the leading units of the infantry
brigade closed up behind them.*

Early next morning—June the 13th—the 22nd Armoured Brigade
group wheeled to the left to seize the Villers-Bocage ridge. The
Sharpshooters (4th County of London Yeomanry) led with a com-
pany of the motor battalion, the Rifle Brigade. Behind this advanced
guard were the second armoured regiment (5th Royal Tanks) and
two infantry battalions of the 131st Brigade (1/5th and 1/7th
Battalions, The Queen’s Regiment). Squadrons of the divisional
reconnaissance regiment (8th Hussars) and the armoured car regi-
ment (11th Hussars), covering their flanks, met a number of enemy
tanks, but Villers-Bocage was reached without difficulty. A squadron
of the Sharpshooters with its regimental headquarters and a com-
pany of the Rifle Brigade drove through the town and out along
the wood-flanked road rising to Point 213 on the way to Caen.
While tanks went forward, the Rifle Brigade company and the rest
were halted behind the crest of the hill, when Tiger tanks swept
the column with fire from roadside woods and destroyed all its
vehicles. Meanwhile other enemy tanks and infantry covered the
eastern exit from the town and all attempts by the rest of the Sharp-
shooters to free the road and join their advanced guard failed. The
latter had found Point 213 held by a mixed force of tanks and
infantry. After a fight lasting for some hours the squadron was sur-
rounded and eventually overwhelmed. In all 25 tanks, 14 armoured
trucks and 14 Bren carriers had been lost in the engagement.*

Though the first troops had got through Villers-Bocage without
opposition German tanks and infantry had been in other parts of the
town. The 1/7th Queen’s were called up but only succeeded in
clearing the western half and meanwhile the road behind them
through Tracy-Bocage was under attack at several points. Moreover,
German prisoners taken were found to come from infantry of the
2nd Panzer Division, evidence that troops of another armoured
division were coming into action on their southern flank. When this

REPULSE AT VILLERS-BOCAGE 255

was realised General Erskine decided, with the corps commander’s
approval, to break off the fight for Villers-Bocage and to strengthen
his position on the high ground by Tracy-Bocage which was ‘to be
held at all cost’.*

Next day (the 14th) the 50th Division continued the battle for
Tilly sur Seulles and the road westwards through Lingévres and la
Senaudiére—on which the German hold had in fact been strength-
ened. First the Royal Air Force attacked all three places with bombs,
rockets and cannon from eleven squadrons of 83 and 84 Groups.
Then two brigades attacked on a four thousand yard front, sup-
ported by the divisional and corps artillery and by guns of the Royal
Navy and of the American V Corps on their right. Fighting con-
tinued all day. The 151st Brigade captured about half of Lingévres
village and on their right the 231st Brigade captured la Senaudiére.
But nowhere could they break the German front; the fact that seven
miles away to the south the 7th Armoured Division had thrust an
arm into the enemy’s side had not weakened his determination to
hold his forward positions. It was the British armoured division which
was ordered to draw back its outstretched arm that night, in order
to prepare for a stronger thrust in a few days’ time. By then a second
armoured brigade (the 33rd) which had been delayed in landing
would be able to join it.*

In reaching these decisions the divisional and corps commanders
were influenced by the knowledge that while the 7th Armoured
Division was outstretched deep in country held by the Panzer Lehr
Division, the 2nd Panzer Division was in turn coming into action
against it from the south* Until the 50th Division made headway
and the armoured division was strengthened by the addition of the
33rd Armoured Brigade, its precarious positions at Tracy-Bocage
and the near-by Amaye sur Seulles were only a liability.

All day enemy detachments of tanks and infantry had been test-
ing the armoured brigade’s defences, coming in from both sides of
the route to Tracy-Bocage, and strong joint infantry and tank
picquets had had to be put out to keep the road open. There were
signs that the enemy was assembling troops south of the British
positions and about eight o’clock in the evening attacks developed
against both Tracy-Bocage and Amaye sur Seulles. They were en-
gaged with every available weapon and great execution was done;
what probably settled the issue was the fire brought down by some-
thing like 160 British and American guns of various calibres. Here
are some extracts from an account written by one commanding
officer:

“The enemy had quite appreciable artillery and mortar sup-
port and his infantry were supported by some of his heaviest
tanks .. . but this time it was we who were sitting still and the

256 EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

German tanks who were moving and... quite a number of
them were brewed up . . . and after that the infantry rather lost
heart . . . the Horse Gunners firing air bursts at 400 or 500 yards
. .. really rather enjoyed their party. Then the Americans took
a hand... their S.P. 155s had been supporting us throughout
... We had an OP officer ...who certainly knew all the
answers. As the firing died down . . . there were quite a number
of German infantry in a certain wood to our right front. The
American OP then called for a special concentration on it. I
think its code name was ‘“‘Pandemonium”’: at all events. . . it
meant that every gun within range had to engage and it could
only be ordered by an American General. However, it came
down within about a minute and a half and it certainly was a
real “Spandemonium’’. Afterwards, two Germans who sur-
rendered said . . . in the wood they must have had some 800 or
goo casualties. Although this is no doubt a gross exaggeration it
will give you some idea of the sort of shoot it was. It may have
caused telegrams from Washington due to the colossal amount
of ammunition expended but it certainly put “‘finis’’ to any
further German attack .. .’*

The withdrawal of the 7th Armoured Division began half an hour
after midnight on the 14th/15th, covered by the noise of over three
hundred heavies of Bomber Command who dropped over 1,700 tons
on German concentration areas south and east of Villers-Bocage at
Aunay sur Odon and Evrecy, on the request of Second Army* While
this was in progress the enemy made no attempt to interfere and at
five in the morning of June the 15th the 7th Armoured Division
reported that it had disengaged* Pending the arrival of the 33rd
Armoured Brigade it was stationed between the 50th Division and
the Americans at Caumont.

If the results of the 7th Armoured Division’s first action in Nor-
mandy appear to be unimpressive it should be recognised that circum-
stances were much against it. It had gained its reputation in open
desert warfare; fighting in the close bocage country needed a very
different technique. This called for a trustworthy marriage of tanks
and infantry, but the tanks and infantry associated in the first two
days’ fighting were complete strangers to one another. With Panzer
Lehr still holding up the advance of 50th Division and with a second
armoured division coming up unexpectedly against them the 7th
Armoured Division could hardly have achieved full success. As it was,
the immediate result of these operations was disappointing.

Meanwhile, in the American sector progress had been made on
both sides of the Vire estuary. By nightfall on the roth the rst
Division of Lieut-General L. T. Gerow’s V Corps (the one nearest
to the British XXX Corps), had its right at Balleroy on the edge of
the Forét de Cerisy; the forest itself had been cleared by the 2nd

VILLERS BOCAGE

1 aA Q 1 2 3 4

Situation midnight lth June 1944 ed
Operations 12th June 1944 —————_>
2 Operations 13th/l4th June 1944 Cree
on sie Situation morning 15th June 1944. —_

Soe Roman numerals show Corps; others Divisions.
Oe, .
Port en Bessin Dakin
— Roh plete: Fes e eg. ve omeey
Arromanches

XXX i g seul
Yy
D> BAYEUX ae
y (Arriving)

4
Sg 4

VILLERS
BOCAGE

a ISS

Aunay sur Odon

Digitized by Google

VON RUNDSTEDT AND ROMMEL TROUBLED 257

Division and, on its right again, the 29th Division’s front ran north-
westwards to the neighbourhood of Isigny.

After the United States V Corps had passed through the Forét de
Cerisy on the roth it had proceeded to widen the salient so formed,
particularly in the direction of the British sector, and by the 12th,
when the 7th Armoured Division was on its way to its new axis,
General Gerow’s left was at the outskirts of Caumont. To the north-
west, the two American corps had been finally joined together early
on that day, when VII Corps completed the capture of Carentan.
There the German garrison had ‘. . . used up every scrap of ammuni-
tion .. .’ and a supply dropped by air was too little and too late to
save the situation. To deepen the front at this point, and generally
to face towards St. L6, the Americans now brought in XIX Corps
between the other two.*

In accordance with Montgomery’s directions Bradley intended to
hold Caumont firmly, in order to support Dempsey’s thrust to
Villers-Bocage, and to take St. L6 later. He did not wish to push V
Corps too hard for the time being; the introduction of a new corps
must involve a pause for regrouping and he was conscious that the
urgent and main task of his army at this stage was to cut the Cotentin
peninsula and capture Cherbourg.*

In pursuit of those objectives VII Corps at Utah had been having
much hard fighting, but by the evening of the 12th it was evident
that German opposition to the Merderet bridgehead was cracking
and a speedy advance westwards could be expected. Further north
Montebourg was still holding out but VII Corps was closing around
it and, with strong support from the naval guns, had secured a footing
on the Quineville ridge north-east of the town.

The Germans were indeed steadily losing the battle.

The bridgehead of their Anglo-American enemies had been con-
solidated and was progressively being extended; at Caen in the east,
between Bayeux and the Vire in the centre, and in the Cherbourg
peninsula on the west the Allies were seriously threatening to break
their defence. All their available reserves were being committed as
they arrived at the front but the dominance of Allied air power made
their movements slow and dangerous. The German air force was of
little help. ‘Out of the first twelve fighter-bomber attacks carried out
by serviceable aircraft ... only in two attacks did our aircraft
penetrate over the front line. During the other sorties the bombs had
to be released over our own territory so that our aircraft could take
up fighter combat.’#Their own air headquarters judged the ‘success’
of their fighter forces as ‘only negligible’. It was obvious to von
Rundstedt and Rommel that neither the German naval nor air forces
could effectively interfere with the Allies’ transfer of strength to
Normandy or in the battle that was being fought there. They could

258 EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

neither stop nor match the Allied build-up and could not bring to
the battle in Normandy the full German strength in the West; for
both commanders believed that a second landing in northern France
or Belgium was soon to come and that therefore the substantial forces
of the Fifteenth Army must be held in readiness to meet it.

On the 8th von Rundstedt had appealed urgently for reinforce-
ments, having already ordered the bringing up of three additional
armoured divisions and the preparation of two infantry divisions
to relieve the armoured formations that were being employed in
emergency to hold the British advance. On the 9th Rommel had
ordered ‘the absolute prevention’ of the loss of Cherbourg and
of the junction of the Allied bridgeheads ‘west of the Orne and
west of the Vire’. But on the following day von Rundstedt ordered
the destruction of all Cherbourg harbour installations that were
not indispensable for German naval operations, showing that in his
view its loss was only a matter of time. On the roth the Seventh
Army war diary recorded that ‘the German command’s calculations
are largely ruled out by the enemy’s control of the air’**On that
morning the Second Tactical Air Force had been asked to destroy
the headquarters of Panzer Group West, newly established near
Thury-Harcourt. That evening rocket-Typhoons of 83 Group and
Mitchell squadrons of 2 Group attacked heavily. The building was
not badly damaged but the orchard where vehicles were parked was
saturated and everything in it destroyed; seventeen officers, including
the Chief of Staff, were killed. What remained of the headquarters
went back to Paris to be reconstituted and I SS Panzer Corps took
over its duties*On the roth C-in-C West’s war diary records that
‘the Seventh Army is everywhere forced on the defensive’* and
next day von Rundstedt and Rommel met to discuss the very
serious position that was developing. They were in complete agree-
ment and decided that they would report independently to the
Fihrer.? It is unnecessary to quote both for there is no material
difference between them. They give similar appreciations of the
Allies’ intentions and of the German situation. “The formations of
Army Group B fighting in Normandy are forced on to the defensive
between the Orne and the Vire. Offensive operations cannot as yet
be conducted in this broad sector for lack of forces and because the
armoured divisions, with their striking power, had to be used for
defence. Any attacks launched would not succeed and would only
consume men and material.’ The further forces which were arriving
were to be used ‘for defence, so that a cohesive front is built up’. In
the Cotentin it was proposed to attack the Allies from the west and
from the north ‘in order to prevent a breakthrough to Cherbourg,

®Von Rundstedt’s report was sent to OKW on the 11th, Rommel’s a day later.

HITLER ORDERS COUNTER-ATTACKS 259

and to press these enemy forces back to the east and south’ but ‘it is
not yet possible to tell whether, if this succeeds, the enemy east of the
Vire can then be attacked ... with the forces thereby released’.
This is from von Rundstedt’s report; Rommel puts it more bluntly.
The proposed attack in the Cotentin is ‘to annihilate the enemy
there’ and ‘only when this has been accomplished can the enemy
between the Orne and the Vire be attacked’. Both emphasise the
necessity for infantry to relieve the armoured divisions now holding
the defensive front in order that the armour may be freed for offen-
sive action. And both describe four considerations which may delay
the realisation of their plans.

‘(a) The numerical superiority of the enemy air force is so great
that no major movement by day is possible. The rapid supply of
reinforcements, ammunition, and fuel is made almost impussible
by constant, heavy air attacks on nodal points of the road system,
inhabited places, bridges and railway stations . .. Movements
on the battlefield, and behind it when assembling for an attack,
necessary tactical transfers, etc., are immediately and severely
bombed from the air . . . From the long term point of view this
superiority of the enemy air forces will paralyse all movement
and control of the battle, and make it impossible to conduct
operations.

(6) The guns of most enemy warships have so powerful an effect
on areas within their range that any advance into this zone
dominated by fire from the sea is impossible . . .

(c) The material equipment of the Anglo-Americans . . . is far
superior to that of our infantry divisions operating here.

(d) The enemy can use his very strong parachute and airborne
troops in such numbers and with such weight and flexibility that
our troops suffer heavy losses, especially if the airborne troops are
dropped amongst or behind them... .’

‘I must point out that with this disparity in material a situation
might anse compelling us to take basic decisions. This would be the
case if the enemy perchance succeeded in achieving a real break
through southwards with strong armoured forces supported by his
far superior air force.’

Von Rundstedt added that the troops were fighting excellently,
‘spirit and morale are good, but the material superiority of the
Anglo-Americans must in the long run have its effect on any troops’.
Finally, both requested that their reports should be submitted to the
Fuhrer, von Rundstedt adding ‘verbatim’.*

Hitler’s reaction on the 11th of June was to order II SS Panzer
Corps (consisting of the gth and roth SS Panzer Divisions) to be
transferred to Normandy from the eastern front and to direct that

260 EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

‘the enemy bridgehead between the Orne and the Vire must be
attacked and destroyed piece by piece. As a first operation the enemy
will be annihilated east of the Orne in order to free 346 Infantry
Division’¥ The promise of the armoured reinforcements was welcome
news but it would be some time before they could arrive on the
western front. For the rest, the 346th Division had already suffered
so severely in failing to ‘annihilate’ any part of the British bridgehead
east of the Orne (pages 248 et seg. above) that Rommel now pro-
posed to withdraw the German defence in the north-east behind the
flooded river Dives and then to attack the bridgehead again from the
south with the 346th Division, the ‘Luck’ Group of the 21st Panzer
Division and the 7th Werfer (Mortar) Brigade. But Hitler would
have none of this* There was to be no withdrawal to the Dives and
no moving of the 346th Division to the south; his general orders
governed the battle in the Cotentin, and in Normandy there could
be no question of retiring to a new line of resistance. ‘Every man shall
fight and die where he stands.’*

On June the 15th another Hitler directive was received but, while
rehearsing the troop movements ordered or in progress, it contained
little that was new beyond the fact that replacements for infantry
divisions which were to relieve the armour in Normandy would
comé from Norway, Denmark and the Reich. They could not there-
fore arrive quickly. The directive showed no realisation of the urgent
need for immediate action. The strong armoured counter-attack
which alone would offer any hope of reducing the Allied lodgement
must apparently wait till I SS Panzer Corps was relieved by the
infantry divisions not yet available and until II SS Panzer Corps had
arrived from Russia. But meanwhile the situation grew more dan-
gerous hourly. The two field-marshals had tried to make this clear in
their recent reports to Hitler and from the first there had been much
daily telephoning by the leading staff officers of the two commands
in the West, reporting the growing seriousness of the position to
OKW. After receiving the unhelpful directive of the 15th von
Rundstedt now asked that Jodl or his deputy might be sent to his
headquarters for personal conference and subsequent report to the
Fuhrer*When Hitler was told of this, on the 16th, he decided that
he would himself fly to the West next day to discuss with von Rund-
stedt and Rommel the future conduct of operations.*

While the German commanders were greatly troubled by their
realisation of the way the battle was going, General Montgomery was
quite content. His general policy remained unchanged, namely: ‘to
increase and improve our own build-up through the beaches, to do
everything possible to hamper and delay the enemy build-up by air
action and other means’, and ‘to pull the Germans on to the British
Second Army and fight them there so that First U.S. Army can carry

AMERICANS ISOLATE CHERBOURG 261

out its task easier’* It is obvious that the greater the success of
this strategy the swifter must be the corresponding adjustments of
British tactics to the growth of enemy opposition. As already told
above, the unexpected appearance of the 2nd Panzer Division had
led to a pause in the 7th Armoured Division’s thrust through Villers-
Bocage towards Evrecy. Air reconnaissance had previously reported
heavy rail traffic towards Paris from the north which was believed
to be carrying the 1st SS Panzer Division from Belgium; it was not
thought that the 2nd Panzer Division in reserve for the Pas de Calais
sector would be released at this time because the German com-
manders still believed that a second Allied landing was imminent.
The division’s appearance in Normandy on June the 13th had there-
fore come as a surprise and General Montgomery had written to the
C.I.G.S. on June the 14th, ‘when 2nd Panzer Division suddenly
appeared in the Villers-Bocage-Caumont area it plugged the hole
through which I had broken’ and ‘I had to think again’ and be care-
ful ‘not to get off balance. . . . So long as Rommel uses his strategic
reserves to plug holes that is good’, but he (Montgomery) ‘had not
got sufficient strength to be offensive on both flanks of Second
Army’. He had therefore decided ‘to be defensive in the Caen sector
on the front of I Corps, but aggressively so’, and to use all the
offensive power of XXX Corps on the right of the Second Army. ‘I
shall hold strongly and fight offensively in the general area Caumont-—
Villers-Bocage, i.e. at the junction of the two Armies.’*

In the next few days I Corps did in fact beat off a further attack on
the Ranville bridgehead and keep the rest of 21st and 12th SS Panzer
Divisions pinned to their positions north and west of Caen by
vigorous patrolling and active artillery fire. They also captured the
fortified radar station at Douvres that had originally been by-passed,
taking some two hundred prisoners. In XXX Corps sector, mean-
while, the 49th Division in further stiff fighting re-took Saint Pierre
and captured Cristot from the 12th SS Panzer Division and, by the
19th, 50th Division finally drove the enemy out of Tilly sur Seulles
and pushed south to the outskirts of Hottot. On their right they
joined up with the 7th Armoured Division who held the general line
of the Aure as far south as Livry while gathering strength for a
renewal of the drive eastwards towards Evrecy; they were in touch
with the Americans now holding Caumont firmly.*

The United States First Army had meanwhile been concentrating
on the cutting of the Cotentin peninsula. While V and XIX Corps
strengthened their positions, VII Corps attacked westwards from the
Merderet bridgehead on the 14th. By the evening of the 16th they
had crossed the upper Douve and taken St. Sauveur le Vicomte and
late on the 17th their leading division reached the west coast and was
astride the western road to Cherbourg. VII Corps was now to turn

262 EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

north as the newly arrived VIII Corps moved in to guard its rear,
facing south between Carentan and the west coast.*

Rommel had foreseen the American attempt to break across the
Cotentin and to cut off Cherbourg. In his view two divisions were
sufficient for the defence of Cherbourg; all others were to concentrate
on preventing the break-through. If however the Americans suc-
ceeded, the troops cut off to the north should withdraw into the
fortress ‘In one movement’; other troops which had the necessary
transport should move southwards to avoid being locked up in
Cherbourg. On the morning of the 16th, however, Hitler intervened
to forbid any withdrawal towards Cherbourg; the existing front was
to be held at all costs. *

The situation map opposite shows the positions of the opposed
forces on the 17th of June (D + 11) and it is possible to make a
comparative estimate of their strength.

But the enemy formations shown must not be taken at their
nominal value, for while Allied losses in action had continuously been
made good the German losses had not. By the 18th of June they
had lost some 26,000 killed, wounded and missing, including a corps
commander, five divisional commanders and nearly fifty other ‘com-
manding officers’* Moreover, the reinforcing formations ordered for-
ward since the Allies had gained a foothold in France had, as
explained already, been reaching the front slowly and many of those
shown on the map were still very incomplete. During most of the first
week after D-day II Parachute Corps was struggling forward: one
of its divisions had a battle group near the Forét de Cerisy but the
rest of the division was still south of St. L6. The 17th SS Panzer
Grenadier Division (motorised infantry) had not arrived in time to
counter-attack on the 11th when the Americans captured Carentan,
because Allied bombers had prevented the prompt arrival of its
assault guns and it was short of petrol; when it did counter-attack on
the 13th the town was firmly held and the attack was decisively
thrown back. By the 17th of June the three infantry divisions
ordered forward, the 265th, 275th and 353rd, had each only one
battle group at the front. XLVII Panzer Corps headquarters had
been brought up to take command of the and Panzer and 2nd SS
Panzer Divisions; but the former was still short of its armoured
regiment and the latter had not yet arrived.*

The German Third Air Fleet had also received a small reinforce-
ment of about three hundred or so fighters and about a hundred
assorted bombers. Its work by night over the anchorages was
described in the last chapter and it also had a few lucky hits on
army ammunition dumps ashore; by day it could do little over the
battle area in face of the Allied air supremacy and the destruction
of its nearest airfields; but the fighter and anti-aircraft defences

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HARBOURS AND ALLIED BUILD-UP 263

near Paris caused considerable losses to Bomber Command and the

Eighth Air Force in their heavy bomber attacks in the Seine area*
Nothing that the enemy could do was able to interfere with the Allied

build-up. In those first ten days many of the early difficulties had

been surmounted and reinforcement in men and material was now

proceeding more smoothly. A fuller account of the build-up and of

the difficulties which had to be overcome will be given later.

The provision of artificially sheltered water off the assault beaches
had begun on D-day, when the movement of blockships and Mul-
berry harbour components had started. On the following day the
planting of the first blockships to form Gooseberry breakwaters
began, explosive charges being used to sink them on an even keel.
The three Gooseberries in the British sector were completed by the
10th and the two in the American sector a day later. The first
Phoenix concrete caissons had also sailed on D-day and had begun
arriving on the 8th. Much skill was needed to sink each unit correctly,
for the tidal stream ran at speeds of up to 2} knots and the rise and
fall of the tide was more than twenty feet. Caissons were equipped
with flooding valves but took up to half an hour to settle after flood-
ing began, and during that time tugs had to hold these huge con-
traptions in position in spite of wind and tide. The naval officer
controlling this operation, the ‘planter’, with working parties of sea-
men and soldiers, had a difficult task and the results on the whole
were most satisfactory. Within the harbour thus being created at
Arromanches the building of the Whale piers by Port Construction
Companies of the Royal Engineers had begun promptly and by the
14th the east pier had been completed; to seaward of the harbour the
Bombardons had also been laid.*

At most of the assault beaches one or two piers had been built of
American naval pontoons. These consisted of rectangular steel tanks
bolted together; in lengths of about 180 feet they could be carried at
sea slung to the sides of tank landing ships. In Juno there were two
piers each 700 feet long: at Omaha two of much greater length. On
these, troops and vehicles could be landed dry-shod. For the rest,
the sheltered water provided by Gooseberries greatly facilitated boat
work and the transfer of loads from ship to shore. On June the 7th
Admiral Ramsay ordered the drying-out on beaches of tank landing
ships (L.S.T.s) and suitable coasters. Though this greatly increased
the pace of landing vehicles, the delay by waiting for the tide to
refloat the ships contributed to the difficulties of maintaining a
punctual flow of sailings.

The two small harbours at Courseulles and Port en Bessin were
opened on the 12th and between them handled 15,000 tons in the
next week. Considerable strides had been made in organisation
ashore. Signal networks, signposting and reception arrangements

264 j§$§ EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

were working effectively and Lines of Communication headquarters
were relieving the assault corps of responsibility for the beaches and
ports, while two army roadheads had been established by the
Second Army through which forces ashore were being maintained*
Yet of course all was not perfect. In such huge and complicated
operations, involving three Services and having to face such difficult
conditions, it was inevitable that out of many thousands engaged
some should prove unequal to their job and that however carefully
things were planned some things should go wrong. Liaison between
responsible authorities at sea and on shore was not always effective
to prevent muddles and some serious delays, and there were times
when a volume of shipping lay at anchor off the coast though their
cargoes were urgently required on shore. In one instance, troops of
one division remained on board their anchored transports for two

- days after arrival though the division was anxiously awaited at the

front. And there were inevitable mistakes and mishaps which must
be allowed for*Yet in spite of all, in spite of bad weather, accidents
and personal failings, what had been accomplished by this date was
a magnificent achievement.

There is some doubt about the actual numbers of men, vehicles
and stores landed in the first three hectic days, for the records of the
Navy and the Army do not tally, but thereafter they agree sub-
stantially and the following figures are believed to be reasonably
accurate:**

Allied Landings 6th to 16th Fune, both inclusive

. Stores

Men Vekticles (tn long tons)
American . . . 278,000 88,000
British . . . . 279,000 48,000 95,000
ToTtaL. ... 557,000 81,000 183,000

These figures are impressive yet they alone do not tell the whole
story. Formations were coming in as planned, but on average at least
two days late. To that extent the Allies were forfeiting some of the
advantage gained from delays inflicted on the enemy’s build-up of
reinforcements. It is easy to see the effect of this in the recently
described operations designed to outflank Caen. If the infantry
brigade of the 7th Armoured Division, the 33rd Armoured Brigade
with its 150 tanks, and some at least of the 49th Infantry Division
had arrived two days earlier on their due dates, they could have

‘For the American figures, see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, vol. I,
pp. 416-421.

FLYING BOMBS START 265

taken part in the later phases of XXX Corps’ operations in the west;
Villers-Bocage and the high ground beyond it might well have been
captured and firmly held before the 2nd Panzer Division reached the
battle. With more satisfactory progress in the west, the intended
thrust east of the Caen canal need not have been scaled down so that
I Corps could hold part of the 51st Division and the 4th Armoured
Brigade in reserve; with both available, the attack in the east could
have been driven home before the 7th Werfer Brigade with its heavy
mortars had arrived to strengthen the enemy defence, and before
the ‘88’s of the III Flak Corps® had come up south and east of Caen
to baulk our progress. It seems possible indeed that Caen might have
been taken by now if our build-up of formations had kept to the
planned time-table.

With about seven days’ rations in hand there was no shortage of
food. The two British corps had petrol for 150 miles with them and
there was a fair reserve on shore behind them. Ammunition had been
rationed throughout Second Army but there is no evidence that, as
yet, it had been lacking in an emergency or insufficient for the
operations undertaken. *

With the capture of Caen still delayed and the unexpected arrival
of the 2nd Panzer Division, some of the British air commanders were
beginning to feel anxious about the future, and if territorial gains
were the only criteria of success the Second Army’s operations must
seem disappointing. But the critics were premature in expressing
their fear that the military situation ‘had the makings of a dangerous
crisis’ as Sir Arthur Tedder described it at the daily meeting of Allied
air commanders on June the 14th.*

It will be well to set beside this gloomy view a truer estimate of the
situation. The day after the triumphant success of the opening assault
General Montgomery had reported that General Dempsey, com-
manding the British Second Army, was to proceed relentlessly with
the original plan. He would hold a flank on the river Dives and
capture Caen and Bayeux; he would then pivot on Caen and swing
his right forward¥Bayeux had indeed been captured on June the 7th
and thereafter the advance of XXX Corps had made progress south-
wards in face of increasingly strong opposition. But after ten days’
fighting we did not yet ‘hold a flank on the river Dives’ and Caen
was still firmly held by the enemy; and although the ground won on
D-day by I Corps and the 6th Airborne Division had been consoli-
dated and was now firmly held it had not yet been substantially
expanded. To that extent the enemy had indeed been able to prevent
the immediate realisation of the original plan and General Mont-
gomery had been compelled to modify the method of its achievement.

5 See Appendix V, page 554, for detail.

266 EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

For the time being, as has been told, direct attack on Caen had been
discontinued and while, as he wrote, remaining ‘aggressively defen-
sive’ in the Caen sector he had decided to use his main offensive
strength on the west of the British front.*

The enemy’s success in holding Caen was indeed handicapping the
planned expansion of the British lodgement area. Nevertheless the
Second Army’s achievement and the general military situation ought
not to be measured chiefly by that fact. Only those who fail to
recognise that ‘whether operations will develop’ on the lines pre-
dicted before the campaign opened ‘must of course depend on our
own and the enemy situation’ (page 81) are likely to miss the most
significant result of this fortnight’s fighting—as some did at the time.
For General Montgomery had always foreseen that the ene:ny’s
strongest opposition might well be encountered on the eastern flank
of the Second Army and had planned to hold it there so as to
facilitate advance in the American sector. Taking a long view, he was
justified in feeling that Rommel was now playing his game. We had
established ‘a firm left wing’, even though it did not yet include Caen
or extend to the Dives; Rommel was putting his armoured divisions
into battle piecemeal and all that had arrived were being held on the
British front; and the American armies, with no armoured divisions
opposing them, were enlarging their lodgement area and proceeding
to isolate Cherbourg.

It is difficult to discern in this ‘the makings of a dangerous crisis’.

In the early hours of June the 13th four ‘flying bombs’ dropped in
England—one at Gravesend, one in Sussex, one in Bethnal Green
and one near Sevenoaks; four people were killed and nine injured.
The threatened attack with long-range weapons had begun, though
it had made a poor start. It was renewed on the 15th and by noon on
the 16th 244 flying bombs had been aimed at London. Up to mid-
night on the 16th 155 had been observed by the defence, 144 crossed
the coast and 73 reached London.®

It is not part of this history of operations on the Continent to
describe the attack on England by long-range weapons but it is
necessary to note that the Air Defence of Great Britain, under the
command of Air Marshal R. M. Hill, was part of Leigh-Mallory’s
responsibility; and that the counter-offensive (‘Crossbow’) against
flying-bomb and rocket sites and on the centres of their manufacture,
would absorb at times parts not only of the Second Tactical Air
Force but also of the Strategic Air Forces. At present the latter
were largely engaged in tactical collaboration with the Allied armies

® See Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, chap. XXIV (ii).

VIEWS OF OPPOSING COMMANDERS 267

but still liable for the strategic bombing of transportation targets,
German industrial towns, aircraft factories and oil installations. On
June the 18th, after a flying bomb had struck the Royal Military
Chapel at Wellington Barracks during morning service, killing 131
and seriously wounding 68 members of the congregation, General
Eisenhower ruled that for the time being Crossbow targets must take
precedence over ‘everything except the urgent requirements of the
battle’.

Ten days had passed since the Allies began landing in France and
itis worth pausing at this point to see what the opposed commanders
had been thinking as they watched the battle developing, and what
they were now foreseeing as its probable future course. There is no
need to speculate or to rely on post-war recollections for on both sides
there are contemporary records which reveal their minds. General
Montgomery wrote or telegraphed frequently either to General
Eisenhower, to his own Chief of Staff (de Guingand), or to the
C.1.G.S. (Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke) setting out his current
appreciation and his intentions for future action. He issued few
written orders to his army commanders but saw them almost daily to
keep touch with their operations, to make known his intentions and
to give them directions. And after these meetings he frequently issued
an aide mémotre of what had been decided. From his first association
with Overlord he had expressed confidence in its outcome and before
it was launched he had shown that he had a clear picture in his mind
of the general strategy he would employ and his tactical plans for the
opening phases. In these first ten days the enemy had been strong
enough to delay the full realization of his tactical aims yet he was
quite unperturbed about that and was indeed ‘well satisfied’ with the
way the battle was developing. He had said from the first that the
early capture of Caen was essential. His mind on that point had not
changed though ten days had passed and Caen was not yet captured:
he still regarded it as a necessary step towards the end he had in view
which was the defeat of the German armies in Normandy. But he was
content for its capture to be delayed if meanwhile the German
armoured divisions were being so fully required for its defence that
they were unable to gather strength for effective counter-attack.
Though few of the British operations he had ordered had so far
attained their named objectives yet he was none the less contented,
for most had made some progress and each had led to a further
frittering away of German armoured strength in the east while the
Allies enlarged their bridgehead in the west. The capture of Caen
was needed as a means of further expansion: the destruction of the
German Army was an end in itself. Watching the course of the

268 EXPANSION OF THE BRIDGEHEAD

battle General Montgomery’s attitude was consistently, almost
aggressively confident.

The attitude of the German commanders in Normandy was very
different. Before the landings began neither von Rundstedt nor
Rommel had been confident that an Allied invasion could be
defeated; after ten days they knew that they were fighting a losing
battle* For different reasons both had been dissatisfied with the
. original disposition of reserves: both now knew that the prearranged
plan of defence could not be realised. On their side everything had
gone amiss. Their Intelligence had failed to give effective warning of
the attack and they were taken by surprise. The concrete and steel of
the Atlantic Wall had crumbled away in a few hours. The counter-
attack that was to drive invaders back into the sea had not been
possible. The Luftwaffe had been able neither to silence the Allies’
naval guns nor to ward off their air forces’ devastating attacks. And
though the German armies were fighting stoutly they had not been
able to prevent the consolidation and expansion of the Allies’ lodge-
ment: at best they had slowed the pace of advance only by using
their precious armour in a defensive réle. As von Rundstedt and
Rommel went to meet Hitler on June the 17th they knew that they
were out-matched at sea, on land and in the air.

They met him at Margival near Soissons, in a concrete bunker
built in 1940 to serve as his headquarters for the invasion of Britain.
With Hitler was Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW; with
von Rundstedt and Rommel were their chiefs of staff, General
Blumentritt and General Speidel, and there were some subordin-
ate officers. Nothing new came of the meeting—no recognition
of the fact that the growing Allied forces could not for long be
contained in the existing bridgehead; no relaxation of the orders to
hold everything everywhere; no thought of strategic withdrawal; no
permission for even tactical withdrawals; no greater discretion for
commanders-in-chief (even the proposed movement of an infantry
division from one point to another was countermanded); and no
new strategy. When the necessary reinforcements arrived and the
armoured divisions holding the front had been relieved by infantry
there would be a strong armoured counter-attack which was to make
a break between the Allies and drive them back to the sea. Till then
all existing positions were to be held. Hitler’s preoccupation with the
effects of the V-weapon attack on England and of new mines to be
dropped at sea occupied much time. The naval representative left
the meeting hurriedly at about twelve o’clock and sent a teleprinter
message to Admiral Dénitz, the German Naval Commander-in-
Chief, reporting that the Fuhrer considered the only possible way to
ease the situation on land was to eliminate or neutralise the enemy’s
naval forces, particularly his battleships. What Donitz thought of this

A FRUITLESS VISIT FROM HITLER 269

is not on record and there is no contemporary record of what von

Rundstedt and Rommel thought. What Rommel’s chief of staff

thought in retrospect is told in statements he made to the Allies while

in Captivity and subsequently reproduced in his book. In con-

temporary records of the meeting there is no hint of the strong words

and tense atmosphere which Speidel described, nor of the field-

marshals’ request for freedom to conduct future operations without

being tied to a static defence of all France and with no liberty of
movement. Whether or not Speidel’s post-war recollections are

accurate, the negative outcome of the meeting is as clear in his

version as in contemporary accounts. Talk of V-weapons and new

mines could not have done much to make von Rundstedt and

Rommel more confident of victory in the battles they were fighting.*
‘The discussion’, as von Rundstedt wrote after the war, ‘had had no

success. “Confidence is a great battlewinner. In this battle all the

confidence was on our side.

Digitized by Google

CHAPTER XIII

THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND
CHERBOURG

Canadian forces in Normandy on June the 16th. He had

crossed in the Arethusa and was accompanied by Admiral
Ramsay, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham (First Sea Lord), Air
Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal (Chief of the Air Staff) and Major-
General R. E. Laycock (Chief of Combined Operations Head-
quarters). The King landed on Juno beach where he was met by
General Montgomery. His visit was greatly appreciated.

On June the 18th General Montgomery issued a new directive.
In it he first summarised the results of the past twelve days’ fighting.
The Allies had gained a good lodgement area and, by keeping the
initiative, had got the enemy into an awkward predicament.
Rommel’s mobile reserves were being exhausted, for he had been
forced to use them to plug holes and all their local counter-attacks
had been beaten off; he still lacked good infantry to relieve his
armoured divisions so that they could be grouped for a full-blooded
counter-offensive. “We must now capture Caen and Cherbourg as
the first step in the full development of our plans.’

Accordingly the British Second Army was ordered to launch a new
version of the pincer attack on either side of Caen, in order to
establish a strong force on the high ground north-east of the Brette-
ville sur Laize area and so dominate the exits from Caen to the
south; the First United States Army was meanwhile to press on with
the capture of Cherbourg and also, without waiting for it to fall, to
push southwards. *

It was originally intended to launch the main British attack on
the extreme left but subsequently decided that in the small bridge-
head on the east of the Orne there was not enough room to mount a
strong attack; the left arm of the British pincer would again therefore
only undertake a minor operation in the first instance to extend the
bridgehead southwards; the main attack would be made by the right
arm, its final objective being the named country south of Caen. This
main attack was to be made by the now-landing VIII Corps with a
supporting operation by XXX Corps, and was to begin on June
the 22nd.*

But while it was being prepared bad weather intervened. Ever
since D-day the weather had caused anxiety. Fresh to strong winds,

271

H: Majesty Kino GEorGE VI visited the British and

272 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

bad visibility and troubled seas had continuously affected the rate of
unloading and had limited air activity. The erection of Mulberry
harbours was making good progress. By the 16th the breakwaters
were about half completed; two pierheads were available for traffic
in the British Mulberry and one in the American. But the despatch
of piers and roadways had been delayed by the weather and five
tows of Whale roadway and two Phoenix caissons had been lost at
sea. On June the 17th there were renewed signs of deterioration in
the weather, but on the 18th the day was more promising and the
twenty-four tows of Whale roadway which had been held back (each
480 feet long) set out to cross the Channel*They were well on their
way when, in the early hours of the 1gth, an unexpected strong wind
sprang up from the north, increasing the difficulties of these ungainly
tows and making it almost impossible to work small craft in the
assault area. Rapidly increasing as it veered to the north-east the
wind was blowing at over thirty knots by the afternoon, raising
waves of six to eight feet. The storm continued to rage for three days,
with winds increasing at times to gale force; no such June storm had
been known in the Channel for over forty years*

A raging gale on a lee shore is a seaman’s nightmare. Ships and
craft crowded into the shelter of the Gooseberry breakwaters and the
Mulberry harbours but there was not enough room for them all.
As huge waves broke in the shallow water off the land, ground tackle
of heavier landing craft did not always hold and numbers were
driven ashore; there, pounded by the surf, many broke their backs or
were badly damaged. Rhino ferries were swept high up the beaches,
reducing to matchwood small craft in their path. The shuttle service
from England was suspended but craft which had already left for
France when the storm arose arrived in the assault area to add to
the congestion and increase the number that met with disaster. The
tows of Whale equipment—in all some two and a half miles of
articulated steel roadway—which were crossing the Channel when
the storm broke, were almost all lost at sea or, reaching the coast
when the storm was at its height, were sunk or cast ashore and
wrecked. When at last, on June the 22nd, the storm abated the whole
invasion coast was strewn with wreckage. About eight hundred craft
of all types were stranded, most of them heavily damaged and many
entirely destroyed; on some beaches wrecked craft were piled on one
another in dreadful confusion*

Yet absolute disaster had been averted by the ‘improvised sheltered
water’ which the Cossac ‘Outline Plan’ had regarded as essential for
the invasion’s success. Within the protection of the Gooseberry break-
waters and the uncompleted Mulberry harbours many hundreds of
ships and craft rode out the storm in safety, and unloading never
wholly ceased. Off the Juno beaches the Gooseberry breakwaters

A STORM DELAYS BUILD-UP 273

survived the ordeal virtually intact and eighteen L.S.T.s were cleared
during the storm; but off Sword the Gooseberry had been sited to
meet winds from the north-west and so gave only limited protection.
At Arromanches, where the Gooseberry breakwater was strengthened
and extended by Phoenix caissons to form the embracing arms of the
Mulberry harbour, and where the Calvados shoal to windward of
the anchorage gave some additional protection from the heaviest
seas, the breakwaters withstood the storm well. The main breakwater
held, with its blockships and caissons more or less intact though the
safety margin was extremely fine; in the western arm, though less
exposed, six caissons disintegrated, leaving gaps. Damage to existing
piers and pierheads was considerable but not disastrous, and was
mostly caused when landing craft out of control were driven against
them. But the floating breakwater of Bombardons, turther to sea-
ward, was virtually destroyed. Many of its component units broke
from their moorings and were driven ashore to the west of the
harbour and those that remained at their moorings swung head on
to the wind. Whether or not the loose Bombardons driving shore-
wards damaged the western arm of the harbour is a matter of dispute.
Despite misfortunes the harbour at Arromanches successfully gave
shelter to some 500 landing craft and other vessels and some unload-
ing continued without intermission. Without its protection the losses
of small craft might well have been crippling to future operations*

The American sector suffered much more severely. In the Goose-
berry breakwater off Utah, squarely opposed to the full force of the
gale, a number of blockships broke up, opening gaps to the raging
seas; by the evening of the 21st the breakwater had lost nearly all its
protective value. But it was in the Mulberry harbour at St. Laurent
(off the Omaha beaches) that the devastation was grceatcst. Partly
because of the pattern in which the blockships and Phocnix caissons
had been laid and partly on account of physical conditions which
differed from those off Arromanches a great weight of driven water
overwhelmed the breakwaters. Many of the blockships scttled in the
sands owing to the tidal scour and two broke their backs as the hcavy
seas pounded them: out of thirty-five Phoenix caissons in position
when the storm broke only about ten were intact when it subsided.
Inside the harbour the two piers which had been complcted were
wrecked as landing craft were driven down on them. Many of the
seaward Bombardons came adrift and, again, expert opinion differed
as to whether Bombardons driving ashore increased the disintegra-
tion of the harbour.*

In both British and American sectors the scenes of destruction
were truly appalling and although the work of clearance and
recovery was begun at once with great energy, some days would be
needed to learn the full extent of the damage and longer still to

274 THE STORM, °EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

overcome it. For the time being therefore it may be well to leave the
coast and to see what effect the storm had had on the conduct of the
Allied campaign ashore.

In the first place it had seriously interfered with the planned
build-up of the Allied strength in Normandy. This can be seen easily
in the following figures which show the daily average of men,
vehicles and stores that had been landed in the four days which had
preceded the storm, and the daily average landed while the storm
lasted.

. Stores (tons)

Daily average
landed

15,774 | 18,938 | 2,965 2,929 | 10,666 | 14,308
3,982 5,865 1,375 1,051 4,286 3,064

June 15th to 18th
June rgth to 22nd

In the four days affected by the storm the Americans had planned
to bring one additional regiment and other troops needed to com-
plete formations already ashore; but in the British Second Army,
already two brigades behind schedule when the storm broke on
June the 19th, the deficiency had increased to three divisions when it
abated on the 22nd.!*

Secondly, the British attack had had to be postponed. The limited
attack east of the Orne was now to start on June the 23rd and the
major, right-hand thrust on the 25th*In the third place, the storm
had given the enemy four days’ grace in which to strengthen his
defences and move up additional troops in so far as they could escape
the delaying effect of Allied air operations. The armour of the and
Panzer Division joined the infantry of the division who had come
into the line west of Villers-Bocage over a week before; the 353rd
Division arrived on the Cotentin front to oppose the American
advance on the west; a battle group of 266th Division and a heavy
anti-tank battalion reached the area of operations west of the Vire
and also the remaining units of the 3rd Parachute Division (which
had begun moving up from Brittany on the 13th); a mortar brigade
and a battery of artillery reached II Parachute Corps area; the
arrival of LXX XVI Corps’ headquarters to the east of the Orne
was completed and one medium battery and three troops of heavies
had arrived in the corps area.*

The purpose of the limited British attack on the extreme left was
to capture Ste. Honorine la Chardonnerette on the east bank of the
Orne. It was to be made by the 152nd Brigade of the 51st Division

1¥For the American figures, see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, vol. I,
pp. 416-421, tables 7, 8 and g.

SCOPE OF NEXT OPERATION 275

and was opened before daybreak on June the 23rd by the 5th
Cameron Highlanders, supported by the 13th/18th Hussars, artillery
and engineers.

Unheralded by artillery preparation the infantry advanced in
silence and, taking the German garrison by surprise, captured the
village while it was still dark. Later in the morning German infantry
and tanks of 21st Panzer Division’s ‘Luck’ Group counter-attacked
strongly and the Camerons’ leading company was at first compelled
to give some ground; but the enemy’s successive attempts to recap-
ture the village were stopped by artillery fire or beaten off with the
help of the Hussars, the Camerons being reinforced by a company
of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders. Fighting continued all morning
but by midday Ste. Honorine was clear of the enemy and firmly
held. Thirteen enemy tanks had been destroyed.*

The major operation on.the British west flank, operation ‘Epsom’,
was a much more serious affair, involving both XXX Corps and
VIII Corps. The former had borne the strain of continuous fighting
since it began landing on D-day; VIII Corps, fresh from England
and eager for battle, had only just landed and had not yet bcen
engaged. Some of its divisions (11th Armoured, 15th (Scottish) and
43rd (Wessex) Infantry Divisions?) were not yet quite complete but
the corps was to be strengthened for the coming fight by the addition
of the 31st Tank and the 4th Armoured Brigades, bringing its tank
strength up to over six hundred of all types. The total strength of
VIII Corps when the battle opened was some sixty thousand (includ-
ing three thousand officers). Its own artillery numbered nearly three
hundred guns, and the artillery of XXX Corps on its right and of
I Corps on its left were to bring the total number of guns available
for support up to over seven hundred; three cruisers and the monitor
Roberts were also to co-operate. A large air support was to include not
only strong fighter cover but bombing attacks against enemy posi-
tions on the flank and in the enemy’s rear.*

The general map opposite shows the nature of the country
in which the Odon battle was fought, and the map at payc 286 its
start-line on June the 25th and the ground won by the goth. On
the 25th XXX Corps was to launch an operation (‘Dauntless’)

whose object was to secure the Noyers area and protect the right

* The reconnaissance regiment of the 43rd Division had suffered heavy misfortune.
Their ship (T72/M.T.S.) arrived off Sword beach on the evening of the 20th and
anchored for the night. In the morning a high sea and enemy shclling prevented unload-
ing and with these conditions continuing they were kept there at anchor for three days.
Each night enemy aircraft dropped mines in the area and when the ship was moved to
Juno beach early on the morning of the 24th a mine was exploded under the after cabins
where the troops were sleeping, an ammunition lorry was set on fire and oil on the sea
burst aflame. Landing craft and other warships were quickly alongside and great gallantry
was shown by all troops, but though 105 wounded were rescued 180 men were lost.
Regimental headquarters and one squadron formcd ashore but the remaining squadrons
were not built up from England till late. in July.®

276 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

flank of VIII Corps. Its first task was to capture Rauray on the
spur of high ground overlooking the country through which VIII
Corps was to begin the main attack southwards on the following
morning and secure the line Rauray-Vendes—Juvigny; when that
was achieved it would exploit well to the south. Starting from the
front held by the 3rd Canadian Division between Bronay and Brette-
ville ’?Orgueilleuse, and protected at first by XXX Corps on its
right, VIII Corps was to force in turn the crossings of the Odon
and the Orne and subsequently to establish itself on high ground
north-east of Bretteville sur Laize, where it would command the
roads converging on Caen from the south. As its advance progressed
I Corps would support its eastern flank by capturing Carpiquet.*

The course of the battle that was beginning was largely influenced
by the nature of the ground—the rich cultivated ground of Nor-
mandy. At the start was an area of wide hedgeless fields of standing
corn, falling slowly to the Mue, an insignificant stream. From there
southwards the landscape is more typical of the bocage, its small
farms and orchards enclosed by thick and often steeply banked
hedges, its villages half hidden in hills and its outlines broken by
woods and coppices. From the south-west a ridge of higher ground
extends across the battlefield with spurs running northwards towards
Fontenay le Pesnel and Rauray on XXX Corps front and on VIII
Corps front towards le Haut du Bosq with a final hump south-east of
Cheux. This ridge conceals the ground beyond, which falls to the
thickly wooded valley of the Odon and rises again to commanding
hills on the south of the river. The main roads and railway and the
river Odon all run in the same direction between Villers-Bocage and
Caen. It is difficult country through which to attack and its broken
contours and abundance of cover make it almost ideal for defence.
The 12th SS Panzer and parts of 21st Panzer and Panzer Lehr
Divisions had been holding it for nearly three weeks and when the
British attack opened they were familiar with its intricacies and knew
every point of vantage. Infantry and machine-gun positions had
been chosen with skill and strengthened by wire and minefields;
each was supported by two or three tanks and ‘88’s sited in hidden
positions but able to move to others if detected.

If VIII Corps were obviously set a hard task for their first
operation so also were XXX Corps, as experience showed when
they made their preliminary attack on June the 25th. The capture
of Juvigny, Vendes and Rauray was allotted by XXX Corps to the
49th Division; this also would be engaging in its first operation
as a division. An additional field regiment and a battery of self-
propelled anti-tank guns were added to its artillery and for this first
day it could also call on the additional support from VIII Corps, on
its left, of five field regiments and part of two anti-aircraft brigades

START OF EPSOM BATTLE 277

acting in a ground réle¥ The front to be attacked was held by the
right of Panzer Lehr Division and the left of the 12th SS Panzer
Division, with sixty to eighty 88-mm guns of III Flak Corps in
support.*

Soon after four o’clock on the morning of the 25th, in a thick
ground-mist that persisted for some hours, the 49th Division
advanced on a two-brigade front, with 146th Brigade on the right
and 147th on the left; its third infantry brigade (7oth) and the 8th
Armoured Brigade were held in support. By 9.15 a.m. the 146th
Brigade, attacking with two battalions, captured Bas de Fontenay
against stiff opposition and by early afternoon went on and reached
the edge of the woods that crown the spur north of Vendes. Mean-
while the 147th Brigade on their left, attacking with only one
battalion, found the larger village of Fontenay firmly held, and
though they fought hard and suffered heavy casualties they could
not get beyond the northern outskirts. For some reason that is not
explained a second battalion did not go forward to pursue the
attack until nine o’clock in the evening. Most of the straggling
village was then occupied but it was not cleared of the enemy and
fighting continued throughout the night*Of the 4gth Division’s fight
that day the situation report of the German Army Group B recorded:
‘After heavy fighting on the severely weakened left of the 12th SS
Panzer Division and right of Panzer Lehr Division, attacks by
successive waves of enemy troops, supported in the air by continuous
enemy sorties, succeeded in tearing open a gap 5 km wide and 2 km
deep’¥ But the Rauray spur on the flank of VIII Corps was still in
enemy possession when that corps attacked next morning.

On June the 26th flying weather was so bad in England that the
large programme of air support for the opening of Epsom had to be
cancelled and, for the first time since D-day, practically no aircraft
based in England left the ground. Only 83 Group, stationed in
Normandy, would be able to help VIII Corps, and though they flew
over five hundred sorties their support was handicapped by low
cloud and heavy ground-mist. For it was a lowering, misty day when
at 7.30 in the morning the 15th Division set out to capture the Odon
bridges, five miles away to the south, so that 11th Armoured Division
could then pass through them to seize further bridges over the Orne
and open the way to high ground south of Caen.

It had rained heavily in the night and the dripping crops and
sodden ground made the going heavy. The 44th (Lowland) Brigade
were on the left and the 46th (Highland) Brigade on the right and
they set off behind a strong moving barrage and were supported
by the 31st Tank Brigade¥ Steady progress was made at the outset
but, as the barrage moved on, enemy posts that had been well
dug-in came to life again and in overcoming them the Scotsmen soon

278 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

lost the close protection of the bombardment. German prisoners
taken that morning described what happened. ‘We had gone to
ground and had cmergcd only to find ourselves surrounded by tanks
or furious Scotsmen throwing grenades.*The ‘furious Scotsmen’
themselves lost heavily in this close fighting, especially as they neared
the villages where the enemy had done all they could to strengthen
their positions. La Gaule was taken after a sharp fight, but St.
Mauvieu, Cheux and le Haut du Bosq were entered only with hand-
to-hand fighting and it took a long time to overcome all the parties
which held out to the last in ruined buildings, farmyards and
orchards. St. Mauvieu, after its first capture, was twice counter-
attacked by tanks and infantry of the 12th SS Panzer Division and a
tank company of the 21st Panzer Division; but both counter-attacks
were beaten off, largely by intensive artillery fire. The Glasgow
Highlanders (of the 46th Brigade) who were occupying Cheux were
persistently shelled and mortared from higher ground to the south,
till the village was half blocked by debris and reduced to a shambles.
They lost twelve officers and had nearly two hundred casualties in
this their first day’s warfare. Only the northern outskirts of the long
straggling village of le Haut du Bosq were taken; the rest of the
village, the wooded country on cither side, and the rising ground
to the south were still held firmly by the enemy, with tanks dug in
and infantry covered by machine guns, mortars and minefields*
Soon after midday the 11th Armoured Division (which had been
following up the Scotsmen) was ordered to push through to Tour-
mauville and Gavrus where the Odon is bridged. Its 29th Armoured
Brigade found however that all attempts to deploy south of Cheux
were met by determined opposition, and after some hours of costly
and abortive fighting it was clear that the Odon bridges could not be
rushed by tanks that night. At six o’clock therefore the 15th Division
was ordered to resume the advance and its third infantry brigade
(227th) moved up. Progress was slow. Much time and many men
were lost on this day by the frequent hold-up of troops and vehicles
of all sorts, bottle-necked in the congested ruins of Cheux. Numerous
tracks and roads converge there; it is an obvious target for enemy
guns and mortars posted in the hills to the south. But the only two
roads to the Tourmauville and Gavrus bridges lead from Cheux.
One, on the east, crosses a dip in the ridge to Colleville and goes on to
the bridge near Tourmauville; the other, to the west, goes over the
ridge to Grainville sur Odon and on past le Valtru to the twin
bridges near Gavrus. The brigade’s leading battalions started from
Cheux by both roads at about six o’clock in the evening and in
torrential rain. On the eastern road the advanced guard reached the
outskirts of Colleville but the main body was held up near the Salbey
stream, about a mile south of Cheux, and got no further that night;

BRIDGEHEAD OVER THE ODON 279

on the western road only the ground skirting Cheux was reached,
when the infantry and supporting tanks were embroiled in confused
fighting, there and round le Haut du Bosq. In the fading light
and blinding downpour there was not enough time left to oust the
enemy from their strong hold of the ridge over which the road to
Grainville climbs. Further west, XXX Corps had been fighting all
day to gain possession of the Rauray spur, but the main artillery
support was being given to the Epsom attack on their left and though
they fought hard and had heavy casualties they had captured only
the northern part of it.*

So ended the first day of Epsom. The Odon had not been reached
but the leading troops were within shorter striking distance of the
coveted bridges, and though the enemy showed no signs of weakening
and still held most of the high ground in the path of the British
advance, they had suffered considerable losses of men and tanks and
had not been able to make any effective counter-attack. Army Group
B recorded this as ‘a complete defensive success’ achieved only by
I SS Panzer Corps ‘employing its last reserves’ and ‘with all the
forces of 12 SS Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr Division taxed to
their utmost . . . All available elements of 1 SS Panzer Division and
of II SS Panzer Corps are being brought up to the point of penetra-
tion.’ It was intended ‘to send into action the II SS Panzer Corps
which, with all its available elements and the tank battalion of
2 Panzer Division and the 8 Werfer Brigade under command, will
attack northwards with its right resting on the Orne on 27.6’
but ‘the formations of II SS Panzer Corps and the 1 SS Panzer
Division have bcen considerably delayed in their move up by inter-
vention from the air’** Twenty-First Army Group Headquarters had
learnt on the 2oth that 1st SS Panzer Division had begun moving
from Belgium three days before, and in the days that followed both
Allied air forces attacked the railway system almost continuously.
Key targets in Belgium and France were struck by heavy bombers,
and medium and fighter-bombers attacked railway targets in the
Mantes—Orléans gap and the Paris-Chartres-Dreux area and
marching troops who had been forced to detrain south of Paris and
continue by road. Some infantry of 1st SS Panzer Division was
committed to action on the 28th, but the division as a whole did
not reach the battle area till July the oth*

During the night the 43rd Division began taking over the ground
already won so that the 15th Division could continue the attack,
and at five o’clock on the morning of the 27th the advance was
resumed.*

Bad flying weather still prevented air support from England and
perhaps realising this German aircraft appeared, soon ‘seen off’ by
83 Group fighters* But the 43rd Division had hardly taken over the

280 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

St. Mauvieu-Cheux area when the enemy began making probing
attacks. All these were beaten off, though in the most serious (at
about 9.30 a.m.) enemy tanks penetrated Cheux from the west,
causing temporary confusion and knocking out several guns which
were being moved in at the time. But the attack was repulsed with
the loss of six enemy tanks. A German report stated that I SS Panzer
Corps was attacking that morning with sixty tanks.*

Meanwhile the 15th Division started early. On the western road to
Grainville no progress was made and fighting went on all day in the
Haut du Bosq arca; but on the eastern road Colleville, Tourville and
Mondrainville were taken. Then after a pause for reorganisation
the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (of the 227th Brigade)
advanced again and overcoming light opposition captured intact the
bridge over the Odon near Tourmauville and formed a small bridge-
head on the south bank. Soon afterwards leading tanks of the
11th Armoured Division (the 23rd Hussars) crossed the bridge and
moved out to the lower slopes of a hill to the south-east, which was
to be the scene of much fighting. The ground rises steeply from the
Odon before levelling off to a wide, flat-topped summit known to
the British as Hill 112. Close behind the Hussars, the 11th Armoured
Division’s infantry brigade (159th) and the rest of the 29th
Armoured Brigade began passing through them to cross the Odon.

The 15th Division, now holding the eastern road to the river, set
out from Colleville to cut the enemy’s possession of the western road
by attacking Grainville from the east. The outskirts of the town were
reached but too late to attack that night, for it was found to be
strongly held. So the Scotsmen drew off and prepared to attack next
morning.*

Tanks of the 31st Tank Brigade and of the 4th Armoured Brigade
had been supporting the VIII Corps infantry and feeling for the
enemy on the eastern flank. They were therefore now stationed for
the night in positions to resist any attack from either flank. Late that
afternoon XXX Corps had finally captured Rauray but the high
ground south of it was still strongly held.*

The 12th SS Panzer Division had lost more tanks in the numerous
small and disjointed actions which had markcd the day but had been
reinforced by a battalion of tanks from the 2nd Panzer Division and
by others from the Tiger battalion of I SS Panzer Corps.*

Aircraft of 83 Group had flown a number of defensive sorties to
restrict the Luftwaffe’s increased activity and in answer to the Army’s
requests had made dive-bombing or rocket attacks on gun positions,
villages and other targets, destroying an enemy headquarters and
badly damaging Carpiquet airficld buildings where tanks were
reported assembling. Flying weather improved in the afternoon and
when night fell Mosquitos and Mitchells using flares attacked enemy

33. Rocket-firing Typhoon

ae a]

34. General de Gaulle returns to France
Bayeux, 14th Fune 1944

36. General Doolittle 37. General Spaatz

38. Lancasters of Bomber Command attack armoured divisions near Villers-Bocage

39. Near Paris

AIR ATTACKS ON RAILWAYS

40. At Vire in Normandy

f
es * ‘ ‘ ; A

, : Ne gaia " Ea see #

SIGNS OF MAJZOR GERMAN ATTACK 281

troops on the roads or assembled in woods behind the battle area
with bombs, cannon and machine guns. Bomber Command sent out
over a thousand aircraft; most of their targets were flying-bomb sites
further up the coast but some two hundred attacked a rail centre
between Strasbourg and Paris and the junction at Vaires in the Paris

suburbs, through which reinforcements were coming from Germany.*

By daybreak on the 28th the bridgehead south of the Odon was
being strengthened and enlarged as the 11th Armoured Division
passed over the river. The 159th Infantry Brigade formed a firm
perimeter and the 29th Armoured Brigade moved out through
the wooded ground near Baron to continue their attack on Hill
112. But the Germans had tanks, anti-tank guns and mortars well
hidden in the surrounding country and the British attack was met
by fire from the neighbouring hills to their right, from the slopes
of the hill itself and from the woods north-east of Baron in their
rear. Inconclusive fighting went on all morning and soon after
midday the 11th Armoured Division was ordered to maintain and
improve its bridgehead position but not to advance to the Orne until
the 15th and 43rd Divisions had cleared the area between Cheux
and the Odon.*

For north of the Odon enemy pressure was increasing on both
sides of VIII Corps and frequent air reports showed that additional
troops were coming into action against it. Their air force was provid-
ing both weak fighter cover and strong flak defence in the Villers-
Bocage area to the south-west, and for the first time the movement
of German troops from that direction was being risked in daylight.
Bad flying weather again prevented the Allied air forces in England
from taking much part in the day’s fighting but 83 Group did well.
They brought down twenty-six of the enemy’s aircraft and destroyed
or damaged a greater number of troop-carrying and other army
vehicles and tanks on the roads or halted in woods.*

The left shoulder of the salient, where it joined the front of the grd
Canadian Division, was now strengthened by the addition of the
g2nd Guards Brigade (recently arrived in France as the forerunners
of the Guards Armoured Division) who were put under command
of the 43rd Division and stationed south of Bretteville l’?Orgueilleuse
and on either side of the Caen—Bayeux road. Further south Mouen
was taken, but by a strong counter-attack tanks of the 21st Panzer
Division recovered it; the close country from there to the river
remained in German hands. There was evidence that troops and
vehicles were assembling in Verson and on Second Army’s request
the place was heavily attacked by Typhoons.*

On the western flank two battalions of the 15th Division with tank
support started a drive southwards to clear the ground between the
road to Grainville and the Rauray spur. Strong opposition was met as

282 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

they approached the railway west of Grainville and after a stiff fight
the infantry were forced to give ground and got no further that
night. The enemy had attacked Grainville during the afternoon and
had penetrated the town but were eventually driven out again and
a number of tanks in the vicinity were beaten off. Meanwhile infantry
and tanks had cleared the country between Colleville and Grainville.
Overcoming strong enemy pockets near the railway and west of
Mondrainville they crossed the Caen road and captured le Valtru.
The close country to the south, through which the road leads over
the Odon to Gavrus, was still held by the enemy but Gavrus and the
nearby bridge were by then occupied by the Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders. For after being relieved by the 11th Armoured Division
of responsibility for the first bridge which they had captured near
Tourmauvile, they had moved westward through the wooded
country on the south bank of the river and had seized Gavrus and
its bridges. There they remained in isolation, with the road between
them and le Valtru held by the enemy.

The 29th Armoured Brigade had had to fight hard to retain their
hold on the northern part of Hill 112 and the Baron area. Enemy
tanks covered by a heavy mortar barrage had counter-attacked in the
afternoon in an effort to drive them off the hill, but the 3rd Royal
Tank Regiment and part of the 8th Battalion, The Rifle Brigade had
beaten back the attack and had improved their positions.*

At the end of that day (the 28th), though no further advance had
been made, the ground won by VIII Corps was more firmly held
and the corps was in a better position to withstand the counter-attack
which appeared to be imminent. In the course of the day’s fighting
prisoners had been taken not only from the 2nd Panzer Division but
also from the 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions. The 1st SS had just
begun to arrive from near Bruges. The 2nd SS had come from near
Toulouse and had been greatly delayed en route by fights with the
Resistance and by the attentions of the Allied air forces; moreover,
about half had been unable to move because it had no motor trans-
port. On arrival at the front it had been stationed south of St. L6 in
army group reserve, but a battle group had been moved hurriedly
eastwards after Epsom began and the first of its units to arrive had
been put straight into battle against 49th Division on the 28th. There
was evidence too that the formidable II SS Panzer Corps, with the
gth and roth SS Panzer Divisions, had now arrived in the neighbour-
hood from Russia*It was this cumulative evidence of preparation for
a major counter-attack which had decided Lieut-General Sir
Richard O’Connor, commanding VIII Corps, not to push the attack
further till the position north of the Odon was more secure. The
British salient was over five miles deep into the enemy front but
still less than two miles wide. Round it were apparently gathering all

PANZER ATTACKS BEATEN OFF 283

the Germans’ armoured divisions in Normandy. Till the salient was
broadened and its flanks made safe a further advance would invite
disaster. XXX Corps on its right, though now established on the
Rauray spur after hard and prolonged fighting, had been forced
out of Brettevillette (which had been taken earlier in the day)
and the enemy still held the ground carrying approaches to the
salient from the south-west; on the left flank I Corps had postponed
for the time being its projected attack on Carpiquet, the western
gateway of Caen* General Montgomery’s desire to fight the German
armour on the British front had so far succeeded but it would only
be justified if the armour were held and there was no setback. For the
time being that was the most important consideration.

The morning of the 29th broke bright and clear and air reports of
large-scale enemy movements towards the battle flowed in continu-
ously. The Second Tactical Air Force was out in strength and great
damage was being inflicted both by aircraft and by the artillery who
also were in action early. Key positions on approaches to the battle-
field, troop concentrations and headquarters, and movement on roads
were all attacked with good effect as was soon to be proved.*

The Germans were apparently not yet ready to attack, for the
morning passed quietly, small counter-attacks on XXX Corps front
being driven off. On the eastern flank the 43rd Division attacked
Mouen and by eleven o’clock had taken it and the neighbouring
village of Bas de Mouen. The day before they had occupied Marcelet
to the north of Mouen; they now succeeded in clearing the close
country southwards to the Odon and had one battalion beyond
the river.

On the west flank the 15th Division resumed their drive south-
wards. When the railway near Grainville was reached they met
strong opposition and were forced back, but they firmly held a track
from the woods west of Grainville which leads over the hill to Rauray,
crossing the road from Noyers to Cheux. In the course of the after-
noon a German officer was taken prisoner carrying plans of the
counter-attack for which he was reconnoitring, and about six o’clock
the counter-attack began, coming in from the south-west. Tanks
and infantry in about three-battalion strength attacked astride the
Noyers—Cheux road. There was hard fighting and a few tanks broke
through one of the Scottish battalions and got as far as Cheux before
they were knocked out; the rest of the attacking troops were driven
back, the situation was restored and the holding troops reorganised.
The artillery had played a large part in defeating the attack and later
in the evening a regiment of the 4th Armoured Brigade swept the
country between Grainville and the Noyers road where pockets of
enemy were still found.*

About the time of this counter-attack another was in progress

284 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

further south against le Valtru. At first it made progress but by six
o'clock in the evening the enemy had been driven back and the
situation restored. A third attack had been made by the enemy south
of the Odon. The tanks and infantry of 11th Armoured Division had
extended their hold on the Baron area, pushed southwards to the
Esquay road and at last established a company of the Rifle Brigade in
the wood on the southern slopes of Hill 112. Then a sharp counter-
attack coming in from the wooded ground near Bougy compelled
withdrawal from advanced positions facing Esquay and Gavrus.
But the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders still held their position
covering the nearby bridge, often under heavy shell and mortar
fire. A final attack, this time from the east, never materialised. Forty
or so tanks which had been moving from Caen i into Carpiquet were 0
heavily attacked by Typhoons that no more was seen of them that day*

The 29th had been an anxious day. There had been sharp fighting
all round the salient but every attack had been defeated and several
attempts to concentrate for others had been broken up by artillery
fire. Much of the day’s success was indeed due to the guns, not only
of VIII Corps but also of XXX and I Corps on the flanks. The
tactical air forces had flown a thousand sorties. More German fighters
had been met and ‘seen off’, and the German troops had suffered
much from Mustang, Typhoon and Spitfire attacks. The German
Seventh Army telephone log noted that the counter-attack planned
by II SS Panzer Corps could not start till the afternoon because of
continuous artillery and air bombardment*and its commander, SS
General Hausser, when subsequently questioned in England, con-
firmed this: the counter-attack by both I SS and II SS Panzer Corps
‘was scheduled to begin at seven o’clock in the morning but hardly
had the tanks assembled when they were attacked by fighter-bombers.
This disrupted the troops so much that the attack did not start again
till two-thirty in the afternoon. But even then it could not get going.
The murderous fire from naval guns in the Channel and the terrible
British artillery destroyed the bulk of our attacking force in its
assembly area. The few tanks that did manage to go forward were
easily stopped by the Bnitish anti-tank guns.’* Neither General
Dempsey nor General O’Connor could of course know this and both
felt that the attacks made by the Germans that day were probably
only preliminary to the major attack for which the enemy’s armoured
divisions had been assembled round the British salient. The last of
these had now been identified in action—infantry and tanks of the
gth SS Panzer Division in the attacks on the west flank, and troops
of the roth SS Panzer Division in the attack which had recaptured
ground near the Esquay road and Gavrus.**

® Quoted in G. S. Jackson, Operations Eighth Corps (1948), pp. 51-52.

RENEWED ATTACKS DEFEATED 285

Assuming that a stronger counter-attack was yet to come, VIII
Corps was disposed in strength. General Dempsey ordered the
bridgehead south of the Odon to be reinforced by a brigade of
43rd Division and the 159th Brigade to come under command of
15th Division; r1th Armoured Division should withdraw its armour
from advanced positions in the Baron area and on Hill 112, and be
stationed in the salient ready to meet the expected attack. After
dark the 29th Armoured Brigade withdrew from the hill they had
fought so hard to win, disappointed by an order for which they could
not know the reason. During the night more than two hundred heavy
bombers of Bomber Command dropped over 1,000 tons of bombs
where enemy armour was concentrating in the Villers-Bocage
area.

On June the goth the Germans made no move: presumably they
were getting ready their counter-attack—as the British commanders
were preparing to meet it with their forces well disposed and the
guns of VIII and XXX Corps closely co-ordinated. During the night
much activity behind the German front and the sounds of tracked
vehicles on the move were reported by patrols and at 3.30 a.m. on
July the 1st, after a heavy mortar bombardment, a strong infantry
attack began on the Gavrus sector of the Odon bridgehead. It was
met by the defensive fire of the infantry and of twelve regiments of
artillery and was dispersed before it reached the British positions.
Later it was twice renewed, spreading to the Baron sector, but each
time was stopped by heavy defensive fire.*

A second attack had meanwhile been launched north of the Odon,
this time on a front of about a mile and a half, stretching from VIII
Corps flank near Grainville, across the Noyers-Cheux road and the
high ground where the 49th Division of XXX Corps held Rauray
and Tessel-Bretteville. The attack was covered by a smoke screen
and was pressed hard by infantry and tanks, some of whom got
through forward positions in both corps sectors. But eventually the
enemy was driven off with heavy loss. Infantry and their anti-tank
6-pounders claimed many of the tanks which had reached our front
and many more were destroyed as they tried to close in by the fire of
our own tanks and artillery. By 9.45 a.m. General Speidel, Rommel’s
chief of staff, had already telephoned to von Rundstedt’s head-
quarters that ‘... the resumption of the attack by II SS Panzer
Corps had been stopped by very strong artillery concentrations’*
Two hours later enemy tanks appeared again, moving towards the
flank of VIII Corps, and were again stopped by the fire of our tanks
and artillery. After this second failure a local German commander,
reporting his midday situation to gth SS Panzer Division, finished his
message with a quotation: ‘. .. abandon hope all ye who enter here
(Dante) Signed M.. .*However, a further attack was attempted

286 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

(and was broken up) in the early afternoon and yet again, and finally,
at about half-past four. This time the infantry came up the road
from Noyers in troop-carrying vehicles, and proceeded to dismount
and form up with their tanks near Queudeville in full view and at
no great distance away. Every available machine gun, mortar and
gun was brought to bear on them and they were driven off before
ever getting into action.*

The hunting down of small parties of enemy left isolated within
our forward position after the previous attacks had meantime con-
tinued with the help of flame-throwing tanks and at the end of the
day all original positions had been re-established and strengthened.
Identifications showed that infantry, anti-tank guns and tanks of the
gth SS Panzer Division and a battle group of the 2nd SS Panzer
Division had been engaged in the actions north of the Odon, and
troops of roth SS Panzer Division in those against the bridgehead
south of the river* It was there that the last flicker of life was noted
that evening. About 6 p.m., when the Rauray action had begun to
wane, the 159th Brigade saw the Germans ‘assembling’ between
Gavrus and Esquay, but the movement was brought to nothing by
our defensive fire. On the eastern side of the VIII Corps salient there
had been less activity, though the 32nd Guards Brigade had knocked
out a few tanks of the 12th SS Panzer Division and there had been
some skirmishing in the Carpiquet area*

The day’s claims came to over forty tanks and, though some may
have been duplicated, air photographs taken four days later show
clearly twenty-two burnt out German tanks lying abandoned in the
open in less than a mile square of the battlefield* Our own casualties
had been considerable but our position was unshaken. The enemy
had suffered a sharp defeat, yet comparing the scale of his actions
with the number of his armoured divisions in the area it was still
reasonable to suppose that they covered preparations for the stronger
armoured counter-offensive. Of the whole Allied position this was
where the enemy’s potential for offensive was strongest, the only
place where he was in a position to make a serious attack on the
Allied front. Yet Epsom had in fact forestalled and spoiled the last
German effort to break the Allied front that could be made while
there were still some fresh armoured divisions with which to attempt
it; from then on much armoured strength was gradually frittered
away as it had to be used to plug holes in their own defences.

The operations that have been described were the principal events
on the British front during the last weeks of June. Apart from these,
I Corps positions on the east had been slightly advanced by an attack
by the British 3rd Division, which captured the Chateau de la
Londe, north of Epron, after two days’ fighting. To the west of the
battle for the Rauray spur, XXX Corps had had continuous hard

THE EPSOM BATTLE

{ 0 1 2 3
MILES

British front evening 24th June 1944 —— =
British front evening 30th June 1944 —————
29th Armoured Bde 29th June 1944 )

German counter-attacks 29th June
and {st July 1944

Roman numerals show Corps; others Divisions

Tessel Bretteville
ws Lehr

Digitized by Google

ALLIED AIR EFFORT 287

fighting south-west of Tilly and especially about Hottot which was
twice entered but each time retaken by the enemy. Four miles away
westwards Longraye was captured, and from there XXX Corps
joined up with the American left flank just east of Caumont*

But before turning to affairs in the American sector it is desirable
to add something to what has already been written in previous
chapters of the part that was being played by the Royal Air Force in
the furtherance of Overlord. The Second Tactical Air Force and Air
Defence of Great Britain were so closely associated and such essential
partners in army operations that to describe them every time would
involve much needless repetition. The reader should remember that
day by day, and every day, while the army fought on the ground the
air forces fought from the sky. In describing army operations it 1s not
always necessary to particularise the part played by, say, infantry or
artillery; similarly, it should not be necessary to record on every
occasion the part played by aircraft in warding off any German
planes that ventured near the scene of operations, by photography
or observing, reporting and attacking the enemy’s movements,
by helping to stop attempted counter-attacks and, on the army’s
requests, by attacking strong-points, gun sites or enemy troops that
were holding up progress. It must also be remembered that for the
air forces the battlefield reached out over a far larger area than the
ground being fought over by the armies and that their work included
the constant attack on railways, roads and bridges which was doing
so much to prevent or hamper the enemy’s operations.

It remains to be told shortly what else Bomber Command had
been doing since D-day to further the progress of Overlord through
the less closely associated strategic air offensive and in other ways. To
the air offensive against the German air force, oil, railway com-
munications and industry General Eisenhower had added, on June
the 18th (page 267), that attacks on the German flying-bomb sites
were to be given precedence over everything except the urgent re-
quirements of the battle. Since then much of Bomber Command’s
resources had been devoted to the attacks on flying-bomb targets but
there were very few days and nights on which other targets were not
also attacked. Between D-day and the end of June forty-four separate
attacks were made on railway communications converging on Paris
from the east and the south, and nine on German oil plants and fuel
depots; and mines were dropped almost daily for the Navy. In a
fairly typical twenty-four hours, the 27th/28th, over seven hundred
heavy bombers and Mosquitos dropped more than three thousand
tons on flying-bomb sites; about two hundred attacked two key
railway centres with some seven hundred tons, while sixty engaged in
radio counter-measures to divert German night fighters; fourteen
Bomber Command aircraft laid marine mines and thirty-six carried

288 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

arms and ammunition to French Resistance groups. A comparable
programme was carried out daily; there was no pause in Bomber
Command’s offensive.*

Similarly, the American air force maintained both strategic and
tactical air operations. In their case, however, less attention was paid
to the attack on flying-bomb targets and more to those designed to
limit aircraft production and oil. In the attack on communications
they paid special attention to the destruction of bridges over the
Seine and the Loire and the prevention of their repair.*

The American front at the end of June ran generally from
Caumont to the west coast of the Cotentin above la Haye du Puits.
In winning the sector between Caumont and the Vire—Taute canal,
V and XIX Corps had found, as had the British corps, that an
advance against stubborn opposition in the close bocage country was
a slow and costly business. The line was temporarily stabilised within
about five miles of St. L6, while the fight to clear the Cotentin and
capture Cherbourg was completed and preparations were made to
advance to the south. :

In the Cotentin, VII Corps had had conspicuous success. The
new VIII Corps had assumed responsibility for the front which
faced south, and VII Corps had turned northwards after fighting
which had carried them from the original Utah beach to the west
coast and so had cut off the German forces to the north which were
to defend Cherbourg.

That was on June the 18th. The VII Corps left was that night on
the west coast near Barneville sur Mer; by the night of the rgth it
was twelve miles further north and by the 2oth was within five miles
of Cherbourg, facing the line of landward defences planned by the
Germans earlier in the year. By then the storm was raging in the
Channel. It interrupted the landing of build-up requirements at
Utah and Omaha and although this did not directly prejudice VII
Corps operations it coincided with an inevitable pause; for its
advance had been so rapid that it must close up and collect its
strength before launching the final attack on Cherbourg. With the
storm abating on the 22nd, the attack was resumed. The hopelessness
of the German position had been broadcast by the Americans to the
Cherbourg garrison and the general in command of some twenty-one
thousand troops had been given till 9 a.m. in which to capitulate.
When no response was made, the assault began soon after noon. For
eighty minutes first ten squadrons of the Royal Air Force and then
twenty-three groups of the United States Ninth Air Force attacked
enemy positions, strong-points and forts. Following this the advance
began and for three days there followed hard fighting, as one by one
the outlying defences and forts were captured, each with its comple-
ment of defending troops. Pressure was everywhere sustained with

\ las

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MARITIME SUCCESSES 289

great vigour and Cherbourg reached on the 24th. On the 25th the
town was entered while for three hours a naval force bombarded the
protecting defences at the Army’s request (page 291 below). There
was much close fighting and no general surrender that day but on
the 26th the commander of the garrison and the local naval com-
mander surrendered with some eight hundred men. More prisoners
were captured as the defences were overcome. The extremities of the
outlying positions, resting on the coast, were the last to be taken but
all opposition had ceased by July the 1st and the whole of northern
Cotentin was then in American hands. All Cherbourg’s port equip-
ment and facilities had been destroyed by the Germans and its waters
were blocked by sunken ships and heavily mined. Many weeks and
much hard work would be needed betore it could be cleared and
re-equipped for use, but the Allies were at least sure of a harbour
before long.‘

The adjoining map shows the Allied front in Normandy at the end
of June, but before going further with the story of the land battle
what had meanwhile been happening at sea must be recorded.

On June the 17th it had been reported to Admiral Dénitz (page
268) that ‘the Fiihrer sees the only possible relief for the land forces
in the elimination or harassing of enemy naval forces, particularly
battleships’. Since then, however, German naval operations had
been on an even smaller scale because of the destruction of their
remaining surface vessels and the toll taken of submarines. With
what they had they did little damage during the rest of June. The
unrelaxing vigilance of the Allied sea and air forces and their instant
reaction to any enemy threat ensured that the stream of shipping
between England and Normandy was virtually immune from naval
attacks, and casualties from that source during these weeks were
minute.

The U-boat menace was stifled by the air cover of Coastal Com-
mand and ceaseless patrolling ‘by the Allied navies, fulfilling their
complementary réles. The first U-boat had succeeded in reaching the
‘Spout’ on June the 15th (page 242); the second did not do so till the
25th. By the 3oth two more had arrived but only onc, U.984, was
successful. Coming up to the Channel she had torpedoed and badly
damaged the frigate Goodson on the 25th; arrived in mid-Channel she
attacked a convoy of south-bound American ships in the Spout on
the 29th and torpedoed four. Three were successfully towed in and
beached but became a total loss; the fourth continued her voyage to
France. After thisthe U-boat madc her way back to Brest. This isolated
incident shows what damage might have been donc by the twenty-
five U-boats that had been ordered by the end of June to attack

* See Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, chap. X.
U

290 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

shipping in the Spout if the Allied defence had been less vigilant. In
fact, of the twenty-five, seven had been sunk and three damaged and
forced to return, five had given up or turned back with defects, and
six were still making their way up Channel at the end of June. Only
four had succeeded in reaching the Spout and of these two were
already returning to base. Meanwhile Allied aircraft had sunk five
others patrolling in the western Channel or Bay of Biscay, making
a total of twelve sunk during June. Three more submarines were
ordered to mine Cornish waters. One was damaged and turned back
soon after leaving Brest. The others laid their mines off Plymouth
and Land’s End.*

Away from the scene of these actions Coastal Command kept watch
on U-boats trying to pass north of Scotland in order to attack
shipping in the Channel or the Atlantic. Their work over those
lonely waters may be illustrated by the story of how one U-boat was
sunk 120 miles north of Shetland on June the 24th. U.r225, bound
for the Atlantic, was sighted and attacked by a Catalina flying-
boat of the Royal Canadian Air Force and elected to fight it out
on the surface. The aircraft was badly damaged by enemy fire during
the run in but staggered on to straddle and sink the U-boat with
depth charges. By then the Catalina was unmanageable; the star-
board engine fell out and, burning furiously, the flying boat was put
down into the sea. The crew got clear and were in or clinging to the
dinghy for twenty-one hours before being rescued by a launch of the
Air/Sea Rescue Service. Two had died of exposure; the captain,
Flight Lieutenant D. E. Hornell, died soon after he was pulled from
the water. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.*

After the bombing of le Havre and Boulogne the E-boats did no
further damage in June. On the 18th those remaining at Cherbourg
managed to escape to St. Malo and a few days later they broke back
to the eastward and successfully reached le Havre. In this risky
passage across the Allied front they were pursued, but in the darkness
and poor visibility their high speed enabled them to escape. At this
time the enemy attempted to evacuate shipping from Cherbourg and
British coastal forces fought a number of actions near the Channel
Islands in which they sank a German minesweeper, one escort
vessel and four coasters without loss to themselves.

E-boats had some minor success later against convoys between
Dungeness and Beachy Head, but they had virtually ceased to be a
factor in the Normandy fighting and at the beginning of August all
but six at le Havre and Boulogne were out of action.

During these last days of June the enemy increased night activity
in the air, adding to the minelaying by low-flying aircraft attacks,
torpedo attacks, and, occasionally, flying bombs. An early victim
was the cruiser Scylla, flagship of Admiral Vian, which was mined on

CHERBOURG HARBOUR 291

the evening of the 23rd. She was towed to England for repair and
Admiral Vian transferred his flag to H.M.S. Hilary.*

Naval co-operation with the armies ashore (and the enemy’s fear
of the naval guns) has already been noted in describing the progress
of the fighting. There is no need to elaborate in detail the day to day
part which the warships played, for its significance has been recog-
nised. The biggest call for naval assistance on shore was General
Bradley’s request for help in the final reduction of Cherbourg which
was mentioned on page 289. Cherbourg’s heavy guns, well concealed
in almost indestructible concrete emplacements, were distributed not
only in the port itself but in a ring of outlying forts and a number of
strong-points; the three largest batteries mounted 280-mm (11-inch)
guns. The bombarding force was to subdue the chief of these guns
while the final assault went in. Commanded by Admiral M. L. Deyo,
U.S.N., it comprised three United States battleships and four cruisers
(two of them British) with a screen of eleven American destroyers.
Ahead of these moved a large number of British and American mine-
sweepers. Fire opened at 14,000 yards (about 8 miles) from Cher-
bourg and the defending guns there replied vigorously. For three
hours the duel was continued. The battleship Texas, the cruiser
Glasgow and three destroyers received hits and others were damaged
by splinters; there were fifty-two casualties, killed and wounded.
Nineteen of the twenty-one missions which the ships had been given
were completed when the ships were withdrawn. As already told, the
Cherbourg garrison commander surrendered next day.>*

It was to be expected that the harbour and port facilities would
have been reduced to a shambles and as soon ag the surrender had
been completed Commodore W. A. Sullivan, U.S.N., and Com-
modore T. McKenzie, R.N.V.R., heads of the American and British
Salvage Sections, flew to Cherbourg to survey the damage. The
harbour was thickly strewn with mines of every description, many of
them fitted with anti-sweeping devices, delayed-action firing mech-
anism, or trip lines to entangle sweepers or divers. Access to the
docks and basins was blocked by sunken ships great and small, and
large numbers of tugs, barges and small craft. Almost all the decp,
water quays had been demolished; cranes, clevators and railway

S There is an amusing story, in Froissart’s ‘Cronycle’, of Edward the Third’s landing at
St. Vaast La Hougue, south of Barfleur, in the 14th century. ‘Whane the kynge of Eng-
lande ed in the Hogue saynt Wast, the kyng yssued out of his shyppe, and the firste
fote that he sette on the grounde, he fell so rudely, that the blode brast out of his nose.
The knyghtes that were aboute hym toke hym up and sayde, Sir, for Goddessake entre
agayne into your shyppe, and come nat a lande this day, for this is but an yvell signe
for us. Than the kyng answered quickcly and sayd, Wherfore, this is a good token for
me, for the land desyreth to have me. . . . So that day and nyght the kyng lodged on the
sandes, and in the meane tyme dyscharged the shyppes of their horses and other bagages.”
The nearby ‘Cherbourgue’ is described as ‘stronge and well furnysshed with men of
warre’. (From Pynson’s edition of 1523 and 1525. Translated by Sir John Bouchier. Vol. I,
cap. CXXII.)

292 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

wagons had been blown into the water, and the quay walls blasted in
on top of them. On shore, the Gare Maritime and naval arsenal and
base were wrecked, and along the whole water-front buildings and
workshops had been reduced to ruins.

The work of recovery began as soon as the fortress fell and the last
outlying batteries had been captured on June the goth. On that day
the first Allied vessel, a British minesweeping motor-launch, passed
the outer breakwater but for some time only small craft feeling their
way with the utmost caution were permitted to enter the harbour.
The most urgent task was mine clearance, for no ship could enter
port with the essential engineers’ equipment for reconstruction work
until at least part of the anchorage had been made reasonably safe.
At Admiral Ramsay’s suggestion, Admiral Kirk accepted the loan of
Commander J. B. G. Temple, R.N., to direct the mine-clearance
operations and the work was entrusted mainly to the British 9th and
159th Minesweeping Flotillas, with other British and American units
assisting. Normal sweeping methods within the wreck-strewn har-
bour were not enough. Some of the mines were inaccessible to
sweepers and these were tackled by ‘P’ Parties, British teams of
young men, all volunteers, trained in under-water bomb disposal
and the use of shallow-water diving equipment. In the muddy waters
of the lower Thames they had practised the grisly art of tackling
all manner of German mines, guided only by a sense of touch. In the
course of six weeks from the beginning of July, these ‘P’ Parties
explored nearly the whole floor of the harbour and they were also
continually on call to deal with explosives and booby traps found
among the wreckage obstructing the quays.

Apart from mine clearance, the reconditioning of the port went
ahead as a joint Anglo-American enterprise under American control,
Commodore Sullivan being in general charge of salvage assisted
by Commodore McKenzie and the British salvage team. In other
respects reconstruction was controlled by U.S. naval and military
authorities. With the loss of three minesweepers and seven other
small vessels over a hundred mines were accounted for by July the
16th. On that day the first deep-draught ships were safely brought
into the outer harbour and anchored; they had been waiting outside
for days, loaded mainly with essential equipment for port develop-
ment. From then on a trickle of supplies for the army began, carried
in Dukws over the beaches within the harbour to dumps inland. The
trickle eventually swelled slowly into a flood. Cherbourg, which in
peace-time was mainly a passenger port and intended to develop to
a Capacity of 9,000 tons a day, eventually reached more than double
that daily average; until Antwerp was available it was the mainstay
of the port system serving the American forces. **

* See Ruppenthal, op. cit., vol. II, chap. ITI.

OPERATION NEPTUNE ENDS 293

Away on the extreme eastern flank the abandonment of General
Montgomery’s original intention to extend the Bnitish left flank to
the Dives had left the coastal country beyond the Orne in enemy
hands. Numerous mobile batteries were concealed in wooded
country and beyond the Dives were two heavy casemated batteries
at Bénerville and Houlgate. These continued to shell Sword beaches
and anchorage and seriously interfered with their use. Counter-
battery fire by battleships and cruisers had destroyed some of the
heavier guns and silenced the batteries temporarily from time to
time, but in spite of persistent effort and the firing of over a thousand
heavy and medium shells neither battery was put out of action per-
manently; and neither the bombarding ships nor the artillery could
silence the enemy’s mobile guns firing from hidden positions in the
woods. A number of landing ships were damaged and, though all
were unbeached successfully, drying-out here was stopped and all
personnel ships were transferred to Juno for unloading. The small
headquarters ship Locust, a corvette and some ferry craft were also
damaged, and an ammunition coaster was hit and set on fire. From
June the 25th all landing ships and coasters were also transferred to
more westerly areas and the use of the Sword beaches was finally
discontinued, in agreement with the Army, at the end of June.*

By that time the fall of Cherbourg, the firm establishment of a
growing lodgement area, and the attrition of the enemy’s submarines
and surface vessels made it possible for Admiral Ramsay progressively
to reduce the assault forces as originally constituted and to release
bombarding ships and craft which were now needed for the projected
assault on the Mediterranean coast.*An account of the long and
sometimes heated discussion on whether, when and where this second
landing should take place is given in Mr. Ehrman’s history of grand
strategy during this period.’ It is enough to note here that on the last
day of June the British Chiefs of Staff advised Mr. Churchill to give
way to American opinion ‘for the sake of Allied solidarity’ and agree
that Anvil should be launched as soon as possible, August the 15th
being set as the target date. Only later, when the forces who landed
there came eventually under General Eisenhower’s command, do
their operations play a direct part in this history.

On June the 24th Rear-Admiral J. W. Rivett-Carnac set up his
headquarters ashore at Courseulles as Flag Officer British Assault
Area and, in turn, Commodore Oliver withdrew from Juno (on the
same day), Commodore Douglas-Pennant from Gold (on the 27th)
and Rear-Admiral Talbot (on the 29th) from the then nearly
deserted Sword anchorage. Similarly Force Commanders in the
American sector withdrew after Rear-Admiral J. Wilkes, U.S.N.,

¥ John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. V, chap. TX.

294 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

had established his headquarters ashore as Flag Officer West. On
June the 3oth Admiral Vian, the British Task Force Commander,
withdrew to England (he was followed by Admiral Kirk, U.S.N.,
three days later) and on that day Operation Neptune was officially
concluded* Its planning, organisation and execution had been wholly
successful and although, as the assault phase of Overlord, Neptune
was now completed this did not affect the navies’ continuing responsi-
bilities, as will be seen in subsequent chapters. They were still
responsible for naval protection of the daily convoys carrying their
precious cargoes of men and supplies to France and bearing to
England thousands of casualties and German prisoners of war; they
were still responsible for the naval protection of the anchorages and
harbours, and as long as the armies were fighting within the range
of their guns they would continue to assist them with the gunfire
which the enemy so dreaded. The navies’ contribution would not
be completed till victory was won.

The following figures indicate some of the results of the Neptune
operation.*

By June the goth there had been landed in France 850,279 men,
148,803 vehicles and 570,505 tons of stores.

During that time every effort by the enemy to interfere with the
Allies’ naval movements had been defeated and thousands of our
ships and craft had crossed and recrossed the Channel safely. As the
table opposite shows, 51 had been lost and 76 damaged by enemy
action, while 8 more had been lost and 44 damaged by other causes.
It is worth noting that of the total casualties attributable to enemy
action (127), nearly half (59) were caused by mines; the united
efforts of enemy U-boats, surface vessels and aircraft, which resulted

_ in 68 casualties, were little more dangerous than hazards of the sea,

from which the 52 casualties are shown under ‘other causes’.

It will be well to see, now, how these events were affecting the
German command. A study of contemporary documents shows
clearly that while fighting was being conducted with skill by local
commanders and stubborn bravery by their troops, the battle as a
whole was being directed by Hitler. His control was not limited to
the issue of broad directives; not even a division could be moved
without his concurrence and several divisional moves that had been
ordered by von Rundstedt or Rommel were promptly counter-
manded by Hitler. The field-marshals were being treated as little
more than subordinate commanders; hundreds of miles away at his
headquarters the Fiihrer knew, better than they who faced realities
in Normandy, how their fight should be conducted! He discounted
their statements and distrusted their judgment, and he ignored their
repeated requests that someone from OKW should visit the front
to report independently on the true state of affairs. All power of

295

Allied Shipping Losses in Operation Neptune—6th to 30th Fune 1944
(Excluding landing craft and other miscellaneous small craft)

Warships

Cause Merchant
of vessels and Remarks
Loss Larger | Smaller | auxiliaries
vessels
SUNK
By Mines . ... . 9 Ri 7 10 (a) 7 Destroyers and

U-boats. . . . . 2 (6b - 4 2 Fleet Minesweepers
Aircraft. . . . . 2 (c) - 3 te) 2 Frigates
Gunfire . - 2 3 c) 1 Destroyer and
Surface craft torpedoes 1 (d) - 1 Frigate
Other causes. - I 7 (d) 1 Destroyer

Total sunk . .. . 14 10 35

DAMAGED

By Mines . ... . 12 (e) 7 14 (e) In one case damage

U-boats. . . . . 2 - 2 was superficial
Aircraft. . . . . 2 I 4 (f) In two cases damage
Gunfire ‘ 13 (f) 5 10 was superficial
Surface craft torpedoes 2 _ 2
Other causes. 9 6 29

Totaldamaged . . ./| 40 19 61

initiative was hamstrung by his close control and his overriding and
reiterated order that there must be no withdrawal anywhere.

So far as offensive action was concerned, von Rundstedt had pro-
posed on June the 15th that the available armoured divisions and those
that were on the way should be massed for a major counter-attack
as soon as infantry divisions arrived to relieve the armour at present
holding the British front. “The direction of this thrust’, he wrote, ‘has
still to be determined.’ Later his intention was to split the Allies’
bridgehead ‘east of St. L6’* Hitler agreed to this at the conference
on the 17th (page 268) and three days later sent a directive in that
sense, naming the divisions to be used* Meanwhile planning for it had
started. On the 19th Rommel had sent two sketch maps of alterna-
tive developments to Geyr von Schweppenburg (who as commander
of Panzer Group West would be responsible for the counter-attack)
and on the 26th the latter replied with proposals for his basic plan.
Meanwhile, on the 24th, von Rundstedt’s war diary had noted that
the counter-attack could not start until July the 5th—-7th. Yet, on the
same day, Hitler ordered him to examine the possibility of an attack
‘during the next few days’ against ‘the rear of the rst U.S. Army
which is attacking towards Cherbourg. After destroying these forces
the aim of further operations is to relieve Cherbourg.’ This was to be
‘in addition to the plans for an offensive which have been reported’—

296 THE STORM, ‘EPSOM’ AND CHERBOURG

that is the major counter-attack already being planned. Von Rund-
stedt replied almost at once that neither sufficient force nor supplies
could be assembled for an attack towards Cherbourg within the next
few days, and until the launch of the major counter-attack ‘the area
round and east of Caen’ must continue to have most importance.
Next day the war diary noted von Rundstedt’s belief that the Allies
planned to attack there and that these plans ‘require our own
reserves to be assembled correspondingly’. He conferred with
Rommel on the 26th and sent a memorandum to OKW explaining
in detail why both regarded Hitler’s proposed counter-attack
towards Cherbourg as not possible, adding, ‘it may become necessary,
undesirable as it is, to use all the new forces now coming up to
intercept, attack and destroy the English offensive which is expected
within a short time from the area round and west of Caen. . ..®(This
was the day on which Epsom began and the commander of Cher-
bourg surrendered.)

Hitler however was unimpressed by the considered views of his
field-marshals. On the 27th he gave von Rundstedt another order to
examine the possibility of an attack against enemy forces west of the
Vire. ‘The Fihrer holds firmly to the idea of attacking not the
strength, but the weakness of the enemy west of the Vire where
weaker American forces are located on a broad front.’ (So ‘weak’
that they had just swept most of the enemy from the Cotentin and
had captured Cherbourg!) His ‘basic idea’ was to attack the Ameri-
cans with four or five named armoured divisions; to ‘support’ the
bridgehead between the Orne and the Vire by ‘infantry divisions and
battle groups’; and also to attack east of the Orne as soon as possible
‘not merely after the main attack’. This order was received on the
day that saw VIII Corps across the Odon. It was too much for von
Rundstedt. Ignoring this further order to consider a counter-attack
west of the Vire, he said that if the German troops there were not
soon to be encircled commanders should ‘now’ be given freedom to
withdraw to a more favourable line. ‘In conjunction with Field-
Marshal Rommel, I [von Rundstedt] therefore ask for a free hand
to order even extensive adjustments of the front . . . and for a corres-
ponding directive.’*

On the following day both field-marshals, travelling separately by
road as they were not allowed to go by air or train, set out on a six
hundred mile journcy to Hitler’s headquarters at Berchtesgaden for
conference with the Fiihrer. On the same day (28th) Dollmann,
commander of the Seventh Army, died suddenly of heart attack.

The conference did not begin till six o’clock in the evening of the
2oth. There were present besides Hitler and the two field-marshals
only Field-Marshal Keitel, head of OKW, and General Jodl, chief
of the OKW Opcrations Staff, for von Rundstedt had asked for a

A VISIT TO HITLER 297

private meeting. Subsequently Goring, Donitz, Sperrle and a
number of staff officers were brought in and a personal meeting was
changed into a general conference at which Hitler did most of the |
talking. He gave no indication however of any new policy. The only
notes on policy which Jodl made in his diary for that day doubtless
express what seemed to him a summary of what was significant. “We
are now compelled to ward off the English attack, instead of counter-
attacking. ... Then if all goes well, we could still advance against
the Americans.’ Official records of the conferences and such personal
reports as have survived do not differ materially. Hitler was to issue
a new directive that night and what followed the meeting will be told
in the next chapter. Von Rundstedt’s request for greater freedom
of control remained for that day unanswered.*

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CHAPTER XIV
THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

T the end of June, with Cherbourg captured and the Second
Army on the Odon, General Montgomery reviewed the situa-
tion with his army commanders and outlined his plans for the

next phase. Before examining these it will be well that the reader
should have some further knowledge of the general state of affairs.

On the conclusion of Neptune and the gradual withdrawal of the
Assault Forces, naval protection of the all-important lines of com-
munication between the main Allied base in England and the assault
area off Normandy was reorganised. The supply convoys sailing
regularly under the Home Commands continued to be protected by
their own escorting warships. Arriving in the assault area they now
came under Admiral Rivett-Carnac’s orders for he was responsible
(under Admiral Ramsay’s direction) for naval command of the
British assault area including local operations, defence from seaward,
sailing of homeward bound convoys and administration of naval
personnel in the area; he was at the same time to maintain close
liaison with the local military and air force commanders. Under him
general responsibility for the defence of the vulnerable eastern flank
was given to Captain A. F. Pugsley, R.N., who as Captain (Patrols)
had operational control of all vessels allocated for patrols and striking
forces (destroyers, contro] frigates, corvettes, anti-submarine trawlers,
coastal craft and minesweepers), including minesweepers employed
on the night defences described in an earlier chapter*A new ‘Support
Squadron Eastern Flank’ was formed of some seventy-six small craft
drawn from the original assault forces; its commander was Com-
mander K. A. Sellar, R.N., and its purpose to man the eastern
defence or ‘Trout’ line by night (page 221) and to support the army
when required by day*Its main task by day was to bombard enemy
forces along the coast, operating often in enemy-mined waters beyond
the Orne and threatened by shore batteries. In these conditions the
Support Squadron had a difficult and dangerous duty and a very
responsible one, for the enemy’s possession of this stretch of coast,
which had enabled him to make the Sword area practically unusable
(page 293), also helped hostile craft based on le Havre to creep round
the coast in darkness under cover of shore batteries and to shelter in
its small harbours, Cabourg and Trouville.

At sea a number of clashes occurred between enemy E-boats
(which had been reinforced by some brought from the Baltic) and the

299

300 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

Navy’s motor torpedo-boats and supporting frigates. Most of these
actions in darkness between small, fast-moving boats were incon-
clusive. There were some casualties on both sides but the enemy did
no damage to the steady stream of ships passing to and from the
assault area and had only two successes against convoys moving
slowly through the Channel. On the night of the 26th /27th two ships
in convoy were damaged off Dungeness and four days later, off
Beachy Head, four were damaged of which one sank.

At the beginning of July there were two U-boats at large in the
‘Spout’ area and others either approaching it or returning to Brest.
After their initial losses in June only U-boats fitted with schnorkel
were used in Channel operations and against these aircraft were less
effective as they seldom exposed themselves. Even so the result of the
month’s anti-submarine operations is sufficiently striking.

Eighteen sorties were made during the month against the Channel
convoy routes and the effect on the seventeen U-boats concerned (for
one made two separate sorties) was as follows:

Destroyed by the Navy inthe Channel . 6 (U.390, 678, 212,

672, 214, 333)
Damaged by the Navy in the Channel . 3 (U.671, 741, 275)

Completed their patrol undamaged . § (U.218, 953, 673,
309, 621)
At large in the Channel on 31st July . 3 (U.984, 667, 671

second trip)

Between them these seventeen U-boats had sunk one infantry
landing ship, a merchant ship and an anti-submarine trawler; two
other merchant ships had been damaged.

During the same period two U-boats were sunk by aircraft! in the
Bay o Biscay and a third foundered close off Brest on an air-laid
mine.

In the early hours of July the 6th a new menace suddenly
appeared. A ‘strange object’ was seen moving slowly through the
Trout line and was at once engaged by gunfire from the Support
Squadron. Thereupon it released a torpedo and disappeared. There
followed a hectic interval in which similar objects, widely dispersed,
were discerned in the darkness and similarly dealt with by the vigi-
lant defence. They were in fact ‘human torpedoes’.? These had been

1 Flying Officer J. A. Cruikshank, R.A.F. Coastal Command, was awarded the Victoria
Cross for his gallantry in fighting one of these till it was sunk, after his navigator was
killed and he and his crew were badly wounded.

* Known to the Germans as a marder (marten) it was an improvised weapon composed
of two torpedoes fastened together one above the other. The speed of this contraption was
only about 2} knots and it was not submersible. Astride the upper torpedo (from which
the explosive had been removed) sat the pilot, sheltered by a Perspex hood only part of
which showed above the water. The under-slung torpedo when released by the pilot
travelled at 20 knots towards its target, leaving the pilot to elude the defences and escape
back to base—if he could.

EFFECTS OF STORM Zol

met in action three months before off Anzio in Italy but this was
their first appearance in the Channel. The German records show
that on this night twenty-six had set out from le Havre. Two broke
down before reaching the assault area, nine were sunk by the
defenders, fifteen escaped back to their base. Two small minesweepers
had been torpedoed.

Two days later another attempt was made to pierce the defence by
twenty-one of these human torpedoes launched from Houlgate.
Their attack began at three o’clock in the morning and continued
during the forenoon. All twenty-one were brought to action and the
German records show that all were sunk; a few pilots were picked up
from the sea. In this crushing defeat one minesweeper was lost and
the Polish-manned cruiser Dragon severely damaged. She was an old
ship and had played her part in the naval bombardments; but still
she would continue to serve, for on abandonment she was sunk
where she would form a needed extension of the Gooseberry break-
water off Sword beach. After the Support Squadron had dealt so
faithfully with this new form of attack several weeks passed before
it was renewed.*

After the storm the most energetic measures were taken to repair
the trail of damage and destruction in the assault area. Salvage was
a herculean task, made more difficult by the fact that many wrecked
craft had been driven high up the beaches and those which were
repairable could not be refloated till the July spring tides. The full
salvage organisation was brought into action at once and additional
resources were made available including a repair ship and skilled
ratings, many of them drawn from the Home Fleet. Many craft
were temporarily repaired where they lay and by the 8th of July
some 600 stranded craft, besides coasters and other small vessels,
had been refloated. Another 100 were safely brought off on the high
tides a fortnight later, and in order to cope with the sudden influx
of damaged craft from the assault area, the repair organisation in
home ports was also expanded.

On reviewing the situation with expert assistance the Supreme
Commander decided that no attempt should be made to restore the
piers and equipment of the American Mulberry harbour off Omaha;
only its Gooseberry breakwaters would be repaired and strengthened
to give shelter to small craft; such equipment as remained there after
the storm was to be used to complete the British Mulberry at
Arromanches, where the harbour was to be strengthened to with-
stand as far as possible the onset of winter gales. This would involve
the production of forty new Phoenix caissons of stronger construction
and the work of ‘winterisation’ would not be completed till late in
the autumn. Meanwhile one stores pier was already finished and two
more were in hand. By the 2oth of July the harbour would be in full

302 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

operation on a maximum scale, with moorings for seven deep-draft
cargo ships and for a larger number of coasters within the shelter of
the breakwater; and all three piers were by then in use.*

The set-back in the rate of landing vehicles and stores occasioned
by the storm could not be wholly overtaken but in the week that
followed—June the 23rd to the goth—there was a remarkable
recovery in view of the destruction and disablement of so many
landing craft. In that first week after the storm, the daily averages
landed were as shown:?*

Daily average
landed

June 19-22 (storm) .

1» 23-30 . 20,188

The overall supply situation was generally satisfactory, but a short-
age of some essential types of ammunition had at times caused anxiety
to both Bntish and American commanders. On June the 22nd there
had been only one day’s reserve of 25-pounder and 4:2-inch mortar
ammunition in the British army roadheads; by then their total
ammunition stocks had fallen from 29,800 tons to 9,562 and some
rationing had been imposed. But by special shipments and, in the
American sector, some delivery by air the situation was quickly
improved. By the rst of July British roadheads held nine days’ stocks
of 25-pounder and fifteen days’ of 4-2-inch mortar ammunition and
contained 64,942 tons of ammunition of all kinds. There is no
evidence that lack of ammunition seriously handicapped or delayed
British operations at this time, but the American history states that
their offensive southwards would have been started earlier had it not
been for shortage of ammunition.*

By the beginning of July the planned arrangements for ensuring
the supply of petrol to the growing Allied forces in France were
making good progress. These were to take two forms. The first,
essential in the early stages of the campaign, consisted of the cstab-
lishment of petrol and oil storage depots fed through buoyed pipe-
lines from tankers moored off-shore; this plan was known as “Tom-
bola’. The second was a more novel and ambitious plan to supply
petrol from England through Pipe Lines Under the Ocean (‘Pluto’).
The history of Pluto, of its origin, the technical difficulties that were
overcome and its eventual outcome are told later. At the beginning

? For the American figures, see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, vol. I,
pp. 416-419.

THE NORMANDY BASE 303

of July the laying of cross-Channel pipes had not yct started but the
Tombola scheme was already coming into use. The British depot was
built at Port en Bessin and the American two miles further west near
Ste. Honorine. The first 6-inch pipeline for the former was completed
on June the 25th and the first for the American depot a week later;
by July the 14th there were two in use for each depot and three
shorter lines were hauled ashore for American use at the eastern
end of Omaha*The supply of petrol for the Allied armies and air
forces in Normandy was for the time being assured.

The armies’ administrative organisation ashore was by now well
developed. In the British sector Second Army had relieved the
original assault corps of responsibility for back areas and Head-
quarters, No. 11 Lines of Communication Area had taken control of
beach- and port-working. The organisation, shown in outline, was as

follows: *

H.Q.11 L. of C. Area
Beach 102 Beach 101 Beach
Area Sub-Area Sub-Area

Port en Bessin Arromanches GOLD Area JUNO Area SWORD Area
Harbour Mulberry Beaches Beaches Beaches

H.Q.4L. of C.
Sub-Area

Two roadheads through which the British forces were being main-
tained were under command of Headquarters, Second Army Troops;
No. 1 Army Roadhead was near Douvres la Délivrande and No. 2
round Bayeux. Signal networks, signposting and traffic contro] were
fully adequate and newly landed personnel could find their destina-
tion quickly. Since the storm an average of approximately 14,400
men a day had landed in both British and American sectors, but the
British leeway had not yet been made good and Second Army was
still short of three divisions at the end of June.

By this time the number of men landed was British 397,819,
American 452,460, a total of 850,279. If the approximate number
brought in by air in the airborne assaults and the subsequent airlifts
be arceds the grand total of the Allied landings was about 875,000
men.

While delay of the early build-up was due mainly to bad weather,
limitation of tactical progress had also handicapped the development
of administrative plans. The pre-D-day forecasts had contemplated
that a lodgement might extend as far as Lisieuk, Alengon, Rennes

304 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

and St. Malo by the 1st of July (D plus 25) “actually it enclosed rather
less than one-fifth of that area. The space between the beaches and
the front line was inadequate for the base installations which had
been planned, and with anything up to 10,000 vehicles a day passing
through some of Second Army’s traffic posts congestion was acute;
it would have been unmanageable if the Allies had not held com-
mand of the air.

Headquarters of Twenty-First Army Group was still in England,
General Montgomery having with him in Normandy only his small
Tactical Headquarters. Until June the 22nd this was at Creully, with
General Dempsey’s Second Army Headquarters and the Head-
quarters of Air Vice- Marshal H. Broadhurst, commanding 83 Group,
within a mile or two. On June the 22nd General Montgomery had
moved to Blay in the American sector six miles west of Bayeux, where
he was within easier reach of General Bradley’s First Army Head-
quarters at Grandcamp les Bains on the coast near Omaha. The
Supreme Commander had visited Normandy several times and had
stayed there with General Bradley from the 1st to the 5th of July.
He was showing some anxiety about the pace of the Allied advance.
On June the 25th he had written to General Bradley, urging him
*, .. to rush the preparations for the attack to the south’; and on
July the 7th had said in the course of a letter to General Mont-
gomery: *... It appears to me that we must use all possible energy
in a determined effort to prevent a stalemate...’ To this General
Montgomery replied ‘. . . of one thing you can be quite sure—there
will be no stalemate . . .“It will be seen later that, as he wrote this,
further operations had begun for the capture of Caen and were
making good progress.

The First Canadian Army commander (Lieut-General H. D. G.
Crerar) had arrived in Normandy on the 18th of June with a small
staff but General Montgomery had come to the conclusion that,
until Second Army had completed its landings and the front was
further advanced, there would not be room for another army head-
quarters and its large complement of army troops. First Canadian
Army headquarters was therefore retained in England and did not
become operational until the 23rd of July. In the circumstances the
need for a headquarters, Lines of Communication (under the direct
control of Twenty-First Army Group) was not urgent and the
organisation represented by the diagram on page 303 generally held
good until the middle of July. In the meantime the incoming
Canadian formations were under the command of Second Army
(which temporarily would contain five corps) till the First Canadian
Army was constituted in France.*

Much the same thing happened to the American follow-up army
(the Third, under Lieut-General G. S. Patton) which had been

AIR STATISTICS 305

expected to operate from about the 25th of June. He landed early in
July but for three weeks was hidden in the Cotentin bocage—that the
Germans might continue to believe he was in England commanding
the Allied army which they still expected to attempt a second landing
in the Pas de Calais area. Meanwhile his divisions went under the
First Army as they arrived on the Continent.*

Lack of space had also limited the provision of airfields. By the
beginning of July the British had constructed twelve‘ airfields, but
three or four were still denied them by shellfire; the Americans had
another eleven in use. Altogether, these represented about threc
quarters of the programme for this date. By the 5th of July the whole
of 83 Group and nine groups of the Ninth Air Force would be
operating from the Normandy fields.*

Yet even though bad weather had hampered air operations there
had been no inadequacy of air support for the armies, no loss of air
mastery, no failure to prevent air interference by the enemy. In the
foregoing chapters a broad outline of air operations in June has
been included; a separate book would be needed to describe them in
detail. Here it is only possible to indicate their scale and scope by
figures; readers must be left to picture for themselves the effort that
lay behind them.

A usual measurement of the scale of air operations is the number
of sorties involved, a sortie being one mission—a single there-and-
back flight—of one aircraft, so that, for example, a bombing attack
by ten bombers is described as involving ten sorties. Obviously a
sortie may be comparatively short, easy and safe, or long, difficult
and very dangerous; in one the pilot may see nothing of the enemy,
in another he may have to fight off enemy aircraft and brave a
hurricane of anti-aircraft fire; a fighter patrol may take less than an
hour but a Catalina flying boat may spend ten hours on anti-U-boat
patrol. Nevertheless there is no other single standard by which to
measure the great variety of air operations. Measured, then, in this
way the combined effort of the Allied air forces involved 163,403
sorties as shown in the table overleaf.

In these multifarious actions the Royal Air Force lost 3,083 air
crew,® killed or missing, and the American Eighth and Ninth Air
Forces 3,170. Of the total 6,253 airmen lost, 5,006 were in Bomber
Command and the Eighth Air Force, for while the total aircraft lost
(1,508) were fairly evenly distributed between the tactical (740) and

* Chief Engineer 21 Army Group’s Report of Situation at ogoo hrs 1 July gives
British sector ten completed airfields, plus one emergency landing strip and one glider
landing strip. Nine of the airfields appeared to be in R.A.F. use. Report of 4 July gives
one more rearming and refuelling strip (Amblie) completed. *

5 In one of these bomber operations, Pilot Officer A. C. Mynarski of tHe Royal
Canadian Air Force was awarded the Victoria Cross for sacrificing his life in order to
save a badly wounded member of his crew.

306 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

the strategic (768) air forces, the loss of each heavy bomber involved
a much larger crew.

Allied Air Operations, June 6th to June 30th, 1944 *

Sorties flown

Nat ati ae Meee ree
ature of operation ond T.A.F.| eshee t, <Codcal U.S. oth | U.S. 8th

and Air Air
A.D.G.B. Command | Command Force Force

1. Direct and Indirect Support of
Operations
(a) Offensive o eee by
fighters and fighter
bombers .. 9,871 14,650 5436
(6) Attacks by heavy, medium
and light bombers... 2,923 7,088 8,820 18,435
(c) Fighter escorts, support
for bombers, intrudcrs,
spotting for naval gunfire 4,074 |
(d) Visual, photographic and

590 | 8,548
weather reconnaissance. 5,010 1,150 2,800 648
(e) Troop carrying and glider
towing in airborne opera-
tions. * Support for Resist-
ance Forces by Special
Duty Squadrons a 907 270
(f) Day and night fighter
cover for home bases, ship-
ping and lodgementarea . | 23,167 12,348 1,766

2. Maritime Operations
(g) Anti-U-boat patrols .. 3,983
if Anti-shipping pa : 1,335 1,987
(t) Minelaying .. . ‘ 325
(j) Air/Sea Rescue . .. 1,140 200
3. Operations against V-weapons
(k) Attacks on launching sites,
supply depots and flying
bombs in flight . .. . 2,800 4,660 1,500 2,210
4- Long-term Operations
(2) peor on synthetic oil

1,662 350

~
co

Pp 975 2,360
(m) Attacks on ‘industries and

cities. 200 3,590
(n) Fighter escorts and light.

bomber ash for a neaNy

bombers. 780 4,095

Total sorties 51,227 | 15,048 47,438
|

Total Allied Air Force Sorties — 163,403

While the Allied air forces thus flew over 130,000 sorties in support
of the armies, the fighters, fighter bombers, bombers and reconnais-
sance aircraft of the German Third Air Fleet together flew a grand
total of 13,829 sorties. In that comparatively small effort they lost
808 aircraft while the Reich Air Flect lost a further 185 in fighting

ARMY STRENGTHS 307

the Allied attacks on targets in Germany*An officer detached by the
German Historical Branch to report on the air position in the West
visited the Third Air Fleet area in July. From a long and detailed
report one paragraph may be quoted:

“The effect of Anglo-American air supremacy on the Normandy
front and as far as Paris is so great that all convoy traffic is re-
stricted to night time and even single vehicles are only used by
day in the most extreme emergencies. The main highway, Paris—
Versailles—Dreux, is ploughed up by direct hits from the western
end of Versailles to the goods yard at St. Cyr. The villages of
Laigle, Argentan and Falaise are reduced to ruins. The losses in
motor vehicles amounted in some units to as much as 40% of
the original strength and at the same time large quantities of
reserves of munitions and fuel were destroyed.’ *

He noted that ‘owing to the enemy’s air superiority no photo
reconnaissance could be made to ascertain the effect of V.1 attacks
on London’; the figures for June are given here. As the table oppo-
site shows Crossbow operations against launching installations and
flying bombs since D-day had involved 11,170 sorties. Since June the
13th, 2,049 flying bombs had been launched; 22 had been shot
down by our fighters before they reached the English coast; of 1,557
which had crossed the coast fighters had shot down 504 in flight,
224 had been brought down by anti-aircraft fire, 41 by barrage
balloons and 5 by the Royal Air Force Regiment’s guns; 783 had
reached London.

In the last fortnight of June a few flying bombs which had appar-
ently gone astray dropped in the assault area without causing any
damage to shipping.*

One further matter must certainly have been present in General
Montgomery’s mind when he outlined his plans for future operations
at the end of June, namely the resources both in France and else-
where on which he could count. Casualties up to then had been
considerably less than had been allowed for in Overlord planning
and so far they had been made good by replacements. The Army
figures are as follows: *

Allied Battle Casualties—Fune 6th to June 30th

{

Killed | Wounded Remarks

Missing | Total

* Men at first reported missing

British and
Canadian . | 3,356 | 15,815 | 5,527* | 24,698 who later rejoined have been
American. .j, 5,113 | 26,538 deducted.

5,383 | 37,034
ToTaA.s | 8,469 | 42,353 | 10,910 oo

308 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

Replacements dispatched to make good these losses were: British
and Canadian 38,000; American 41,000; total Allied replacements
79,000. So far then, losses were being more than made good.®

At the beginning of July the British and American armies in
France were approximately equal in strength; each had the equiva-
lent of some fifteen or sixteen divisions. The Americans had nine
further divisions waiting to cross from England and a steadily increas-
ing force preparing in the United States which would eventually
make up thcir Overlord armies to sixty-one divisions. But only the
cquivalent of some six British and Canadian divisions waited in
England to join Twenty-First Army Group and its full strength
would never excccd twenty divisions. It was not even certain that
the British manpowcr situation would make it possible to maintain
all these if the war continued for long* Knowledge of these circum-
stances had thcrefore to be taken into account in planning future
operations.

At the end of June elements of eight panzer divisions had been
identified between Caen and Caumont; none had yet been met on
the rest of the front and the United States First Army was able to
reorganise and regroup without hindrance. This was what General
Montgomery had been aiming at, for his intention was to hold the
maximum number of German divisions on the eastern flank between
Caen and Villers-Bocage and *. . . to swing the western or right flank
of the Army Group southwards and eastwards in a wide sweep, so
as to threaten the withdrawal of such enemy divisions to the south
of Paris’. The Seine bridges between Paris and the sea would be
kept permanently out of action by the Allied air forces. A strong force
established in the area of le Mans and Alencon would therefore be
a serious threat to the enemy concentrated near Caen and to their
line of withdrawal through the Paris—Orléans gap.*

His plans depended for success on two factors, on whose importance
he was most emphatic. The (British) left flank was the pivot on
which the main stroke would hinge; it must therefore always re-
main secure, otherwise the whole movement might lose its balance.
As a corollary the (American) right flank must forge ahead with the
utmost speed before the enemy had time to switch his more mobile
troops from the positions into which we had just succeeded in
drawing them.

As events will show, General Montgomery here set the general
pattern of the campaign for the next six or seven weeks.

* Army Group B’s casualty return up to June goth was admittedly incomplete, for at
that date the losses in the defence of Cherbourg and its surrounds were not known. They
are said to be included in the returns for June 6th to July 7th. For that time the German
casualtics were given as: 1,830 officers (including g generals, 109 commanders and 7
General Staff officers), 75,166 NCOs and men, 3,787 ‘Russians’, Total 80,783. *

MONTGOMERY?’S POLICY UNCHANGED 309

The immediate task of the British Second Army was to hold the
main enemy forces between Caen and Villers-Bocage and ‘... to
develop operations for the capture of Caen as opportunity offers—
and the sooner the better’. First United States Army was required to
begin on the right flank an offensive southwards on the 3rd of July
and then, pivoting on its left at Caumont, to swing eastwards to the
general line Caumont-—Vire—Mortain—Fougéres. When the base of
the Cotentin peninsula was reached, near Avranches, the right-
hand corps (VIII) should be turned westwards into Brittany and
directed on Rennes and St. Malo. Plans must now be prepared for
the rest of General Bradley’s command to ‘. . . direct a strong
right wing in a wide sweep south of the bocage country to
successive objectives as follows: (a) Laval-Mayenne, (5) le Mans-
Alencon’.*

On the rst of July the capture of Carpiquet, which had been post-
poned during Epsom, was now ordered for the 4th; the major attack,
on Caen, was to follow about the 8th, by which time the 59th
Division would have landed and be near to take part alongside the
grd British and 3rd Canadian Divisions* Carpiquet airfield had been
used for some years by the occupying Germans; it contained a lot of
concrete and wire, many pill-boxes and anti-aircraft posts. Since
D-day the whole area had been converted into a strong-point to
guard the western approaches to Caen. Its garrison now consisted of
the 26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and some tanks of the 12th
SS Panzer Division, all well entrenched. (Map, page 275.)

The attack was to be made from west to east by the 8th Canadian
Infantry Brigade, who would start from a firm base at Marcelet,
held by the 32nd Guards Infantry Brigade still under the command
of the 43rd Division. To prevent interference from the south the
latter’s 214th Brigade temporarily occupied Verson and the adjoin-
ing village on the Odon without incident during the night before
the attack.

For its task the 8th Canadian Brigade was given an additional
infantry battalion and also had under command, or at call, a regi-
ment of gun tanks, three squadrons of special tanks from the 79th
Armoured Division, a battalion of machine guns, twenty-one regi-
ments of artillery, H.M.S. Rodney and two squadrons of rocket
Typhoons.

On the evening of the 3rd the Rodney with a spotting aircraft
fired fifteen rounds from her 16-inch guns from 26,200 yards on
the pulenige round Carpiquet as a preliminary to next morning’ S
attack*and at 5 a.m. on the 4th the artillery opened. Fifteen minutes
later three infantry battalions began to move forward with tanks
close behind them. The enemy replied promptly with a counter-
barrage which took a steady toll of casualties, but the two battalions

310 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

on the left kept up their advance and by half past six had reached
their objectives—the village of Carpiquet and the nearby hangar
area. On their right flank smoke and mist caused the third battalion
to lose touch with its supporting tanks and it was nine o’clock before
it had fought its way to the first of the hangars on the west of the air-
field. It was there met by a hail of fire from strongly held positions at
the other end of the airfield and eventually, after hard fighting,
had to withdraw.

While mopping-up around Carpiquet village was still not com-
plete, and before it was realised that the attack on the hangars at the
west end of the airfield had failed, the fourth battalion went forward
towards the village intending to pass through and capture the con-
trol buildings at the east end of the field. By 11 a.m. the battalion
was in Carpiquet but there became involved with the other two
battalions in mopping-up the village. All of them with tanks and
other supporting units were heavily shelled and mortared, while
coveys of German tanks drove around in the distance. In the after-
noon the right battalion returned to the attack and again reached
the hangars on the west, but was then counter-attacked by tanks and
driven out once more; it was then ordered back to the base at
Marcelet.

During most of the day the weather was so bad that the air force
could do little to bring immediate help to the Canadians. But it im-
proved in the late afternoon and Typhoons of 83 Group went into
action against the enemy at the east end of the airfield where about
seventeen tanks appeared to be dug in among the buildings*A
counter-attack launched by I SS Panzer Corps, begun during dark-
ness, went on into early morning and reached its height about eight
o’clock on July the 5th when a thrust from the south succeeded in
penetrating some of the Canadian positions* With help from the guns
and from the Typhoons the situation was eventually restored;
several Panthers were knocked out and many Germans killed and
before midday Panzer Group West made a report to Army Group B
that ‘the attempt to recapture Carpiquet has failed* They had had
enough and fell back on shelling and mortaring, while the Canadians
postponed any further attempt to complete the capture of the airfield
till Caen itself was attacked on the 8th.

On that day I Corps, strongly reinforced and now comprising
about 115,000 officers and men, was to clear Caen as far as the river
Orne and establish bridgeheads across the river south of the city.
Meanwhile VIII Corps on its right was to be ready at twenty-four
hours’ notice to launch a new attack towards the upper reaches of
the Orne.*

In the previous four weeks the German defences north of Caen had
been greatly strengthened. The anti-tank ditches and weapon pits

OPPOSED FORCES AT CAEN Bil

begun before D-day had been extended and supplemented by a
wealth of minefields and other obstacles. Every incident of the
ground had been skilfully used in forming a defensive belt two or
three miles deep. This included mutually supporting positions based
on what were by now virtually tank-proof villages (Lebisey, la
Bijude, Galmanche, Gruchy, Franqueville, Cussy and Couvre-Chef)

and was studded with dug-in tanks, assault guns and multi-barrelled

mortars to support the infantry. Behind this belt, round the fringe
of the city, were other artillery and mortar positions; on the west
were the unsubdued positions at Carpiquet airfield¥ The front from
Hérouville on the Caen canal, through Lebisey to the railway
near Cambes was held by infantry of the 16th Luftwaffe Field
Division of LXXXVI Corps, with some tanks of the 21st Panzer
Division in support (though its main body had gone out to rest).
From there, through Gruchy to Carpiquet airfield and the Odon
near Verson, the front was held by I SS Panzer Corps with the 12th
SS Panzer Division, the 7th Werfer Brigade and detachments of the
ist SS Panzer Division. In reserve near the Orne about five or six
miles south of Caen lay the rest of the 1st SS Panzer Division which
was only now completing its move, and distributed in the corps area
were the dual-purpose 88-mm guns of at least one regiment of
IIT Flak Corps. West of Verson stood II SS Panzer Corps facing the
British VIII Corps salient. (Map overleaf.)*

It was a strong position and I Corps planned to attack with three
infantry divisions (3rd British on the left, 59th in the centre and 3rd
Canadian on the right) supported by the 27th and 2nd Canadian
Armoured Brigades and a number of flail, engineer and flame-
thrower tanks of the 79th Armoured Division. In addition to the
artillery of the three attacking divisions the guns of the Guards
Armoured and 51st Divisions and of the 3rd and 4th AGRAs would
be available with those of the battleship Rodney, the monitor Roberts
and the cruisers Belfast and Emerald*In the late afternoon of July the
7th H.M.S. Rodney’s 16-inch guns fired twenty-nine rounds from a
range of 25,000 yards on to the hill (Point 64) just north of Caen on
which the roads from Epron and Lebisey join before running down to
Caen*The Germans regarded this position as a key point of the Caen
defences.

Later that evening heavy bombers were to be used for the first
time for tactical support of the Army’s forthcoming operation. In
order to safeguard the attacking troops it had previously been decided
that pending further experience the bombline should be 6,000 yards
ahead of the nearest troops* This meant that the bombs would fall on
the enemy’s rearward defences on the northern outskirts of Caen,
some three miles behind the strongly defended forward area which
the infantry and tanks would have to capture. As the attackers

CAPTURE OF CAEN

MILES
Approximate front evening 7th July == == ==

Bomber Command target areas
evening 7th July

British attack 8th and 9th July : —
German front evening 9thJuly = 2S

@ 2/Div Périers sur le Dan
\ I ai
i sage la Londe Bénouville

- Brit Div

3 Cdn Div aN

f Gruchy Ss
St t cb re
‘ai authie ® Cussy Vs Chet ff /Lebisey

Franqueville » " Andee S

Carpiquet
a
Marcelet #

[
Corps ool

sur on
43 Div

1 Verson }

ae /255 Div
-~

ntai we /SS Div
goon ] y ee (elts)
JY = l0sSbiv on
g zw I SS Corps

S
C or p S Bourguébus

g.0rne

Roquancourt
®

312

CAEN ATTACKED 313

could thus not follow closely behind the bombers it was decided that
the bombing of rearward defences should be done on the evening of
the 7th so that this would not only facilitate the advance of the
troops when they reached that area but would meanwhile prevent
the enemy from bringing forward reinforcements during the night
and block the movement of his tanks through Caen.’*

Shortly before dark, as the men of I Corps completed their
arrangements for the morrow, a long stream of Lancasters and
Halifaxes of Bomber Command, with a strong escort of Spitfires,
began to pass overhead in the direction of Caen. From 9.50 p.m.,
while guns of VIII Corps fired on the enemy’s anti-aircraft positions,
over 450 bombers struck at the selected points on the northern
outskirts of Gaen. The leading aircraft met some fire from the target
area and from guns to the south of Caen, but as the attack went on
the response wavered and eventually ceased; all was over in an
hour, a demonstration of power and accuracy which gave great con-
fidence to the soldiers who would soon be advancing to attack, and
provided valuable lessons for future supporting operations by heavy
bombers.

As the heavy bombers turned for home the light bombers and
intruders of 2 Group came in to harass movement behind the enemy
lines. A good deal of activity was seen during the night and among
other targets twenty-six trains were attacked. At 11 p.m. the artillery
of I and VIII Corps opened and, reinforced by the naval guns,
began softening up the village strong-points and the enemy batteries*

At 4.20 a.m. on July the 8th the full force of the artillery came
down in front of the 3rd British and 59th Divisions, who then moved
forward in the first phase of the attack. Progress was comparatively
rapid and, within an hour, the leading brigade of the 3rd Division
(moving ‘one up’) had reached Hérouville and Lebisey, and the two
brigades leading the attack of the 59th were in the outskirts of both
la Byyude and Galmanche—their first objectives.

The weather was fair, though cloudy, and Second Tactical Air
Force fighters were already at work just ahead of the assault. Soon
after 7 a.m. 250 medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force joined in
the battle and for the next two hours attacked strong-points, likely
forming-up places, gun areas, bridges and headquarters; their
fighters went further afield against the enemy’s roads and railways.

7 It has since been stated that the reason for bombing several hours before the army
attack ed was an adverse weather report, but this was not so. The records show that
the air forces in France were warned on the 6th that an appreciable air effort would be
needed on the evening of the 7th, and at the Air Commanders’ morning meeting on the
7th it was agreed that the evening attack should be made by Bomber Command with
the double purpose quoted above. In neither case was any reference made to weather,
and in fact the forecast supplied to the air staff that day was favourable both for the
bomber attack and for their return to base. #

314 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

H.M.S. Rodney again shelled Point 64 and later in the day she fired
on enemy transport near Ifs and at a group of thirty-five German
tanks waiting in country south-east of Caen, and hit them with
16-inch shells at a range of 32,000 yards. The report on the shoot
reads: ‘Enemy paid dearly with a “‘flamer”’ and several “smokers”’
and a disorderly retreat’. Typical targets for the cruisers were bridges
over the Odon and railways on which H.MS. Belfast fired*Accurate
shooting on targets far out of sight without the help of ‘spotting’ air-
craft would not have been possible. The spotters had to fly in view of
the target slowly enough to observe the fall of shell and to wireless
back corrections. Only a few days before this one had been brought
down by enemy fire and a second damaged. In roth SS Panzer
Division’s ‘Lessons from the Normandy Front’ it was said, ‘the
greatest nuisance of all are the slow-flying artillery spotters, which
work with utter calmness over our positions’.®

The corps commander ordered the next phase to start at 7.30
a.m. The two 59th Division brigades were to pass fresh troops through
to capture their second objective (the villages of Epron and St.
Contest) and the 3rd Canadian Division on their right were to join
the attack with one brigade aiming firstly at Buron and Gruchy and
then at Authie. The main weight of the corps artillery was now
switched to the front of these divisions, and under cover of a new
series of concentrations the second phase duly started.

Affairs on the extreme left, about Lebisey, went well but in the
centre the 12th SS Panzer Division fought back hard and parties
held out against the 59th in la Bijude and Galmanche. Similar
struggles were soon developing in Epron and St. Contest, while
no progress was being made between them where the way was
barred by a trench system just west of la Bijude. Seeing this, General
Crocker told the 3rd British Division to push some armour forward
on to the high ground (Point 64) just north of Caen and later in the
morning he put his reserve (the 33rd Armoured Brigade) under the
division’s command. *

The Canadians were in Buron by half past eight but the r2th SS
Panzer Division were prepared to fight to the end amongst the rubble
and it took most of the day to master them. The Germans made
repeated attempts to eject the Canadians with tanks but they were
eventually defeated by the Canadian armour and by a 17-pounder
anti-tank battery which itself was credited with. thirteen ‘kills’. The
casualties around Buron were heavy on both sides; by the end of the
day the assaulting infantry battalion had lost 262 officers and men,
killed and wounded, and its supporting squadron was left with only
four of its original fifteen tanks. At Gruchy, on the right, things had

*H. J. Parham and E. M. G. Belfield, Unarmed into Battle (1956), p. 78.

CAEN LIBERATED 315

gone better, though not without a sharp fight. What probably
settled the issue here was the somewhat unorthodox action of about
sixteen Bren carriers of the divisional reconnaissance regiment which
suddenly charged, jn cavalry fashion and with all Esune firing, right
into the middle of the German position.*

The heavy fighting at Buron had delayed progress but at 2.30
p.m. a fresh attack was begun and, in an hour or so, the Canadians
had secured both Authie and St. Louet; and when parties of enemy
were seen from Carpiquet withdrawing to the south a battalion was
speedily despatched to Franqueville. The way was now clear for the
next phase and a second brigade began an attack on Cussy and
Ardenne at 6.30 p.m. By 8.30 p.m. the Canadians had captured
Cussy and knocked out six tanks from a number which attempted
a counter-attack; Ardenne was secured next morning, the enemy
having withdrawn during the night.

The 59th Division and their supporting troops had kept up the
pressure all day and succeeded in taking St. Contest and what was
left of la Bijude, but their other objectives still defied them. The grd
British Division had completely cleared the Lebisey area and, apart
from some heavy shelling and mortaring from east of the Orne and
a short-lived tank sortie against Hérouville, were not seriously im-
peded. In the early evening, supported by the 33rd Armoured
Brigade, they captured the high ground round Point 64 and were
then overlooking Caen from the position they had hoped to gain on
D-day. Patrols reached the outskirts of the city but it was getting
dark and further penetration was hampered by debris.

By nightfall on the 8th the wings of the attack were little more than
two miles apart, and the corps commander decided to leave the
clearance of Caen to the flank divisions and told the 59th to clear
up the hard core of resistance on its immediate front but not to go
on into the city.*

Meanwhile, Second Army ordered that the VIII Corps operation
(to be called ‘Jupiter’) would begin on July the roth, and shortly
before midnight a brigade of the 43rd Division set out to secure a
suitable start line just across the Odon from Verson.*

During the night intruders of the Second Tactical Air Force
attacked a good deal of movement on the other side of the Orne and
the pilots thought that most, if not all of it, was heading away from
Caen, but patrols were busy probing enemy positions along the
front and the fighting which flared up here and there seemed to
show that no general withdrawal had begun. In fact, Rommel had
agreed that the heavy weapons of all three corps (LAXXVI, I and
II SS Panzer) should be withdrawn from Caen during the night.
Strong infantry and engineer forces were to remain behind to hold
a close perimeter round Caen, and only if attacked by superior

316 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

forces were they to withdraw to a new line along the east bank of
the Orne and thence across to Venoix and Bretteville north of the
Odon.*

Early in the morning (July the gth) the divisions were on the move
again. The 3rd British pushed tank patrols against the flank of the
opposition in the centre sector and then began to move into Caen.
There were snipers and mortars but these gave little trouble com-
pared with the bomb craters, the rubble and the large blocks of
locally quarried stone which choked the narrow streets. While the
division struggled to get through, the 59th had been working forward
steadily and were on all their objectives by midday. The Canadians
had cleared Carpiquet and finding little opposition had made sure
of Bretteville sur Odon as well. At about half past two their armour
had met with the 3rd British Division, and by 6 p.m. I Corps had
reached the Orne at Caen and was also up to the Odon above the
junction of the two rivers. Some of the bridges were still intact but
they were either blocked by rubble or denied by German troops on
the opposite bank. To oppose our further progress, the 1st SS Panzer
Division had been moved nearer to Caen during the day.*

Apart from a little mopping-up the operation was over. The hard
character of the fighting is shown by the high losses on both sides.

In I Corps the casualties were about 3,500 with the 59th and the
grd Canadian Divisions each having more than a thousand. About
80 of our tanks were destroyed or out of action*According to the
German war diaries all the battalion commanders of the 16th G.A.F.
Division’s regiment west of the Orne had either been killed or
wounded and it had lost 75 per cent of its strength; the total in-
fantry strength of the 12th SS Panzer Division had been reduced to
the equivalent of one battalion. On the 8th twenty of its tanks had
become a total loss and most of its anti-tank guns had been destroyed.
Nearly 600 prisoners were received in the I Corps cages.*

About a third of Caen’s 60,000 inhabitants had remained in the
city during the siege which had lasted since D-day. Despite their
privations they greeted our soldiers with a generous, if pathetic,
welcome. For some they could provide flowers, for al] they had
cheers and good wishes.

With the capture of Caen and with the Americans nearing St. Lé,
the time was riper for the decisive action towards which General
Montgomery had been working—namely a double attack designed
at once to enlarge and strengthen the eastern open flank of the
Allied position and compel the enemy to fight there with his strongest
armoured forces; and simultaneously to break out of the American
sector to the open country south of the dJocage and turn eastwards
towards the Seine. Some days must elapse while troops were being
regrouped for these twin attacks, and meanwhile the pot was kept

FIGHT FOR HILL 112 317

boiling by a limited action to hold the enemy armour in the east and
to round off the ground won in the Epsom battle and by the capture
of Carpiquet airfield and Caen city. The bridgehead south of the
Odon was to be expanded by the capture of Eterville and Maltot and
by the recapture of Hill 112. The troops to be employed were the
43rd Division reinforced by the 4th Armoured, 31st Tank and 46th
(Highland) Infantry Brigades. They were to be supported by addi-
tional artillery of the 11th Armoured and 15th Divisions and by
grd and 8th AGRAs. They would start from the shallow Odon
bridgehead which now stretched from Verson to Baron, for the
214th Brigade had crossed the river to come in on the left of the
129th Brigade on the night of the 8th. The attack was to open at
5 a.m. on the 1oth. *

As shown in the map of the Odon battlefield, facing page 275,
high ground which separates the valleys of the Odon and the Orne
rises to its highest point on Hill 112. The hill is crossed by the road
from Caen to Evrecy passing through the straggling village of
Eterville as it climbs to the hill-top; about a mile away on the far side
Maltot nestles in the Orne valley. Though Hill 112 dominates the
surrounding country, much of the battlefield is in full view from
beyond the Orne and from hills around Evrecy to the south.

Following the opening bombardment early on the roth, leading
troops of the 43rd Division reached Eterville and were well up on
the slopes of Hill 112 by eight o’clock; the advance towards Maltot
started soon afterwards. Eterville was taken and held. Maltot was
entered in spite of sharp opposition but by mid afternoon armoured
counter-attack and heavy mortaring made it clear that the low lying
village could not be held until Hill 112 was in our hands. Meanwhile
there was hard fighting for possession of the hill. Defending infantry
were hidden by the corn and tanks lay waiting in copses. One
battalion reached the road over the hill top but could get no further
and the rest of the brigade was pinned down below the crest. A fresh
attack by the 5th Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry supported by the
7th Royal Tank Regiment was launched in the evening and by
nightfall Hill 112 and the small nearby woods were occupied. From
there to Eterville the 43rd Division had all four infantry brigades and
much of its armour on the ridge and on the slopes behind it at the
end of the day. North of Eterville a brigade of the 3rd Canadian
Division had crossed the Odon to strengthen the left of the bridge-
head where the rst SS Panzer Division had been identified.

Those who hoped for a quiet night were disappointed. Counter-
attacks began soon after midnight and were repeated at several
places along the front till late on the 11th. More than once German
troops penetrated Eterville but all were thrown out and roo dead
were left behind. On Hill 112 the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry

318 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

were heavily attacked and after all their anti-tank guns had been put
out of action and they had lost 240 casualties they had to fall back
to the hill-top road.*

In all there were two thousand casualties in this two-day action and
little ground had been gained; yet 1oth SS Panzer Division, 102nd
SS Heavy Tank Battalion and part of 1st SS Panzer Division had
been held in the fight. Panzer Group West’s war diary records that
General Eberbach told the commander of II SS Panzer Corps on the
11th that Hill 112 ‘is the pivotal point of the whole position . . . in
no circumstances may it be surrendered ... The loss of Eterville
might be borne, but not that of Hill 112% Yet they had lost half of it,
for the 43rd Division had captured the northern slopes and were
halfway across the almost level hill-top. Before them were the wide
hedgeless cornfields in which much blood had already been spilt.
Standing out on the skyline in the centre of this front is a lonely
crucifix and near-by a memorial has been raised to record the
courage and sacrifice of the 43rd Division.

Meanwhile in the American sector the task of the First Army was
very difficult, largely owing to the lie of the country there. Its 40-
mile front ran roughly in a quarter-circle from Caumont, through
Carentan, to the west coast beyond St. Sauveur le Vicomte. Behind
this line communications were, for the most part, unfavourable. In
front of it on the left, between Caumont and the river Vire, the
country was hilly and broken and rose steadily as it approached St.
Lo; west of the Vire there was a belt of low ground six to ten miles
deep, covered with marshland and intersected by numerous sluggish
streams; only near the west coast was there a narrow corridor of dry
land. (Map, page 288.)

General Bradley’s first object was to secure the general line St.
L6—Marigny—Coutances. This would bring the First Army clear of
the restricting defiles and provide it with a good lateral in the St. Lé—
Lessay road. He decided to begin on the extreme right with an
attack by VIII Corps down the corridor near the west coast. The
other three corps were to join the battle later on his orders.

In heavy rain and thick cloud, which cancelled the air support
programme, the offensive opened on the 3rd of July with three
divisions of VIII Corps attacking due south for la Haye du Puits.
The enemy’s resistance was stubborn and only some 6,000 yards
were gained in the next three days. On the 4th VII Corps entered the
battle in the Carentan sector, aiming at Périers, about ten miles to
the south-west. Confined to an isthmus of dry land only about two
miles in width, the corps made little more than a mile’s progress in
two days’ hard fighting. XIX Corps then joined the offensive and on
the 7th made assault crossings of the river Vire and the Vire—Taute
canal, the intention being to secure the rising ground just to the west

HITLER OVERRULES HIS GENERALS 319

of St. Lé. By nightfall a two-pronged attack was going well and had
reached the neighbourhood of St. Jean de Daye. It appeared to
General Bradley that this sector offered a good prospect of success
and he therefore ordered an armoured division (the 3rd) to re-
inforce the bridgehead that night. It was then directed to drive for
the objective south-west of St. Lé.

Meanwhile First Army intended that another three divisions
should take up the attack east of the Vire on the gth, and thrust
through the hills which immediately protected St. L6.*

American troops were being opposed for the first time in this cam-
paign to elements of the enemy’s armoured divisions. One of the
German infantry divisions (the 276th) that had been coming up to
release armoured divisions holding the front in the British sector took
over the front of Panzer Lehr Division on July the 5th, though a
battalion of Panzer Lehr’s tanks and most of its anti-tank battalion
were left behind in support of the newly arrived infantry. The
remainder of the armoured division, which it had been intended to
rest and refit, was instead ordered to move westwards to strengthen
the defence threatened by the American attack north of St. L6. At
the same time 2nd SS Panzer Division, including its two battalions
of tanks, its guns and three battalions of infantry, was also ordered
to move still further westwards to the area round Périers.*

While progress on the Allied side was steadily advancing General
Montgomery’s plan, on the enemy side, by comparison, plans and
counter-plans were being debated. The whole Hitler-controlled
conduct of the battle had been questioned and memorable decisions
had been taken—but the German position had steadily worsened.
To understand what had occurred it is necessary to recall the meeting
at Berchtesgaden on June the 29th at which much had been dis-
cussed but little decided. At its conclusion a new directive was
promised and this was issued by OKW late that night. By then von
Rundstedt and Rommel had already started on the long journey
back to their respective headquarters. There they found the new
directive waiting for them when they arrived late on the evening of
the goth. Its only significant references to policy were the admission
that a further attack against the British forces east of the Orne was
dependent on the arrival of another field division and on ‘the with-
drawal of enemy naval forces’; and that an attack in the west against
the Americans was ‘not possible at present’; that ‘the most important
tasks for the immediate future’ were: ‘(a) A flank attack to destroy
the enemy forces thrusting through Baron [that is the Epsom attack
of the British VIII Corps] towards the Orne. (5) 7th Army must not
allow themselves to be driven into open country. 2nd SS Pz. Division
“Das Reich” will have to remain where it is in reserve [that is south
of St. Lo] until the main body of 17th SS Pz. Grenadier Division has

320 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

been successfully relieved by infantry. . .” Other subjects dealt with
were matters of detail.*

But on von Rundstedt’s return he also learnt that Rommel had
meantime received situation reports from Hausser, acting commander
of the Seventh Army, and Geyr von Schweppenburg, commander of
Panzer Group West, both of whom advocated an immediate evacua-
tion of Caen and withdrawal to a new line, further south, that would
be out of range of naval guns. Von Rundstedt at once informed
OKW of this by telephone and without waiting for sanction he
authorised Rommel to order immediate preparation for a planned
withdrawal from Caen* He then followed up his telephone message
by sending forward to OKW the text of the reports from Hausser
and Geyr von Schweppenburg and the covering letter from Rommel
strongly endorsing their recommendations. His own personal appro-
val of the proposed measures and request for freedom to act on them
at once read as follows:

‘1. I agree with the estimates of Field-Marshal Rommel, and
of the Cs.-in-C of 7th Army and Pz. Group West. I request that
I may zmmediately be allowed a free hand to carry out a planned
evacuation of the Caen bridgehead and, after this, to adjust the
front, at my discretion, to the approximate line Orne-Bully-
Avenay-Villers-Bocage-Caumont area. It is just when II SS
Panzer Corps’ thrust is making itself felt that I consider that a
suitable opportunity for the adjustment of the front has presented
itself: covered by II SS Panzer Corps, the infantry divisions can,
as they arrive, form a new front line withdrawn from the reach of
the enemy’s naval guns. Through this planned evacuation,
particularly of the Caen bridgehead, irreplaceable units of I SS
Panzer Corps, that is, 1st SS ‘“Adolf Hitler”? Panzer Division, 12th
SS ‘‘Hitler Youth” Panzer Division, and units of 21st Panzer
Division, will be released in good time from an ever-narrowing
encirclement and will thus be set free for any further operations.
These troops, which are our best, must be preserved east of the
Orne at fighting strength; this decision is urgently necessary, lest
valuable forces should once again be destroyed by the enemy.

“2. In spite of the proposed withdrawal of the front from the
whole Caen bridgehead to a line from east of the Orne to the
Caumont area, there will be for the time being no alteration in
the present planned attack which all available forces are making
astride the River Odon towards Caen. Because of the situation
an immediate decision is essential.
[signed] von Rundstedt
Field-Marshal’ *

Although von Rundstedt and Rommel had asked for greater free-
dom before they went to Berchtesgaden it had not been conceded
and when Hitler received this budget of letters and reports, all

41. Spitfires in flight

42. Air Marshal Sholto Douglas 43. Air Marshal Hill

VON RUNDSTEDT DISMISSED 321

embodying a counter-proposal to the course he had prescribed only a
few hours after his meeting with them, he must have received a
shock. Here were his commander-in-chief in the West, the com-
mander of the army group responsible for fighting the battle, the
commander of the principal army involved, and the commander of
most of his armoured divisions all combining to advocate a radically
different policy and a free hand to carry it out. Evidently they
thought they knew better than their Fuhrer! They distrusted his
judgment and thought they could do better without his direction!
Moreover his displeasure is likely to have been heightened by the
fact that von Rundstedt had forwarded (and both he and Rommel
had approved) the report of a subordinate condemning in scornful
terms the Fiihrer’s policy of defence. For in advocating immediate
withdrawal from Caen to the new line described in von Rundstedt’s
covering letter, Geyr von Schweppenburg had written:

“It is no longer possible (a) to achieve a break-through to the
coast ... (b) to hold lines with panzer divisions, without their
dwindling or already depleted units... being consumed in
a very short time; (c) to expect a change in the situation by
badly equipped or mediocre infantry divisions, which have
indeed been allocated but cannot get here within the predict-
able future ... A clear cut choice must be made between the
inevitable patchwork of a rigid defence, which leaves the initiative
to the enemy, and flexible tactics which give us the initiative
sometimes at least ... An elastic conduct of operations is the
better course.’*

As von Rundstedt had approved this it was clear that the freedom
he asked for was in fact freedom to alter the whole conduct of the
German defence; he must think that even Geyr von Schweppenburg
was wiser than the Fiihrer! Then von Rundstedt (and von Schwep-
penburg) must go.

That afternoon von Rundstedt received the immediate answer to
his request in a message from OKW.

“The present positions are to be held. Any further break-
through by the enemy will be prevented by tenacious defence or
by local counter-attacks. Assembly will continue and further
mobile formations will be released by infantry divisions as they
arrive. Detailed orders will follow.’*

This was received by von Rundstedt at 5.40 p.m. on the Ist July. At
once he cancelled preparations for the evacuation of Caen and gave
orders for Hitler’s directive to be carried out.

Events then moved quickly. On the 2nd Hitler’s adjutant Lieut-
Colonel Borgmann arrived at von Rundstedt’s headquarters. He
gave the field-marshal a letter from the Fuhrer saying that he was

322 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

superseded and, at the same time, handed him the Oakleaves to his
Knight’s Cross. At eleven o’clock on the 3rd Field-Marshal Ginther
von Kluge arrived and assumed command* It was given out by
OKW that von Rundstedt had been allowed to retire at his own
request for reasons of age and health, but after the war von Rund-
stedt strongly denied this false explanation and his dismissal after
what had happened was, surely, almost inevitable. On the 4th Geyr
von Schweppenburg was also superseded by Hitler’s order, and
General Eberbach was given command of Panzer Group West. Four
days later, on July the 8th, Hitler issued a new and fuller directive.
The first two paragraphs are given below.*

‘Directive for the conduct of operations in the West.

(1) The enemy has succeeded in landing in Normandy and in
seizing with astonishing speed the Cotentin Peninsula together
with the fortress of Cherbourg.

He expected but has failed to achieve the rapid widening of the
bridgehead from Elbeuf to S. of Granville.

In the next stage of operations it will very probably be the
enemy’s intention to make a thrust along both sides of the Seine
towards Paris and then to employ the bulk of his highly mobile
forces in a war of movement.

Consequently, in spite of all the attendant risks, the enemy will
probably attempt a second landing in the 15th Army’s sector, all
the more so, as public opinion will press for the elimination of
the sites of the long-range weapons firing on London. The dis-
positions of the forces still available in England suggest attacks
primarily against the sector between the Somme and the Seine
by divisions assembled north of the Thames, but also against
Belgium and Southern Holland. At the same time, however,
surprise attacks designed to effect the capture of one of the large
ports in Brittany cannot be ruled out.

Similarly, an attack against the French Mediterranean coast may
also be expected. The time chosen for it will depend upon the
enemy’s intentions and progress in his operations in general. It
is unlikely that he will conduct two large-scale operations in the
Mediterranean theatre simultaneously.

(2) The present relative strengths of the opposing forces and the
fact that the majority of all our mobile formations are already
committed preclude for the time being any major offensive
aimed at the destruction of the enemy in the bridgehead. Never-
theless, in no circumstances may the bridgehead be allowed to
increase in size to any appreciable extent, otherwise our forces
will prove inadequate to contain it and the enemy will break out
into the interior of France, where we do not possess any compar-
able tactical mobility with which to oppose him.’

VON KLUGE TAKES OVER 323

The success of the Allies’ elaborate precautions to ensure tactical
surprise in their initial assault had been matched by an equal
success of the steps taken to deceive the enemy as to their intentions.
It will be remembered that as part of these they set out to provide
false indications that although they might attempt a first landing in
Normandy their main attack was to take place about the middle of
July and be directed against the Pas de Calais coast. Hitler’s direc-
tive shows how well this deception had been sustained; although
at times von Rundstedt.and Rommel had seemed to question the
imminence of a second assault they had agreed that the defence of
the threatened coast must not be weakened. Indeed they underlined
the danger of a second landing there at the end of June, when they
urged a change of policy. In an estimate of the situation on the 27th
von Rundstedt had written that if strong forces assembled in the
south-east of England were used for landings anywhere from the
Somme down to the Seine, in conjunction with ‘Army Group
Montgomery’s’ probable thrust towards Paris, the German forces
behind Fifteenth Army were ‘too weak to face this* The reader will
not fail to realise how valuable it was that the Fifteenth Army was
thus being held in idleness all this time while a few miles away the
rest of Rommel’s army group was being defeated in Normandy.

The Allies were now so strongly established in Normandy that
they need fear nothing that the enemy might do to prevent their
continuing the attack, but the German forces were stretched to the
limit in their attempt to prevent a break-out from the lodgement

area. By July the 16th their losses amounted to over 100,000 men*

Such reinforcements as could be scraped together were coming for-
ward slowly and painfully, under constant attack by the Allied air
forces and further delayed by the sabotage of Resistance groups;
moreover, many of the reinforcing formations were poor in quality,
with insufficient training for battle and indifferent equipment. Thus
while the Allied strength increased daily the German strength daily
diminished. And neither at sea nor in the air were their efforts to
hamper Allied operations having any significant effect.

It was a grim situation that von Kluge inherited and its difficulties
were aggravated by Hitler’s reorganisation of the command to
which he was appointed at this critical juncture. The forces opposing
the Allies were grouped in the Seventh Army facing the Americans
on the west, and in Panzer Group West confronting the British on
the east; both had been given new commanders. Command of the
Seventh Army had been given to the SS General Hausser, in spite
of Rommel’s recommendation that General Kurt von der Cheval-
lerie, commanding the First Army, should be transferred to. the
Seventh. The new commander of Panzer Group West, General Eber-
bach, an able soldier with much experience of armoured warfare,

324 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

had latterly been serving in Germany as Inspector of Armoured
Troops; he was a very different type from the volatile Geyr von
Schweppenburg whom he replaced. Thus, of the previous com-
manders in the West only Rommel remained and he too was now
to serve under a new commander-in-chief. In view of his somewhat
restive acceptance of von Rundstedt’s authority and his confidence
in himself, he can hardly have been easily reconciled to his sub-
ordination to a new chief who had neither von Rundstedt’s experi-
ence of French affairs and proved wisdom nor his own knowledge
of the Normandy situation. He had submitted to Hitler’s orders for
the future control ot operations but he had shown that he had no
confidence in Hitler’s judgment; he had no reason to feel any greater
confidence in the leadership of his new commander-in-chief.

The briefing which von Kluge had had from Hitler and the staff
of OKW before taking up his new appointment ‘had convinced him
that the events in the West were the result of mistakes and omissions
on the part of commanders and troops’.® He had also been warned
about Rommel’s intransigence. Immediately after taking over from
von Rundstedt on July the grd he had a meeting with Rommel. The
only official record found is a paragraph in C-in-C West’s war diary
which reads:

‘The most important points stressed by the new C-in-C West
were as follows: Defence. The present line to be held at all costs
(situation on the left wing still not clear). Our own position to be
improved by advancing our line wherever this is really advant-
ageous, that is to say, by attacking after the most careful prepara-
tion. Defence in depth to be built up with all available means,’*

But according to Speidel (writing after the war) von Kluge ‘spoke in
the Berchtesgaden style without any first-hand knowledge of con-
ditions at the front’ and ‘Rommel, raising his voice, protested
against the unjustified criticisms by Hitler and the High Command’.
The conversation became so heated that Speidel and the other staff
officers were ordered to leave the room.!® Two days later, on the 5th,
Rommel sent von Kluge the following letter:

‘I send you enclosed my commentson military eventsin Normandy
to date. The rebuke which you levelled at me at the beginning of
your visit, in the presence of my Chief of Staff and Ia, to the
effect that I, too, “‘will now have to get accustomed to carrying
out orders’, has deeply wounded me. I request you to notify me
what grounds you have for making such an accusation.’ 34

® Speidel, Invasion 1944 (Stuttgart, 1949), p. 191. An English edition, entitled We
Defended Normandy, appeared in 1951.

10 Loc. cit., p. 132.

11 The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (1953), p. 481.

ROMMEL SPEAKS HIS MIND 325

The memorandum enclosed was concerned with past events. Its
final paragraph referred to Rommel’s conviction that the German
channels of command were unsatisfactory and that ‘only the unified
close-knit command of all three Services, on Montgomery’s lines,
will ensure final success’. Four days previously (on the rst) he had
already proposed that the naval and air forces in the West be put
under his command. *

After their first stormy meeting von Kluge made a two days’ tour
of inspection. According to Speidel, he had not been able to escape
‘the overwhelming evidence of the facts, the unanimous views of all
the military commanders, and the logic of the situation; he had tem-
porarily been bemused by Hitler’s phrases. He took back all his
accusations.’ }2 After his return he did not interfere with Rommel’s
control of the battle and they seem to have worked in harmony.

Two measures were put in train in order to implement Hitler’s
directives. The first was related to the order that the present positions
were to be held (page 321 above).

On taking over the command of Panzer Group West General
Eberbach discussed the situation with Rommel and two days later
issued a directive. The Group’s immediate task was to hold the exist-
ing front. At present this was only a line; what was needed was a
system of defence in depth. He set out the principles on which this
should be conducted and ordered that all troops and weapons should
be dug in and all otherwise unemployed men of services behind the
front should be used for the preparation of rearward defence
positions. A week later he toured the front to stimulate a more active
preparation of defences in depth.*

The second order on which action was taken was Hitler’s directive
that: “The most important tasks for the immediate future are (a) a
flank attack to destroy the enemy forces thrusting through Baron
towards the Orne .. .’ (page 319). Planning for this followed but in
its final shape the plan was not reported to OKW till July the 17th.
There is no neéd to examine the plan in detail for it was overtaken
by events and was never used, but certain features are worth noting
because they show how completely unrealistic it was. It proposed to
use all three armoured corps (comprising seven armoured divisions)
and it named August the ist as the target date by which infantry
divisions must have completed their relief at the front; the attack was
then to be made on a three-mile front between Grainville sur Odon
and Juvigny, striking behind the British forces in the Caen area
towards Luc sur Mer. In other words, it discounted the threat of the
Americans to break out in the west and proposed to use almost all
its armoured divisions to break into the British position in the east.

12 Speidel, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

326 THE CAPTURE OF CAEN

Von Kluge noted ‘the execution of this attack is entirely dependent
on the development of the situation in the Normandy battle area in
the next few days and weeks ¥ That Rommel himself did not take this
plan seriously is shown by the fact that when forwarding it to von
Kluge on July the 15th Rommel sent forward next day a statement
of his personal observations for the Fiihrer. After rehearsing the
losses incurred, the paucity and poor quality of the equipment of
reinforcements, supply difficulties and the steady growth of Allied
strength, he concluded that ‘in these circumstances we must soon
expect the enemy to succeed in breaking through our thinly held
front, especially that of 7th Army, and to thrust deep into France...
The [German] troops are fighting heroically everywhere, but the
unequal struggle is nearing its end. It is in my opinion necessary to
draw the proper conclusion from the situation. I feel it my d

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Full text of "Victory in the West Volume 1 The Battle of Normandy (History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series)"

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